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# MY WORKING LIFE

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*Sydenham of Combe.*  
*1927*

*[Frontispiece.]*

# MY WORKING LIFE

BY COLONEL  
LORD SYDENHAM OF COMBE

G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.B.E., F.R.S.

KNIGHT OF JUSTICE ORDER OF ST. JOHN OF JERUSALEM

COMMANDER OF THE CROWN OF BELGIUM

HON. COLONEL 63RD AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS

LONDON  
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

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## PREFACE

THE drawbacks of autobiographies are manifest and have often been catalogued. They cannot present a true picture of a writer, because no man knows himself. They may display an exaggerated egoism. There are too many of them. All this and more must be admitted. On the other hand, no one presented with a mass of material can disentangle it without the knowledge that has passed into the shadows. Nor, unless the biographer has been intimately associated with his subject, can he draw correct inferences as to the motives and the trains of thought which have inspired a life of work. The widely differing presentations of the same individual, tinged with the predilections and prejudices of the biographer, illustrate this inevitable difficulty.

“The individual withers,” and nothing really matters except the work he may have striven to accomplish in so far as it may help or supply warning to others. And every one who has lived long and “in his time” tried to play “many parts,” must have drawn together clues of some historical value. In days when shortness of memory—due doubtless to the increasing complication of human affairs which overtaxes our powers to assimilate and unravel—tends to be more and more pronounced, lessons of national importance may be lost.

In these pages, I have sought to chronicle the experiences of nearly sixty years, and to draw such conclusions as seemed to be forced upon an earnest student.



Public taste now seems to demand vivid characterisations of personalities, which may be, and often are, sadly wide of the mark. I have not attempted anything of this kind, but only to describe working relationships which have influenced my career. "Rough hew them as we will," our lives are largely ruled by the help and encouragement—even by the opposition—of others.

Strong views in regard to our national defences, in relation to the security of the Empire, led me to the naval and military studies which produced my *Fortification* in 1890, sharply criticised at the time, but since wonderfully justified by events, and especially by the Great War. The slow process, at length ending in a complete reorganisation of our military system, which I have attempted to record, may be of interest to all who regard our Imperial responsibilities with concern. The pieces which go to complete some puzzles are here brought together for the first time. Thus certain lessons, gleaned at Alexandria in 1882 and in the Sudan in 1885, are explained, and three important phases in Military Reform—the Hartington Commission (1888-90), the Reorganisation Committee (1901), and the Reconstitution Committee (1904)—of which I have inside knowledge, are reviewed.

After 1901, a wider range of study, including the baffling problems of government, provided absorbing interests, and my happy recollections of Australia, where the faith of a Liberal was destroyed and too sanguine hopes of closer political union evaporated, are recorded. To all that I learned and worked for in India, I have given prominence, because I attach supreme importance to our duties towards her multitudinous peoples, and dangerous misunderstandings widely prevail. The stories I have tried to tell of the steps by which the passage of the Government of India Bill was secured, and of the handling of the critical rebellion in North-Western India, with its illuminating sequel in a British Law Court, are replete with warnings half forgotten or unknown.

Many of the threads I have sought to trace lead straight from experiences and controversies to the Great

War, when mistakes of several kinds—which might easily have been avoided—entailed the prolongation of the tremendous ordeal. It is essential to hold up before the generations to come, lest they forget, the shining records of heroism on sea and land and in the air, never surpassed in our annals and displayed by all classes alike, which form the lights in a sombre picture. But our successors must be enabled to know where we failed, or a day may come when lessons, now plain, will have again to be learned at the cost of death and suffering.

In the House of Lords, for twelve years, I diligently strove to defend the principles I had at heart and to give warnings of the dangers I foresaw. My many speeches on Indian matters never reached the public and may not now be reproduced; but I have indicated their general tenour. The recent significant admissions of Lord Lytton, whose candour does him honour, and the remarkable speech of the Maharaja of Benares, who reflects the well-founded forebodings of the Princes and Chiefs, justify all that I attempted to bring to the notice of the House when there was still time for caution. Another crisis in the fate of India, fraught with grave issues, is approaching, and some of the reflections to which experience has inexorably led may not be inopportune.

A great part of my efforts in the House of Lords and the Press from 1917 onwards was devoted to expose the dangerous movements which have already caused immense losses to the nation with more to follow. It may have been natural that plain warnings of what the so-called Russian revolution would bring about on the world scale, coming from one with no personal knowledge of the situation at Moscow and Petrograd, should fall flat; but, on September 18, 1918, the Foreign Office received a prophecy astounding in its accuracy. The Netherlands Minister, who was in charge of British interests at Petrograd, had watched events at close quarters and was in contact with leading Bolsheviks, had no doubts as to what was coming. Writing at length on September 6, he declared that

"The danger is now so great that I feel it my duty to call the attention of the British and all other Governments to the fact that, if an end is not put to Bolshevism in Russia at once, the civilisation of the whole world will be threatened. This is not an exaggeration but a sober matter of fact. . . . I consider that the immediate suppression of Bolshevism is the greatest issue before the world, not even excluding the war which is still raging."

This tremendous warning was not made public in a White Paper till April, 1919, and immediately afterwards an "abridged edition" was issued from which it was eliminated!

Bolshevism has already caused more loss of life and more human suffering than the Great War, and its effects on the Empire are incalculable. We are only at the beginning of trade calamity in China.

In a chapter on "The Aftermath" I have bluntly recorded impressions, perhaps unpalatable in days when there is visible reluctance to face realities of which the majority of our people have not been informed.

In the final chapter, I have made a rough survey of world conditions pointing to an era of revolution in forms which cannot yet be forecasted; but our danger is greater than that of many other States.

The main stream of political tendency to-day is bearing our old country towards an upheaval against which "unlimited democracy" provides no protection. The manufacture of Socialists, to which the impending addition of millions of young women to the electorate will supply a new impulse, proceeds apace. The effects—not fully revealed—of the World War and of the orgy of strikes and restriction of output which followed, have shaken the national finances and the industries and commerce by which we live, to their foundations. The country would quickly fall into ruin if plunged into "the new economic order"—destructive of every quality which has made our nation great and proved to be disastrous wherever tried—that

even moderate Socialists are determined to enforce. The immediate effect, as in Russia, would be widespread want. Then, as is well understood, would come the opportunity of the Left Wing—the Communists who visibly exercise disproportionate power in the Councils of organised “Labour.” Of what would follow, there can be no doubt, and the theory that special national characteristics would render us immune from “the red ruin and the breaking up of laws” which accompany revolutions, is baseless. All this would result automatically if a sufficiency of Socialist votes were polled in the gamble of a general election, even though many of the voters who turned the scale of destiny were opposed to revolution.

One clear issue, therefore, and one alone, now presents itself to our people—blindly to accept or sternly to combat a hopelessly discredited economic experiment certain to lead to catastrophe in an over-populated land dependent on sea-borne commerce for the necessities of existence. This, in the strife of factions, the babel of confused counsels, and the flow of treacherous propaganda, is not understood. The once great Liberal Party, engrossed in domestic wrangles, is helping continuously towards a Socialist—revolutionary—victory. The splitting of votes in three-party contests may always entail the return of a Socialist in spite of an anti-Socialist majority.

I have lived to see the Empire—the most beneficent agency the world has known—held up to scorn, and to watch the unchecked teaching, to children and the ignorant, of dislike and contempt of the achievements of our forefathers—teaching formulated mainly by aliens working unceasingly for world revolution. This is not a picture drawn in old age from comparison with a past imagined to be more sane than the present. Many now existing conditions are without precedent.

Looking back, with powers now sharply restricted, I find it difficult to understand how the large mass of writing, of which I have only given indications, was accomplished. I try to think that it may have exercised some small influence on the thoughts of others. As Rudyard Kipling

has finely said : “The utmost a writer can hope is that there may survive of his work a fraction good enough to be drawn upon later, to uphold some truth restated.” This book is in part a collection of restatements. Is “a fraction” of it “good enough to be drawn upon”? I cannot tell.

S. of C.

LONDON,

*March, 1927.*

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# MY WORKING LIFE

## CHAPTER I

### FAMILY—EARLY DAYS—EDUCATION

I WAS born on Independence Day in the revolutionary year 1848, and it has several times happened to me to join Americans in celebrating their great anniversary. My father was vicar of a small Lincolnshire parish in the depths of the country close to the Nottinghamshire border, and four miles from the Trent Valley. Here ten children, of whom I was the eldest, were born and brought up.

My paternal grandfather, who was a general in the Madras Artillery, received a bullet in the side at the siege of Seringapatam, which he carried till his death at nearly ninety-three. His grandfather, Henry Clarke of Winchester, married the daughter of Anne Hyde, niece of Edward Hyde, Lord High Chancellor. His mother was a Tredway, daughter of a City merchant whose firm seems to be extinct. My grandmother was the daughter of Humphrey Sydenham of the Combe and Brimpton branch of this once great family now almost derelict, which descends directly from Robert de Sydenham, described as Lord of Sydenham, North Petherton, Somerset, in the reign of John. My maternal grandfather was a Mayor, brother of the father of John and Joseph Mayor, who took rank amongst our greatest classical scholars. My grandmother was a Pratt, whose mother was a Cowper, sister of Henry Cowper, for many years Clerk of the Parliaments, to whom his relative, the poet Cowper, addressed some

verses. As a girl, my mother used to stay with this Henry Cowper at Tewin Water, near Hatfield. Through my Cowper great-grandmother I am connected with the family of the Lord Chancellor of Queen Anne's times. To all such matters I never gave a thought till I was called upon by Sir Francis Galton to answer an elaborate *questionnaire* addressed to all the Fellows of the Royal Society.

Our lives, till school days began, were varied only by occasional visits to London and to the Yorkshire coast. At the age of three, I was taken to the 1851 Exhibition, and I seem to remember a large tree inside Sir Joseph Paxton's building, which would impress a child. My father farmed his glebe, and we became familiar with all the ordinary operations of agriculture in which we assisted as we grew older. One tragedy resulting from this is fixed in my memory. My brother and I had participated in the annual ceremony of sheep-dipping, and it occurred to us in an evil moment that our tame rabbits needed the same treatment. Next day they were all dead, and we were long inconsolable.

The country, on the Lincolnshire side especially, was flat and uninteresting, but there were large woods full of mystery, a moor where the wild gentian could be found, and a lane where the *Osmunda Regalis* still flourished. From our windows, on clear days, the stately pile of Lincoln Cathedral could be seen, nine miles to the east, and later we came to realise its architectural grandeur and superb position. The Roman road from Lincoln to Newark passed within a mile of the vicarage, and for a part of its length retained its fine proportions, providing broad tracks of turf over which we used to ride. As long as I can remember we had a donkey which was most successful in unseating us, and my first savings (£10) went to the purchase of a Welsh pony on which we learned to ride.

My brother and I were inseparable. We roved the fields and woods, learned all about the habits of birds, collected eggs, ferns, and wild flowers, and unconsciously

assimilated the rich lore of the countryside. We were always planning something—boats, miniature harbours on the ponds, kites, fishing tackle, harness for the pony and donkey, and later model engines. Tools and resources generally being strictly limited, we were forced to devise make-shift expedients, which is the best way of developing ingenuity and inventive powers.

Much is now written about the dullness and gloom of village life by people who have no idea of the extraordinary advances in the past seventy years. At Swinderby, sanitation was unknown, but the fathers and mothers of the hamlet lived to a good old age, and there was little illness. Until kerosene arrived, only the vicarage and one or two farm-houses boasted of colza lamps. For the rest, tallow candles, some of them home-made, supplied the only light in the long winter evenings. On rare occasions a magic lantern arrived at the school, and the villagers were privileged to see lurid pictures of the earthquake at Lisbon, and of a man swallowing a string of rats in succession, together with the vortices of whirling colours—perhaps the forerunner of jazz—which then represented the mechanical possibilities of the lantern. The farmers were our friends, who used to lend us light carts for fishing excursions. The blacksmith's and carpenter's shops, where much could be learned, were our favourite resorts. The agricultural labourers, who used to come to church in white smocks, were poorly paid, and worked long hours, but they were in all respects skilled men, which is now generally forgotten. The same Irishmen arrived every year to help at harvest time, and were regarded as interesting but not entirely trustworthy foreigners. There was a strong contingent of hereditary Wesleyans, who mostly came to church. The village children brought their pennies to the church school, and their parents would have thought free education an indignity. Karl Marx had not yet formulated the deadly doctrine of the class war, and harmony prevailed. Real poverty was confined to two or three households of which the heads were thriftless or intemperate. There was general contentment, while the

country people, who received only the most elementary education, were far more shrewd and less credulous than their successors to-day. I do not know the present conditions at Swinderby; but the Kentish village where I now partly live has electric light, a village hall with frequent entertainments, a band, cricket, football, golf, and miniature rifle clubs for working men, while the population "listened in" to the King's speech at the opening of the British Empire Exhibition. The clothing of the people in town and country has been literally transformed since my childhood, and progress—measured by amusements and leisure—has been amazing; but, with all these advances, discontent—a town product—has grown apace.

My home life was broken when, at nine, I was sent to a dame's school. The lady, and one master (who taught me to illuminate), conducted our education. It was the function of her husband to administer corporal punishment. Having committed an offence, we were sent to bed, there to undergo what might be a long anticipation of woe before his arrival. Thence I went to Repton, with its old associations and beautiful country, which I well remember; but measles, succeeded by double pneumonia—the only serious illness I have had—caused my removal. Rossall followed, bleak, inhospitable, and then decidedly rough, but eminently healthy. Here my brother joined me, and we learned mainly cricket. Later we both went to Haileybury, then in its infancy, and I found myself in the Sixth Form under the Rev. Arthur Gray Butler, the Headmaster. We played cricket, compulsory Rugby football, and hand fives; but much of our spare time passed in country rambles for butterflies and birds' eggs or in mechanical pursuits. My two study mates and I set up a workman's bench and devoted ourselves to making model steam engines. We were otherwise sadly idle, and sometimes filed and drilled instead of attempting to prepare our lesson. On such occasions it was necessary to pounce upon a diligent student and make him give us a hurried construe before entering the class-room. I remember once



*[From a daguerrotype.]*

GEORGE SYDENHAM CLARKE, AGED 6.

*[To face page 4.]*



sitting down without knowing where the lesson was, and Mr. Butler, seeing me diligently taking notes, called me up and discovered only drawings of parts of engines. When we met many years later, he reminded me of this incident, and said that his suspicions were aroused by my apparent intellectual absorption, which he thought unusual.

At length the time came to choose a profession. I had a taste for mechanics and an inclination towards engineering. Neither my father nor any one else in our parts knew anything about this profession; but eventually it was discovered that there was a civil and a military branch to be entered by apprenticeship or a cadetship at Woolwich. At Rossall, I had served in the 65th Lancashire Volunteers, then the only enrolled school corps in England, and had acquired some military leanings. My cousin had recently joined the Madras Engineers from Addiscombe, and it was eventually decided that I was to compete for the Royal Military Academy.

There was no time to lose. I had been, if not utterly idle, at least not diligent, and my school reports had harped on the theme "could do better if he would." I had never been at the top of any class or won any prize, though at Haileybury I ran second in a school Prize Poem on Sicily, of which I can still remember scraps. I had acquired much promiscuous though not academic knowledge; but I could barely solve a simple quadratic equation, and the Woolwich examination demanded a high standard of mathematics. My prospects were not hopeful when I went to Wimbledon School, then successfully conducted by Messrs. Brackenbury and Wynne, for a year of intensive culture.

At Wimbledon I dropped all games and worked strenuously. A young Irishman, named Quintin, took me in hand and taught me trigonometry, conics, statics, dynamics, hydrostatics, and the calculus. There was no question of cramming. The subjects were thoroughly drilled into me, and my mind awoke to a new understanding, which was to mean much in the future.



In December, 1865, the examination was held in the Old Chelsea Hospital. It was a bitter winter, and on one day the hour of beginning had to be postponed as the examinees were unable to reach the great hall in time, on account of deep snow. I passed a miserable fortnight, which remained a nightmare in subsequent years. At last the day of announcement arrived, and my father and I rode to a neighbouring village to get the first news. He took the paper, evidently found the place, and I waited for what seemed an interminable time. He had begun at the bottom of the list, and I was easily first.

My routine education, which followed the conventions of the day, had now ended, and, looking back, it seems full of defects, perhaps since remedied. By far the greater part of nine years had been devoted to classics, to which I am infinitely indebted, though they were made needlessly repellent, and at the time I found attraction only in Latin and Greek verse. Until I came under Mr. Butler, I had no idea that Thucydides and Tacitus were great historians, or Sophocles and Horace immortal poets. If, when a new author was put before us to mangle, we had been told something about his life, times, and genius, our work would have had a new meaning. I am most strongly opposed to the elimination of classical education, and I believe that even a grounding in Greek is of great value, if time can be found for it; but I hope that *methods* of teaching have been radically changed.\* In all these years I never gleaned the dimmest conception of the British Empire, its history, resources, and responsibilities, nor of the Navy in its relation to the Commonwealth. History was not really taught at all in those days, and there was no foundation for studies which I was to find absorbing. Of science, vital to a clear understanding of practical affairs, I was taught nothing at school, but I picked up scraps from books. The number of

\* Not long ago I noted that Dr. Alington declared that "it is a simple fact that the curriculum of all Public Schools has changed almost out of recognition in the last quarter of a century." Such drastic change was certainly needed.

masters who played a part in my school education was very large; but only two, who differed in every possible respect, left any impression upon my mind. The result of this experience was to make me doubtful of the extravagant claims loosely advanced on behalf of education, and especially distrustful of the methods of the educational bureaucracies, which national systems require. Now that our national bill for education exceeds £90,000,000, and mounts yearly, doubts as to the value received seems to be accumulating.

In January, 1866, I entered Woolwich, then known as "the shop," and my whole outlook was changed. The discipline was strict, and luxuries were unknown. Barrack furniture and sanded floors were the rule in our rooms; but carpets and easy-chairs have since appeared. Three excellent principles were driven into the cadets—punctuality, care of dress, and respect for authority—and I am doubtful whether, after cadet age, these habits can be so deeply inculcated. The Royal Artillery and Engineers owed much to them, and for most of us I believe they became permanent. Every term each cadet contracted with another to brush him down before parade. I can well remember the intense relief when the inspecting officer passed one's back without remark. A speck of dust involved at least one "hocster"—marching about for an hour, beginning at 6 a.m.

The teaching varied greatly in quality, and some of the civilian professors were not skilled in keeping order in their classes. Professor Sylvester was the greatest geometrician of his day; but he could not teach mathematics, and unfeeling cadets sometimes played upon his nervous temperament. Much time was wisely devoted to drawing in various forms, and we were taught to make sketch surveys. In artillery we were then behind the times. We actually practised with 10-inch mortars, and the field gun—then an Armstrong breech-loader—was soon to revert to muzzle-loading! I remember that a drawing of what was called the "French interrupted screw" breech system was explained to us, and we were bidden to note

its hopeless defects. The interrupted screw principle, improved by the Welin modification, was to sweep all before it and to become almost universal. Our instruction in Fortification was conventional and already out of date, as I found it to be at West Point, which I visited in 1888. One apparent chance affected my whole career. I could not make head or tail of Practical Geometry, and Professor Peter Bradley, its greatest exponent, could not unravel my difficulties. In hospital for a few days with me there happened to be a senior cadet, Henry Denison, who gave me the missing clue, which made the subject which I was destined to teach for nine years perfectly clear.

At Woolwich, for the first time, I had the run of a workshop and the delight of a steam-driven lathe. Here I worked steadily, and when I left I could accomplish a fair turner's or fitter's job, which helped me to an understanding of skilled labour when it came to be required. I also learned the wet plate process and acquired an interest in photography, which was to prove invaluable.

In July, 1868, I passed first out of the Academy, after taking ten prizes and the Pollock Gold Medal. The fine old veteran, Sir George Pollock, was present, I believe for the last time, at the prize-giving by H.R.H. Princess Christian, who told me more than forty-five years later that she remembered the occasion.

I thus entered the army with the encouragement of success due entirely to hard work, with new ideas and ambitions, and with a promiscuous assortment of military knowledge, not all sound. Examinations as a test of capacity are rightly regarded with scepticism; but all depends upon the way they are conducted and the subjects they embrace. The curious fact, that four officers of the Royal Engineers occupied first-class Governorships at the same time, and that all had headed their batches in the final examinations, seems to prove that these tests are not necessarily fallacious. According to custom, the passed cadets all dined together, and I made my first speech from the chair, which must have been a poor performance. We

then dispersed for ever, and nearly all of that company have now passed away ; but the association of two and a half years proved an enduring link, and to come across a member of one's Woolwich batch was always a pleasure.\*

\* " Woolwich makes professional soldiers." Evidence of General Lord Methuen before Lord Elgin's commission on the conduct of the South African War.

## CHAPTER II

### CHATHAM, ALDERSHOT, AND COOPERS HILL

THE courses at the Royal Engineer Establishment \* lasted two years and were varied and practical. We were well drilled, and came in contact with our men, whose psychology is interesting and peculiar. We penetrated the mysteries of Company Accounts, Engineer captains being responsible paymasters. We dug trenches and traced siege works at night, learned pontooning at Wouldham, made triangulation surveys, went through courses of engineering, building construction, and elementary astronomy, and were initiated into submarine mining, then at the beginning of large developments, as was signalling, just recognised as of military importance. We were all practised in throwing hand-grenades, which soon became obsolete, to be revived by the Japanese in the Russian War and to assume new and important forms in the Great War.

Looking back in after years on this period of military education, I thought that, up to 1870, we had advanced little in field engineering since the Crimean War, and that some of our instruction was too rigidly conventional. One *lacuna* was typical of these and later years. We were never taught tactics, and more than thirty years later a talented Engineer officer, in a clever sketch entitled "Duffers' Drift," explained in a series of dreams how it was necessary to learn some elementary tactical principles by painful experience in the Boer War. At Woolwich I had won the prize in the subject of Military History, then taught for the first time to the senior cadets by Captain

\* Since named the School of Military Engineering.

(afterwards General the Rt. Hon. Sir) Henry Brackenbury, whose lectures on the Waterloo campaign made a deep impression on my mind. At Chatham, Military History was ignored in those days ; but more than ten years later I was to be offered the Instructorship in this most important subject.

Our two years at the Royal Engineer Establishment meant much more to us than professional training. Here we learned the dignity and comfort of a Headquarters mess, came in contact with senior officers who were making their mark, and became familiar with the pictures of our great men and with the regimental trophies and plate which represented memories of the past. We young officers thus caught the spirit and the traditions which have distinguished the Corps all over the world and never shone more brightly than in the Great War. From Chatham we went forth to be scattered all over the Empire, though most of us were to return at some time. The advantages of a period of common training are incontestable, and the close and happy relations between the Royal Artillery and Engineers, which I was destined to have special reasons for appreciating, were due to the fact that the officers started their careers at "the shop."

Chatham marked a great turning-point—perhaps the greatest—in my life. Here I met one who was to share all with me for more than thirty-seven years, to inspire and to provide the strongest and best incentive to effort. Absolutely selfless, ambitious only for my career, cheerfully bearing my growing absorption in official and private work and the many inevitable separations which befell us, she made possible all that I was able to accomplish. Of what are called "prospects," ours were remote and exiguous. My subaltern's pay, after more than eleven years of expensive education, would be regarded with disdain by a Poplar street-sweeper to-day. My fiancée trusted implicitly to my star.

In the summer of 1870, I was ordered to Aldershot. At this time Captain Crossman, an able R.E. officer, was beginning a project for the defence of London with which

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I was anxious to be associated, although later I regarded it as rank heresy. This was not to be, and, as has often happened, failure to obtain a desired post proved an advantage. The work at Aldershot was not inspiring, and consisted mainly of supervising minor building operations and repairs to barracks, under the meticulously complicated system which then prevailed. Drills and formal field days in the Long Valley were frequent. Once the Division marched out to Hartford Bridge Flats, where I had to arrange for the watering of the cavalry horses ; but such little experiences were rare. We lived in old wooden huts of the Crimean period, bitterly cold in the winter (of 1870-1), and very expensive to maintain. Our Corps mess was pleasant and homelike, and it was a great advantage to be brought into contact with all the other arms of the service ; but, as a centre of training for war, Aldershot was, in those days and much later, hopelessly inadequate. I followed the Franco-German war vaguely and read some military history ; otherwise the time passed in my duties and in riding about the country.

As there seemed no hope of our marriage, we decided to go to India and begin our life at Rurki. I had volunteered for Indian service, as was then the custom, when an apparent accident changed everything. It was necessary for me to go to London by a particular train to attend my grandmother's funeral. My commanding officer, Colonel C. C. Chesney, the author of *Waterloo Lectures*, and of a prophetic article on the German Army first published in the *Edinburgh Review*, chanced to go by the same train. At Surbiton, Colonel G. Chesney got into the carriage and told his brother that he wanted a young R.E. officer to teach Practical Geometry and Engineering Drawing at the new college at Coopers Hill which he was establishing to meet the requirements of the Indian Public Works Department. I applied at once for the post ; but it fell to Lieutenant (afterwards Colonel Sir) M. Ommaney, who almost immediately accepted another appointment, leaving the reversion to me. On June 1, 1871, the anniversary of

Howe's great victory, I was married at Alverstoke to Caroline Emily, eldest daughter of Colonel (afterwards General) P. H. Fellowes.

On Coopers Hill, apostrophised by the Irish poet Sir John Denham, in the seventeenth century, a teaching staff of six (soon to be augmented), and fifty students, assembled, no one knowing any one else; but we quickly began to work as an organised community. For the staff much preliminary study and arrangement of courses of instruction were necessary, and I found myself at once in full civil harness. The change of objects and occupation was drastic and perhaps intellectually exhilarating.

Here my wife and I settled down, with small means, for more than nine years. Our little house looked down on Runnymede, and across the Thames valley to Harrow and its spire. Englefield Green was not then suburbanised, and the residents were very kind to us. For me a period of strenuous writing soon set in and became a life habit. I began with the laudable desire of producing a text-book helpful to my pupils, and in 1874 Messrs. Spon published *Practical Geometry and Engineering Drawing*. A cheaper edition, with additions, was published in 1884, and also a little volume on *Perspective*. In order to keep up my knowledge of German, I then translated a little book on *Graphic Statics*, by Karl von Ott, a German professor. We were at this time somewhat backward in this important aid to engineering, and, as I wrote: "In England, notwithstanding the valuable contributions made by Professor Clerk-Maxwell and the late Professor Rankine, the subject can hardly be said to have received the recognition it merits." My translation was published in 1876, and the work upon it was a revelation which led to much further study, and to a more ambitious book—*The Principles of Graphic Statics*—published in 1879, with a second edition in 1888, in which year I found my original book in use in the great Technical Institute of Massachusetts. Whatever may have been the practical value of this book, I learned immensely in the writing.

In March, 1877, I sent a short article with a stress



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diagram of a bow-string girder to the *Engineer*, my first contribution to any paper, and received a totally unexpected cheque for £5! While immersed in these technical studies, I read some military history, and especially Colonel Hamley's *Art of War*, the first great book of the kind by a British author, which started very different trains of thought. In 1879, I translated a little work by General von Schröder on the siege of Plevna, which had made an impression on military opinion, and I was asked by Colonel R. H. Vetch, the Secretary of the R.E. Institute, to write a study of this memorable siege, with all the material then available. This involved a year and a half of steady work, and I corrected the last proofs at Chatham the day before leaving England. The lessons of Plevna, which I endeavoured to extract, were many and important. Some, perhaps, were not wholly learned before the Great War; but my book, being published as an Occasional Paper of the R.E. Institute, did not secure general circulation in the Army. I am no judge of its value, but Colonel (afterwards Sir) Lonsdale Hale, who helped with some criticisms, was most encouraging. When I was at Stockholm in 1885, King Oscar warmly expressed his opinion of my book. In 1886, I visited Plevna and examined the Turkish defences over which I had pondered deeply seven years before. The writing of this book was to affect my whole career.

We were naturally a musical family, and at the R.M. Academy I had worked hard at the cornet—an impracticable instrument for an amateur—going so far as to be not quite painful. At Coopers Hill, I ardently took up the violoncello, with its infinite and baffling possibilities. My little leisure and many interruptions prevented steady progress; but I think I became a just tolerable performer, and at our house at Melbourne I once had the great honour of accompanying—indifferently—Madame Melba in a song. The idea struck me that the constancy of the vibrations of a tuning-fork might be used to measure velocities of rotation. This germ appealed also to my good colleague Professor Herbert Macleod, and we set about

many months of experiment, with the great advantage of his physical laboratory. Lewis Carroll's booklet had just appeared, and we christened the object of our investigations "The Snark," because "we pursued it with forks and hope." After long and, to me, infinitely instructive experiments, we ran our quarry to earth, and communicated the invention of the "Cycloscope" to the Royal Society. Further work followed on the reverse plan of using controlled rotation to measure the vibration periods of tuning-forks, and the results are recorded in the *Philosophical Transactions* of that Society. Our long labours led, I am afraid, to nothing of practical utility; but this invention is, in certain respects, unique, and if ever it were desired to measure the velocity of rotating bodies *in vacuo*, our purely optical method may be disinterred.

My appointment as examiner in Practical Geometry to the Science and Art Department provided other and most useful experience. I inspected the night schools in London during one winter and gained an insight into their work, excellent in some cases and lifeless in others, the difference depending entirely on the teacher. I held this post with a few interruptions for many years, during which the number of examinees increased largely. My work consisted in setting three papers, in appointing and directing a number of assistant examiners, and checking a proportion of their marking.

Among my recreations in all these years photography took a prominent place. The art was then developing quickly, but I practised the old wet-plate process for some time, later adopting the commercial dry plates of the day, which led to the rapid gelatine process and the films. Photography is now reduced to its simplest terms, and all the troubles and vicissitudes which used to beset us in our wanderings at home and abroad have disappeared. Half a century has passed since it was necessary to travel with a tent and a bath always liable to get out of order.

At Colonel Chesney's wish, I raised a company of Volunteers among our students, attached to the

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Berkshire battalion then commanded by Colonel R. Loyd Lindsay, V.C. (afterwards Lord Wantage). We attended the summer camps of the battalion, and one year at Streatley a pontoon unit was brought from Chatham at our Colonel's expense, and my company, not a member of which had seen a military pontoon before, quickly constructed a bridge over the Thames, connecting our camp and drill-ground, and maintained it, while letting frequent barges through, till we broke up. During this time I held two commissions, and it was an advantage to keep in close touch with company and battalion drill.

The years in our first little home passed swiftly and happily. We never again knew the pedagogue's privilege of regular holidays, which my examiner's fees enabled us to spend in trips at home and abroad until the arrival of our only daughter in May, 1878. The Rhine, when we visited it, had not yet been spoiled by great German industries, and on all our tours my camera accompanied us.

The younger members of the Staff were all strong Gladstonian Liberals and Free Traders, finding inspiration in the *Daily News* and the *Spectator*, which was bitterly opposed to Lord Beaconsfield. The heated controversies which arose over the Bulgarian atrocities, the purchase of the Canal Shares (which I afterwards regarded as a wise measure), and the Berlin Treaty created sharp antagonisms in society long forgotten. I remember well a typical pronouncement of the *Spectator*: "Nemesis follows quick where Lord Beaconsfield leads the way."

Across Englefield Green lived Mr. R. H. Hutton, of rough and formidable exterior but kindest of men. We used to see him often in an over-filled pony-carriage, driving an old pony, with two fluffy dogs towing astern, quite oblivious of the principles of the R.S.P.C.A. At his house we chanced to meet Mr. Cashel Hoey, then Secretary to the Agent-General for Victoria, which led to a friendship lasting to his death. Little known, but extremely able and exercising much influence, he had a natural *penchant* for military history, and it happened that my book on Plevna appealed strongly to him. He

reviewed it flatteringly in the *Spectator*, conceived the idea that I should become lecturer on Military History at Chatham, and set himself to bring this about with the help of his friends Mr. Childers and General Sir Andrew Clarke. I was to begin with Marlborough's campaigns, which he thought had been too much neglected. Mr. Hoey was a rare friend, and to him was due another important turning-point in my career.

In 1880 my promotion to Captain was due, and I decided to resign my post at Coopers Hill. Of more than twelve years of subalternhood I had passed nine in civil life, which might have seemed most prejudicial to my future. The hard and varied work of those years proved, however, peculiarly beneficial, and gave me an education which in the ordinary course I could never have obtained. I also acquired the habit of writing—usefully or not, but always earnestly—which has pursued me into old age. Besides producing five books in those nine years, I wrote frequently in the *R.E. Journal*, and occasionally in *Nature*. The general press, the quarterlies, and the magazines were to come later.

The India Office sent me a generous appreciation of my services, and my volunteers presented us with a clock which is still a useful and a cherished possession. Our first home was broken up, our belongings were sold, and we found ourselves at Chatham, where I took command of the 5th Company to prepare for embarkation for Bermuda.

## CHAPTER III

### BERMUDA AND GIBRALTAR

BERMUDA in 1880 was regarded—no doubt with insufficient reason—as a remote and restful spot where the less hopeful Artillery and Engineer officers were likely to find themselves. I, therefore, applied for a vacancy at Gibraltar; but it had been represented that an unmarried captain would be preferred. As our little daughter had just broken her arm and needed care, we had decided that I should go alone, so that I should have fulfilled the requirements. I was refused, and a married captain, whose wife accompanied him, was sent to Gibraltar!

In December, the Indian troopship *Crocodile* (Captain Doughty, R.N.) was closely packed at Portsmouth with the 86th Regiment—just converted into the Royal Irish Rifles and grumbling thereat—and three companies of Engineers with their families. We went out into a gale, and I shall never forget the misery—or the atmosphere—of the troop-decks at night when I had to accompany the nimble First Lieutenant on his rounds. My marine experiences having been confined to Channel crossings, the discipline and organisation on board the *Crocodile* were a revelation. The naval officers took us in hand, and gently but firmly kept us in our places. When the gale abated we set all the sail available, the troops, told off in watches, assisting. We sighted the Azores, and soon after ran into perfect weather. The much-suffering women and children appeared on deck under a cloudless sky, and the blue waters were soon alive with flying fish. The first experience of the quick change from an English winter to the soft airs of Southern Seas can never be

forgotten. Our voyage, at economic speed, lasted a full fortnight, and at length we mysteriously hit off in mid-ocean the little group of coralline islands which was to be our abode. A faint tropical aroma reached us before a dignified black pilot with a large straw hat took us through the Narrows to anchor in Grassy Bay, and my company was conveyed in an absurd gunboat, the *Viper*, to Hamilton. Night fell suddenly as we marched up through a crowd of Bermudian coloured people to our quarters at Prospect Camp.

The fascinations of these islands and islets must be seen to be realised. The climate in winter is ideal, and though a south wind makes the nights trying in the summer months, the heat is never distressing. There are no real trees, except a few tall stone pines at Hamilton, and no springs or rivulets. The low-growing Bermudian cedar supplies the timber for the sailing boats, which survive to a great age, and the "red bird" makes brilliant scarlet patches in its dark foliage. The population depends on rainfall caught and stored in tanks, which, with their catchments, have to be kept scrupulously clean. The prevailing "Bermuda complaint" is peculiarly inconvenient, but not dangerous, and it was supposed—perhaps wrongly—to arise from inadequate cleansing. The islands provide a paradise of flowers, lilies grown in abundance for the New York market, the orange-red dwarf lantana everywhere, and the southern shore in spring a blaze of oleander blossom.

On the dangerous rocks of the Bermudas, the *Sea Venture* (William Strachey) was wrecked in 1609, and, in the next year, the *Admiral*, belonging to the fleet of the West Virginia Company. Here, therefore, is laid the scene of *The Tempest*, the last and one of the most plainly Baconian of all the "Shakespeare" plays, as I was to discover many years later. Here Tom Moore for a time discharged some mysterious duties for the Admiralty, which Mark Twain defined as "keeping a register of the Admirals who died there." Here a former Governor and Engineer officer, Sir E. Reed, devised a theory of storms.

Here came strange birds of many kinds, to seek a resting-place in their far-ranging and inscrutable migrations.

My company soon settled down to its new and various duties, one of my Scottish sergeants becoming a sort of Government gamekeeper, a post which he thoroughly enjoyed. I took up cricket for the last time and captained the R.E. team, which had the advantage of a good left-hand bowler, Lieutenant C. K. Wood, and a corporal who was a useful bat. I kept wicket and contributed sadly little to the scores ; but we did not lose all our matches. There was plenty of lawn-tennis, and we rode about the islands, visiting all places of interest. To some of us boat-sailing was an absorbing pursuit, and the Bermuda rig has certain special attractions.

My work was neither strenuous nor professionally improving ; but I owe to my sojourn in these Lotus Islands far more than I can express. The so-called " fortress " of Bermuda was my first glimpse of the Empire, its western gate, 3,000 miles across the Atlantic, and everywhere, in strange surroundings, was the impress of British government. At Admiralty House, Sir Leopold and Lady McClintock showed me the greatest kindness. My first contact with the Navy was established, and I went out in the old *Northampton* for her firing practice, a perfunctory performance in those days. There, dancing like a midshipman, I first saw Captain John Fisher, who was to come into my life many years later, and I began to take a strong interest in the Navy. I carefully studied all the defences of the islands, and came to the conclusion that many of them were wrongly conceived, which started new trains of thought. The scheme of submarine mining provided another subject for much reflection. The military atmosphere of Bermuda was not inspiring. Formal drills were our only exercises, and the sappers, who can drill like guardsmen if they choose, do not shine when the unreality of the performance is plain to them. Books were hard to come by, and all my literary activities of the preceding nine years came to a standstill.

The months seemed to pass slowly in the Bermuda

fairly land, and I felt keenly the separation from my wife and little daughter. We had, except in the brief onion season, only a fortnightly mail from New York and no cable,\* so that the sense of isolation from the world became oppressive. My kind commanding officer, Colonel Gordon, at length gave me leave just as the *Orontes*, almost empty, was about to sail for England. We had a quiet passage, the only incident being the discovery of a large buoy in mid-Atlantic, which we sank by a few shells from a 12-pounder. The Governor of Bermuda and Lady Laffan were on board, and we played whist nearly every night in Captain Kinahan's cabin. Sir Robert was a sharp critic, and I was not a good performer; but the chaplain was distinctly worse, and he proved a buffer behind which I sheltered.

I meant, if possible, not to return to Bermuda, and it was arranged, how I do not know, but certainly by Mr. Hoey's good offices, that I was to be transferred to Gibraltar, his great plan for my being appointed to teach Military History at Chatham remaining in abeyance. Meanwhile, I was introduced to General Sir Andrew Clarke, which was the beginning of a long friendship of infinite importance to my career. He was generally regarded as a close relation; but his branch of the enormous Clarke family migrated to Ireland in Cromwell's time,† and mine came from Hampshire.

Gibraltar, the gate of the great sea highway to the East, was full of absorbing interests—a relief after the seclusion of Bermuda. Here I came into closer contact with the Navy, and Captain the Hon. E. and Mrs. Fremantle, in their charming house, were very kind to me. The Governor was the fine old Indian soldier, Lord Napier of Magdala, who had a place in his heart for his old Corps.

\* I did not forget this great need, and a few years later I found that the Admiralty had been moving in the direction of a cable to their outpost. In a memorandum of August 12, 1885, I reviewed the whole question and suggested the diversion to a cable of a subsidy of £17,000 paid for a monthly service from Halifax to Jamaica viâ Bermuda. Notice to terminate the contract had been given, so that the way was clear. This suggestion was accepted, and ultimately a cable was laid from Halifax to Bermuda, and later extended to Jamaica.

† He used to say that his ancestor was a farrier in Cromwell's army.



We had a delightful mess, and the defences then being constructed brought me into direct association with the Artillery. Rides into the Spanish Hinterland and occasional runs with the Calpe hounds over peculiar country, which our ponies cleverly negotiated, gave me some knowledge of its many attractions. Algeciras, destined to be the scene of an important conference and to be provided with hotels and a golf course, was then decidedly primitive, and the bull-ring was its principal feature. Here I conveyed my camera, and with exceeding difficulty secured some rather striking photographs, which I afterwards showed at an exhibition of the Photographic Society. It was necessary to bribe the Spanish police to prevent people standing up when some striking episode occurred, and, as I could only focus on a selected part of the arena and wait for something to happen there, success was a matter of luck. The kodak has removed all these difficulties.

I spent a week at Tangier, where, according to Mark Twain, the smells are thousands of years old, riding out into the beautiful country half derelict, and meeting Kaid Maclean, who, from a sergeant in the army, had grown to be a power among the Moors. The scenes in the market at Tangier were a revelation of Eastern life, and the Riffs, constantly at war with Spain, were the most picturesque figures imaginable. At Easter, 1882, I made the well-known trip—Malaga, Granada, Cordova, Seville, Cadiz—which brings back memories of Roman remains, of Moorish art lavishly expended on the Alhambra and the great Mosque of Cordova, and of Andalusian life vividly displayed at the great Easter Fair at Seville. Later I visited Tarifa,\* across the Bay, where the walls still showed traces of the long-forgotten siege described by Napier, who, after giving some interesting details, which I tried to follow on the spot, significantly asked: "To whom, then, was England indebted for this splendid achievement? The merit of the conception is undoubtedly due to General

\* I was to visit Ceuta later on.

Campbell, the Lieut.-Governor of Gibraltar . . . it was his imperious and even menacing orders which prevented Colonel Sherrett from abandoning Tarifa even before the siege commenced."

The Gibraltar Library contained some valuable books, and I was able to avert the scrapping of a number of historically important French military works, including those of Jomini, which had been condemned as "out of date." Among the archives of the R.E. Office I unearthed some interesting correspondence between the Board of Ordnance and the Chief Engineer (1718-50), of which I gave specimens in an article for the *R.E. Journal* (July, 1882). In these letters one could trace indications of the same differences of opinion between London and military stations as existed a century and a half later. Official psychology changes little; but, in my time, there was no such relief from formality as occurs in a letter of March 31, 1720, to Captain Horneck from Bell Jones. The writer begins: "You have lived luxurious so long in your Denn, that the Board do not think it proper or advisable to set you at liberty till they know what effect the Lent will produce." The South Sea Bubble was evidently distracting the Board of Ordnance at this time, and the letter ends: "I am just going with Daddy Meades to water the evening and to talk of this grand Bubble which he has got £2,000 by. He gives his blessing to you, as I do my humble service and hearty wishes for your health and welfare." In 1738, Mr. Skinner, "Chief Engineer on the Spott at Gibraltar," had apparently put off compliance with the Governor's orders to build "Stone Pillows for a Gallows." An official of the Board, therefore, gave the following instructions: "We desire, when the Governor insists on it again, that you will let him know that as the Building of a Gallows is not necessary for the defence of the Garrison, we think it may be postponed, and that whenever it is done the charge should be defrayed out of Contingencies allowed for the Garrison." This is in quite the best style of controversy between two warring departments of State.

Smuggling was naturally frequent, the temptations

being irresistible. Dogs with packets of tobacco on their backs were taken outside the fortress just before the barrier was locked for the night, and ran to their homes in Linea in the darkness. On the steamer going to Malaga, I saw a Spanish woman stowing tobacco in her hair. In the harbour, guarda costas, whose activity was announced by a gun, frequently attempted to interfere with British craft ; but Captain Fremantle's arrangements generally foiled their efforts. The official view was that the Spanish preventive system was not whole-heartedly worked ; but the opportunity arising from a free port in close proximity to Spanish territory must have created great difficulties.

My stay at Gibraltar in 1881-2 proved most instructive. I made a careful study of the existing defences, and tried to arrive at an estimate of the functions which the fortress could discharge in war. Some of my conclusions were afterwards embodied in an article published in the *Spectator* (July 7, 1883). Lord Henry Lennox had stated in the House of Commons (June 7) that the Spaniards proposed to mount guns on the coast "so as best to command the Straits of Gibraltar," and I tried to dispose of this fallacy. On the other hand, it was necessary to point out that they could, by mounting guns and howitzers in concealed positions, which I had seen, deny the use of the harbour and dockyard. "Gibraltar Bay is inviolable only so long as Spain permits it to be so. Varying in breadth from 8,000 to 9,000 yards, it is now throughout its length brought within practicable range of guns mounted along the Spanish shore ; while of its total circumference of fifteen miles, only about three miles belong to England." \* In the event of a war in which Spain was hostile, therefore, it would be necessary to occupy a considerable area of Andalusia, and we might be forced "to embark on a considerable campaign for the indirect object of securing the advantage of the possession of Gibraltar." In the Great War, most happily, the neutrality of Spain saved us from this inconvenient obligation. Another popular fallacy at

\* Forty-two years later this fact was brought to the notice of the House of Commons by Major-General Sir J. Davidson, M.P.

the time was that Gibraltar, *quâ* fortress, closed the entrance to the Mediterranean, which could be effected by naval force alone. The value of Gibraltar to the Empire is immense, but it is inexorably bound up with sea-power. In later years there was a project, which I strongly opposed, for transferring the docks to the eastern side of the Rock, and there have been suggestions for an exchange of Gibraltar for Ceuta. After visiting the latter, I came to the conclusion that this would be a grave mistake, political considerations apart.

Rumours of impending trouble in Egypt were followed by a stream of refugees crowding the westward-bound steamers calling at Gibraltar. We began to be afraid that, if anything happened, we might, like Captain Horneck 162 years before, be left "luxurious" in our "Denn." I thought that if I could only get home, there might be chances, and again my commanding officer (Colonel C. Ewart) was so kind as to grant me leave. The difficulty was to get a passage, and I boarded a P. & O. whose captain at length consented to take me if I signed a declaration that whatever happened I would not complain. I was ready to sign anything; but some small difficulties did arise. It was arranged that I should sleep in the saloon; but several ladies claimed prior rights, and this plan did not work. I was then assigned to a gangway which led past the head of the main companion to the captain's cabin. Here I unwillingly witnessed some tender partings at night, the principals being quite unaware of my presence. The good captain let me use his cabin for my toilet, and the voyage was soon over. I found preparations for the dispatch of an expeditionary force in full swing. The naval bombardment of the defences of Alexandria had taken place on July 11, and on the 25th I received orders to proceed to Egypt *viâ* Brindisi on the 28th.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE TEL-EL-KEBIR CAMPAIGN

ON August 2, I arrived at Alexandria with orders, which I had myself written, to make a detailed report on the defences, and the effects of the fire of the fleet upon them. Thus, at the age of thirty-four, my first independent public task came to me, as the result of the impression produced by my study of Plevna upon Major-General Sir Andrew Clarke, lately appointed Inspector-General of Fortifications.\*

I reported at once to Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, then in command, who gave me every assistance. On his staff was Lieutenant (afterwards General Sir) E. Hutton, whom I was to know well in after life, and to serve with in Victoria. Two other R.E. officers and I were temporarily quartered in a flat vacated by some refugees, and I began work at once on the forts close to the town. Captain Walford, R.A., who arrived before me, had already made some sketches, and we continued together until his sudden recall.

It was necessary to survey all the forts, to mark every hit they received, to analyse the work of different ships as far as possible, to examine every gun and to photograph those dismounted by fire, to investigate artillery stores and magazines, and generally to note everything which bore directly and indirectly upon the great question of ships *v.* forts. This involved going on board every ship which had been engaged on July 11. Admiral Sir

\* Sir Andrew was an old friend of Mr. Childers, then Secretary for War, and his appointment was sharply criticised as a political job; but there was at this time no senior R.E. officer nearly so well qualified by training and experience for this important post, and the selection was perfectly justified.



[Author's photo.]

TWO 9-INCH R.M.L. GUNS IN RAS-EL-TIN FORT, 1882.

That on left wrecked by a large shell from the Fleet: that on right broken from its anchorage by unchecked recoil.

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Beauchamp Seymour and all his officers gave me the greatest assistance, and I secured a promise of being taken afloat if the forts at Aboukir were bombarded, which then seemed possible. I was particularly anxious to discuss the bombardment with Captain J. Fisher, who was in command of the *Inflexible*, but he had gone home on account of illness.

In this work I was absorbed till September 10, by which time I had surveyed all the forts attacked and examined all the others. The Admiral kindly detailed the gunboat *Beacon* (Commander T. S. Brand) to take me to Marabout and Adjmi on the extreme left. I had quickly found that caution was necessary. Descending one day into a gunpit,\* smoking a cigar, I found myself ankle-deep in large grain powder, and retreated hastily. In Fort Marabout, also, there was a large magazine with a floor covered with loose powder, which Beduins had been looting. Most of the magazines were recklessly exposed; but only one explosion (Fort Adda) occurred, and, owing to the failure of our General Service fuse, too many of our shells were blind.

The work all day in a burning sun was hard, but intensely interesting. One alleviation is impressed on my memory. I was surveying Meks Fort, three and a half miles out in the desert, and had just discovered a large store of unfilled mines and a plan showing where it was intended to lay them, when a little gunboat anchored near the shore, and a naval officer and his boatswain landed. I showed him over the place, and he then took me and my sapper orderly on board, where we had an unforgettable meal. It was "the plucky little *Condor*," and this was my first meeting with Lord Charles Beresford, cheeriest of sailors and possessed of a fund of shrewdness. We never quite lost touch with each other, and more than thirty years later we were allies in the House of Lords,

\* This pit contained a short 40-pounder on a platform hauled up and down by a winch—a plan devised by Lieutenant Beverley-Kennon, U.S.N. The newspapers had reported the existence of a "heavy gun" which defied the naval gunners by disappearing. This somewhat futile arrangement was the explanation.



vainly attempting to secure a rational blockade of Germany.

The U.S.S. *Lancaster* was at Alexandria for several weeks, and had helped in restoring order after the bombardment.\* Commander C. F. Goodrich, U.S.N., who had also been directed to report on the effects of the naval fire, was sent to me, and I gave him all the help in my power till his ship sailed. Thus began a friendship and a correspondence which lasted forty-three years, and made my visit to America in 1888 a wonderful experience.† After his retirement Admiral Goodrich twice stayed with me in India.

The refugees soon returned to their flat, and we took up our abode in a great cotton store close to the outlet of the Mahmudieh Canal. At night, on the roof under the stars, with a veiled candle, I developed the photographs I had taken, and always a naval picket on the bridge sang melancholy songs of which "Far away" was a favourite. The men who fought hard by at Aboukir in 1798 would perhaps have despised the rather mawkish sentiment which appealed to their successors. So far may education alter popular taste.

Alexandria had been placed in a state of defence and was quickly reduced to order under military government. The Egyptian troops cleared out after the bombardment; but they or the mob committed many murders and set some parts of the town on fire.‡ They then entrenched themselves across the Cairo railway at Kafr Dowar (or King Osman), opposite our position at Ramleh, while at the same time throwing up the lines of Tel-el-Kebir, intended to block an advance from Ismailia. In the evenings, we sometimes rode out to Ramleh and tried to make out what was going on at Kafr Dowar. The Egyptians had one 15-cm. Krupp gun, capable of ranging

\* Assistance was also forthcoming from U.S.S. *Nipsic* and *Quinnebaug*.

† The Navy Department at Washington sent to the Foreign Office a generous acknowledgment of my assistance to Commander Goodrich which never reached me.

‡ After examining the buildings destroyed and those struck by shells from the fleet, I came to the conclusion that the heavy damage—valued at nearly £5,000,000—was almost entirely due to incendiarism.

over us, which they fired occasionally. One shell pitched about fifty yards short of my pony and covered us with sand ; but the splinters seemed to be smothered. We had no means of replying, until Lieutenant (afterwards Admiral Sir) Percy Scott managed with great energy and resourcefulness to bring up a 7-inch gun from one of the forts, anchoring the carriage to a tree stump. I did not see this gun fired, but I believe it was able to reach the enemy's lines.

General Sir Garnet Wolseley's plan of campaign was a secret, and at Alexandria there was a belief in some quarters that it included an attack on the lines of Kafr Dowar. The seizure of the Suez Canal on August 20 and the departure of the transports for Port Said at once showed that the main line of advance on Cairo was to be from Ismailia. Major-General Sir E. Hamley was left at Ramleh until later, and, realising what must follow, I tried hard to accompany his (the 2nd) division. It was ultimately arranged by Colonel H. Maitland, R.E., that I should go as his Brigade Major ; but, unluckily for me, Captain Green, R.E., who had agreed to remain believing that an attack from Alexandria was impending, changed his mind. I then begged Sir E. Hamley, whom I had met at Bearwood, to let me go in any capacity. He was very kind, but refused to act without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, which he was reluctant to obtain.\* My luck had failed me, and I tried other means, which succeeded too late for my purpose. Thus I arrived at Ismailia on the morning of September 13 to learn that the lines of Tel-el-Kebir had been carried, and that the Egyptian army had apparently broken up.

On the 15th I reached Tel-el-Kebir by train, made a careful survey of the whole position and took photographs. It was a most unpleasant task. The smell from the many unburied bodies was almost overpowering, and dense swarms of flies, following every movement, formed a sort of mask, making the use of the prismatic compass very

\* There was at this time some little rift between the two which I could not fathom, but which later was to expand into a gulf never closed.

difficult. Small parties of Arabs seemed to be engaged in looting, and I caused my orderly to fire a few shots in their direction, which produced a hasty dispersal. I remained till my work was done, and I obtained information which had an important bearing on subsequent controversies. Meanwhile, an advanced detachment of cavalry had occupied the citadel of Cairo on the evening of the 14th. The short campaign of 1882 had ended.

A night journey on an engine not under steam brought me back to Ismailia. Two incidents remain in my memory. A difficulty arose between a high staff officer and a sapper engine driver, who tried to explain that the water was low in his boiler, and that, as his injector was not working, he would have to run up the line to pump in more. To this the great man, who was rather short in temper, offered the strongest objection. I tried hard—those were relatively unscientific days—to make it clear that, with 90-lb. steam pressure in the boiler, the course proposed was inevitable, and he reluctantly consented.

The night was very hot, and my two companions on the footplate and I had a consuming thirst, which could only be assuaged by drawing water from the boiler, warm with an unpleasant twang. To hit on a little naval camp, where we were welcomed and supplied with supper and unlimited cocoa, seemed, therefore, like an interposition of Providence.

At Ismailia I met Captain (afterwards Admiral Sir Harry) Rawson, whose brother was fatally wounded in directing the night advance on Tel-el-Kebir. I was not to see him again until we enjoyed his charming hospitality at Sydney, which we tried to return at Melbourne. A brother officer of mine was very ill in our squalid quarters, and a young doctor told me that the case was serious. The only chance seemed to be to put him on board a homeward-bound ship instantly. I explained the matter to Captain Rawson, who readily agreed to dispense with all formalities, and gave me a launch which could catch the *Lusitania*, tied up for the night in the Canal. I had my patient carried on board, delivered him safely to her



[Author's photo.]

PART OF REAR-LINES, TEL-EL-KEBIR, SEPTEMBER 15, 1882.

[To face page 30.]



captain, dined in what seemed culpable luxury just then, and returned. The proceedings were horribly irregular, but I escaped to Cairo before they were realised, and the sick man recovered on the voyage home.

At Cairo I made my first acquaintance with Shepheard's Hotel, was present at the review before the Khedive, was assisted by wiry Arabs to climb the Great Pyramid—in September a most exhausting performance—rode donkeys, and wandered through the bazaars in search of mementoes for the little family circle at home. I was sitting on the terrace of Shepheard's Hotel gazing on scenes which every traveller used to think it necessary to describe, when a great explosion occurred. We all rushed to the station, where a fire had broken out and small-arm ammunition was crackling, with an occasional shell-burst. One shell exploded near me, but two trucks luckily intervened. We worked for some time, moving trucks containing ammunition, and trying to restore order. There were rumours of foul play, and a brown substance suggesting dynamite was discovered, but was, I think, identified as *hasheesh*!

On October 3, Major Lloyd, R.A., and I were ordered to Damietta to examine the defences, which consisted of field works thrown up with the idea of defending the town and coast forts at the mouth of the Nile. Here were many interesting discoveries, but the works, like those of Alexandria, were defective in most respects.\* At Damietta we lived at the Mudirieh, and, having no mosquito nets, we were heavily punished. For some years afterwards, I was liable to sudden attacks of malaria, confirming by anticipation the important discoveries of Sir Ronald Ross. Much more serious at the time were Nile boils, constantly spreading, which the military surgeons could not alleviate, and which at last nearly incapacitated me.

Returning to Alexandria, I finished my notes, inspected

\* In the *R.E. Journal* I subsequently published a critical account with drawings of all the field works constructed by the Egyptians, which were far inferior to those of the Turks in 1877-8.

the lines of Kafr Dowar, and went by sea with a party to examine the defences of Aboukir. It was interesting to follow on the chart the tactics by which Nelson won his great victory, and in the distance was an old tower, perhaps that from which "François" watched the battle of the Nile and described to his wife what he saw: "Seven—It is now night and the fire still increases. Half after seven—The whole horizon seems in flames, this shows that a ship is on fire. . . . A little after nine—A vessel blows up. How tremendously beautiful! A sky covered with fire." And then the realisation of the great tragedy: "Noon (August 2)—The express has arrived from Aboukir. O fatal night! O fatal action for the honour of France! The fleet is destroyed." Night fell as our tug returned, and the Levantine skipper declared with floods of tears that he could not take us into the harbour. There were no provisions; and the prospect of remaining out was disconcerting, but the solution proved simple. A young naval sub-lieutenant of the party offered to take charge of the tug and the weeping captain was sent below. Selecting a bearing through the Corvette Pass on the light at the end of the breakwater, our naval adviser piloted the tug through the reef and won our respectful admiration.

On my return home our Deputy Adjutant-General, Sir John Stokes, offered me the Chatham appointment, which I declined. As he firmly believed that I had long been scheming for this post and had done his best to keep me out of it, his astonishment was as natural as my amusement. I then obtained leave to work up my report, and we all spent the winter of 1882–3 at Bath. All my sketches had to be converted into drawings, which, with the photographs, formed a substantial volume. The text occupied nearly one hundred printed foolscap pages, and all was finished on February 13.

I had given my best to this first task, and, looking through it in my old age, I think I may claim that it was

\* My article on "The Intercepted Correspondence of the French," *The United Service Magazine*, August, 1899.

exhaustive. There is at least a mine of detailed information on which sound doctrines could be based. Was it to prove of any real use? It was headed "secret," and distributed to some home and foreign stations, where it was safely locked up. Sir H. Tyler, in the House of Commons, asked for its publication, which was refused. I can think of no reason except that the general inefficacy of the fire of the fleet was plainly demonstrated. This was no reflection on the Navy, but arose from circumstances which had not been sufficiently taken into account. The French fleet at Sfax, where the defences were negligible, did much less execution. The experience gained at Alexandria strikingly confirmed that of Sebastopol, which had never been understood, and agreed with much of earlier date.

Mr. Churchill has recorded with enviable skill \* the disjointed proceedings which led to the failure of a great project certain to succeed if it had been carried out in accordance with sound principles. On January 11, 1915, he received from Vice-Admiral Carden a plan in some detail for the opening of the Dardanelles by purely naval action. "This plan," he wrote, "produced a great impression upon every one who saw it. It was to me in its details an entirely new proposition." Later, the proposal to use the 15-inch guns of the *Queen Elizabeth* strongly appealed to him and to Lord Kitchener, and he complained that "no one at any time threw the slightest doubt upon the technical soundness" of Admiral's Carden's plan. "No one of the four or five great naval authorities, each with his technical staff who were privy, said 'This is absurd. Ships cannot fight forts.'" But "great naval authorities" and "technical staffs" obviously could not form a reasoned opinion on such a question unless they were in possession of all previous war experience bearing upon it. At Alexandria the *Inflexible* used 16-inch guns, which fired eighty-eight rounds, and I had carefully noted the effects. Further war experience, and notably that of Admiral Sampson's fleet at San Juan and Santiago in 1898, perfectly

\* *The World Crisis*, 1915.



confirmed that of 1882, and was faithfully recorded in my book.\* The Japanese in 1904 had shown wise caution at Port Arthur.† A whole mass of information was available, and I venture to think that the Carden plan and its ready acceptance at Whitehall by Mr. Churchill and the advisers whom he was moulding to his will would have been impossible if this information had been studied.‡ Lord Cromer wrote to me that some one did mention the existence of this Report; but it was never unearthed, and Major-General Sir Stanley von Donop, then Master-General of the Ordnance, told me that he was never consulted. The plan was based upon an estimate of the effectiveness of naval fire against even moderately well-conceived works on shore, which large experience showed to be fallacious. As Vice-Admiral de Robeck significantly telegraphed on March 27: "The original approved plan for forcing the Dardanelles by ships was drawn up on the assumption that gun fire alone was capable of destroying forts. This assumption has been conclusively proved to be wrong when applied to the attacking of open forts by high-velocity guns." But, as I had pointed out more than thirty years before:

"The effect of the fire of modern guns on earthworks has been, on the whole, immensely overrated. Impressions derived from experiments require considerable correction, especially where ships are concerned. . . . For dealing with earth parapets generally, it is possible that the new guns may prove to be even less efficient than existing ordnance. . . . The next ten years will doubtless see a considerable development of the power of ships' guns; but the offensive strength of coast works will advance *pari passu*, and the ships themselves will continue to labour

\* *Fortification*, 2nd edition, 1907.

† I was told that my first edition (1890) had made an impression on the Japanese staff.

‡ I am inclined to think that Lord Fisher, who wrote on March 4, 1915, "The more I consider the Dardanelles, the less I like it," may have been influenced by his memories of 1882; but he was at this time absorbed with ideas of landing armies in Schleswig Holstein at Texel, or in Pomerania, and this is only a speculation.

under certain disadvantages which cannot be obviated and have not been sufficiently recognised" (Report).

The Admiral, whose excellent dispositions on March 18, 1915, were carried out with the greatest gallantry, had painfully learned lessons ready to his hand in advance. Natural conditions made the action at Alexandria child's play compared with that which he undertook; but he accomplished all that could be expected. The allied naval forces escaped with less losses than I feared; but the Dardanelles campaign will remain one of the great tragedies in our history, while the landing on April 26 was one of the most brilliant achievements in our military annals. The moral is that the successful conduct of war may turn upon the mastery by its directors of the lessons of the past.

The operations in Egypt in 1882 were, judged by present standards, insignificant. As soon as the line of communications by railway from Ismailia to Kassassin was in working order, the conclusion was certain. Sir Garnet Wolseley's plan of July 3 was admirable. As I wrote in the *Spectator*: "In electing for an assault with the bayonet, Sir G. Wolseley showed military genius of a high order. There was the self-reliance which is willing for an adequate result to face a risk, the judgment which forms a perfectly correct idea of the resistance to be met, the confidence in the troops which induces reciprocal confidence." Controversies, however, supervened, and much was written in favour of night attacks which I thought unsound. When, therefore, five years after the event, an official history appeared which seemed inadequate, and in some respects inaccurate, I tried to make a general survey of the operations; \* but I am doubtful if even now some not unimportant facts are understood. It was a costly mistake to begin the bombardment of the forts at Alexandria without an adequate military force ready to be landed immediately. The massacre of June 11 showed what might happen, and Sir Archibald Alison's troops at

\* *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1888.

Cyprus could have been at hand in readiness. The bombardment was precipitated by a report that "guns are now being mounted in Fort Silsileh" after Dervish Pasha had undertaken that no "military preparations" should be made. On July 10 an ultimatum was sent to Toulba Pasha; but the bearer of the reply spent a great part of the night trying to find the flagship, which had moved out of the harbour to her bombarding station. The reply was eminently conciliatory; but it was rejected as being too late, and at 7 a.m. firing began. I inspected the guns in question, two French 32-pounders of the eighteenth century, and unfortunately Fort Silsileh did not bear on the harbour,\* but on a small bay called the New Port, which lay quite outside the sphere of operations. The Egyptians, by moving these wretched guns, stupidly brought about their own undoing.

The night march on Tel-el-Kebir, though the hard and perfectly open ground was exceptionally favourable, called for the greatest care. The Highland Brigade, leading the 2nd Division, found itself in "crescent formation" with "the flanks nearly meeting," and only the fine discipline of the troops and the efforts of their officers prevented confusion and possible firing. Even so our luck was remarkable. Isolated in front of the lines of Tel-el-Kebir was a redoubt containing eight Krupp field guns. According to the official history, this extraordinary work "had been twice seen . . . but on neither occasion had it been possible to distinguish it from the main body of the works." In simpler language, its separate existence was unknown. By pure good fortune, the left flank of the 2nd Division just missed it.† Had the gunners been alarmed and opened fire, the whole line behind would have been aware of what was coming, and the attack might have failed, or at best have succeeded with heavy losses. Much loose writing in favour of night attacks was inse-

\* The report on which action was taken stated that the guns "were facing in the direction of the harbour."

† An officer on the extreme left of the leading brigade told me he was certain he had heard Egyptians talking in the night. Except this work there were no outposts to give warning.

curely based on the storming of Tel-el-Kebir, but the moral was plain. The risks are great even in the most favourable circumstances, and, as I wrote, "only very well disciplined troops commanded by very good regimental officers" could expect success.

When Lord Wolseley's dispatch appeared, it almost completely ignored the work of the 2nd Division, and Sir E. Hamley was stung into writing his memorable article in the *XIX Century* in defence of the troops who, without any question, decided the action. In front of the Highland Brigade was the strongest part of the whole line, which dwindled into insignificance as an obstacle where the 1st Division attacked about fifteen minutes later. The trench which Hamley's Highlanders stormed had vertical sides, and I scrambled out of it with difficulty when there were only dead bodies on the other side. Of what actually happened, Hamley's official report gave an excellent account, which was not reflected in the dispatch of the Commander-in-Chief. Fourteen years later it fell to me to write a study of Hamley's life in which I tried to do justice to the decisive work of the Highland Brigade at Tel-el-Kebir.

"From unforeseen circumstances it happened that Hamley's command bore the brunt of the fighting . . . and suffered proportionately. Its losses were 75 per cent. greater than those of the 1st Division. . . . Moreover, Hamley's success enabled the artillery to be brought up at once, and two batteries entered the lines soon after the Highlanders. . . . Subsequently, in the growing light, he led the advance by which the victory was sealed. . . . It was his good fortune to have commanded the force whose action proved decisive; it was his distinction to have led that force with conspicuous personal gallantry." \*

I then had before me the striking testimony of Sir A. Alison to Hamley's personal action "at a very critical period." All this will now seem old history; but I think that the

\* *Quarterly Review*, July, 1896 (my article).

dominant part played by Hamley at Tel-el-Kebir still awaits the justice which at the time was denied.

In military history, the campaign of 1882 can only rank as an episode; but greater operations have had far less important effects. As I wrote later : \* “ In less than a month from the date of the landing at Ismailia, Egypt lay powerless in the grasp of England, and recognition of the heavy responsibility involved would have averted many subsequent troubles.” Inexorable circumstances have perhaps at last driven home that responsibility.

To me, the time spent in Egypt was a period of intensive education. Professionally it proved invaluable, not only on the technical side, but as a revelation of some of our military defects which I tried to follow up in later years.

\* *Quarterly Review*, July, 1896.

## CHAPTER V

### THE WAR OFFICE, 1883-4—BERLIN

At the end of February, 1883, I joined the Fortification branch of the office of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and we made our first home in London. Lord Carnarvon's Commission on "the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad," appointed in 1879, had made a most valuable Report,\* and that of the Earl of Morley's Committee on "the Defence of the Mercantile Ports of the United Kingdom" was presented about the same time. Both were the outcome of a growing sense of uneasiness as to the state of the national defences which was abundantly justified. The 'eighties of last century were critical years in many respects. The ambitious schemes initiated by Lord Palmerston in 1860 were incomplete, and many of them were badly conceived. In February, 1888, Colonel Sir C. Nugent was able to say, at the United Service Institution, that the military ports

"have been completed, with the exception of the armaments, for seven years; and on the land side—well, you can walk round the land fronts and see for yourselves, as I dare say every foreign Military Attaché has done over and over again. . . . My firm belief is that, if you beat to quarters at this moment, you could not open fire over the whole front of Portsmouth; I doubt if you could in six days—I was nearly writing six weeks," etc., etc.

\* This Report was treated as secret, which made it useless to the public. I begged that it should be published with some necessary excisions, and it was at length decided that I should edit it under the direction of Lord Carnarvon. This brought me into association with a charming personality, and a friendship which lasted till his death. I edited and wrote a preface to his defence papers in 1890.

This was the melancholy outcome of large expenditure unscientifically applied.

In artillery progress, owing to our obstinate rejection of breech-loading, we were rapidly falling behind the times. Worst of all, the strength of the Navy had been allowed to decline to a dangerous extent, and a great effort to enlighten the public was needed in order to bring about the Naval Defence Act of 1889, by which the fleet was at length restored to the standard subsequently maintained and was enabled to prove the salvation of the Empire in 1914-18. All this, together with the scares of 1878 and 1885, is now forgotten, and mercifully time was given us to make good deficiencies and to dispel some of the illusions which a long period of peace had engendered.

The appointment of Sir Andrew Clarke at this juncture was most fortunate. In his distinguished and varied career he had not been directly connected with questions of fortification and could bring an open mind unclouded by preconceptions to bear upon the problems awaiting solution. "We used to feel that he was as young as we were, and as ready as the youngest of us for any innovation which held out hopes of progress. Once convinced that a step was necessary and right, he advocated it with enthusiasm and rare pertinacity." \* Such and more was my first chief at the War Office, under whom I served for three and a half years, leading to a close friendship and a voluminous correspondence which ended only with his death in March, 1902.

I brought to my new post some strong convictions with regard to the Empire, the Navy, fixed defences and their mutual relations. It seemed to me that "Fortification in this country had become highly conventionalised. The plain lessons of the Crimean campaign had been ignored, and in matters of coast defence pure theory had usurped the place of induction based on the experience of war." †

It became my ambition to try to develop a school of

\* *Life of General Sir Andrew Clarke*, 1905 (my Preface).

† *Ibid.*

thought in regard to the broad aspects of national defence and security founded upon the teaching of the past ; but nearly eight years of study were needed before I was able to write the book I contemplated. Meanwhile, I had the best opportunities for acquiring the necessary knowledge of the state of our defences and for watching the technical development of artillery. Accompanying my chief on inspections, and in the course of my duties, I was able to study most of the existing fortifications of the United Kingdom, and to witness experimental trials at Shoeburyness and Lydd.

The Fortification Branch of the War Office underwent some salutary changes.

“ With the office of the Director-General of Artillery, relations were somewhat strained, and the Royal Regiment had too little voice in regard to the armaments with which it would have to fight. Sir Andrew Clarke obtained the services of an artillery officer as adviser, and the establishment of a Joint (R.A. and R.E.) Works Committee secured practical co-operation between the scientific services.” \*

It seemed to me essential, in view of the nature of the many and important questions to be dealt with, that a naval officer should be permanently attached to the office, and this was arranged by Sir Andrew Clarke. Captain (now Vice-Admiral Sir) T. S. Jackson arrived and was the founder of a long and distinguished dynasty of naval advisers, whose special knowledge was invaluable. We promoted him at once, and he was always known as “ the admiral,” the title passing on to his successors.

At the end of 1883, I drew up a long reasoned Memorandum on *The Protection of Heavy Guns for Coast Defence* with the object of obtaining agreement on general principles to guide the design of the new defences. I laid special stress on the experience gained at Alexandria, and drew attention to the defects in certain of our existing works.

\* *Life of General Sir Andrew Clarke*, 1905 (my Preface).



Among the main points which I sought to emphasize were the following :

“ In siting guns dispersion will be aimed at as much as possible, and the placing of the most powerful guns of a battery in close juxtaposition will always be avoided. High sites will be preferred for open batteries.\*

“ Invisibility will be striven for by all possible means. It is the cheapest form of protection. Clean cut lines and even slopes will altogether disappear, while vegetation will be judiciously encouraged.

“ Parapets from 35 to 40 feet wide will be ample for all purposes of protection, and sand will be employed in front of gun emplacements where possible.

“ Since it is now tolerably certain that ships will have to anchor, or come back to a given point to fire when seriously engaging coast batteries, the employment of curved fire against them will sooner or later find favour. The fact that, with an 11-inch howitzer at 7,300 yards' range, five shots out of ten were placed on a target representing the deck of the *Inflexible* is significant.”

In the Dardanelles our ships were unpleasantly surprised by the fire of concealed howitzers to which no reply was possible.

This memorandum received the general approval of the Admiralty, and I think it helped to crystallise opinion in the forms which I desired. Subsequently I tried to elaborate the principles I was seeking to apply. Thus in an article “ Invisibility ” in the R.E. Corps papers (1885), I advocated in detail methods which were highly developed in the Great War under the name of camouflage. I was then directed to draw up a General Order directing these methods to be applied, which was approved by the Commander-in-Chief and issued “ by command.” Some time afterwards, when inspecting the defences at Plymouth, H.R.H. was horrified by their untidy appearance, and

\* This was the great lesson of the Wasp and Telegraph Batteries at Sebastopol, two wretched works which put four of our ships out of action.

Colonel Sir W. Jervois,\* returning to that port from South Australia, was completely deceived, thinking that the forts he had helped to design had been destroyed, so well had they been blended with their surroundings.

There were two matters which seemed to need practical tests. Evidence as to the effect of machine-gun fire from our ships at Alexandria was of a negative character. In all, 33,493 rounds were expended, including 14,233 from Nordenfelt guns, the steel bullets of which left easily recognisable marks on the Egyptian guns and carriages. My general conclusions were that in well-designed works little effect could be expected and that "ships will not be able to engage well-protected guns served by European gunners at machine-gun ranges without running considerable risks. Whether they will run those risks remains to be seen. This is a question which was not settled at Alexandria" (Report).

It had been asserted, however, that a machine gun in a boat might keep a heavy gun silent if "it could manage to begin." I, therefore, proposed a series of trials at Inchkeith, which were carried out by H.M.S. *Sultan*. Captain (afterwards Rear-Admiral Sir) R. Tracey showed the keenest interest in these trials, and the members of the Works Committee, who conducted them, were deeply indebted to his thoughtful kindness. Till his death we remained friends, and I learned much from him. The results of the Inchkeith experiment, which I described in the *Times* (August 23, 1884), incidentally served to bring out the great disadvantage of muzzle-loaders in coast defences. A breech-loading gun, provided with a steel hood, could have been fought with trifling risks to the gunners under the fire of the *Sultan's* machine guns, 1-inch Nordenfelts, and 10-inch shrapnel.

There remained the question of pitting a ship against a disappearing gun, and I proposed another series of trials, which were carried out in November, 1885, by H.M.S.

\* I had sharply criticised some of Sir W. Jervois's creations, and on his return he sought me out and told me that he welcomed my views—a rare example of large-mindedness.

*Hercules* at Portland Bill, and were intended to include practice from a 6-inch howitzer specially mounted on her deck. This experiment was made as realistic as possible. A dummy gun appeared at intervals of three minutes which were advertised by a puff of smoke. The ship fired 6,910 machine-gun and 29 Hotchkiss 6-pounder rounds at short ranges—750 to 950 yards. The howitzer practice was not carried out. These trials, which I described in the *Times* (December 11, 1885), showed that such fire against a disappearing gun was hopeless. In August, 1886, H.M.S. *Hercules*, at anchor in smooth water, carried out 6-inch howitzer practice at a conspicuous flag distant 1,500 yards and failed to place a shell within twenty yards of the target. This was forgotten or unknown in 1915, when one of our battleships at the Dardanelles carried a howitzer on her turret !

Several years were occupied in arriving at decisions in regard to the general character of the new coast defences at home and abroad, and the advocates of armour were not easily convinced. At length a steel cupola, designed by Captain (afterwards Colonel) T. English, a most able engineer, was ready for trials at Eastbourne. We had just parted from our "Admiral," Captain T. S. Jackson, who happened to pass in command of H.M.S. *Comus*, while we were at work there. A telegram was concocted to greet him on arrival at Portsmouth. "To the Admiral of the *Comus*, Portsmouth. Works Committee observed with satisfaction difficulties of navigation successfully overcome; but why no sails and why only 14 guns salute?" This effusion of course found its way to the naval Commander-in-Chief and created some amusement. Our "Admiral" indignantly replied that he was carrying out a steam trial (which we knew) and that he had fired the regulation number of guns !

The trials of this cupola, which had to be trained by a detachment working a capstan in an underground chamber, proved instructive. It imposed upon the shore gun, in an aggravated form, some of the disabilities inevitable in the case of a turret ship, and the Committee



A 10-INCH SHRAPNEL SHELL FIRED FROM H.M.S. "SULTAN" AGAINST A BATTERY ON INCHKEITH, AUGUST, 1884. [Author's photo.]

Note that this battery had been made quite unnecessarily conspicuous.

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was not favourably impressed. When firing at the cupola we introduced a sheep to test the effect—if any—of shock. Some of us thought the poor animal was slightly deaf in consequence, but direct evidence was not forthcoming! I think that these trials helped to dispel some nebulous ideas and to support the views advanced in my tentative Memorandum.\* It was made clear to me by my investigations at Alexandria that shore guns in open emplacements, sufficiently dispersed and concealed as far as possible, could be silenced only by direct hits. Thus an extremely small target,† compared with that of a ship, could be presented, and firing into a coast battery would be useless. This is exactly what had to be rediscovered at the Dardanelles more than thirty years later, as the late Sir Julian Corbett explained.

The school of thought which contemplated large residential forts ‡ round London and elsewhere was by no means extinct in 1884 and later. After translating a suggestive lecture by Captain von Wittenburg of the Prussian Engineers, I had written several articles on "Provisional Fortification," § in which I pointed out that formidable defences could rapidly be constructed by civil labour if designs were prepared in advance, and that, in our case, simple forms were admissible. I was most anxious to make an experiment of this kind, and Sir Andrew Clarke at once agreed. Eventually Fort Twydale was constructed by civil contract on the East side of Chatham, as part of a projected line of works never carried out. I described the general features of Fort Twydale in the *Times* (June 30, 1886), and justified its design on historical grounds. It was to cost "rather less than one tenth that of the stereotyped erections of the schoolmen, but to possess a defensive strength compared with which Tewfik's poor little Plevna redoubts were as shelter trenches."

\* See p. 42.

† When the gun was end on at most 18 square feet. *Fortification*, by the writer.

‡ Like those built on the land side of Portsmouth and Plymouth under the Palmerston loan.

§ R.E. Corps Papers and *Journal*.

It was to be practically invisible and, a deep ditch being excluded by the time factor, the obstacle was a strong sunk steel fence supplemented by barbed wire under full fire from the parapet. The contractor hoped to complete the work in about three weeks. I saw this provisional fort later, and from a short distance its presence could not be detected; but, alas for human expectations, observations from aircraft might enable such a work to be quickly rendered untenable by howitzer fire.

In 1883, the important question of what was to be done with the Suez Canal presented itself. The two British directors had pronounced in favour of constructing a similar parallel waterway so as to separate up and down transit. This was opposed by the French engineers, MM. de Rouville and Dauzats. There was another suggestion of an independent wholly British canal as well as some schemes of a wild-cat character. In 1870, Sir Andrew Clarke had been associated with Captain (afterwards Admiral of the Fleet Sir) F. Richards in reporting upon the great work of M. de Lesseps. He was, therefore, keenly interested in the question at issue, believing that the proper solution was enlargement. Captain T. S. Jackson and I were directed to study and report on the whole matter. This was evidently irregular; but there was then no branch of the War Office charged with duties of this kind, and it was most necessary that an exhaustive case should be prepared for the consideration of the Government. I wrote the official memorandum (dated August 16, 1883) with a note on the Navigation of the Canal, adding diagrams showing the s.s. *Orient* in the existing and proposed channel, and estimates of the amount of excavation and cost required for the latter. Captain Jackson added a valuable Appendix.

Public opinion was at the time much confused and a Press offensive against the duplication of the Canal seemed desirable. In the *Spectator* (September 29, 1883) I tried to explain the situation, pointing out that M. de Lesseps, who had "carried out his great project in spite of English opposition," must be admitted to have established "a

monopoly of water transport across the Isthmus." I also urged that the Government should reconsider the whole question, and "give full weight to the arguments which can be brought forward in favour of a single broad canal, after taking the opinion of the many experienced captains accustomed to the navigation of the waterway."

In the *Times* (November 17) I argued the whole question at some length, and tried to explain the root causes of the existing difficulties. "The inadequacy of the Canal is a great and growing evil, but it is due mainly to the increasing disproportion between the section of the waterway and that of the ships that use it, not to the number of vessels alone." The Canal could be enlarged for £8,000,000. "Why should an additional £10,000,000 be spent to secure uncertain ultimate advantages? If, as M. de Lesseps professes, he is anxious to meet the wishes of his principal customers, surely the Suez question admits of a more scientific solution than this." I never clearly knew what happened in exalted quarters; but the project devised in the Fortifications Branch was accepted and duly carried out, while my estimates luckily proved close to the actualities.

Throughout 1884, the situation in Egypt and the Sudan became an absorbing and painful study as events moved inexorably towards the final tragedy at Khartum. In a letter of September 2, 1883, General Gordon had written: "Her Majesty's Government, right or wrong, will not take a decided step *in re* Egypt and the Sudan; they drift, but at the same time cannot avoid the onus of being the real power in Egypt." This failure to recognise responsibility has dogged our policy almost ever since. At the time when Gordon wrote this letter Hicks Pasha, with 10,000 hapless Egyptian troops, was permitted to wander off to destruction on November 4, 1883, at Shekan in far distant Kordofan. Before New Year's Day, Slatin Pasha in Darfour and Lupton Bey in the Bahr Gazelle had been forced to surrender. At Sinkat, El Teb, and near Tamai in the Eastern Sudan, disasters had already occurred, and Baker Pasha's ill-found force was cut up near El Teb



on February 4, 1884. The control of the Sudan had thus passed into the hands of the Mahdi, and Gordon left London on January 18! The situation was not understood, and Mr. Gladstone's Government must have believed that it could be relieved without recourse to arms by this simple expedient. Sir Andrew Clarke had, I believe, suggested the mission to his old friend, who, in a letter, dated six days before he left, wrote: "Things are too mixed in the Sudan and Egypt for me to think of it, and you know this well enough."

The ill-founded hopes which at this time were cherished in regard to his heroic mission were soon changed to ever-growing anxiety. Early in February, 1884, at Sir Andrew's request, I wrote a short note on the situation, which was printed on the 11th and sent to Gordon on the 20th, but, I believe, never reached him. The gist of this note was that to deal with the Mahdi revolt

"there is but one way, and that way has been clearly pointed out by Lord Dufferin in his famous Report, by General Gordon, by Sir S. Baker, and by Ismail Pasha. The railway from Suakin to Berber must be made and should be made by England and at once. Viewed as a commercial undertaking, this railway recommends itself. Regarded as a political measure, the significance of its construction will be immense. Telegraph to Gordon that England has decided to hold Suakin for the present and to commence the railway at once. Leave the rest to him with the new position and power which the announcement will carry with it. . . . In less than a year the 250 miles of line will be completed, and at any time, it will be possible for England to grip the heart of the Sudan."

Four months later, in the *Times* (June 18), I wrote a closely argued article on "The Suakin-Berber Railway," premising that this was "precisely one of those questions to which the educating power of the Press is particularly applicable."

Meanwhile, Sir Andrew Clarke continued to urge the construction of the railway with rare pertinacity. The project was worked out in full detail, the idea being to use

Indian labour. In May we believed that the Government was about to adopt it; but only permission to organise a base at Suakin was forthcoming. This work was carried out, and proved a great advantage in 1885.

The expedition under Major-General Sir G. Graham, nearly 4,000 strong, was concentrated at Trinkitat sixteen days after the decision was reached, and the tribesmen who followed Osman Digna received a sharp lesson. Sir G. Graham subsequently wrote that, after the fighting at Tamai, "the road from Suakin to Berber was open for British or Indian troops, and the opportunity for rescuing Gordon and for saving Berber and Khartum was actually within England's grasp." On March 7, 1884, Gordon telegraphed: "I think it, therefore, most important to follow up the success near Suakin by sending a small force up to Berber." And Sir Evelyn Baring shortly afterwards reported that "it has now become of the utmost importance not merely to open up the road between Suakin and Berber, but to come to terms with the tribes between Berber and Khartum."

The "battle of the routes" was, however, long protracted. Lord Wolseley's plan, originally submitted on April 8, and opposed by Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Stephenson, commanding in Egypt, and Admiral Lord John Hay, was at length accepted, and a vote of credit was taken on August 7. Whatever the merits of this plan, which involved the construction of large numbers of special boats, it was adopted too late.\*

Among incidents engraven on my memory in those anxious days, was one which I believe occurred towards the end of May, 1884; but I stupidly neglected to record the date. I was acting as A.D.C., and I showed Sir Henry Gordon into my Chief's room. When he had gone, Sir Andrew told me that he had come straight from Mr. Gladstone, who said that "if he considered his brother in danger, all the national resources should be used to rescue him." Sir Henry replied that "he did not think

\* "In Egypt we regarded it as a forlorn hope." Lord Grenfell's *Memoirs*.

there was any danger," and Sir Andrew remarked, "Then you have killed your brother."

As bitter attacks were made after the tragedy at Khartum, I sent these facts to Mr. Morley when he was writing Mr. Gladstone's life; but he made no response, and I thought that he treated the whole matter inadequately. Sir Henry Gordon was in communication with Zebehr Pasha, and had opposed his being sent to the Sudan as General Gordon had asked. Mr. Gladstone may well have thought that his information was the best available at the time.

In the *Times* (July 22) I tried to describe "The Military Situation in Egypt," again pleaded for the Suakin-Berber railway, and ended my article by pointing out that "the present attitude of passive expectancy will in the long run prove costly in the extreme, even if it does not lead to disaster."

I can never forget the hopes, the disappointments, and the hard work of the ardent champions of the Suakin route. The railway, for which we fought in vain, was eventually built without any difficulty, and is now an all-important factor, rendering British responsibility for the future of the Sudan—at length accepted—a practical policy.

The appearance of the belated official history of the Nile Expedition of 1884-5 gave me the opportunity of reviewing the whole course of events from the battle of Tel-el-Kebir to the withdrawal of the Suakin force and the abandonment of the Sudan. This I attempted in a long article in the *Edinburgh Review* (July, 1890), which aroused some interest on account of the bitter controversies over the failure to rescue General Gordon. The following conclusions, at which I then arrived, were not controverted; but the mystery as to the precise orders governing the proceedings to be taken if the steamers had reached Khartum before the end, has never been revealed. It is certain that Gordon would never have voluntarily abandoned the people he had nobly defended. Sir George Arthur has recently stated that Lord Wolseley had "a

firman in his pocket in case Gordon should refuse to obey orders." It may be, therefore, that Colonel Sir Charles Wilson's mission, with twenty men of the Royal Sussex Regiment in their red coats, was expected to kidnap Gordon and bring him away in safety. The only orders to this little expedition which were disclosed directed it to "march through the city to show the people that British troops were near at hand," and then return at once.

"After five and a half months of strenuous effort, this was the practical outcome. From the small force at Gubat, itself completely *en l'air*, a squad of British troops dressed in the red coats specially brought across the desert . . . was the utmost succour that could be sent to Khartum, which had been starving for a month. The fictions of success all but attained, of failure in time to be counted by hours, and of preventable delays on the 22nd and 23rd [January], by which Khartum was lost, could never have taken shape but for General Gordon's steamers and the sorely tried fidelity of their crews. Failing these steamers, how could the handful of troops at Gubat have made even the show of an advance on Khartum? . . . The impression conveyed by a study of the official history is necessarily painful. The toil and sacrifice were so great, the failure and the final tragedy so complete. Yet, from the soldier's point of view, flashes of light relieve the gloom of the picture. The men who composed the desert column were capable of any military achievement. Those less fortunate, who for long days struggled against the rushing torrents of the Monasir rapids, showed a spirit of unconquerable determination worthy of the noble traditions of the British army. But above all towers the lonely figure of the hero of Khartum, faithful to his charge, inspiring confidence in the motley crowds of which he was the one guiding force, teaching them to fight and to endure, dying gladly with them and for them." \*

\* My article in the *Edinburgh Review*. The story of "the battle of the routes," which I tried to tell, had much in common with the confused counsels which led to the fiascos at the Dardanelles and in Mesopotamia.

This failure, like that at the Dardanelles, was due to errors which could easily have been avoided. Both showed the devotion of the British soldier at its best, and both happily escaped darker tragedies. The prompt action of Sir Redvers Buller saved the small force at Gubat from destruction. During 1883-4, it was first brought home to me that decisions might be reached in haphazard fashion, and that there was no machinery enabling the Government to weigh conflicting opinions and to arrive at reasoned conclusions.

In the winter of 1884-5 I spent a week at Berlin with orders to report on an exhibition of hygiene. Here I gained my first impressions of the German Army; but I now retain only two reminiscences. The most interesting exhibits were elaborate appliances for fitting railway vehicles for the carriage of wounded, which presented new features. An Englishman, whose name I have forgotten, took me to a number of places to which the latest methods of ventilation had been applied. I recall a great *Bier Halle* where every one was smoking, and the air, which was artificially warmed, seemed perfectly clear and fresh. It was gratifying to find that my guide seemed to be at the head of this branch of hygienic science in Berlin. This was the first of my many official missions abroad.

## CHAPTER VI

SUAKIN, 1885

THE idea that hard fighting at Suakin would be involved undoubtedly influenced Mr. Gladstone's Government against the Berber route and the railway project. There seemed to be an impression that the boat expedition might thread its way to Berber and Khartum without this unpleasant necessity. When this impression was rudely dispelled at Abu Klea and Kirbeka, and the impossibility of further operations without large reinforcements\* became obvious, Lord Hartington telegraphed (February 11) offering the immediate dispatch of a force to deal with Osman Digna. Three days later Lord Wolseley replied: "By all means make railway by contract to Berber. It will be invaluable as a means of supply, and I recommend it being begun immediately. Contract to be, if possible, for so much per ton military stores and supplies and men carried per mile." The effect of this telegram was to nullify the preparations of Sir Andrew Clarke for constructing the railway with engineers and labour from India, and the War Office concluded a contract with Messrs. Lucas and Aird, but not on the basis of "so much per ton" of stores and men "carried per mile." This decision was reached nine months too late to save Gordon and Khartum.

The prompt assembly of troops and railway plant at Suakin was a remarkable performance.

\* "Khartum in the hands of the enemy cannot be retaken until the force under my command has been largely augmented in numbers and artillery." Lord Wolseley's telegram, February 8.

"Before the end of March, a force 13,000 strong, including a complete brigade from India and a battalion and field battery from New South Wales, with a transport of nearly 7,000 camels and 1,000 mules were assembled at Suakin. . . . A telegram from London sufficed to bring from India a force of 3,000 men complete with 3 months' supplies, all camp equipment and regimental transport . . . and a corps of 900 labourers of whom a large number were specially fitted for railway work. Remote New South Wales telegraphed her patriotic offer of troops on February 15, and on March 29, the contingent landed at Suakin, no single arrangement having to be made at home. . . . Even excluding the railway ships (40), the whole steam-going mercantile marine of Russia would not nearly have sufficed for the purposes of the expedition, which would have required much more than one-third of the whole steam tonnage of France. . . . No difficulty of any kind was experienced ; nor was the trade of the Empire in the least disarranged. . . . Not one of the Great Powers of Europe could have transported such a force to the shores of the Red Sea in so short a time. Great Britain could have trebled that force without great effort, and this fact serves to illustrate the great power which the Empire will wield if ever it is organised for war." \*

Lieut.-General Sir G. Graham, V.C., was appointed to the command, and he at once asked me to go out as his Military Secretary. It was, however, decided at the War Office, four days before I was due to start, that a Captain was not eligible for this post, and I was relegated to the vague position of special service officer. Major G. Barton was summoned from Hong Kong, and meanwhile I was to act.

The General and his staff arrived at Cairo on February 26, but unfortunately he was crippled by an accident to his leg, and it was not till March 4 that he "hobbled into his sitting-room leaning on my shoulder" (Diary). The work, during this interlude, was hard and intensely interesting.

\* *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1890. Article by the writer.

Masses of telegrams had to be dealt with, and I was in frequent communication with Sir Evelyn Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer), who then seemed reticent and alarming, though in after years he used to talk most freely and always showed me the greatest kindness. Major-General Sir George Greaves, the chief of the staff, Major-General Fremantle, and Captain the Hon. G. Stopford, Sir G. Graham's A.D.C., preceded us to Suakin, whence we received the news of frequent Arab raids on the camp. I dined with my R.E. brother officers at Kasr-el-Nil barracks, met Colonel (afterwards General Sir) H. Maitland, R.E., who had been good to me in 1882, and made many new friends, including Major (afterwards Colonel Sir) C. Watson, R.E., who gave me valuable information about the tribes round Suakin. "We agreed perfectly in the necessity for a declaration of policy to reassure the Sudani people" (Diary); but this hope was not to be realised.

My chief and his staff reached Suakin with the 5th Lancers in the *Lydian Monarch* on March 13, and we began to take stock of the situation. I noted "camp abominably pitched; defence never considered" (Diary), and there was firing all round, with some casualties every night.\* A complete rearrangement was made and the nightly raids soon ceased.

There is no more inhospitable-looking land than the Red Sea littoral. From the sea, the ground rises gradually to a tangled range of serrated hills six to ten miles distant, and is covered with prickly mimosa bush in scattered clumps, which, when mirage occurs, seem to be standing out of water. The country is generally blind at short range to dismounted men. The hills, rocky and barren, seem to bar off the interior; but they form isolated masses, between which the passage is easy, and among them lie broad khors—the beds of great rivers in ages long past—trending towards the sea. The ground outside Suakin had been fouled by endless caravans, and most wisely a new harbour to the north—to be called Port

\* "Osman Digna's people hover round and have killed or wounded fourteen of our men in the last few days" (Diary, March 13).



Sudan—was selected when the Suakin-Berber Railway was at length constructed. Such was the theatre of operations in which our little drama was to be played.

The object was to clear the country in order to push on the railway, and it was evident that the organisation of the friendly tribes, mostly Amarars, in combination against Osman Digna's followers would be of special importance.

On March 19, I accompanied my Chief, who went out with the cavalry to reconnoitre Hasheen and to select a site for a zariba. On the 20th we marched out in force, at 6 a.m., to the Dihilbat Hills, the Arabs falling back. From a small hillock the General and I had an excellent view of all that followed. The Berkshire Regiment soon cleared the Hills, while the cavalry drove the enemy through the thick bush. Unfortunately a squadron of the 9th Bengal Cavalry was ordered to dismount, and we watched the enemy rounding on the sowars and driving them into the Guards' square, which was in reserve. On the top of the hillock, the General dictated a dispatch on our first skirmish. We saw the zariba nearly completed, left the East Surrey Regiment in possession, and returned to camp, having lost about fifty killed and wounded. Next day H.M. the Queen telegraphed gracious inquiries.

An advance to Tamai was now decided upon, and an intermediate zariba was first to be formed. We started on March 22, with a great convoy in square filled with camels, mules, water-carts, and non-combatants, crashing through the bush in what seemed hopeless confusion. After thus marching, with frequent halts, about three miles, the General and staff returned, leaving Major-General Sir John McNeill in command.

“ We saw the force vanish away among the dense scrub, a cloud of dust in the distance. At 2.45 p.m. heavy firing broke out, and the General ordered out two battalions of Guards and the Horse Artillery Battery. We rode out towards the zariba, meeting sinister rumours of all kinds. Loose camels, men speechless with fright straggling back, ham-strung mules staggering about ” (Diary, March 22).

I questioned several of the fugitives, who were convinced that the whole force had been destroyed. "I shall never forget our anxiety. General perfectly calm. . . . At last a message came from McNeill that he had been attacked heavily while forming a zariba and was all right now. Loss 'not severe'" (Diary, March 22). A dispatch to Lord Wolseley and the Secretary of State for War was hurriedly drafted, and I galloped back to Suakin with an Indian escort. One correspondent reached the telegraph office before me, and I had to interrupt his message. At night we received some details of the fighting by limelight messages.

On the following day we started with the Guards in square and reached the Tofrik zariba at noon. The scene was indescribable. "Heaps of dead men and camels lying about. Badly wounded men being tended amidst dead camels and piles of scattered boxes. Stench unforgettable. Bodies being burned, but the camels resisted the process" (Diary, March 23). I talked to many of the defenders, including Colonel E. Leach, V.C., and Lieutenant Lindsay, R.N., hearing exactly what had happened. Information had reached us that it was known we intended to form a halfway zariba, and that we were to be attacked while it was being constructed. This I myself reported to Sir G. Graham; but I do not know if it was conveyed to Sir John MacNeill. The attack was delivered "according to plan," and many of our men were caught at work away from their rifles. The British soldiers and marines saved an awkward situation; but the Sikhs behaved admirably and falsified Lord Wolseley's expectations.\* The total losses exceeded 470, including 174 officers and men killed or missing.†

On March 26, we started again with a large convoy for the zariba, and the right front of our square was sharply

\* "It is very doubtful if even the very best of our Indian regiments could stand the charge of the Arabs, such as those which our troops had recently to encounter near Suakin." Memorandum of April 8, 1884.

† The presence of a balloon on March 22 would have provided ample warning and prevented this loss; but the balloon detachment was not ready on this day. A few days later a balloon went up, giving a long range of vision over the dense scrub.

attacked when we were two miles away. The Arab spearmen who, in little groups, charged out of the bush, almost on to the bayonets of the Guards, gave a fine exhibition of reckless bravery; but the firing was happily too high and caused only three casualties. I watched one man squatting under a bush and shooting steadily, while our bullets were knocking up the sand close to him. The difficulties of a square filled with non-combatants and impedimenta, moving in such blind country, were again strikingly manifested. This was the last attack delivered by Osman Digna's followers, and beyond nightly sniping at our camps when we moved out into the country they attempted nothing. There was no further military difficulty in pushing on the railway.

Order had been restored in the zariba, and I took dispatches for the Queen, Lord Wolseley, and the Secretary of State for War to the top of the look-out, finding there Captain F. Rhodes, by whom they were transmitted to Suakin.

Major Barton, who arrived ill from Hong Kong, was invalided, and on March 27 I was in orders as Military Secretary, while a telegram was sent to Korti to obtain Lord Wolseley's sanction. Three days later I had to decypher, in a temperature of 105°, a reply which read like a death sentence. It began: "Clarke is unworthy of the confidence of a General Officer," and went on to advise my Chief "in his own interests to select an infantry officer," adding that the sender was coming to Suakin and would explain. Having been for three years deep in the confidence of Sir Andrew Clarke, I racked my brains to find a clue to this unqualified denunciation, and could only attribute it to my opposition to the whale-boat plan which I had criticised in the *Times*. Meanwhile, I had to deliver my translation to the General and to Sir George Greaves, who were most considerate, though the latter, speaking with knowledge of Lord Wolseley as a close personal friend, gave me the coldest comfort. I was forthwith attached to the Intelligence Branch, under Major Grover, R.E., and began to give over my office to Major (afterwards Lieut.-

General Sir) E. Collen, whom I came to know well in later years. On March 29, I accompanied my Chief to the harbour to welcome the Australian contingent, the first to volunteer for the service of the Empire across the seas, and the harbinger of the splendid achievements of the Dominions in the Great War. The occasion was thus, perhaps, historic.

On April 2, we started for Tamai, and formed a zariba on the Teseleh Hills in the evening, to be sniped in the night till the Horse Artillery fired one round of shrapnel which brought silence. Again in square, wrongly I thought as the ground was open, we advanced next morning into and across the Khor Ghob, a broad, sandy bed with a number of huts which we burned, the ammunition in the thatches exploding. Before returning, I rode out to the scene of the severe fighting on March 13, 1884. Many skeletons were scattered about, and I examined the place from which the Arabs entered our square after the Black Watch had made their charge.

On April 6, we rode out with two battalions of Guards and the Australians towards Handoub, to make a zariba which was to become No. 1 Station of the railway, and on this day the Tofrik zariba was evacuated, 2,000 camels being employed. On the 8th, Handoub was occupied by Coldstream Guards and Australians under General Frementle, and I rode there with Sir Gerald Graham. "The progress of the railway seems unsatisfactory; great waste of force owing to contractors not knowing how to deal with native labour. Skilled Indian artizans and plate-layers are being put to coolie work and are naturally disgusted" (Diary, April 6). This was to be expected, but would be righted by experience.

I was now appointed political officer at the front, and two objects appeared to be paramount: (1) to bring about an agreement with all tribal chiefs hostile to Osman Digna, or wavering in their allegiance, and (2) to show ourselves out in the country, which I believed to be now safe. So long as we remained fixed to zaribas, the confidence of the Arabs could not be won.

On April 11, I moved out to Handoub, taking Mahmoud Ali Bey, his two sons Achmet and Hamid, who proved useful scouts, and a number of Fadlabs, some in scarlet jackets, who camped close to our zariba. My orders were to open negotiations with the tribes, and two days later I led a reconnaissance to Otao with 100 of Mahmoud Ali's scouts and a detachment of Mounted Infantry, to examine the wells and select a camping ground.

On the 14th I proposed a reconnaissance, the friendlies to go over the hills and the Mounted Infantry round by Hasheen to meet in the Deboret valley. General Fremantle, commanding at Handoub, agreed, and we started at 6 a.m., Captain More Molyneux, my able assistant, and Mr. A. Brewster, invaluable from his knowledge of tribal conditions and dialects, going with the friendlies, and I with the Mounted Infantry under Captain Briggs, to examine Hasheen, where we burned a number of huts. The forces met in the valley, and the friendlies drove in nearly 1,000 sheep and goats, our first important capture.\* On the 16th, taking Mahmoud Ali and his people with us, we moved the political tent to Otao, which was to be our headquarters. Tambuk now became our advanced post, and General Fremantle moved there. On the 18th, we reconnoitred the Deboret valley by another route among the hills, and the Scots Guards marched fully twenty-two miles under a burning sun. On the 20th, Sir Gerald Graham, with Colonel (afterwards Lieut.-General Sir) Bevan Edwards, R.E., three A.D.C.'s, and Captain Joppe, German Military Attaché, arrived at Otao, and we all rode out to Tambuk, where written political instructions were given to us. I was placed under the orders of General Fremantle, and directed, among other things, to explain to the tribes that we wished them to be "independent of, but friendly to Suakin, and that we would help them, at

\* Mahmoud Ali, too old for fighting, had not accompanied us, but his efforts that evening, and on May 6, to secure the best of the flock for himself had to be firmly restrained. It was sad to note that, in February, 1887, he was accused by Seyd Mahmoud, an Ashruf Sheikh, of shipping 300 slaves to Jeddah!

any rate at first. If they will strike for supremacy and independence of Osman Digna, they will have not only assistance but co-operation."

On the 22nd Captains Molyneux, Briggs, and I examined the wells at Nafailamei and went to Tambuk, where a message arrived from Otao that Sir George Greaves had telegraphed "all up" and intimated that the expedition was to be withdrawn. This was the first official warning that the end was near—to me a terrible disappointment—but for several days hopes and fears alternated. On the 28rd, Sir G. Graham, in a private letter to me, wrote: "Take no notice of Reuter's telegrams, but continue your work as if they had never been sent. . . . I mean to smash Osman Digna before leaving if the tribes will help." The uncertainty soon became very trying, and the great meeting of chiefs which we were trying to arrange was frequently postponed. It was difficult to know what to tell the tribes, and it seemed doubtful whether proposals for movements out into the country would be sanctioned.

On the 24th we started from Tambuk and reconnoitred about ten miles in the direction of Dissibil, halting close to the entrance to Khor Adit.\* On the way, the native scouts seemed frightened, and said many prayers; but they returned to Otao in high spirits and feasted till late on a camel, thoughtfully sending us the kidneys! I was ordered to Suakin next day, and dined at the Headquarters mess, where depression seemed to reign, and I could get no definite information. At Otao I found "most confusing orders," and rode to Tambuk with Captain Stopford to ask General Fremantle's permission for a further reconnaissance of Khor Adit. I was relieved to receive a telegram from the General at 4.30 p.m. on the 28th: "Following just received from Chief of Staff. Reconnaissance ordered for to-morrow as requested." Captain Molyneux and I started next morning with detachments of Camel Corps, Mounted Infantry, and 17th Company R.E., over the route of the 24th, but going

\* "Lunched under a green and really shady tree" (Diary).

several miles further. While tube wells were being driven Captain Molyneux and I rode on along the broad Khor to the furthest point on the Berber road reached by the expedition.

Spies having brought news, on May 5, confirming the presence of a gathering of Arabs under Mahomed Adam Sardun at Thakul Wells, about eleven miles from Otao, and the constant night sniping at our camp being apparently due to parties from this gathering, I proposed a combined night movement from Otao and Suakin to meet at the wells at daybreak. General Fremantle cordially supported the plan, and in the evening I was delighted to receive a telegram direct from the Chief of the Staff saying that the 15th Sikhs were going to Otao by train and were to march with the Mounted Infantry to Thakul Wells, adding, "They will be met at the wells by a force leaving here at midnight." That night we slept in our clothes, but the sergeant of the guard forgot to call us, and we were awakened to find the Mounted Infantry and the Sikhs ready and waiting for the friendlies. We went to their camp and routed them up at once, but the start was delayed till 2.15 a.m.

I shall never forget the night ride with the friendlies, leading the column, or the miserable feeling that the delay might spoil the whole plan. As day dawned, we reached the north end of the Abent Valley just as the Suakin mounted force, also behind time, arrived at the southern end, driving towards us a crowd of Arabs, who broke away over some low hills on our right, while the Suakin Mounted Infantry fired two very creditable volleys happily over our heads. I reported to Colonel Palmer and then returned to join the friendlies, who were following the Arabs. I watched some of them intermingling with Adam Sardun's men, and neither side seemed to use their spears. On the other hand, with our Mounted Infantry close behind, they were most active in driving in Sardun's sheep and goats, of which we secured over 1,100.

I went back to the wells, where I found Sir Gerald Graham, who seemed pleased with the operation. He



[Author's photo.]

FRIENDLY ARABS AT OTTAWA, MAY, 1885.

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rode back with us to Otao and returned to Suakin by train, while we tried to present a decently smart appearance before Lord Wolseley, who was shortly expected. The troops were too tired after their long march to be paraded; but the friendlies seemed as fresh as when we started. With much difficulty, I got them into a line, posting the biggest man in front with a green flag, and placing myself on the right of this strange company. General Fremantle presented me to Lord Wolseley, who "turned away and took no notice of me" (Diary). I was instantly reminded of his meeting, at the bridge at Tel-el-Kebir on September 13, 1882, with Sir E. Hamley, fresh from leading the decisive attack of the 2nd Division. "Sir G. Wolseley, looking not in my face but towards my breast, muttered what sounded like 'Oh, Hamley, is that you?' and turning from me, began to write on a paper placed on the parapet of the bridge."\* Hamley had, on September 11, suggested to the Commander-in-Chief the disadvantage of arriving in camp at Kassassin in darkness, the hour of starting having been fixed by his orders. An insignificant captain had criticised his plan of the boat expedition in the *Times*. These incidents were curiously alike.

My poor little scheme of a combined operation had succeeded perfectly. We had completely surprised the Hadendowas at Thakul and captured their flocks, with a loss of three wounded. The important matter was that it was soon widely known over the countryside that we had made long night marches from places twenty miles apart, and that no concentration within our reach was safe. With Mahmoud Ali's red-jackets I had taken about fifty men of other tribes, who would spread the news, and the moral effect was remarkable. Next day the son of Ali Rahab and Hassab Abdullah arrived with promises of assistance. The prospects of organising an Amarar League seemed to brighten, when on the 8th a report came that Otao was to be evacuated and the expedition was to be withdrawn immediately. Next day I received orders

\* *Hamley's Diary.*

to "put off" the gathering I had arranged "for a week at least; plead no instructions." Mr. Brewster and I went at once to Suakin to find out what was to happen, and Sir G. Graham told me that the latest orders were "to hold Otao and make the railway permanent." I returned to Otao and imparted this information. On the 12th Lord Wolseley arrived, and we rode out to Tambuk. I was again presented to him. He shook hands and discussed the political situation, afterwards cordially asking me to dinner on board the *Queen*. On the next day Captain Molyneux, Mr. Brewster, and I went out to Tobelido wells, where we had arranged for a gathering of Arabs, including some of Osman Digna's people.

"As we rode with scouts in front, small groups met us among the bushes and preceded us to a khor . . . where about 250 Arabs were assembled. They gathered round us and held our horses when we dismounted. Just then a troop of Australians rode up, and I directed them to go away, fearing that the Arabs would think we had led them into a trap. We squatted down, and got the head men to discuss the situation; the rest sat grouped round us, holding their spears upright" (Diary).

The conference was hopeful. The Arabs declared that they were willing to fight with us, and that many others would come in. Last year we had gone away and left them without any backing. Now it would be different, and they even thought they could capture Osman Digna. "Then we rode home, looking back on that strange group, with the dark mountains and the setting sun behind it" (Diary). This was the end of many schemes and hopes, the negotiations with the tribesmen being subsequently transferred to Major Chermiside. On the 14th I dined on the *Queen*, where the Commander-in-Chief was so pleasant that it was impossible to raise the question of his accusing telegram, and I began to think that the misunderstanding, or whatever it was, had passed away. At Stockholm, in the autumn, however, I received a message from the War Office saying that unless I could deny the authorship of

a letter that had appeared in the *Times*,\* I could expect no recognition of my services in the Sudan. I had not then seen this letter, and not till after many years did I know who was the writer; but my repudiation was unavailing. Several years later I received an invitation to dine at the Ranger's House, Greenwich, where I found a family gathering made most pleasant by Lord Wolseley's Irish charm. I saw him for the last time at Buckingham Palace, where we had a little friendly conversation. The mystery which, at the time, caused me despair was never solved.

On the 17th, with many of the old staff and a full complement of troops, I left the harbour soon after daybreak, the *Jumna* with Sir G. Graham preceding us. "The men did not cheer, and we watched Suakin disappear. Few, if any, of us will ever see it again. I felt great regret at leaving the friendlies—real regret in spite of the pleasure of getting back to home and civilisation" (Diary). Whether, but for the cloud at Penjdeh on the far frontier of Afghanistan, our expedition would have completed its task, no one can tell; but the railway could certainly have been built without any opposition from the tribes, and the engineer in charge told me that, with better organisation of the base, he could complete about two miles a day—more than we had calculated upon when it was being strenuously advocated.

My short experience of political work had given me a great liking for the Arab. Fuzzy-wuzzy had some good qualities. He brought us trustworthy information; he conveyed verbal messages with wonderful accuracy, and the suspicion with which our men were at first apt to regard him was not justified. He could have kidnapped Captain Molyneux, Mr. Brewster, and myself with ease on some occasions and held us to ransom. A wild-looking camel-man used to bring to the front bags of Maria Theresa dollars,† which he could have taken straight to Osman

\* The letter, which was signed "Scrutator," sharply criticised the alteration of Sir Gerald Graham's recommendations for honours and the substitution of some other names by Lord Wolseley.

† Then the approved currency of the littoral.

Digna. While these tribesmen of the desert were childlike, the politics of their petty chiefs were as complicated as those of the Socialist Party. We in the political tent at Otao were constantly interviewing amazing persons, some of whom arrived at night, and trying to obtain information as to the intentions of Osman Digna, Adam Sardun, Onoor, and other tribal leaders while seeking to gain the confidence of their opponents. For fighting purposes against other tribes, even the Hadendowas, who displayed the fanatical recklessness of the Ghazi in attacking British troops, are of little value, but for scouting purposes they are excellent.

What these children of the desert must have thought of us I cannot imagine. In 1884, we had suddenly descended upon the coast, advanced to Tamai, killed a large number of them, and disappeared. A year later we repeated this manœuvre, but we built a railway for twenty miles and encouraged them to believe that we would remain and stand by our allies. High policy then demanded another withdrawal, and our political work had been hampered by the astute Osman Digna, who, though much discredited, informed the tribes that he was constantly receiving encouraging letters from the Mahdi, and pointed to our fleet of ships at Suakin, which he declared would again take us away, as happened.

The Official History stated that

“with the break-up of the gathering under Adam Mahommed Sardun, the political question of the Eastern Sudan may be said to have been solved for the time; large numbers of the Amarars placed themselves unconditionally at the disposal of Sir G. Graham, and a decided movement, which embraced even some of the Hadendowa clans, was set on foot against the Mahdists.”

This statement almost textually followed my final Report covering our endeavour, and I think it correctly represented the situation when we left Suakin.\* I was anxious about the fate of the tribesmen, and I then wrote :

\* Captain Molyneux, Mr. Brewster, and I received no mention in Lord Wolseley's dispatch.



[Author's photo.]

X Intelligence Department Tent.

CAMP AT OTTAWA, TERMINUS OF RAILWAY, MAY, 1885.

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"Should the Amarars fail to make a stand after our withdrawal, the policy of blockade will probably find advocates. It will be proposed, by cutting off the country from external communications on the east side, to produce such a shortage of grain as will bring the revolted tribes to terms. I venture to submit that such a policy is scarcely justified, and that it has not even the recommendation of certain success." \*

Unfortunately this policy did find advocates, as I tried to explain later in a long article in the *Edinburgh Review*,† tracing events in the Sudan from 1882 to 1892. Great efforts, strongly backed by Sir Evelyn Baring, Nubar Pasha, Sir H. Drummond Wolff, General Sir Frederick Stephenson, and Major-General (afterwards Sir) W. Butler, were made to open trade. In February, 1886, Colonel (afterwards Lieut.-General) Sir Charles Warren arrived at Suakin and was soon recalled, to be succeeded by Major (afterwards Colonel Sir) C. Watson. Both warmly advocated a conciliatory policy, which appeared hopeful; but the latter also was quickly recalled, and, repudiating the views of Sir F. Stephenson, as in the matter of the Nile Expedition,‡ the War Office telegraphed: "In the opinion of the military authorities, in which Mr. Campbell-Bannerman concurs, it would be very unwise to open the trade as proposed." The situation then became acute. "Suakin was insulted and threatened . . . the gardens under the walls were pillaged at night, and once more Suakin was in a state of siege." §

A fourth expedition of 4,750 men under Major-General (afterwards Field Marshal Lord) Grenfell descended upon Suakin, on December 20, 1887, and the besieging tribesmen were routed. The whole story of the Fate of the Sudan until our occupation is painful reading. Misunderstand-

\* Final Report to Sir G. Graham.

† *The Fate of the Sudan*, January, 1892, dealing, *inter alia*, with Major (now Lieut.-General) Sir F. Wingate's excellent book *Mahdism and the Eastern Sudan*.

‡ See p. 49.

§ My article in *Edinburgh Review*.



ings, indecision, and consequent changes of policy led to unnecessary loss of life and much suffering. After the fall of the Liberal Government in 1895, I was included in a little deputation to Lord Salisbury on behalf of the Sudanese; but I can only remember trying to say a few words of sympathy for the tribesmen.

The expedition of 1885—a trivial incident from the present military point of view—severely taxed our energies at the time; but my brief experiences as Military Secretary and Political Officer were infinitely instructive. I reached some strong conclusions as to the defects in our staff system, which stood openly revealed in the Boer War and were not remedied till 1904. My belief that Gordon could have been saved, if the advice of Sir Andrew Clarke and Sir Gerald Graham \* had been taken, was strongly confirmed. The difficulties, military and physical, were less than we supposed, and the available water supply on the first portion of the Berber route was far greater than we then knew. The obvious disadvantages of a line of communications of “about 1,500 miles” (Lord Wolseley’s dispatch of June 15), as compared with one of 250 miles, and the fact that a desert expedition, with an inadequate and inefficient supply of camels,† had to be begun at Korti 1,220 miles from the sea base, proved fatal to success. Into Suakin all the resources of the Empire could have been poured.

And now all had ended, bringing only disappointment to our plans and hopes. On May 23, we landed at Alexandria, our destination being still uncertain. On the 28th, Lord Wolseley telegraphed to Sir G. Graham: “You may go home any way you like, if it does not cost Government anything”; and the latter, with many of the old staff, left

\* See pp. 48–50.

† Sir George Arthur has stated that Lord Wolseley’s “objections to the Suakin route were the difficulty of finding the number of camels necessary for transport and the possibility that a small check at the end of a long march across an almost waterless desert might bring disaster” (*Life of Lord Wolseley*). The number of camels that could quickly have been landed at Suakin was unlimited. It was the hopeless deficiency of camels, and the “check at the end of a long march,” that made the attempt to relieve Khartum impossible.

in the *Jumna* on the 31st, stopping at Malta for some hours and being signalled to communicate at Gibraltar, where we learned that the Amir had been assassinated. On June 13, I arrived at Waterloo, and was met by my wife, Mr. Cashel Hoey, and Captain Jackson, R.N.

## CHAPTER VII

COLONIAL DEFENCE, 1885-92. MISSIONS ABROAD, 1885-86

THE fear of war with Russia, widely felt throughout the Empire in 1885, was natural, if somewhat exaggerated. Complete helplessness was realised at many distant ports, where it was believed that a few cruisers like the *Rurik* and *Rossia* could easily work destruction. If we had possessed an adequate navy, panic symptoms might have been allayed; but we were then dangerously weak at sea, and local defences—no substitute—were, therefore, in popular demand. The Colonial Office was deluged with appeals, which had to be passed to the War Office, Admiralty, and Treasury, involving complicated inter-departmental correspondence, which might lead nowhere.

On April 14, the Hon. Robert Meade, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, proposed to set up "a small Standing Committee, composed of Representatives of the three Departments," to deal with all the defence correspondence. The recommendations of this Committee were to be sent "to those members of the Colonial Committee of the Cabinet departmentally concerned, *i.e.* Lord Hartington, Lord Northbrook, and Lord Derby; when any question of Imperial funds is concerned, they could go to Mr. Childers also." Mr. Meade's minute, which wandered around the Departments and collected twelve sets of approving initials, was to prove the starting-point of important developments. Sir Andrew Clarke became Chairman, with Mr. Meade, Colonel (afterwards Lieut.-General Sir H.) Geary, R.A., and Captain T. S. Jackson, R.N., as original members.\* Captain (now Colonel Sir)

\* A Treasury representative, Mr. R. (now Lord) Chalmers, was added later at my suggestion.

H. Jekyll, the able ex-Secretary of Lord Carnarvon's Commission, was appointed Secretary, but resigned in June to take up another post, and I was selected as his successor.

Thus, again apparently by chance, I found the opportunities which I most desired. All defence papers from the Colonial Office came to me, and for seven years I worked with Mr. (afterwards Sir) R. Meade, to whom I owe more than I can express. It became my duty to study the local conditions of all Colonies, and to draft and print recommendations for discussion by the Committee. There had then been no attempt to organise the defence of the Empire as a whole, and in October, 1886, I drew up a long memorandum "for the guidance of Governors" in making local preparations for war, in which all the various means of defence were included, and suggestions for dealing with each and with civil requirements were outlined. It was requested that "a small Standing Defence Committee should at once be established in each Colony. . . . The duty of the Committee would be the organisation of the resources of the Colony and the preparation of a general scheme of defence on the lines above indicated in sufficient detail to enable it to be put in force without any delay." The principal points to be dealt with by the local Committees were laid down, and the schemes were to be returned to the Colonial Office every year for examination and criticism. At the same time I prepared elaborate forms in which all the resources of a Colony bearing directly or indirectly on defence could be entered, the forms to be corrected annually and returned for information. The Committee approved these proposals, and the Instructions and Forms were sent out under the authority of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The four so-called "fortresses"—Gibraltar, Malta, Halifax, and Bermuda—were at first excluded from our purview; but later this embargo was removed.

It was a small beginning of Imperial organisation; but the scheme soon worked with success varying with localities and individuals. The annual reports began regularly

to arrive and to be sent back with mildly-worded criticisms and suggestions. Local interest in many Colonies was strongly aroused, and where the Governor or a local G.O.C. gave personal attention, well-considered schemes were evolved. Before I left the Colonial Defence Committee, this organisation was operating smoothly, and code words had been arranged conveying orders (1) for preparation in accordance with the scheme, but short of expenditure, and (2) complete preparations for imminent war.

The work grew steadily, and the functions of the Committee gradually extended far beyond its original charter. I was directed by the Secretary of State to prepare a summary of our proceedings up to October 31, 1891, by which date we had dealt with 478 agenda at 58 meetings, circulated 87 printed memoranda, and criticised 61 local defence schemes. In addition, we had made detailed proposals for the strength of all colonial garrisons and dealt with 151 subjects of the most varied character, almost all our recommendations being accepted and acted upon.

There were some large questions in the background, and in the autumn of 1885 I tried to urge the pressing need of a Colonial Conference. Mr. Meade was sympathetic, as always, and I think that Sir Robert Herbert, a broad-minded Imperialist, was an early supporter of the idea; but there were then misgivings in some quarters. The necessity for personal discussion with Colonial (now Dominion) statesmen doubtless appealed to many other minds at this time, and in the following year the invitations were sent out by Mr. Stanhope on behalf of Lord Salisbury's second Administration.\*

The first Imperial Conference met in 1887, and the opening scene was not auspicious. Lord Salisbury had not consulted the Colonial Office, and we were a little anxious as to what he might say. The question of the New Hebrides was just then burning rather fiercely in

\* In 1901, believing that a second conference was overdue, I wrote a strong appeal in the first issue of the *Empire Review* (February), headed "Wanted an Imperial Conference."

Australia, and the Prime Minister most unfortunately treated it lightly, implying that the use of a large-scale map sufficed to dispose of the matter. There was sound sense in Lord Salisbury's statement; but it was unhappily worded, and any one who understood the Australian point of view could have no doubt of what would follow. There were three of the bitterest speeches I have heard, which wisely were never published. One Australian representative said: "The speech to which we have just listened might have been made by a French Minister."

On April 6, 1887, the Conference discussed the proposals of the Admiralty, based on Admiral Tryon's Report for strengthening the local Naval forces of Australasia by five *Archers* and two torpedo vessels to be maintained by the Colonies at a fixed annual contribution of £122,597 for a period of ten years. These proposals were not well received, by the representatives of Victoria and South Australia especially, and no decision was reached. Carefully following the discussion, it seemed to me that a simple modification might lead to unanimity, and I wrote at once a Memorandum to Mr. Meade in which I pointed out that:

"Unity of action among the Australian group should be the first object of Her Majesty's Government. . . . No such favourable opportunity of arriving at a decision may be obtained for years, and it seems specially important that the first Colonial Conference should achieve a palpable success. If the question of the Australasian Navy remains unsettled, the Conference must necessarily be regarded as a failure. To arrive at a settlement, therefore, a compromise appears to be necessary, and a moderate concession on the part of the Imperial Government would be justified in view of the extreme desirability of giving a fair start to what constitutes a new phase of Colonial policy."

I ended by suggesting certain concessions. This Memorandum was printed the same evening, at once accepted by the Admiralty, and adopted unanimously by the

Conference. I did not regard this ten years' agreement as satisfactory, and when later I came fully to understand Australian sentiment, I saw that it could not endure. It was, however, the beginning of a movement which in good time led to the notable services of the Australasian Navy in the Great War.

The discussion of April 6 revealed what seemed to be misunderstandings in regard to the principles of local Naval defence, and I wrote for Sir Henry Holland (afterwards Lord Knutsford) a note on the general aspects of the question, pointing out that :

"The whole question seemed to be handled as if Australia were in a ring fence, and provided that the force maintained within that fence was adequate, all the conditions of defence were fulfilled. . . . The whole standard of defence of the Australian Colonies is based on the fact that an enemy could send small squadrons only into their waters ; that few, if any, ironclads would be able to reach Australian ports, and that considerable expeditions could not be undertaken.\* But these limitations to an enemy's action, which have been universally accepted, exist solely in consequence of the great ironclad fleet maintained by the Imperial Government in European waters, and based upon fortresses and coaling stations created and maintained without charge to Australian tax-payers."

The Victorian representatives had alluded to an intention to spend £500,000 on the fixed defences of Port Phillip, as a reason why the naval contribution might be unpalatable. As this would certainly involve waste, I pointed out that : "In the view of Her Majesty's Government, the conditions of local defence would be very materially changed by the permanent addition of seven ships of war to the Australian station. If that increase becomes an accomplished fact, the scale of future expenditure on local defence may undoubtedly be modified." This note was

\* So far as Russia was concerned, I think this was justified, but relatively to France we had fallen below a safe standard in 1887 (see p. 40).

printed on April 23 and circulated to the Conference, where perhaps it may have helped to clear the air.

My work on the Colonial Defence Committee, from 1885-92, was most instructive and stimulating. I was brought into touch with four Departments of State, and the Colonial Office especially, learning many lessons on the problems of administration. It was a great gain to come in contact with such able First Sea Lords as Admirals Sir Cooper Key and Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, with a stern Treasury economist like Sir Reginald (afterwards Lord) Welby, and with officials like Sir Robert Herbert and Sir Robert Meade, who succeeded him, and to whom doubtless I owe my first and second decorations.\* Colonial officials and private individuals used frequently to visit me, bringing direct information of value, and my opportunities of trying to inculcate the broad principles at which I had arrived were exceptional. The Secretaryship of the Committee passed to able successors, who all made their mark, and after 1904 I was again to be closely associated with its work in Whitehall Gardens.

Many and varied experiences came to me during this eventful period. In the autumn of 1885 Captain Jackson and I accompanied Sir Andrew Clarke to see the trials of the Nordenfelt submarine, first visiting an interesting exhibition at Antwerp, and then going on to Hamburg and the delightful city of Copenhagen on our way to Landskrona. Here the hospitable Swedes placed the gunboat *Edda* at the disposal of the thirty-nine officers from all European countries, as well as from Japan and Mexico. I described the trials in two articles in the *Times* (October 1 and 9), explaining the technical peculiarities of the boat and its performances. It always retained surplus buoyancy and was dragged under water by horizontal screws in sponsons on the beam, the motive power being super-heated steam, and the fire-box requiring to be sealed during submergence. We were all impressed with

\* C.M.G. 1887 and K.C.M.G. 1893. On parting Sir R. Meade gave me an inscribed silver inkstand which remains a cherished memento of those strenuous years.



the potentialities revealed, and I wrote that : " It is certain that the Nordenfelt boat, as at present existing, will effect no revolution ; but it seems equally clear that we shall shortly have to face possibilities which we have hitherto been able to neglect. Scientific experiment, in other words, money judiciously employed, will enable us to hold our own in any future development of submarine warfare." \*

Watching the evolutions of the boat, it occurred to me that the application of the principle of the *camera obscura* to a tube standing on the deck of the submarine would enable it to be navigated under water, and I made the suggestion to Mr. Nordenfelt. This idea would later have occurred to many minds, as the submarine without a periscope would have been a failure.

It was proposed by the British representatives that the international officers should give a dance to the ladies of Landskrona, and invitations were sent out by Captain Nordenfelt of the Swedish Horse Artillery. I remember the huddled crowd of damsels at the end of the room requiring courage to break up, as they knew no language that we could speak. Sir Andrew Clarke danced like the youngest of us, and I think this simple festivity, at which the refreshments consisted of beer and sausages, was a success. From Landskrona, we went to Stockholm, just too late for the outdoor life of this charming city. The Swedes showed us the greatest kindness, and King Oscar entertained us at dinner and expressed keen interest in my book on Plevna. We were taken to visit the coast defences ; but the wise precaution of including ladies interfered with our powers of observation, and I noted mainly that the works were well concealed.

There had been some disagreement between Mr. Hawkesley, the great engineer, and the City authorities as to the great waterworks under construction by the Corporation of Liverpool, and the former had spoken disrespectfully of the dam which was to hold up the water of the Vyrnwy valley in North Wales. Public opinion having been thus unsettled, Sir Andrew Clarke was asked

\* *Times*. October 9, 1885.

to report, and I went with him to inspect the site of the new lake-reservoir. I calculated the strength of the dam, which had, of course, a large factor of safety, and the only question was the soundness of the structure. The work was being perfectly carried out by the engineer in charge, and all that could be done was to take out a core to prove that it was solid to the bottom. This was arranged, when I was called away and Major T. English took up the question. From Sinaia in the Carpathians, I posted a draft Report to Sir A. Clarke, of which I only remember stating that nothing but an earthquake would endanger the dam, and happily that has not occurred.

In June, 1886, Mr. Gladstone's Government was defeated on the Second Reading of the Home Rule Bill, and a dissolution followed. Sir Andrew Clarke resigned his office in order to stand for Chatham. I wrote his election address—my only effort of the kind—and went to help him in his twelve days' contest, and to canvass for the first and last time in my life.\* Mr. Gladstone sent a telegram which contained the words: "I rejoice in the prospect of your entering Parliament, where you will not, like your opponent, run down Lord Spencer for his brave and manly government of Ireland." This was unfortunate, as our astute opponents turned the telegram to their own advantage by shifting the comma to follow "will" instead of "not." There were no militant Socialists in those days, and the election was peaceful; but Sir John Gorst retained his majority.

On December 12, 1885, after spending a few days at Vienna and Buda-Pest, Major (now Major-General Sir) D. O'Callaghan and I arrived at Bucharest to report upon an elaborate series of artillery trials. Two cupolas, French (St. Chamond) and German (Gruson), were in competition for the armament of a ring of forts designed by General Brialmont for the defence of the capital. Each competitor had his newspaper recording daily the achievements of the one and the disabilities of the other,

\* My first political article appeared in the *Chatham and Rochester Observer*, June 30, 1886.

which caused us much amusement. We found another great gathering of officers from all countries, and I was again dimly conscious that the British representatives were regarded as strange and unaccountable animals. The Roumanians were always cordial; but of the rest of this great cosmopolitan assemblage, the two Turks seemed to be most attracted to us. One was an elderly Artillery officer, who at an early date said, "You take notes; I will copy them"—a resolve which he occasionally remembered. The other was a young "Capitaine de Frégate," who seemed to know nothing, but was invariably friendly.

Bucharest covers an immense area; the streets are few; but the roads which probably followed casual sheep-tracks, form an intricate maze, making our numerous calls difficult even to the native drivers. The cold was intense—below zero on some nights; but locomotion by sleigh was rapid and exhilarating. In strange surroundings, we spent six weeks. Our work at the "Polygone," where the trials were carried out, was heavy, but we had both been trained to these performances. Then there was the writing up of notes in spare half-hours, endless official visits, skating, lunches, dinners, suppers, dances, the opera and theatres.\* The Roumanians and the few English residents showed us unbounded hospitality. We were taken over the military institutions, and everything possible was arranged for our instruction and entertainment. At the cafés, where people used to foregather at a late hour for a *thé au rhum*, a notable visitor was a huge ram, known as "*le bélier*," which used to wander in and out, finding delight in the smoke of cigarettes held under its nose. Here we heard *Tsigane* music, wild and semi-barbaric, but often sad and beautiful.

I suppose that I was at this time depressed about my prospects, as I find in my diary, December 31: "So ended a bad year, taking it all round. Full of disappointment and of hard work. No success, but some good times, and anyhow E. and V. [my wife and daughter] are well and

\* I retain a confused recollection of *Hamlet* well acted in Roumanian and of *Linda di Chamonix*.

cheery. Better luck for the year that has begun. Thank Heaven one cannot foresee what is coming."

Among memories now dim are a visit to the beautiful summer palace at Sinaia,\* in the Carpathians, and our private reception by King Charles, wisest of then living Hohenzollerns, and later justly regarded as an influence for sanity, when Europe was being headed towards the abyss. At the banquet on January 9, also, the King showed us marked kindness, and we had to explain—unconvincingly—why we alone of all the foreign officers present did not wear the decoration which he had conferred. Being apprised beforehand, we had referred to our *chargé d'affaires*, Mr. (afterwards Sir) Percy Sanderson, who telegraphed laconically, "Impossible d'accepter." When, therefore, an official of the Court brought the insignia of the *Etoile Roumaine* to our hotel, we had felt obliged to refuse the honour. More experienced persons would doubtless have accepted the decorations, worn them on the occasion of the banquet, and discussed propriety afterwards. As it happened, we were made to commit what was regarded as a *bêtise* characteristic of the English and unintelligible to a Swede or a German.

Among incidents forgotten I find such items as :

"Then to *Cercle Militaire* and found whole garrison in full dress. War Minister very polite. We were much stared at. *Thé au rhum* ; more champagne, which made talking French decidedly easier. Discussed Plevna with a Colonel who was with Skobelev, knew Gourko, etc. War Minister expounded his project for a port on the Black Sea. He is a smart fellow with a look of Dizzy."

This, after a long day at the Polygone, followed by a big dinner party ; but we were young. Or this : "Saw Madame Cora in a cage with five lions, rather a grisly performance as they evidently did not like it, and her arms had been terribly scarred by 'Louis.'"

Here is my description of the Royal *chasse aux loups*

\* Here, on January 11, 1886, I find in my diary, "Wrote long letter to Sir A. [Clarke] with Sketch Report on Liverpool dam."

organised for the few foreign officers, except regular military attachés, remaining on January 16, 1886 :

"Started 7 a.m. . . . costumes marvellous. One man dressed in wolf skin with a muff. After an hour and a half in the train to Fratesti, got into a *trainot* with four small horses and one driver on the near wheeler. Party consisted of a Belgian, French, and Roumanian officer, two *paysans*, and ourselves. Arrived late and found a long line of guns posted. Chose a place and waited patiently. Soon a great noise, drums, bugles, shouting, etc., and the beaters (cavalry) hove in sight. About ten shots in all were fired. I never saw anything except crows. Result—3 hares and 2 foxes, for 150 guns and 1,000 beaters. Missed the luncheon and got to a village \* where were only sour bread and some coffee. Picturesqueness of the scene indescribable. King very kind. They all thought us lost."

What had happened was that the beaters had camped for two nights close to the tract believed to hold wolves, and had lighted fires and sung vigorously. There was probably not a wolf within ten miles when we arrived, and the official responsible for the fiasco had unpleasant experiences.

Major O'Callaghan and I were under orders to go to Malta and Gibraltar, and our telegrams from the War Office had been puzzling. As I was particularly anxious to see Plevna, and we both wished to visit the battlefields of the recent Serbo-Bulgarian campaign, we decided that Sofia lay on the most direct route to Constantinople. On January 23, very tired, but not without regrets, we left Bucharest with Mr. (afterwards Sir) V. Chirol, then on the staff of the *Standard*, whom I first met in Egypt and who had been our good companion for many days. We crossed the Danube from Giurgevo to Rustchuk on the following day, chartered two carriages with four and three horses, completed our victualling arrangements, and started for

\* This village, far out in the country, which we had the chance of seeing, was little, if at all, more advanced than the Indian villages I was to know more than twenty years later.

Plevna, spending a night at Biela and another at Vino in little hahns, where the sleeping accommodation was horribly dirty and restricted to one tiny room with only two beds, well populated.

On the 26th we reached the little town of Plevna, unknown till 1877, and then to win temporary celebrity. Here we spent two days riding over the battlefields of August 30 and September 11, and examining the Turkish defences, which I had studied on paper far into many nights in 1879-80, and gaining new insight into Osman Pasha's memorable defence. Unfortunately there was a baffling mist, which made general impressions of the position impossible. Once only, when we were on the Grivitza plateau, "the fog lifted a little and we saw a glorious view to the east and south—the ridges sharp and clear, the valleys in a silver mist; beyond, the Balkans rugged and snow-covered" (Diary). Our guide was a Turk, who had served as a corporal in the central sector, and we owed to Mr. Chirol's knowledge of Turkish the information he could give. "Everywhere are skulls and bones whitening the fields—a miserable sight" (Diary).

After difficulty with an intoxicated driver, we started, still in mist, crossing the Vid and passing through the western defences of Plevna to Gorny Dubnik—a great redoubt where 4,000 Turks resisted 20,000 picked Russian troops with sixty guns for ten hours. Then came Telische with another great work surrendered to Gourko after bombardment, thus completing Todleben's investment and isolating Plevna. On December 10, 1877, shortly before midnight, the last effort to break away to the West was hopelessly shattered. General Ganetsky received Osman Pasha's unconditional surrender, and "personally set out to visit his brave, resolute, and wounded enemy. . . . Thus the system of operations adopted at Plevna, consisting of a persevering adherence to a close blockade, . . . resulted in the attainment of the desired object." \*

After Lukovitza the country begins to resemble the

\* Todleben's Report.

lower Alps and becomes very fine at Orkanié, where there was another strongly fortified position, part of the defences of the pass, which the Turks failed to hold against Gourko's well-planned advance on Sofia. We left Orkanié in a fog, and "walked up the last part of the ascent. At the top, the mist suddenly lifted like a stage curtain and disclosed marvellous effects—glimpses of high snow peaks on the left, rich indigo mountains in front tinted with warm sepia by the trees" (Diary).

After lunching at "Hotel Gourko" (a little shanty) at Taskhössen, we reached Sofia in the dark over an appalling stretch of road, to find ourselves in a civilised hotel and to read a telegram, "posted up in the billiard-room crowded with Bulgarian officers" (Diary), announcing the fall of Lord Salisbury's Government. Here we remained for six strenuous days and rode over the battlefield of Slivnitsa, where the course of the fighting was explained to us by officers who had been engaged. On February 4, we drove to Czaribrod over the Dragoman Pass to visit the forces still on the Serbian frontier, riding next day over scenes of the fighting. At night the village was pathetically illuminated, "each house having two or three dips burning" in honour of Bulgarian Union. In the evening two priests came in and made a centre of the eager political talk characteristic of the Balkan peoples.

Throughout our stay at Sofia the young Bulgarian officers were most cordial, showing us over their barracks and military institutions, while from Sir Frank Lascelles, our Minister, we received the greatest help and kindness. Prince Alexander of Battenberg, the hero of the only war in which all the senior officers on one side, being Russians, were withdrawn at the start, entertained us at the New Palace and spoke gratefully of the support he had received from Lord Salisbury. When we parted from him, we little thought that he was soon to be kidnapped and taken across the Danube, one of the leaders in this disgraceful episode being a Bulgarian officer who was introduced to us as having specially distinguished himself in the war. From the full information we gleaned, it was clear that the youngest

army in Europe owed a decisive victory to the fine leadership of the Prince and the wonderful marching power of the Rumelian militia, which reached the scene of action at a critical moment.\*

Sofia, in those days, was only beginning to be modernised and lacked all means of recreation. "The Bulgarians," I then wrote, "will need amusing by-and-by," and a naturally dour people with an unfortunate *penchant* for politics certainly require distractions.

On the 7th we started in two carriages, taking a wounded Bulgarian soldier, for Philippopolis along the route now followed by the Orient Express. At Ichtiman we stopped for the night, and a Bulgarian tried to translate a recent play entitled *Milan* into Turkish, which was rendered to us by Mr. Chirol. All I recorded was: "*General*: That noise is the Bulgarians retreating. *Milan*: Then I had better go to the front" (Diary). This was the gist of it all, and at that time the Bulgarians had the liveliest contempt for the Serbians, who twenty-six years later proved themselves staunch fighters.

When next day we crossed the pass, there was a splendid view in brilliant sunshine: "In front, the fertile plain of Philippopolis; right, the Rhodope range, snow-capped and quite close; left and distant, the blue wall of the Balkans, the highest peaks covered with snow" (Diary).

The large Turkish village of Tatar Bazardchik, where we made a short halt, is wonderfully picturesque, and Philippopolis, built about four rugged hills, full of Roman remains and now the centre of the attar of roses industry, is intensely interesting. Here we met Captain Jones, V.C., our Consul-General, who entertained us royally, and told

\* In after years it was publicly stated, doubtless for propaganda purposes, that Prince Alexander deserted his troops at Slivnitza, and I made a vigorous attempt to defend him from this baseless slander. The Slivnitza position was threatened with being turned on the left by a Serbian column moving through the hills, when he hurried back to Sofia and succeeded in organising a force which averted the danger. Full justice has never been done to the best ruler Bulgaria ever had, and I once begged Admiral H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg to publish the papers at his disposal.



us the inner history of the revolution in which he was one of the prime movers. All this is now forgotten, though the effects were far-reaching. Eastern Rumelia, under the Treaty of Berlin, was constituted an autonomous state with a Turkish Governor-General, and the Turks were to retain the right of garrisoning the Balkan Passes. The Serbian attack united Bulgaria as proposed in the Treaty of San Stefano, and what had been regarded only seven years before as a British triumph at Berlin instantly passed into oblivion. The lesson was lost upon the framers of the Treaty of Versailles, who sowed broadcast the seeds of future troubles.

The Prefect of Philippopolis, a very intelligent and "politically-minded" young Bulgarian, took us up a hill from which there was "a grand view of the old town and distant mountains."

On the 10th we reached Adrianople and visited the great mosque of Sultan Selim. "Proportions magnificent and some of the marble work very fine; but new colouring crude and offensive" (Diary). From a minaret with 240 steps we obtained a fine view of the town and the ring of forts. Adrianople was occupied by Skobelev on January 22, 1878, and Gourko's force was concentrated there on the 27th for the advance on Constantinople. In 1912, Adrianople made a memorable defence against the combined armies of the Balkan States; but the ill-designed permanent forts, two of which, luckily escaping arrest, we inspected, had been supplemented by earth-works.

On February 12 we arrived at Constantinople, after obtaining a good view of the Tchatalja Lines—a fine defensive position then armed and garrisoned by the Turks. Of Baron Hirsch's line from Philippopolis, which was paid for at so much per kilometre, we formed a poor opinion. It was badly laid out and the train service was execrable. Sir William White, our Ambassador, received us with the greatest kindness. His knowledge of the Near East was amazing, and he was outspoken to or beyond the verge of discretion. Had we been served at

Constantinople in the two years before 1914 by a representative with his commanding personality and intimate knowledge of the Turk, much would have happened differently in the Great War.

We visited all the places of special interest in the wonderful capital of the East Roman Empire. Of San Sophia I noted: "a noble building, decorations showing exquisitely toned tints; light everywhere, none of the gloom of a Gothic cathedral, but general effect spoiled by hideous green medallions bearing verses of the Koran" (Diary).

The Mosque of Bajazid still had its great court "simply crammed with pigeons," as when the young von Moltke wrote of them: "Doubtless they are descended from the pigeon which whispered into the ear of the Prophet, I know not what news; but most of these birds would be much embarrassed to establish their lineage. One could not bring more exactitude to bear upon it than on that of the numerous nephews of the Prophet."

We explored the mysteries of the bazaars and bargained over cups of coffee with their solemn denizens. Sir W. White took us in the Embassy launch up the Bosphorus with "two Englishmen—one a Professor of something somewhere. Views magnificent, palace after palace, ruins, cypress trees and grand effects. Caiques everywhere and the souls of erring odalisques flitting up and down" (Diary).

At the Embassy we met Baron von der Goltz, whom I described in my diary as "a fine fellow decidedly."\* Among distinct memories are the little British graveyard at Scutari "beautifully kept," and the weird desolation of the vast Turkish cemetery "a maze of broken stone and black cypresses." On February 17 we lunched at the Embassy for the last time, finding Sir W. White much perturbed by some impending change of policy which he could not understand. On the following day we started with an Embassy bag for Athens, after parting with our

\* In the *Quarterly Review*, October, 1891, "Germany and von Moltke," I noticed his remarkable book *Rosbach und Jena*.

good friend Mr. Chirol, whose experience and knowledge of the Turks had been invaluable.

We woke on the morning of the 18th to find ourselves at anchor off the Dardanelles, where we tried to sketch one of the forts. The immense advantages of the Straits for purposes of defence, which the Germans were to turn to account, became clear to us, and we studied through field-glasses the old castles at the entrance which offered most attractive targets to naval fire and were destined to create illusions sadly dispelled.

At Athens, Sir Horace Rumbold received us most cordially and spoke openly about Greek affairs and of his distrust of the new Ministry. Our time was too short; but who can ever forget the contrast between the magnificent pile of the Acropolis and the tawdry modern town? Nowhere else does the ancient civilisation seem so cruelly to mock that of which we boast. The evidences of her long dead past still dominate Athens, and the achievements of the little, largely sterile State which gave imperishable art and a great literature to the world appear almost mythical when one views all that remains of the old Greek Empire.

On the 21st we landed at Naples, where "after dark Vesuvius showed out wonderfully; great streaks of glowing lava and occasionally a shoot of flame" (Diary).

There was time to see lovely Sorrento, Pompeii, and the famous Museum, filled with art treasures, and to hear *Aida* at the Grand Opera House, followed by a beautiful ballet. On the 23rd we landed at Messina and went on by train through perfectly beautiful country to Catania. Starting next morning at 5 a.m., we had an "exquisite view of Etna rosy with the rising sun—a splendid cone rising above blue-black hills—in the foreground a glorious sweep of the bay, blue waters with one white sail" (Diary). The ruins, Greek and Roman, the great catacombs and the caverns of Dionysius at Syracuse, are marvellous, and in the luxuriance of the gardens, Nature displayed her constancy amid the ruins of the great works of dead races.

On February 25 we landed at Malta, and found ourselves again in military harness. It was our duty to inspect all the defence works, and in consultation with the local authorities to make recommendations in regard to them and their armaments. At Malta the old Vauban school had revelled in an orgy of drawing-board fortifications, of which Valetta is an outstanding example. The battle of the Nile settled the fate of the island, and, as always in such cases, the fixed defences proved of little account. We, in our eighty-four years of occupation, had shown disregard of principles, and I find in my diary some caustic criticisms of our achievements. For three weeks we worked strenuously and covered the whole island. The R.A. and R.E. officers gave us every assistance, and only the Governor, General Sir Lintorn Simmons, appeared to resent our activities. It was quite natural that he, as a former Inspector-General of Fortifications, should dislike the intrusion of a young captain into his kingdom. Fortunately he agreed cordially with us as regards one peculiarly fatuous defence work, which, however, turned out to have been erected during his reign at the War Office.

On March 27 we arrived at Gibraltar, where General Sir John Adye warmly welcomed us, and I was back in the surroundings I so well knew. After another strenuous period we left for home, and arrived on April 5.

Then followed a long spell of night work in drawing up a monumental Report and working up our sketches. One result was, I believe, to avert the adoption of the cupola defences which, in Belgium and Roumania, proved futile in the Great War; but our armament work at Malta and Gibraltar may have been of more importance. At the former we found a museum of 831 guns of 27 natures, many of them long obsolete. We reached agreement with the R.A. and R.E. officers for the removal of 581 guns and the addition of 152. This drastic revision may have saved years of involved official correspondence. Incidentally, we laid stress on the disguising of coast defences by various methods. This four months' tour was

an educative experience of great importance affecting my subsequent writings.\*

In August, 1886, I received the following orders: "His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief desires that you will proceed to Linz this day [18th] for the purpose of attending the pontooning operations of the Austrian Army." On the 20th I arrived at this charming little Danubian town, where I was received with the greatest cordiality by the officers of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Pioneer Regiment and by H.I.H. the Archduke John commanding the Army Corps. My German was not very strong, and Lieutenant Weidinger was appointed to be my cicerone. The pontooning operations lasted fifteen days and were most instructive. I was thus suddenly plunged into the simple life of an Austrian country garrison which interested me intensely. There was a young Pioneer officer who was known as *der Engländer*, because he had long, fair Dundreary whiskers. This was clearly an impression derived from Leech's pictures in the bygone pages of *Punch*, and it seemed to indicate how little one nation may know of the habits of another. At a café, the advertised attraction was a giant and a *black man*, the latter a Somali lascar who would not have deflected any attention in Oxford Street. I had supper with a Colonel, where the daughters of the house, to my dismay, waited upon the guests, and I attended a regimental party where some ladies tried to improve my German while enjoying sausages and draughts of beer of which I was afraid. I dined—at 2 p.m.—with the Archduke John and had much talk with him and Lieut.-General Beck, both greatly interested in the Sudan. I had read a military pamphlet by the Archduke which I fortunately remembered. Small and vivacious, he struck me as original and advanced in his military opinions. In his room there was a beautifully painted but decidedly *risqué* picture of a classical subject, for which he said he had

\* Our offence in visiting Sofia without any authority was condoned, doubtless on account of dispatches to the Foreign Office from Sir F. Lascelles and Sir William White, who supported our irregular proceedings.

recently apologised to an Archbishop, who tactfully observed: "But that was in the days before sin." Not many years later my host disappeared, and as John Orth served in a sailing ship believed to have been lost on the coast of South America; but the mystery was never solved, and more than once since reports of his death have appeared in the newspapers.

I was able to examine one of the famous forty-two towers of Linz begun by the Archduke Maximilian in 1830 and highly praised by Marmont. Of them I afterwards wrote: "The Linz towers contained the germ of the modern entrenched camp, and were, in many respects, far superior to works subsequently constructed." \* Before leaving, I managed a trip to Ischl, which I found disappointing; but Gmunden and the lovely Traunensee linger in my memory. A number of officers came to bid me farewell at the station, and lasting impressions of the kindness I received from the Austrians made it most difficult to regard them as real enemies in the Great War. I had now within a few months seen something of three European armies from the inside and had noted defects from which we also suffered at this time.

On September 5, I was back in London, to struggle with another elaborate report, of which the gist was the merits of the old Birago boat pontoons.† I also tried to define the bridging requirements of European warfare in the light of the exercises I had witnessed.

\* *Fortification*, 1890.

† Our sausage system, on which I was brought up at Chatham, had before this been replaced by boats designed by Major (now Lieut.-General Sir) Bindon Blood.

## CHAPTER VIII

### MISSIONS ABROAD, 1888-1900

ON September 8, 1888, I arrived in New York with instructions to report upon the Zalinski "pneumatic gun," and to visit Government establishments and private factories of special interest. I was met on board the *Bothnia* by Lieutenant Paull, U.S.N., who took me to the Navy Yard, where the Admiral had just received orders—a Presidential election being imminent—to enter a number of men for whom he had no use, and was naturally annoyed. I shall never forget the kindness of the Staff who showed me over the Yard, and delivered me late in the evening on board the *Providence*, a luxurious paddling hotel with the "walking beam" engines now extinct. I was met at 5 a.m. on September 9 at Newport by my good friend Captain Goodrich, who conveyed me to the Torpedo Station on Goat Island, where he was in command. I found a complete itinerary made out, and it was arranged that he should accompany me during part of the tour. All that was done for me was most inadequately described by the Secretary of the Navy as "some little recognition of the services\* rendered to this Department." Our Naval Attaché, Captain Gore-Jones, who was known to be of an energetically inquiring disposition, had recently visited the station, where he was shown everything. One room, however, in a rather prominent position, was purposely kept locked, and his efforts to look into it were gently but persistently baffled. *It was empty*, and I wondered what he reported!

My stay at Goat Island was made delightful by Captain

\* To Commander Goodrich in 1882 (see p. 28).

and Mrs. Goodrich. I was able to see some of the Newport "cottages"—palaces of luxury—and the *Stiletto*, the first torpedo boat of the U.S. Navy—wooden and blazing from her funnel when she was forced—took us several trips. At the Naval War College, I heard a thoughtful lecture by Captain A. T. Mahan, the Commandant, on "Naval Strategy in relation to the Gulf and the Caribbean Sea," of which I was reminded when his great book, *The Influence of Sea Power on History*, appeared. He and another able lecturer both insisted upon the annexation of Cuba to provide a naval station "essential to the effective assertion of naval supremacy in the Gulf," and after the Spanish War of 1898, Porto Rico, though not Cuba, became American territory.

My travels extended North to Toronto and Halifax, West to Chicago and Pittsburg, South to Washington and Annapolis. In the Navy and Army schools at Annapolis, West Point and Willets Point (Engineers) and the Government factories, I found little to learn. At West Point, General Parke and Colonel Michie showed me everything. The position of this great military academy on a bend of the noble Hudson river, commanding magnificent views, is unrivalled; but the teaching seemed somewhat behind the times, in fortification and tactics especially. On the other hand, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, under the direction of General Walker, appeared far ahead of anything we then possessed. Here 800 students were engaged on four-year courses of technical instruction, and I noted, "Teaching appliances exceeded anything I ever dreamed of" (Diary, September 17). Here perhaps was one of the forces at the back of the amazing industrial activity which I found everywhere. The great watch factory at Waltham Abbey was a notable example. An admirable organisation, and the most effective use of machinery were supplemented by amenities for the workers which I had never seen equalled. There were hostels providing cheap board and lodging, with recreation rooms for reading and dancing. A park had been recently presented by the company and laid out at



the cost of the employees. No wonder that "all seem happy, all well clothed, and all showed a high level of refinement" (Diary, September 18).\*

At the great Carnegie and Phipps Steel Works near Pittsburg, then enjoying the enormous advantage of being run entirely by natural gas, there was the same excellent management, almost wholly in the hands of young men—Mr. Schwab was twenty-eight, and Mr. Allbot, the Vice-Chairman, about thirty. The youth of the executive heads of the great industries seemed to account for the vigour which foreshadowed all that has happened since 1888.

The falls of Niagara—the even descent of vast masses of water into a calm pool below—impressed me less than the Whirlpool Rapids lower down, where the same water suddenly rages in the wildest confusion of ever-changing forms. Here, on the Canadian side, mocking this terrific display of Nature's forces, a little portable engine was laboriously pumping water to a hotel! †

Among memories still fairly clear is that of a dinner of the Loyal Legion at Delmonico's on October 3, when I was placed between the fine old veteran General Sherman and ex-President Hayes. The former had "plenty of fire left," and, as I had studied the Civil War, he found an appreciative listener to his reminiscences. I was unexpectedly called upon to make a speech, which was received with indulgence by the Legion, but must have seemed flat in a country where after-dinner speaking is a fine art.

At Pittsburg I received orders by cable to meet Major-General Goodenough at Halifax, "with a view to a good report on the defences being made for the information of His Royal Highness." The implied compliment—unusual in such communications—puzzled me and amused my American friends. I accordingly arrived at Halifax on October 11, and spent a week carefully inspecting all

\* Alas! that in after years there were great labour troubles.

† In 1924 Canada was using 3,227,000 horse-power generated by water, representing the equivalent of 29,000,000 tons of coal.

the defences and finding much to criticise. The autumn tints were superb ; but the wind was piercingly cold as we traversed the splendid harbour and examined the extraordinarily difficult country at Dartmouth, where it was proposed to build impossible forts.\* My incursions into Canada at Toronto and Halifax took me into what seemed a totally different country. The Canadian towns appeared places of rest in comparison with the surging, strenuous life of the American cities, but the people looked prosperous and happy. Upon Canada lay the unmistakable stamp of British habits, customs, and methods, which, in the Great Republic, had undergone changes, in the North especially. Canada then seemed like the England of the middle nineteenth century ; but later she was to receive powerful impulses from across the border.

I returned to New York viâ Boston and saw some interesting trials of the Zalinski dynamite guns at Fort Lafayette. Six shells were fired with great accuracy, but the one live shell failed to explode. The principal attraction of the pneumatic gun was that it could drop a mine containing 600 lb. of blasting gelatine at a range of 2,000 yards or one of 200 lb. at 3,500 yards, while—unlike our submarine mines—involving no danger to navigation. I reported favourably on the new weapon, and one gun was purchased by the Government of Victoria and afterwards taken over by the War Office. At Shoeburyness, it showed remarkable accuracy ; but the three 15-inch guns of the *Vesuvius* proved ineffective at the bombardment of the wretched defences of Santiago in 1898, for reasons which might have been anticipated. The pneumatic gun dropped out in the great advance of artillery ; but the energy and ingenuity which my late friend Major Zalinski brought to bear upon it deserved the highest praise. Like Ericsson and Hiram Maxim, he was a born inventor.

My experiences in America were peculiarly instructive. I brought away not only a mass of technical information,

\* Happily they were never constructed, and in 1905 the defences of Halifax and Esquimalt were handed over to the Dominion Government.

but a number of lasting impressions. The many Americans whom I met showed me unmeasured kindness and were unsparing in time and trouble on my behalf. That I could never reciprocate their wonderful hospitality was always a haunting reflection. I saw American industries when they were at the beginning of the amazing developments since accomplished. I found a land of startling contrasts. Washington, one of the few cities laid out according to a regular plan (French) and consequently beautiful, was admirably administered by an officer of Engineers. New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, under democratic government, were then behind our great towns and must have taxed the patience of their citizens. Private enterprise seemed everywhere to be achieving triumphant success, while providing high standards of comfort for the manual workers. Congress did not appear to rise to the level which the signatories of the immortal Constitution, whose pen I handled at Philadelphia, fondly hoped. The express which took me from Washington to New York, with its baths and library, was far ahead of anything at home; but, from the point of view of comfort, the great hotels then left much to be desired. I was forcibly struck by the charm of the country through which I travelled. The Hudson River has few rivals in distinction, and the scenery round Harper's Ferry, where the Shenandoah and Potomac join near "John Brown's Fort," pointed out to me by my vivacious companion, Commander (afterwards Rear-Admiral) Roberly Evans, is most beautiful. Ambitious new townships—bright patches of electric light at night—were springing up along the great railways. But one missed the imposing Norman remains, the fine Tudor mansions now becoming derelict, the noble Gothic cathedrals, and the old-time villages clustering round grey churches with centuries behind them, which make the fascination of our countryside. History was being made; but the distant past had nothing to show.

I left America with many regrets, with a full realisation of the marvellous material progress before her, and with

the determination to do all in my power to promote trust and understanding between the English-speaking peoples.\* Only in recent years have I become painfully aware of the reasons which may make this great object unattainable.

On October 19, I went on board the *Aurania*, in those days almost a "greyhound," and reached Liverpool on the 27th. So ended an educational experience which left a deep mark on my after life.

Elaborate reports remained to be written, and I received an appreciative personal letter from Lord Wolseley dated November 26.

"I have placed before His Royal Highness your most interesting report on the Zalinski gun, and he has desired me to express to you his satisfaction at what he describes as 'a most clear and admirable report.' I have much pleasure in expressing to you H.R.H.'s approval, and in saying how entirely I agree in the terms in which it is expressed.

"Yours very truly,  
"WOLSELEY."

In October, 1889, my old friend Lieut.-Colonel D. O'Callaghan and I were again associated with orders to report upon the French Exhibition. General Coste of the Engineers received us with great kindness, and we were able to make a careful study of a mass of recent artillery *matériel* and other objects of military use, shown by the Minister of War and the great private firms. We found much to learn, and there were some steel processes which seemed in advance of our own. We waited upon our

\* I find that my subsequent literary efforts were powerfully influenced by my brief experiences in the United States in 1888. Four years later I strongly urged the creation of an Embassy at Washington, which afterwards became an accomplished fact. "While British diplomacy has unquestioningly accepted the 'Eastward position' from the traditions of the past, a greater than any European power has arisen across the Atlantic. . . . Washington appears still to rank with Brussels or Bucharest." "The Foreign Policy of the Future," *The Speaker*, September 17, 1892.

Ambassador, Lord Lytton, whose genius did not lie in military technical matters, and who did not affect to disguise his boredom. Another elaborate report had to be prepared, and I can only hope that it proved of some value.

In September, 1890, Lieut.-Colonel N. L. Walford, R.A., and I were ordered to Magdeburg, to report upon a long series of trials of twenty-five natures of ordnance, some of them with novel features, made by the Gruson firm. This was my third experience of a great international military gathering, and the arrangements were a revelation of German organisation. Everything was foreseen and thought out, and for our spare time we had a choice of recreations, all carefully planned. I was able to manage a trip to the Harz mountains, and to enjoy their distinctive scenery. General Joubert, attired in a striking uniform of light blue and gold—mostly gold—was a prominent figure. He did not seem to fit in well with the European officers; but he developed a strong attraction towards us, and we were helpful to him on the firing ground. After a Gargantuan banquet, we took him in charge and delivered him with care at his hotel. The Gruson firm, by these trials, secured a fine advertisement. Their ordnance showed some original features, and they were beginning to be rivals of the huge Krupp establishment which subsequently absorbed them.

In 1890, when the defences of the Meuse, designed by General Brialmont, were in progress of construction, the King of the Belgians asked for an independent report on them, and I was ordered to make a careful inspection of these somewhat novel fortifications. A young Belgian engineer was directed to accompany me, and I made a detailed examination of the positions of Liège, Namur, and Antwerp, which, twenty-four years later, assumed crucial importance. I am afraid that my conclusions were unpalatable to King Leopold II, and they were, most naturally, resented by General Brialmont; but they proved strangely prophetic. As regards the defences of Liège and Namur, I reported that :

“It is not the protection of Belgium against invasion which is directly sought, but the closing of a route connecting the territory of two other Powers, who, it is assumed, must sooner or later be again at war, and either of whom might conceivably select this route as offering advantages in striking at the other. The new defences are, in fact, regarded as a legacy of 1870–1, and their *raison d'être* is the permanent rivalry of France and Germany.”

Of the value of the forts themselves, with their weak armaments, I formed a poor opinion.\* They did not effectively defend the intervals or the roads of approach in all cases, and large clearances would be required to prepare the positions for defence. One of these intervals, which I reported to be particularly blind, was actually used in August, 1914, by the Germans, who entered the town of Liège before most of the forts were taken. I calculated that the minimum field forces, independently of the fort garrisons, which the defences of Liège and Namur required would be 29,500 and 23,000 respectively. Such field forces were not to be found when the attack came, although, as I wrote :

“It is probable that the Germans could place 20,000 men in front of Liège in five days from the date of mobilisation, to be followed rapidly by a much larger force.†

“It is certain that the fortifications of the Meuse must be prepared to resist attack at short notice, or lose all military value.

“Belgium unquestionably provides a striking warning against the abuse of fortification, and the widespread fallacy that forts can be substituted, in any except the most restricted sense, for men has received a fresh illustration.

“As regards the possibilities involved in a war between France and Germany, it is clear that the inducement to

\* The 15-cm. guns, already obsolescent, were supplied after much delay by Krupp, and I was informed that they were not satisfactory.

† The actual German performance was better than this, as the strategic frontier railways had been completed. The giant howitzers, secretly prepared, came as a surprise.

violate Belgian territory for the purpose of securing a line of communications is stronger in the case of the latter than of the former Power."

At Antwerp the river defences seemed sufficient, but the twelve large forts of the inner ring were badly conceived and obsolete, while of seventeen outer works projected, only six were nearly completed, and those I examined were full of defects. I reported that :

"The land defences of Antwerp are in a most unsatisfactory condition. The old line of forts is unfit to resist a modern siege train, is indifferently armed, and is too near the town to secure it from bombardment . . . the outer ring is fragmentary and incomplete. . . . Reliance is placed on inundations . . . on the north. On the east and south, however, no protection would thus be obtained."

Whether the outer defences were complete in 1914 I do not know, but the types of forts I saw could have made little resistance, and must have proved futile. Only a large field force, with time to make preparations and to clear the ground, could have hoped to hold Antwerp, which would in any case have suffered from distant bombardment. I consider that the Belgians, here and on the Meuse, made quite as good a defence as was possible in the circumstances, and if my exhaustive Report had been rescued from its pigeon-hole before the blow fell, some illusions might have been avoided. The lure of the "fortress" of Antwerp nearly caused the capture of the Belgian Court and Army—and of Mr. Churchill. Only bad staff work of the Germans averted this disaster.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE HARTINGTON COMMISSION—LITERARY WORK

IN June, 1888, Lord Salisbury's Government, possibly moved by the efforts of the *Times*, appointed a Royal Commission "to inquire into the Civil and Professional Administration of the Naval and Military Departments and the relation of these Departments to each other and to the Treasury; and to report what changes in the existing system would tend to efficiency and economy in the Public Service." It was a strong body,\* from which much was expected. Captain W. H. Hall, R.N., and I were appointed joint secretaries; but my excellent colleague was soon withdrawn for duty at sea, and the Admiralty decided not to replace him. Both at the Admiralty and the War Office the permanent officials at this time were too powerful, and fleeting Naval Lords were rarely able to leave an impress upon the administration. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Hornby, as a great seaman, desired that the Secretary of the Admiralty should be a naval officer, as did Sir George Tryon, and that Naval Lords should be appointed for a term of years, with naval assistants "at the head of the branches which deal with naval work." Mr. Childers agreed, but would make the appointment of a naval or a civil Secretary optional. He considered that the Board "should work as little like a Board as possible." Mr. Forwood, Parliamentary Secretary, opposed any addition of naval officers and seemed to believe that "the construction, maintenance, and shore administration" of fleets

\* Lord Hartington, Lord Randolph Churchill, Lord Revelstoke, Mr. W. H. Smith, Mr. H. Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Richard Temple, Admiral Sir F. Richards, Major-General H. Brackenbury, and Mr. T. H. Ismay.



should be in civil hands. In these cases it was easy to understand what lay behind the opinions given, which was sometimes a baffling problem. To a student of psychology, the proceedings of such a Commission are of absorbing interest. My general impressions were that few members or witnesses had ever made a study of administration or arrived at any principles, and that the two professional members almost alone had any clear ideas on the subject. To the political members, the relations of the Services to the civil power and the maintenance of the fullest authority by the Minister seemed to be momentous. Lord Randolph Churchill, however, produced a detailed plan of a Ministry of Defence, under a Lord High Admiral and a Captain-General\* with "supreme control over and responsibility for the administration of" the respective Services, and a "Secretary of State and Treasurer for the sea and land forces of the Crown." The two professional heads were each to be provided with a Financial Secretary in the House of Commons.

This was a boldly radical suggestion, demanding, as its author stated, that

"the administration of the Navy and Army should be entrusted respectively to members of those professions. That naval training, naval experience, and naval eminence should be the qualifications of our Minister of Marine. That military training, military experience, and military eminence should be the qualifications of our Minister for the Army."

Thus the supremacy of the civil power was directly challenged, and this scheme, if it had been adopted, would never have worked as Lord Randolph intended, and must have degenerated into a civil Ministry of Defence, which was advocated by some military witnesses and strongly opposed by the best naval opinion. The Commission decisively rejected this plan, alleging "grave objections"

\* Both to be appointed for five years, to be Privy Councillors, members of the House of Lords and of the Cabinet, "taking no part" in discussions not relating to naval and military affairs.

and realising that Lord Randolph's scheme "would ultimately approach closely to that of the Minister of Defence" which they emphatically condemned. All this is now forgotten; but the growth of the Air Arm into a position of vital importance has added vastly to the complications of Imperial Defence, and proposals for centralising the general control over our armed forces have again been forthcoming and will certainly persist. I cannot here \* argue this difficult question; but I consider that any such centralised administration would be disastrous, and that the machinery of the Imperial Defence Committee, established in 1904, if wisely used in conjunction with some measure of common training for the three Staffs, can secure the necessary "co-ordination"—horrible word—of our national preparations for war.

Lord Hartington was an excellent chairman, keeping the discussions on ordered lines. Long speeches—the bane of Commissions and Committees—were absent, and the solemnity of the proceedings was occasionally varied by "a certain liveliness" contributed by Lord Randolph Churchill.

The final Report of the Commission was issued on February 11, 1890, but the evidence, some of which was most disturbing, has never been published. The general effect was to reveal an "unsatisfactory and dangerous condition of affairs," † which must have been apparent to every member of the Commission, but the remedies proposed were inadequate. The administration of the Admiralty received a blessing; but the manifest lack of close relationship between the work of the two great Departments of State was met only by the suggestion of "very constant communication and consultation between two highly placed" professional officials, and the change for which I was most anxious received only a lukewarm commendation.

\* Cf. my article "A Minister of Defence," *Nineteenth Century and After*, April, 1926.

† I remember well the haunting fear that so strong a phrase would not pass muster when the final draft was under discussion.

“There might be some advantage in the formation of a Naval and Military Council, which should probably be presided over by the Prime Minister. . . . In this Council also possibly might be included one or two officers of great reputation or experience who might not happen to hold any official appointment in the Admiralty or War Office at the time,” etc. etc.

The functions of this hypothetical Council were duly set forth ; but so tepid a recommendation was little likely to carry weight, and fourteen years were to elapse before such a Council came into existence.

The suggestion to confer a special and peculiar status upon the First Sea Lord in the Board of Admiralty was strongly opposed on reasoned grounds by Admiral Sir F. Richards, while Major-General Brackenbury naturally dissented from the proposed remedy for “undoubted evils” and a “dangerous condition of affairs” as being palpably inadequate.

The Report on the War Office began with a summary of previous proposals and a general description of the existing system, which exposed the prevailing confusion. There were some sharp criticisms.

“The Secretary of State has no Board of advice. . . . Excessive centralisation in the person of the Commander-in-Chief must tend to weaken the responsibility of the other heads . . . the system cannot adequately provide for the consultative as distinguished from the executive and administrative duties. . . . No less than seven committees with ‘no common link between them’ have at different times advised the Secretary of State with regard to the defences of Bermuda . . . the existing system unsatisfactory in principle and in working.”

All this and much more the evidence had disclosed. The evolution of the office of Commander-in-Chief, a curious scrap of history, which I had traced, and the hopeless medley of incompatible functions which he was supposed to discharge deeply impressed the Commission. The most

important of the proposed changes were—"the establishment of a War Office Council. The removal of the executive Command and inspection of the troops from the War Office. The creation of the office of Chief of the Staff with specified duties." All these and some minor reforms were urgently needed; but the whole ordnance system, which Sir Fitzjames Stephen's Committee had exhaustively investigated in 1887, and which Lord Wolseley had scathingly condemned, was disposed of in casual fashion. If the other recommendations were adopted, bringing the Director of Artillery directly under the Secretary of State, there would be "no insuperable objection" to the creation of a properly constituted Ordnance Department dealing with "design, construction, provision, and inspection."

Mr. Campbell-Bannerman expressed "cordial concurrence" in a War Office Council composed of Heads of Departments "equally, separately, and directly responsible" to the Secretary of State; but he argued at length \* against the creation of a Chief of the Staff, who might be a necessity in "continental countries," but was superfluous and even dangerous in our case. "In this country there is no room for general military policy. . . . We have no designs against our European neighbours." This was good Liberal doctrine; but the absence of any defined policy lay at the root of most of the evils and of the waste at the War Office, where no one was charged with thinking out anything, and frequent resort to promiscuous and sometimes incapable committees had proved a futile substitute.

Sir F. Richards laid stress on the grave defects in the Ordnance Department, pointed out that "the Director of Artillery, being deprived of all control over the Manufacturing Departments, appears to have ceased to be a Director at all," and inclined to the restoration of a Board of Ordnance.\*

General Brackenbury considered it "essential" that the Ordnance Factories should be placed under the Director of Artillery, and Mr. Ismay strongly upheld this view.\*

\* In Memoranda published with the Report.

If the recommendations of this strong Commission had been carried out, the course of the South African War nine years later would have been very different. Influences which I never fathomed prevented anything from being done. Lord Hartington did not follow up the work to which he gave much time and thought.\* Mr. Gladstone's fourth Cabinet took office two years later, and War Office Reform languished until the Report of Lord Elgin's Commission on the operations in South Africa necessitated drastic action.

One notable *lacuna* in the Report seemed to escape notice. The third item in the terms of reference—the relations of the Naval and Military Departments to the Treasury—was ignored. Evidence was taken dealing with this aspect of our instructions; but the draft which I prepared for the Chairman never came before the Commission.

### EDINBURGH REVIEW

Early in 1888, I was introduced by Major-General Sterling to Henry Reeve, the editor of the *Edinburgh Review*—a purist in matters of language, and a stern critic. He suggested a comprehensive review of the *Military History of the Campaign of 1882*, and after a long experience of painful condensation, it was a relief to spread out into thirty-four pages of a quarterly. A succession of articles followed of which I thought “Imperial Defence” (April, 1889) the most important as an attempt to weigh the prevailing—and conflicting—policies of the day, and to lay down the principles at which I had then arrived. “The dream of sweeping the Caucasus with a Turkish army,” or of striking at the Russian communications with Central

\* Lord Carnarvon had never ceased to urge that the proposals of his Commission should be adopted, and to his insistence I attribute the measures which followed. In a letter to me on April 14, 1890, he wrote: “I shall be anxious to have a talk with you as to the report of the [Hartington] Commission. My own idea was that it had fallen flatter than should have been the case; but I hardly know why. It is, however, possible—and probable—that a little later much more attention may be called to

Asia from the head of the Persian Gulf has long since vanished into thin air, as have Sir Charles Dilke's ideas that “Russia could be bled to death at Vladivostock ” or that Gibraltar could be bombarded by “a merchant vessel carrying a modern seventy-ton gun.” Even more difficult to understand in our day is the theory that we should increase the Navy in order to “purchase the goodwill ” of a German-Austrian alliance. This article \*—as regards Belgium especially—was prophetic ; but there were inevitably some mistaken forecasts. As a record of the appalling confusion of theories rampant nearly thirty years ago and of the mutually destructive views of their protagonists, it is still not quite without interest. My hope was to reduce the chaos of opinion to some sort of order based upon naval supremacy and Imperial co-operation.

“When Great Britain unsheathes the sword, the cause must be such as to carry with it the acquiescence of her great Colonies. It is not England alone who must suffer, but a great Empire over the seas. Canada, Australia, and the Cape will fight for the honour and integrity of that Empire ; but they will unhesitatingly resent any proposal to commit their destiny to the keeping of Prince Bismarck.”

This last suggestion seems now preposterous, but it accorded with the doctrines of some pandits in 1889, and ten years later Mr. Chamberlain declared that “the natural alliance is that between ourselves and the Great German Empire ” (Leicester, November 11, 1899).† My association with Mr. Reeve lasted till his death, and I owe much to his wide knowledge and constant encouragement. Of my review of the *Life of John Ericsson*,‡ which did not greatly please me, he wrote : “I have seldom read an article with more pleasure. . . . It seems to me to be

\* Afterwards republished in pamphlet form and warmly commended by Lord Carnarvon. The title, “Imperial Defence,” caught on, and passed into Official nomenclature.

† Mr. Chamberlain's policy, initiated, as Lord Oxford and Asquith has lately reminded us, by talks at Windsor with the German Foreign Secretary, Count von Bülow, was not “well received here ” and was “repudiated in the Reichstag by Bülow.”

‡ Published January, 1893.

beautifully expressed and full of interest ” (September 19, 1892).

“ FORTIFICATION. PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE ”

From 1883 onward I had accumulated notes for the book I hoped to write. This led to a series of articles published by the R.A. Institution, intended to test Military opinion. There was no sign of official disapproval until I reached Submarine Mines, which were handled disrespectfully. I was sent for by my Chief, Sir Lothian Nicholson, and severely reprimanded. When he had ended I asked for the presence of the Head of the Mining Branch—an excellent officer and an expert in electrical matters, who had never given a thought to the study of War. A few searching questions as to what he proposed to do in the Mersey if war broke out, caused the unwonted frown on my good Chief’s brow to disappear, and I was dismissed with a kindly caution. At length my book, which involved heavy research work, was accepted by the reigning John Murray. It was an honest attempt to examine our existing theory and practice of Fortification in the light of the experience of War, and it was of necessity sharply—perhaps too ruthlessly—critical ; but it created some stir in many quarters. General Brackenbury, then Head of the Intelligence Department, forwarded it to Lord Wolseley with the following Minute, dated November 11, 1890 :

“ ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

I beg to bring to your notice Major Clarke’s book on Fortifications. . . . Having read it with great care, I beg to express the opinion that, if the simple facts and plain teaching conveyed in these pages were realised by the highest military authorities and the Secretary of State, millions of money might be saved.

“ H. BRACKENBURY, D.M.I.”

Seven years passed before I could bring out a much enlarged edition, embodying further War experience.

“THE LAST GREAT NAVAL WAR”

*The Battle of Dorking*, by Colonel G. Chesney, my chief at Coopers Hill, had a success which its literary skill deserved. A French pamphlet, *Plus d'Angleterre*, shortly followed, and both inculcated the lesson that the British Navy could easily be disposed of, and that our salvation was to be found in military preparations against invasion. This flagrantly conflicted with my strongest convictions, and with all I had laboured to teach in the *Times* and elsewhere. I therefore planned a booklet\* to describe the far-ranging operations of a great naval war and to deal with the invasion question as—I thought—it deserved. From my old friend, Sir Andrew Clarke, I had imbibed the idea that Germany was our real enemy; but as France, at this period, had the only navy which could hope to oppose our own, and as there were just then several sources of mutual irritation, my imaginary naval war was necessarily with our neighbours.†

After sketching the European situation to explain our isolation, and describing the distrust of the Navy, which had been encouraged in some quarters, and the hopeless unpreparedness which then characterised the War Office, I made the *casus belli* to arise in Australia, then in a state of irritation on account of French proceedings in New Caledonia. This was the imaginary attitude of the two nations when war was declared :

“In the one confidence, almost joy, appeared to prevail; in the other perplexity, almost self-mistrust. There were, however, cool observers on both sides who did not by any means share the general feeling. Many French officers, who had studied war and carefully followed the annual British manœuvres, were not entirely convinced of the decadence of H.M. Navy. They realised, as the soldiers failed to do, that unless that navy could be quickly

\* *The Last Great Naval War*. An Historical Retrospect by A. Nelson Seaforth. Cassell & Co., 1891.

† Two years later, in 1893, there was real danger of war with France over the Siam boundary question and the *Linnet* incident.



crippled, no deadly blow could be delivered, and that the weakness due to scattered territories, which was a favourite theme of certain writers, would prove to be a source of strength unless the sea power of the British Empire could be laid low. And in England there were some who, well knowing the heavy cost that must now be paid for the existing want of organisation, believed that the nation, if true to itself, would emerge triumphant."

This was the general thesis of my little story. There were depressing crises, all easily possible in then existing conditions, and the first success came from the Pacific, where the Australians, of their own initiative, captured New Caledonia, and offered 10,000 troops for any service required. The Mediterranean Fleet was caught divided, but was concentrated by Admiral Sir George Tryon after a ticklish manœuvre. Ultimately a general action was brought about near Teneriffe, the Mediterranean and Channel Fleets being skilfully combined under Admiral Sir Geoffrey Hornby, whom I regarded as the greatest sea officer of the day. It was pleasant to confer upon him the well-deserved peerage that he never received. The tactics of the battle were made intentionally unorthodox, and Sir G. Hornby explained that he would have acted differently, as I well knew ; but a great naval victory was won at heavy cost, and the way was now clear.

"The empire of the sea was no longer challenged, and all over the world the nation prepared to strike hard. The Navy had nobly played its part ; the day of the Army had come.

"Already the message from Australia appeared to have caused a violent swing of the unsteady pendulum of public opinion. . . . The tremendous preparations at all the many fortified ports slackened, and the nation was soon half inclined to be ashamed of the ugly redoubts which disfigured the Surrey hills. The number of persons who had always held that 'Britannia needs no bulwarks, no towers along the steep,' seems to have been great, judging from the prevailing tone of the writers of this period."

After the great fleet action we began to strike hard all over the world. The number of troops employed was, from the continental

“point of view, obviously insignificant; but these British troops could be carried across the seas at will, while France could not transport a corporal’s guard from Toulon to Algiers or Tunis without risk, and nearly a million of men lay perforce inactive though their comrades were being outnumbered over half the world. So much could the Navy do for England, and the country which had largely ignored its own history, or learned to believe that steam had changed all the conditions of naval war to its disadvantage, was astonished at its own powers. . . . The situation was a strange one, yet perfectly simple. The army of France was intact. France was unconquered. Yet every day the merciless pressure of the British Navy was more severely felt, and outside of France there was no place where the French flag was secure.”

In these depressing conditions, the “Ligue anarchiste des Antipatriotes” began to show activity, and the leaders of “Labour” having “sedulously preached the doctrine that the interests of the working classes of all countries were identical, that war was in the main a recreation of the aristocracy indulged in at the expense of labour, and that a general disarmament was attainable by the agency of trade unions,”\* a convention of French and British workmen was planned, but failed. “The whole incident appears exceedingly significant as a first attempt of the working classes of two countries to deal directly with each other during a period of war.” Eventually the President of the United States offered his good offices, and the “Treaty of Washington” was signed.

My brochure covered a large canvas, from Tonquin to Martinique, and dealt with the naval movements in much detail, as it was my special object to bring the whole Empire into the drama of war. It embodied contro-

\* This, written in 1890, became a popular doctrine in some quarters more than thirty years later.

versies long dead, and emphasised defects since remedied ; but it may perhaps have had some educational value thirty-five years ago. General Sir G. Chesney, who almost alone detected my authorship,\* thought it was a mistake to introduce real names, and perhaps he was right. Some of my prophecies proved curiously accurate. There was a school which expected the bombardment of coast towns for ransom, and some of our publicists seemed to believe in this theory. I selected Scarborough for my object lesson, as, among other places, did the Germans in their pursuit of "frightfulness." I revived the old system of convoys, which the Carnarvon Commission had pronounced impracticable, but which proved invaluable in the Great War when tardily adopted. The French call to Clemenceau to lead them was to come later. The "Commonwealth" of Australia duly arrived, as did a "Chaotic Portuguese Republic"† in 1910. President Roosevelt was able to bring about the Peace of Portsmouth. I employed Admiral Fisher, as commander-in-chief in the East Indies, to direct territorial attacks on Mauritius, which had been lost early in the war, and Réunion. In 1914-5 his mind was engrossed by his great Baltic scheme. Certain specified reforms at the Admiralty and War Office, indicated as the result of the war, have come to fruition. On the other hand, my foresight was sadly misconceived in some respects. I assumed Imperial Federation as one result of a war in which the Colonies all shared. This I came to regard as only a dream. I anticipated that "while on land the nations may still furiously rage, the rule of the sea is in safe guardianship"—that of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. The rise of the German Navy falsified my predictions. I imagined that battleship tonnage would be reduced, and it has multiplied exceedingly. I pictured a Channel Tunnel, "through which more than 200 trains pass every twenty-four hours," and we are still afraid to begin it.

All such efforts of imagination are purely ephemeral,

\* Confidently assumed to be that of a naval officer.

† Four revolutionary outbreaks in twelve months, 1926-27.

and any impression they may produce is quickly destroyed by events. Two friends, who did not know who wrote the little book, told me that, after reading it, they felt as if all must have happened. An undergraduate who won a Navy League prize said that among the publications which had directed his attention to the Navy was *The Last Great Naval War*. At the time, this little testimony came as an encouragement. Perhaps the labour and thought expended were not all thrown away.

### “IMPERIAL DEFENCE”

*Imperial Defence*, dedicated to H.M. The Queen and published by the “Imperial Press” in 1897, entailed extensive historical and statistical research. It dealt, in successive parts, with The Empire, Trade, The Navy, The Army, and Imperial Organisation. The historical portions, to which I gave great care, may still have some small value for reference purposes; but the “Imperial Press,” started with high aims and influential support, disappeared, and the *Imperial Magazine*, which formed part of the scheme, did not materialise.

### “THE NAVY AND THE NATION”

Mr. (afterwards Sir) J. R. Thursfield was for many years a member of the staff of the *Times*, who had worked earnestly for the rehabilitation of the Navy in the 'eighties. We had many views in common, and at his suggestion a number of our essays were republished by Murray in 1897 with the title of *The Navy and the Nation*, to which I contributed an Introduction and seven articles. Among those selected were “Imperial Defence,” an address given before the Royal Colonial Institute on February 12, 1896, “Submarine Mines,” and “Can England be invaded?” an historical study which appeared in the *National Review*, May, 1896, and was fully justified by the Great War. The disinterment of our literary efforts may have helped to direct public opinion along the lines we desired. Magazine articles usually reach only a limited number of

readers, and are not easily available for purposes of reference.

### “RUSSIA’S SEA POWER”

Incursions into military history, including Lord Auckland’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1838, the War with Persia in 1856–7, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–8, and Lord Lytton’s Afghan War of 1878–90, together with perennial discussions of Indian Frontier problems, had led me to form strong conclusions as to Anglo-Russian relations. I hoped to deal fully with the expansion of Russia from the time of Peter the Great, the rise of the Russian Navy, and the successive scares which had hampered and warped British policy, leading to the public description of Russia in 1888 as “Our great enemy.”\* This project, like many others, had to be abandoned. There was no time, and I fell back upon a modest monograph—*Russia’s Sea Power*†—which, though giving only a brief sketch of Russian expansion, the building of the Navy and the naval and commercial position at that time, provided reasoned grounds for a strong appeal for the revision of British policy that I believed to be essential. In the Preface and the last chapter, “Anglo-Russian Relations,” I sought to make my thesis clear. If Russian policy had often been irritating and inexplicable, ours must frequently have seemed exasperating. As an example, I pointed out that when in 1869 “Russia occupied Krasnovodsk . . . about twelve hundred miles in a direct line from Peshawar,” our Ambassador at St. Petersburg at once asked for “explanations.” “Mervousness” seemed to have grown into an established tradition.

“A habit once acquired escapes self-criticism, and even its humorous side may elude observation. While continuously protesting against the Russian occupation of territory which we do not desire, we have, since 1884

\* *The Balance of Power.*

† Murray, 1898.

only, annexed or brought under our influence no less than 2,600,000 square miles of the earth’s surface.”

The general indictment was summed up thus :

“From first to last, the policy of hostility to Russia has proved an absolute failure. It has not in the slightest degree retarded her Asiatic expansion. It has bred and maintained misunderstanding and ill-will between two great nations. It has directly provoked measures of reprisal, which have entailed commercial and other loss on the people of Great Britain and India. It has not conduced to our national dignity. . . . If it could finally be buried in oblivion, Europe as well as Great Britain would be a gainer.”

Incidentally, I showed how our trade with Russia had decreased markedly between 1878 and 1894, possibly because of political sentiment.

This little book may perhaps have helped \* towards the change which slowly came about. Mr. Chamberlain, at Wakefield on December 8, 1898, declared that :

“There are no insurmountable obstacles to such a friendly arrangement. . . . I believe that it is quite possible to conciliate what we may call the reasonable ambition of Russia with the fixed and settled policy of this country. . . . Do our opponents mean to suggest that we ought to have fixed war upon Russia, not because she has done anything to which we object, not because she has closed any door which we intend to keep open ; but because we suspect her of ulterior motives which up to the present time have not been disclosed ? ”

This seemed curiously like an echo of *Russia’s Sea Power* published a few months earlier, but may have been only a coincidence of ideas. The *Times*, in June, 1900, had got so far as to write of the “effective and cordial co-operation of England and Russia,” and in an article entitled “The Peril in the Far East,” June 12, I tried to drive this point

\* It was sent to the Tsar through the Russian Embassy, and graciously acknowledged.

home. The *Novosti* responded immediately : " An Anglo-Russian agreement on a disinterested basis is perfectly feasible. Both States would have to rest content with the *status quo* . . . under these circumstances a deplorable antagonism would vanish of itself." There may have been difficulties of which I could not know, and Lord Grey has pointed out that " in 1892-5, we were constantly on the point of war with France or Russia or both." \* But it is at least certain that heavy total expenditure was inflicted upon the Indian and British taxpayers in the pursuit of a chimera. Six years later I had access for the first time to papers which seemed to confirm all I wrote in 1898, and I was able to further the convention concluded by Sir E. Grey in 1907.†

It was in these years that I projected a Naval History of the Mediterranean, and began to collect material. It soon became clear that such a book would rival that of Gibbon in length and was hopelessly beyond my time and powers. I mentioned the plan to Mr. (afterwards Sir) Julian Corbett, who was impressed with the idea. The result was his *England in the Mediterranean*, two valuable volumes which I could never have written.‡

### " KINGLAKE'S CRIMEAN WAR "

The Crimean War abounded in lessons many of which were ignored, and I often found it necessary to refer to Kinglake's great history. It seemed that the size of this monumental work placed it beyond the reach of naval and military officers, and that knowledge of a most instructive campaign might be lost to students of war. In 1899, therefore, I undertook to make an abridgment, with the approval of the Kinglake family, and of Mr.

\* *Twenty-five Years*. Lord Grey of Fallodon.

† As a sad instance of a fallacious forecast, I find that, while explaining the growth of the formidable Navy of Japan, I wrote that " in less than three years the Russian position in Manchuria will be unassailable." The war with Japan, into which Russia was encouraged to blunder, cost her Port Arthur and much more.

‡ In his preface, he too generously described me as the " onlie begger " of this excellent work.

Blackwood.\* I am doubtful if any one else ever read the nine large volumes continuously, and the task, which I found “exceedingly difficult and sometimes painful,” was accomplished mainly in bed after 11.30 p.m. A single volume of 527 pages was the result. Almost sixty years later, French and British armies side by side were again attacking defences created in the field. I believe that we can still learn from the campaign in the Crimea, and that it is a mistake to regard the Great War as a sufficing compendium of military Art and Science. My abridgment may perhaps help to rescue Kinglake’s great work from oblivion.

After 1899, the writing of books became impossible, and several projects had to be abandoned; but in 1896 I was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in consideration of my work on Fortification and Imperial Defence. This honour, which I valued, came as a great encouragement.

\* *Kinglake’s Invasion of the Crimea*. Student’s Edition. Blackwood, 1899.



## CHAPTER X

MALTA, 1892-4

IN October, 1892, I was suddenly ordered to Malta. Latterly I had become aware of a growing hostility towards the Colonial Defence Committee, arising partly from departmental jealousy and partly from misunderstanding. The Committee had been exceedingly active, and its recommendations were necessarily communicated to the Colonies by the Colonial Office. This appeared to be resented in some quarters, and a letter from my old chief, then Governor of Gibraltar, written on January 9, 1892, came as a warning.

“MY DEAR CLARKE,

“I send the enclosed very Bulleresque epistle. . . . I am very sorry to see that the C.D.C. is to be abolished,\* for in my opinion it was out and out the most useful committee with which I was connected. I do not think I deserve the credit which B. gives me. I am not aware of ever having perpetrated the solecism to which he refers, and if you can put your finger on the case, I should rather like to know the particulars. . . .

“Yours most sincerely,

“LOTHIAN NICHOLSON.”

The “Bulleresque epistle,” dated December 31, 1891, contained the following :

“These schemes† are now all passing through a transition stage; the ancient system, initiated I believe by you, of treating them as purely speculative civil

\* Of this I had not heard, and it did not happen.

† See p. 71.

schemes and as such to be carefully kept from the A.G. or any portion of the W.O. Staff in their military capacity has been changed."

Since 1885, there had always been a representative of the War Office Staff, apart from the Chairman, on the Committee, presumably in his "military capacity," and every paper issuing from my office had always been sent to the War Office. This was the "ancient system" which Sir Lothian Nicholson, when he became chairman, had strictly followed, and Sir R. Buller's misconceptions illustrate the difficulties of War Office administration.

I felt the manner of my eviction after more than seven years of strenuous work keenly, and I must have contemplated retirement, as I find that Sir Robert Meade wrote on October 10 :

"I quite agree as to the treatment you have received. . . . But I wish to urge you in the strongest possible way to hold on and not to leave the Army at the present time. First of all it would be playing into the hands of our enemies, who would only be too glad that their machinations had proved successful. I know well the disappointments you have received in your military career; but everything comes to him who knows how to wait."

Mr. Childers had written previously in the kindest terms, advising me to remain, and adding :

"I know no one of your standing so likely to have a brilliant career, and one so useful to the country as yourself. You have not been so much to the front during the last few years as those who interest themselves in you may have expected and hoped; but these are 'piping times of peace' when routine and interest always prevail, and they cannot last long."

Many other good friends wrote in the same sense, and they were right; but nine years were to pass before I could get back to the work for which I had striven to fit

myself. What was at the back of my curt dismissal I never knew, and it puzzled my old chief, who wrote again from Gibraltar on December 11 :

“ It was hard to give you the sack in such discourteous mode. No one deserved such treatment less than yourself, for tho', according to my ideas, you have been a bit extreme in your views every now and then, there is absolutely no one who has worked harder or more loyally than yourself; reward was your due, not peremptory orders to be off. I have often puzzled myself thinking over the reason for this but have failed to find a solution. Of course you were not *persona grata* to some of the noodles who are our 'authorities'; but that is not sufficient when looking for a solution, so I must give it up. All I can say is that your old I.G.F. would have taken care that another course had been followed.”

Some of my views may well have seemed “ a bit extreme ” to my dear old chief, though later they became commonplace, and I fear that I had trodden heavily on some sensitive professional toes, while it was known in some quarters that I wrote for the *Times*. All this was quite naturally against me; but Sir Robert Meade's letter seemed to show that there was more behind. When, on New Year's Day, 1893, Mr. Gladstone's Government gave me a knighthood, while still only a major, Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton shrewdly wrote “ in point of fact it looks rather like a slap in the face from C.O. to W.O.” My experience must have been that of others,\* and looking back after thirty-four years, I remember best the sympathy I received especially from the then heads of the Navy, but for which my official career might have ended.

Our daughter was now nearly fifteen, and her education could not be interrupted. We therefore decided that I should go to Malta alone, and at the end of November I found myself again in a troop-ship and much depressed

\* Sir E. Hamley, perhaps especially, as for nearly sixteen years of his service he was unemployed.

at my prospects. Passing Gibraltar late in the evening, I received a flashed message of good wishes from the Governor. How much such little acts of thoughtfulness may mean! My home life was now broken up for an unknown period, and I was plunged into that of our greatest foreign garrison. My quarters were in the Auberge d'Italie, which, with walls more than three feet thick, was excessively hot in the summer nights, and I became a member of the great Artillery and Engineer Mess at the Castille. A more drastic change of conditions can hardly be imagined. Dispensing Orderly Room justice, with battalion drill on Saturdays, and the general supervision of engineering services of an uninspiring character summed up my official duties. All the threads of my life in London, and all my literary connections, were severed.

Man is, however, the most adaptable of animals, and I tried hard to interest myself in the new environment. There were to be alleviations. I was brought into close contact with the Navy and the Artillery, and I could see the changes in the defences resulting from the mission of 1886. When the fleet was in harbour, a Captains' weekly ride had been instituted, which I was privileged to join. On Saturdays we rode to a selected point, taking turns to send out luncheon. We thus came to know all the wonderful remains, vaguely attributed to the Phoenicians, which in recent years have yielded some of their secrets to excavation. Here in stone are the traces of civilisations beyond the dawn of history. The amazing "cart-ruts," converging towards the edge of the cliffs behind Hagiar Kim on the Southern shore, which we examined, point to the connection of Malta with Africa in a far distant past. The islands, conquered by successive races, have been the sport of sea power, and from the antiquarian point of view they possess extraordinary interest, of which the temporary residents have little idea. To me, however, these rides, when we mainly discussed naval matters, were a liberal education. I came to know Captain (afterwards Admiral of the Fleet

Sir) A. Wilson, V.C., *Sanspareil*, Captain (afterwards Admiral of the Fleet Sir) G. Noel, *Nile*, and Captain (afterwards Admiral Sir) R. Custance, *Phaeton*, who with others contributed to my education. Of this little band, I think that only Admirals Sir A. Moore and Sir R. Custance, who was the original organiser of the rides, now remain; but all have left their mark. I went afloat for short trips with Captains Wilson and Noel, and watched their handling of the battleships of the day with admiration.

I had met the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir G. Tryon, in London, and on many nights he used to give me lessons in naval matters. With a large, unlighted cigar in his mouth, he would address me impressively to a late hour, generally ending by saying, "Next time you must do the talking." That time never came. My last interview with him is impressed upon my mind. He was a student of the Wellington dispatches, into which I had frequently burrowed, and he had discovered a passage in which the duty of a subordinate officer who felt obliged to disobey an order was laid down with Wellington's precision. This he read out to me and said he should issue it to the Fleet.\* A few days later I went home on leave, and I read at an Underground station the loss of the *Victoria* and the tragic death of Sir G. Tryon. If the principles laid down by Wellington had been observed, I believe that the country would have been spared this disaster. Among the many distinguished naval officers I have known, I rate none more highly than Sir G. Tryon. He had a powerful intellect, a wide grasp of affairs, and imagination of the right kind. Undoubtedly his dominating personality contributed to the indecision of his subordinates on June 23, 1893;† but I never found that he resented a difference of opinion,

\* This was done.

† This was brought home to me by the impressions of a Captain third or fourth in the starboard column led by Rear-Admiral Markham in the *Camperdown*. He told me that his first idea was, "This is something new and interesting that the Commander-in-Chief is going to try." It then, flashed upon him that the manœuvre as being executed meant disaster, and he at once hauled out of line.

and if at the Admiralty before August, 1914, there had been any one possessed of his clear insight and grip on the larger naval problems, much would have happened differently.

I found the sudden cessation of literary work very trying, and I welcomed a request to deliver the first lecture to the new Malta Naval and Military Society on December 28, 1893. I chose as my subject "Coast Defence in relation to War." This gave me the chance of trying to enforce the principles laid down in my book by copious examples drawn from naval history, that of the Mediterranean especially. In the short discussion which followed, Captain A. Wilson, V.C., said, "I agree so thoroughly with the lecturer that I am utterly unable to criticise him." All the principles which I then laid down were strikingly confirmed in three subsequent wars; but some of them had not been assimilated before the Great War. As I wrote later,\* my object in this lecture was :

"to show from history and from reason that coast defence, carried beyond moderate limits, can add nothing to the national strength, and may, by perverting our aims and warping our policy, lead to neglect of naval strength upon which the existence of the Empire must absolutely depend. That object can only be attained by keeping historical facts and their plain lessons constantly before the British people at home and in our great Colonies."

In June, 1893, Mr. Andrew Carnegie published a remarkable article in the *North American Review* in which he eloquently advocated the "reunion" of Great Britain and America to end "the wholly unlooked-for and undesired separation of the mother from her child." Ireland and Canada, he thought, were "ready" for this stupendous change; Scotland and Wales needed only "a short campaign of explanation." It was assumed that we might throw off the Empire, because "there is really

\* October 1, 1901. This lecture was first published by the Royal Artillery Institution and then reprinted, with a Preface bringing it up to date, by the Navy League in 1901, after I had been appointed Governor of Victoria.

no longer any decided advantage to the parent land in the Colonies." Our grave responsibilities to the people of India were to be discarded, since "no branch of the race now clear of these would willingly consent to become a partner in them," and besides, the millions of India "can soon be placed upon the road to independence, and the British-American Union would guide to this as well as the present Union of the United Kingdom." This article was brought to me by the American Consul, Mr. J. Worthington, who suggested that I should write a reply. It was easy to show that Mr. Carnegie's political "Re-union," which he regarded as "so easy a task that its very simplicity amazes and renders us incredulous," was hopelessly impracticable. As I wrote: "For us at least it is a revolution such as the world has never seen, and even the great Republic, which swallows with ease an Arizona or an Idaho, would reel under the shock." I was, however, anxious to air the idea of a "Naval Union" between the English-speaking peoples, which I believed, and still believe, would be a great safeguard of world peace. Had such a union existed in 1914, and been known to be valid, the Great War would not have happened. I argued that an oversea expansion of America was certain.

"A policy of abstention from the responsibilities of a great nation has become impossible to the American people. It is even incompatible with the effective maintenance of the Monroe doctrine. Samoa must have taught its lesson. . . . If, therefore, the assumption by the United States of their rightful position among the nations is inevitable, no first step could be so wise, so safe, or so natural as a naval league of armed neutrality with Great Britain."

At the same time I advocated an Anglo-American Council to which "would be referred, by joint consent, all questions not necessarily controversial, but of mutual arrangement, and the misunderstandings which the exchange of diplomatic notes inevitably promotes, together with the

friction on the manufacture of which some newspapers thrive, would cease." The isolation of America ended in 1898. The "naval league" came into existence by the force of inexorable circumstances in 1917; but the previous common study for which I pleaded was wanting, and improvisation in face of the enemy was a poor substitute. My article created a brief impression; but the ruling idea has since been twice or thrice revived.

The Editor of the *North American Review*, Mr. Lloyd Bryce, wrote encouragingly on February 8, 1894: "It is needless to say how interesting and important the article is, and I sincerely trust that when another idea occurs to you for an article you will let me know." Mr. Carnegie, whose "dream" I had rudely dispelled, wrote on April 27: "I have read your article with great pleasure. . . . We strive for the same aim and have the same hopes. . . . May we not become personally acquainted? I long to call upon you and to know you." This kind letter, ending with a cordial invitation to Buckhurst Park, reached me at Valetta; but fate decreed that we were never to meet. Mr. Carnegie's writings always interested me from the psychological point of view. They seemed to show a sharp contrast between the shrewd realism of a great business man and the dreamy idealism with which he regarded world affairs. These apparently conflicting characteristics were not uncommon in Americans in the last century. Two wars and direct territorial responsibilities overseas are changing their outlook, as I pointed out in 1899 must happen and should be beneficial.\*

My first incursion into American policy brought me many too flattering letters. Mr. Worthington wrote from Washington on June 7: "I was dining to-night with a group of the most intelligent naval officers, and

\* After the Spanish-American War I published *Imperial Responsibilities a National Gain* in February, 1899, and again came across Mr. Carnegie who, with Senator J. T. Morgan, was strongly opposing the retention of the Philippine Islands. I tried to treat the question on the broad lines of history and of the building up of national character. I thought this article better than the first, and it seemed to make some little impression.




your brilliant article was discussed. I assure you you would have been immensely gratified if you could have heard how truly and critically it was approved and praised." Captain Cyprian Bridge wrote from the Admiralty on March 10: "You are too well aware of my views not to feel quite sure that I am cordially at one with you. As regards the mere literary style, you have never done anything better." My friend Admiral Mahan had written a reply to me in the *North American Review*, the tenor of which is partly explained in a letter of July 29, 1894:

"You will find points in which I differ from you; nor could I accentuate our points of agreement (they are much more fundamental than the differences) owing to the way my own Government looks on the expressions of opinion, however general, by its officers—particularly if diametrically opposed to the traditions of the party in office. I am quite one with you about the necessity of broadening our sphere; but it would be imprudent to say so explicitly. . . . I had of course to read your paper several times—and each time I did so with increasing admiration for the matter itself. . . . Carnegie is nowhere—and vaporous."

American officers appeared to be in shackles at this period. A curious echo came from the Pacific coast of South America, where an American Consul read to the Captain of one of H.M.'s ships an address of welcome embodying long passages from my article! Such are the lures which tempt a writer to be too prolific.

In June, 1898, I went home on short leave to conduct the annual Science and Art Department examinations, and secured two days at Tunis, where I was deeply impressed with the work of the French administration. The remains of Carthage—Roman overlying Punic—since extensively excavated, interested me intensely. Here was an ancient centre of sea power, which the Romans found it necessary to destroy. Here in tangled ruins could be read the death sentence pronounced by Cato—



ADMIRAL A. T. MAHAN.

*[To face page 124.]*



*Coeterum censeo Carthaginem delendam esse.* Here, coming down through twenty centuries, was a warning of the fate which may befall a great maritime power. Some indications of the galley docks can be traced, but the sea-front of Carthage, at the mouth of the Gulf of Tunis, is devoid of natural shelter and apparently ill-adapted to be a great naval base.\*

In 1894, the idea of abandoning the Mediterranean found favour in some Liberal circles, and Mr. Shaw-Lefevre (now Lord Eversley) and Mr. E. Robertson, who arrived from the Admiralty on a tour of inspection, had caught the infection. At a dinner at the Palace, I incautiously introduced Captain A. Wilson to the former, saying that he inclined to this heresy. The effect was like pointing out a cat to a fox terrier, and when another and more belligerent officer joined in, there was as close an approximation to a scene as the dignity of Government House permitted. Mr. Laird Clowes, writing as "Nauticus" ostensibly from Belgium, was the principal protagonist of this most dangerous theory, and in 1895 he came out into the open. Mr. James Knowles gave me a free hand in the *Nineteenth Century*, and I wrote a scathing article in the April number, warmly approved by all my naval friends, which may have helped to demolish a whole series of baseless fallacies. My general conclusions were :

"Above the purely naval aspects of the Mediterranean question stands the point of national honour. Our presence in the great inland sea dates back 700 years, and has been almost continuous for 200 years and unchallenged for 90 years. A balance of power has thus arisen, carrying with it international responsibilities which we have no right to discard. . . . Suddenly to destroy an equilibrium long existing would in all probability cause a European War. We have no right to

\* Carthage was partly rebuilt by the Romans, to be finally destroyed by the Saracens in A.D. 698. It now seems possible that the main centre of the mysterious trading people who defied the might of Rome for 120 years and invaded Italy over the Alps was submerged near the mouth of the Gulf of Gabes.

inflict this risk upon other nations; we are bound in honour by our international responsibilities."

The proposal to abandon the Mediterranean has not been revived, but, *mutatis mutandis*, these words apply to the recent opposition developed by the Socialist Party with Liberal co-operation, to the creation of an adequate naval base at Singapore, failing which the abandonment of the Pacific in certain circumstances would be entailed. Some of the arguments used by the opponents ominously resemble those employed in 1894-5, and with knowledge of propaganda methods then denied to me, I incline to believe that these two curious examples of obscurantism may have had a common source of inspiration.

The months passed slowly, and I felt keenly the sense of imprisonment in the little island from which on clear days we could just see the coast of Sicily. I studied carefully the fortifications of Valetta, perhaps the most grandiose examples remaining of the school of Vauban, and I came to know the labyrinth of underground passages which they contained. I circumnavigated Malta and Gozo in the R.E. steam launch, examining all the supposed landing-places, and with my good friend Colonel Stuart Nicholson, R.A., I sailed round the islands in the old *Azof*\* anchoring for the night in St. Paul's Bay, where "two seas met,"† and visiting the chapel supposed to mark the spot where St. Paul shook off the viper into the fire. I think that in those eighteen months I learnt all that Malta could teach from the naval and military point of view, and I retain a pleasant memory of great kindness from two successive Governors, Sir Henry Smyth and Sir Arthur Fremantle, from many naval and military officers, and from the Maltese. I served on the Senate of the University, claiming to be the oldest in the Colonies, which on August 6, 1894, passed a cordial vote of thanks for the "valuable assistance you rendered in the interests of education." In June, 1894, I went home on leave, and

\* A little schooner said to have been built to carry a mortar in the Crimean War.

† Acts.

before I was due to return I was offered the post of Superintendent of the Royal Carriage Department at Woolwich. Only once again was I to visit the Island Fortress which played a most important part in the Great War, although not a shot was fired from the armaments which Major O'Callaghan and I helped to settle in 1886.\* That this was inevitable in such naval conditions as prevailed in the Mediterranean in 1914-18 was in strict accordance with my lecture in 1893, and with the principles I had always tried to inculcate.

\* See p. 87.

## CHAPTER XI

### WOOLWICH—WAR OFFICE REORGANISATION, 1901

IN the autumn of 1894 I took up the post of Superintendent of the Royal Carriage Department at Woolwich, which prevented my return to Malta. Why this post fell to me I have no idea; but I had written copiously on artillery matters in several aspects which may have suggested my selection. Another drastic change in my life thus occurred. For more than seven years all my official duties centred upon artillery questions, and it was necessary to polish up my mathematics, which had sadly rusted. Close relations with the Artillery at three stations abroad and in varied experimental work at Shoeburyness, Lydd, and elsewhere, as well as a fair general acquaintance with Naval ordnance, were now to prove most helpful.

I went to Woolwich with some clear ideas of what seemed to be needed.

“(a) Mountings were too cumbrous, this arising partly from the fact that

“(b) Recoils were unnecessarily long.

“(c) The arrangements for loading and handling projectiles were inconvenient;

“(d) Sighting and its relations to training and elevating were unsatisfactory.

“Here were definite lines on which to attempt improvement as opportunity offered.” \*

Such technical matters are necessarily uninteresting, and I must not describe the steps taken or the many diffi-

\* Article in *R.A. Institution Papers*, July, 1897.

culties which had to be surmounted. Plates I and II help to show how far defects (*a*) and (*b*) were remedied before I left Woolwich.

The objects of the Ordnance Factories being to serve the Navy\* and Army, the system at this period was exactly calculated to create the maximum of friction and difficulty. In face of two strong reports and the vigorous protests of Lord Wolseley, the Factories had been placed under a purely civil branch of the War Office headed by the Financial Secretary, a minor political luminary. At the same time, their administration had been centralised under a Director-General, a civil engineer who was as destitute of military knowledge as the staff of his office. I, therefore, found myself cut off from the life of the Army by two well-entrenched bureaucracies, through which every new proposal had to be forced, often at a wasteful expenditure of time and effort. As, further, the Director of Contracts, through whom I had to obtain all I needed, was a functionary who had not the least practical knowledge of the goods he was asked to deliver, delays and mistakes of all kinds were frequent and maddening when I was being hard pressed by the Military or Naval authorities to complete some urgently required article of manufacture.† In 1891, I had sharply criticised this system, which violated every principle of sound administration,‡ not dreaming that it was to entail the most painful official experience of my whole life. I recall cases in which the Central Office from pure ignorance refused to forward important designs on which the greatest care had been bestowed. It was then necessary to fight up to or beyond the bounds of subordination.§ My work was thus frequently embittered by constant struggles to get authority to do something obviously

\* The Admiralty had obtained control over Naval Ordnance, and could deal with the Factories at pleasure.

† An inquiry by a Select Committee presided over by Mr. Jackson was held in 1900 revealing some very unsatisfactory facts, as I pointed out in four letters to the *Times* beginning October 16, 1900.

‡ See Letters of Vetus, pp. 146-151.

§ A dossier of my crimes was prepared by a clerk at the Central Office with a view to my eviction, which miscarried.



right, or by attempts to explain military requirements to persons devoid of all military instincts. When at length some proposed innovation was allowed to go before the Ordnance Committee, of which I was an associate member, I could count on discussion by men who understood the needs of the Service. Whenever possible I broke out of my official prison, by private correspondence, by inviting leading Artillery officers to visit the Carriage Department, and by lectures and articles which the Royal Artillery Institution welcomed.

Looking back on those days, when official troubles loomed large, I remember best the compensations. To germinate an idea, to guide it into a design in the drawing office, and to follow it through the bench and the lathe to the trial ground was always a delight. Pressure of paper—largely superfluous—left me too little time for the workshops, where I tried to master all the various processes, helped by my early manual work,\* and to get in touch with the workers. The managers and foremen were my good friends, and after more than a quarter of a century I receive each Christmas a remembrance from the sadly few survivors. I learned the mysteries of piece-work—its advantages and drawbacks. I came in contact with officials of the A.S.E., then a non-political Union, on terms of amicable discussion, and I derived a lasting impression of the fine qualities of our skilled and unskilled workers. All this was a liberal education of the best kind from which I benefited. It helped to teach the management of men which can be learned only by experience.


The South African War threw a heavy strain on the Department, and our strength was increased from 2,300 to 3,500. In order to save labour, I had devised a simple spade attachment to the service field-gun carriage which had just completed its trials.† It was decided to

\* See p. 8.


† From South Africa I received welcome accounts of the success of this device. Major (afterwards Lieut.-General Sir) H. Sclater, R.A., wrote on January 10, 1900: "I send you a line to say how wonderfully the equipment has stood the severe strain it has gone through. Every one

# I

## CHANGES IN GUN MOUNTINGS, 1894-1901



9.2-INCH MARK II, 1894.



9.2-INCH MARK III.


(A far more powerful gun.) Drawn to same scale.

[To face page 130.]




## II

### CHANGES IN GUN MOUNTINGS, 1894-1901



6-INCH MARK II, 1894.



6-INCH Q.F. MARK II.

(A far more powerful gun.) Drawn to same scale.

[To face page 130.]



make this addition to all batteries going to South Africa, and at the same time pole draught and a special form of brake had to be fitted to the transport vehicles. All this had to be done under high pressure to which my workmen splendidly responded. Small parties had to be sent to distant stations, and it was a pleasure to receive from Commanding Officers tributes to their patriotic diligence. Not a single unit was delayed in embarkation; but not one word of thanks was ever forthcoming from my civil superiors. General Sir H. Brackenbury, however, to whose energy and great ability the rapid equipment of the Expeditionary Force was due, showed warm appreciation.

When all these special demands had been met, I was nearer to a breakdown than I have ever been, and Sir H. Brackenbury invented a brief mission to Gibraltar and Malta to give me rest and change. My daughter had also been overworking at her music, and she went with me on the much-rolling P. and O. *Ballarat* to Malta. Here my old friends the O'Callaghans (he now in command of the Artillery) and General Sir F. (afterwards Field Marshal Lord) Grenfell, the Governor, as genial as he was wise, showed us the greatest kindness. I retraced for the last time the scenes I knew so well, and met many old friends.

My daughter and I then went on to Gibraltar via Sicily and Naples, stopping at Taormina, one of the most fascinating places in the world, lying under the shadow of Etna, and rich in classical remains, notably one of the finest theatres in existence. From Naples we visited Pompeii, and Capri, and ascended Vesuvius. We reached Gibraltar on a German liner, where the passengers were

is delighted with the spade; it has enabled our guns to be fought at close range all day long by reducing fatigue and affording cover to the detachments. . . . We all owe a great debt to you." On January 4, Lieut.-Colonel F. Hall, R.A., wrote from Modder River, where his brigade had fought: "I feel I must write and tell you of the very satisfactory way in which the spade attachment has stood a severe trial. My batteries have done a lot of firing—in three instances over 1,000 rounds were fired by a battery in a day—and as far as I can see, there is nothing the matter with my 18 spades."

diligently fed at short intervals throughout the day and late at night. Sir Robert Biddulph, the Governor, welcomed us, and the R.A. and R.E. Officers made our stay delightful. I was able to see a 9·2-inch gun fired from a mounting of my own design \* at the top of the Rock, where Major O'Callaghan and I, in 1886, had proposed to place it.

This short break, including about three weeks at sea, worked wonders for us both, and I returned invigorated to the duties of the Arsenal and to my literary pursuits.

Early in 1899 the Director-General died, and it was expected in many quarters that I should be promoted. This was not to be, and late at night on February 6, I received a most considerate note from Sir H. Brackenbury telling me that Colonel (afterwards Sir) E. Bainbridge, R.A., had been appointed.† He had been my good colleague at the Royal Laboratory, and henceforth all relations with the Central Office became harmonious. He understood.

I seemed to have reached a blind alley, and my letters of this period show depression. I had declined two most tempting offers from private firms as they could not further the aspirations of Imperial service which I had formed, when the wheel of fortune took a sudden turn and I was called away to Australia.

Since 1901, all our artillery equipment has undergone a revolution. Before the Boer War, simplicity was regarded as a fetish, which undoubtedly hindered scientific progress, and the way of the reformer was strewn with obstacles. In South Africa, foreign equipments—some Ehrhardt field batteries and Austrian howitzers—entailing certain complications previously regarded as prohibitive, were tried in the field. The Great War gave science a free scope, and we overtook and passed the Continental Powers in all that relates to artillery material.

\* See Plate I opposite page 130.

† When I was in Australia the vacancy again occurred, and Mr. Brodrick telegraphed offering it to me. It was then impossible to accept as I could not leave my Governorship for what to Australians must have seemed a far inferior post.

Most of my work at the Arsenal, which covered a wide range, must have been swept into oblivion ; \* but I do not forget the letters of generous acknowledgments from senior officers of the Artillery, or the subscription raised by all my workmen to present me with a silver model of a field carriage with the spade attachment. This kindly thought did not mature, as presentations were contrary to regulations. I can only now hope that these seven years of Artillery work were not wasted.

### WAR OFFICE REORGANISATION COMMITTEE, 1901

The proposals of the Hartington Commission having missed fire partly because there was no driving force behind them and also because they were broadly expressed and needed working out in detail, the War in South Africa was handled by an unreformed War Office. Ineptitude in many aspects was realised by the public ; but, pending the inquiry by Lord Elgin's Commission, definite evidence was not available.

Meanwhile, early in March, 1901, Mr. Brodrick announced certain measures of army reorganisation, which I tried to analyse in two articles in the *Times* of April 18 and 30, in a leader of April 9, and in the *Army League Journal* of July. The system explained in Mr. Stanhope's pamphlet of 1892 still held the field. It had been officially described at the time as the "outcome of the fullest consideration by the Military authorities at the War Office, and by other responsible officers hardly less eminent. The result has been a scheme based upon the highest possible authority." It had never received some essential finishing touches, and it showed grave

\* It was a satisfaction to note that the three 6-inch guns of the little battery at Hartlepool, the only one of our coast defences engaged in the Great War, were fought on mountings of my design (see Plate II), and with the automatic sight for which the Ordnance Council, thanks to General Sir H. Brackenbury, gave me a generous award. These guns were in action at 4,000 yards for forty-five minutes and inflicted "considerable damage" on the three German cruisers which attacked them. There were no casualties in the battery itself, which was of the type that I had strongly advocated thirty years before.



defects in 1899. The task of creating a field army, which he led to Pretoria, fell upon Lord Roberts when he assumed command in South Africa, and improvisation of all kinds terribly hampered the operations. This scheme was now thrown overboard, and the new plans appeared to me, for reasons stated, to be inadequate and imperfectly suited to meet "Imperial needs."

Mr. Brodrick, however, in his speech in the House of Commons on March 8, showed plainly that he recognised the justice of some of the criticisms which had been showered upon the War Office. He spoke of the "paralysing effects" of having to rely too much on a centralised administration; he admitted that the War Office was "too dilatory and too much tied up by regulations"; he also said that the Secretary of State was "in a laager encircled by civilians." Finally, he announced that he had appointed a Committee "to investigate the conduct of business at the War Office."

The "War Office Reorganisation Committee" \* reported on May 9, 1901, after hearing thirty-eight witnesses, some at great length, and most of them having been examined many times previously during the innumerable inquisitions which had been held upon the War Office. Much of the evidence, that of Generals Sir Redvers Buller and Sir H. Brackenbury especially, was of real value. I was examined particularly in regard to the management of the Arsenal, and the evidence generally appeared amply to justify a strong Report; but the Chairman was not greatly interested in administration, and my hopes were dashed when he produced a draft. A curious cave had, however, gradually opened out. Mr. Mather was the most pacific and optimistic of men, brimming over with benevolence. The term "fighting efficiency," used in discussion, evoked from him a horrified protest. His previous knowledge of army officers and things military, if any, was exiguous; but from the first

\* Mr. (afterwards Sir) Clinton Dawkins (Chairman), Mr. E. W. Beckett, M.P., Mr. (afterwards Sir) G. S. Gibb, Mr. (afterwards the Right Hon. Sir) W. Mather, M.P., Colonel (afterwards General Sir) H. S. G. Miles, Sir Charles Welby, Bart., M.P., and myself.

he took kindly to Colonel Miles and myself, and we two were in complete agreement.\* Mr. Beckett and Mr. Gibb, with his great experience of railway management, were attracted to the cave, and in the end we secured nearly everything we desired. This apparently accidental grouping decided the whole tenor of the Report, as may happen in such cases.

We made nineteen principal recommendations, including :

1. A broad scheme of financial decentralisation.
2. Simplification of the soldiers' Pay Lists.
3. Greater financial powers and responsibilities for general officers commanding military districts, entailing
4. Local audits of pay, stores, etc., in their districts.
5. The reorganisation of the Contracts Branch, described as "exceedingly unsatisfactory."
6. The appointment of military officers and soldier clerks in the Military Departments to replace civilians.
7. The establishment of a "War Office Board."

These recommendations, explained in detail, were uniformly supported by the military evidence, and no strong opposition came from the permanent Civil Staff except in one or two instances. A considerable addition, which no one would read, was made to the vast mass of evidence relating to the War Office. Some few of our recommendations were accepted, but needed to be reasserted and developed in 1904, when the powerful leverage of the Elgin Commission could be turned to account.

\* To his death Sir W. Mather was our warm friend, and he came out to stay with me in India.

## CHAPTER XII

### WORK FOR THE PRESS, 1885-1901

IN the period between leaving England (1880) and joining the Colonial Defence Committee (1885), the trend of my life was determined. At Bermuda and Gibraltar, in Egypt, then under British control, and in the Sudan, for which I believed we should be forced to assume responsibility, I learned the lessons which were to govern my future. The potentialities of the Empire as the greatest influence for spreading wide the principles of true freedom, and, by example, leading the vanguard of ordered progress throughout the world, powerfully appealed to my imagination. Here I found my greatest inspiration. To serve, strengthen, consolidate, and perhaps in the future even to help in guiding the Empire seemed to be the objects most worth living for, and I quickly came to regard the Navy as not only a "sure shield," but the essential binding force which, like steel in reinforced concrete, could alone hold the Imperial structure together.

Before leaving for the Sudan in 1885 I had written constantly for the *Times* including twenty-three articles on the Nile Expedition, which entailed for the first time night work at Printing House Square. Arriving soon after 9 p.m. I was conducted to a small upper chamber decorated only with a suspended card giving the approved spelling of certain words. A writing-table, with a pile of small thin sheets technically known as "sides," and two chairs comprised the furniture. Here, shut up into the small hours, it was necessary to search painfully for the truth between the lines of information often inadequate or on maps not always accurate. Telegrams would suddenly

appear which seemed to contradict those awaiting my arrival, and at too frequent intervals a persistent boy came to take away scraps of "copy," which he brought back set up in slips. The Editor or a leader writer would sometimes look in for a chat. I remember well the arrival of the news of the fall of Khartum and the death of Gordon necessitating a conference in which Mr. Walter took part. It was decided that, while the gravity of the situation must be made clear, the abandonment of the expedition should not be contemplated. In two articles, February 6 and 7, 1885, I tried to show the steps that might be taken, strongly advocating that the Suakin-Berber route should be opened without delay, but intimating that Lord Wolseley's views must be decisive.

"That the course urged by Lord Wolseley\* will be adopted whatever it may involve, is certain. Ministers have been open to charges of indecision, inability to understand the situation in the Sudan, unnecessary procrastination and other shortcomings; but they cannot be reproached with a want of generous confidence in Lord Wolseley. We may rest assured, therefore, that the action to be taken will be in complete harmony with his aims. . . . There is no cause for gloomy prognostications; but there are abundant proofs that the situation requires a firm hand, that there must be no delay, and that the vigour of the action taken should be unmistakable" (April 7).

The position of the desert column at Gubat was much worse than we knew, and by promptly withdrawing it, Sir Redvers Buller averted a disaster. The measures taken were short-lived, and the withdrawal of the Nile and Suakin expeditions followed, entailing the abandonment of the Sudan and its re-conquest by Lord Kitchener thirteen years later. After the Burmese War of 1885, I seem to have had a respite from this branch of my work till the China-Japan War in 1894, which required twenty-five articles, and conveyed many useful lessons. Some

\* Made public later.

one must have alarmed my good Editor, causing him to remonstrate with me for too confidently assuming the victory of the Japanese as they pressed on from the Yalu to Niuchuang. The "steam roller," of which we were to hear more twenty years later, was expected to begin to operate. I had, however, carefully weighed the opposing forces, and I could not hedge. When the end was at hand, I thus summed the situation :

"If peace is not now concluded, Japan will evidently be in a position to strike hard in a few weeks' time and may at pleasure move on Peking or Nankin. The small island State has full power to deal swift blows with unerring certainty at its huge and cumbrous enemy. Whatever may be the issue, the Japanese have again demonstrated to the world what the command of the sea implies in the hands of a Power which knows how to use it. Scientific progress has only given a keener edge to an ancient weapon, and no war of modern times is more replete with lessons for Great Britain than that which it is to be hoped has now come to an end " (April 1, 1895).

In 1897, the brief Greco-Turkish War and the Tirah campaign, and in 1898 the Spanish-American War, made heavy demands on "A Military Correspondent." \*

In 1899, there were early indications of coming hostilities in South Africa which I regarded with dismay, and I must have written in this sense to Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, who replied on August 1: "I think the South African business stands as well as we could have it in the circumstances. No harm was done by the debate, and we have reason to believe that the wiser hands in the Cabinet have got it in charge. Still, it is a gunpowdery business." Having watched events in South Africa for some time, I could not share this hopeful view. Ten years previously, in May, 1889, I first met Cecil Rhodes at a little dinner party of four in Mr. (now Sir) Harry

\* All my contributions on the South African War were treated as "Headed articles" without any such prefix.

Johnston's flat. The other guest was Major (afterwards Sir) Claude Macdonald, and we discussed the Empire to a very late hour. I was charmed with the clear vision and the simple directness of Rhodes, in whom I found a sane and inspiring Imperialist after my own heart. I met him again twice in later years and thought him changed.\* When, therefore, the Jameson Raid occurred, I had grave misgivings. The *Times* had not taken this view, and I wrote to Mr. Moberly Bell on May 5, 1896: "I can't see it in this light. I see a clumsy, stupid plot with some vulgar elements in it. I see a plot, the success of which would have been far more disastrous in the long run than the failure. . . . I feel that in the sight of the world the honour of England has been trailed in the mire." The knowledge that subsequently came to me confirmed this opinion; but at the time the sinister aspects of the Raid were not generally realised, and the far-reaching evils which resulted were not foreseen.

Early in September, 1899, I was asked to give an estimate of the forces required if war broke out. I had met Dr. Jameson at Lord Brassey's house in Park Lane and had had a long talk with him—my first contact with a charming personality. He spoke as nearly as I can remember in these words: "You will think it strange that I should say so after they have beaten me; but, from the military point of view, the Boers need not be taken too seriously." I could not accept this opinion. I had looked up the fighting record of the Boers, and at the back of my mind was the stubborn stock from which they descended, which had produced our most formidable antagonists on the sea. After careful study, I arrived at 80,000 men as the minimum force which would be needed.† It was decided that such a figure could not be made public, as

\* Thinking I might have been mistaken, I recently asked Sir Harry Johnston if his experience had been the same. Writing on September 29, 1925, he said: "You are quite right as to the extraordinary change which came over him after 1891. In 1892, he had a fall from his horse near Rondebosch. . . . The Rhodes I knew in 1889 was a delightful person."

† Some time afterwards I discussed this question with Major-General Sir William Butler, who, with far greater knowledge than mine, had reached almost exactly the same figure. We were both mistaken.

it would create alarm. The official estimate was, I believe, 35,000,\* which may have been influenced by the views of Rhodes and Jameson, although our Intelligence Department had exact information of the armaments which the Boers had accumulated since the Raid, even to an almost precise estimate of the available rounds of small-arm ammunition. In those days, the Intelligence Department worked *in vacuo*.

The cordite dissolution of 1895, which led to the formation of Lord Salisbury's second cabinet, proved momentous. It is most doubtful whether the Boer War would otherwise have come about ; but, if so, Lord Wolseley would certainly have commanded the forces in South Africa, which must have altered the character of the campaign.†

In most disadvantageous circumstances, of which the general public had no idea, the war began, and again I spent many nights in Printing House Square, often not reaching my home till after 3 a.m.‡ I knew well that great troubles lay before us ; but they were to take forms which no one could have foreseen. The "Black Week" in December, 1899, the long anxiety for the fate of Ladysmith, and the many untoward incidents which caused much depression, are now forgotten. The tremendous tragedy of the World War has gone far to draw a veil across the disturbing events of 1899-1900 ; but I vividly remember the depression of those days when I struggled with telegrams suggesting more than they told, and strove to fashion a connected narrative which would not convey a too gloomy impression. The end was, of course, certain ; but it was reached through too many painful and costly failures. In all I wrote eighty-two articles, which included some mistaken forecasts not easily avoided when it is necessary to grope for facts ; but no criticism was forth-

\* Lord Wolseley, then Commander-in-Chief, afterwards most candidly admitted that "with all other authorities who have expressed an opinion on this question, I did under-estimate the fighting power of the individual Boer."

† The appointment of Sir Redvers Buller as Commander-in-Chief had been decided upon by the Liberal Government, which would have left Lord Wolseley free.

‡ In those days the final manuscript could be received after 2.30 a.m.

coming.\* These articles were followed by seven others, in which I attempted to set forth the outstanding lessons of what Lord Rosebery rightly described as "not a little War."

At the end of 1900, I was deeply impressed by the fact that the war was degenerating into guerilla forms—numerous small columns employed in chasing with varied results detached bodies of elusive Boers. As "Civis," I wrote "A Plea for a Policy in South Africa," in which I pointed out that our opponents were practically helpless and could not understand our intentions.

"Let it be announced that, while annexation is inevitable, the freedom of the individual will be unaffected, that the property of the people will be guaranteed to them, that it is our object to restore the farmer to the land . . . and that as soon as the conditions permit, responsible Government will be guaranteed in accordance with the cardinal principles of our Colonial system. . . . If such a proclamation were issued in the name of the Queen and distributed broadcast . . . I believe the effect would be electrical. Assuming failure, however, where would be the disadvantage? We should have given to the world proof of our sincere desire to restore peace and prosperity to South Africa. We should have publicly disclaimed the base motives which have been attributed to us" (*Times*, December 4, 1900).

The *Temps* regarded this proposal as important; but declared that it would not "cure the evils from which South Africa is suffering," and genially prophesied as complete a separation of South Africa from the Empire as that of the North American Colonies.

Such a proclamation was never issued, and might have been futile; but the war dragged on until the peace of

\* One anonymous correspondent wrote that, in a sentence ascribing the heavy loss of officers mainly to their habit of "leading by example and not alone by command," the writer had "perhaps unconsciously reproduced with almost exact precision a phrase of Tacitus" (*Times*, November 1, 1899).



Vereeniging was at length arranged by Lord Kitchener on May 31, 1902. Regular war work for the *Times* now ended, but it only formed part of my contributions during this period.

One reminiscence of these days remains unclouded. The news of the relief of Mafeking had arrived, and I drove home through crowded streets after 2.30 a.m., amid scenes which suggested that the traditional character of our people was radically changing. This perhaps was a shallow generalisation at the time; but in later years, I have come to think that it was not unjustified and may be capable of explanation.

After 1884, I began to make a special study of naval questions, to buy all naval histories that I could afford, and to get in touch with the best naval opinion. Later I was present at five naval manœuvres to learn the handling of ships and squadrons and to analyse the problems they were intended to elucidate. This led to much writing, mainly for the *Times*. The strength of the Navy had been allowed to sink to a dangerously low level, and a great campaign was necessary for the enlightenment of the public. Many better pens than mine were busily employed, and helped to bring about the Naval Defence Act of 1889,\* of which the moral was that the Press, wisely using its great teaching powers, could create a popular demand to which a Government must respond.† The immense amount of leeway, due to long neglect, which had to be made up has never been realised. Writing to me on February 2, 1897, when First Sea Lord, Sir Frederick Richards, the greatest naval administrator I have known, said: "Given three years without complications, and I trust that in the great requirements—men, ships, and works—the needs of this Navy for its efficient service will

\* Due to Lord George Hamilton; the policy was carried on by Lord Spencer in Mr. Gladstone's last Cabinet. The urgency of our naval needs at this time is best explained by the fact that our shipbuilding expenditure in 1890-1 was more than seven and a half times that of 1872-3.

† When the Navy League was started, I wrote its first charter, which remained upon the stationery for many years as written "by a friend," and from 1903 to 1907 I was in close touch with Mr. Seymour Trower, most earnest of Presidents, who consulted me frequently.

have been met, and the office of the panic-mongers will be gone." Mercifully these conditions were fulfilled. There was no backsliding, and in August, 1914, the Fleet was stronger, relatively and absolutely, than at the outset of any war in our history.

The *Times*, when the news of the battle of Trafalgar arrived, devoted its *second* article to our greatest naval victory and the most important sea fight since Lepanto! In 1895, I asked permission to write an article to appear on the great anniversary. After a sketch of the campaign, I tried to enforce its lessons, pointing out that "the campaign of Trafalgar is far more complex and—for us—far more instructive than that of Waterloo." And after laying stress upon the moral as a sure guide for the Empire, I ended: "More than any man of his generation, Nelson understood the needs of his country, and the tremendous powers which lie within our easy grasp. To him was given the conception of 'England bound in with the triumphant sea.'" I hoped that such an article might become a hardy annual; but this was not to be, though it was revived in 1915 when I tried to institute a comparison with 1805.

I was present at the Diamond Jubilee Review at Spithead in 1897, and in the most difficult conditions possible,\* I sought to extract the lessons it could teach—the immense advance since 1887 and the wonderful elasticity of movement of naval as compared with military force, pointing out that "in nine days the Channel Squadron of twenty-nine pendants could be at Halifax; in twenty-seven days at Table Bay." And I added:

"Such an assemblage of warships under the flag of any other Power would have implied a direct menace. Our least friendly foreign critic can, however, find nothing to arouse his susceptibilities in the reassertion of a time-honoured national policy. A powerful British Navy is the best guarantee of the peace of the world."

\* My old friend, Captain (afterwards Admiral Sir) E. Poë, had crammed his cabin with guests, and in a babel of conversation I wrote "Reflections on the Naval Review" (*Times*, June 28).

In 1887, when another war seemed not improbable, I was asked to write on "The Franco-German Frontier." I pointed out that the temptation to turn the Eastern defences of France would then be "very strong."

"Maintaining a defensive in Elsass and Lothringen—if necessary permitting the French to reach the left bank of the Upper Rhine—the mass of the German army could be hurled upon the Oise by making free use of the Belgian railway system. The Ardennes and Eifel districts would give considerable protection to the flank of the line of communications till the frontier was fairly crossed" (*Times*, February 18, 1887).

This was very like the cherished von Schlieffen plan applied in 1914, which, as in 1870, "was fixed from the first upon the enemy's capital, the possession of which is of more importance in France than in other countries" (von Moltke).

"The Higher Policy of Defence" (*Times*, May 25, 1888) was an attempt to lay down the principles of Imperial policy based on Naval supremacy as the ruling factor.\*

This was followed by "The Protection of Commerce" (*Times*, August 10, 1888), which—the submarine apart—was prophetic, and these two articles, expanded and illustrated from history, represented the gist of many of my subsequent writings.

The cult of the torpedo boat, expounded in France by Admiral Aube, had found devotees here. The Navy had been saddled with large numbers of these craft, which I believed were quite unsuited to our requirements,† and I urged that we should only build destroyers capable of hunting them down. The Naval Manœuvres of 1892, at which I was present on board H.M.S. *Arethusa* as the guest of Captain (now Admiral Sir) W. H. Henderson, were

\* Captain A. T. Mahan's first book, *The Influence of Sea Power on History*, which was published in 1890, completely vindicated the views set forth in this and many other articles, and powerfully reinforced our propaganda at this period. For the first time we had a philosophy of sea power built up on history from the days of the Punic Wars.

† Second-class torpedo boats were actually carried on the decks of cruisers at this time.

intended to elucidate the capabilities of the torpedo boats. I thought their performance futile, and in a long article, "The Recent Naval Manœuvres" (*Times*, September 24, 1892), I seized the opportunity of arguing at length that "experience and reason combine to prove that the right policy for the British Navy is to prepare to adopt a vigorous offensive against the torpedo boat in the limited areas which it can infest in war." In the cult of the torpedo boat, there seemed to lurk danger for the future, and I wrote that :

"In an age which has seen a leap in advance in all that relates to invention, the expert acquires inevitable importance. . . . It results, especially in a long peace, that the clever electrician or mechanic may secure distinction unattainable by a study of tactics or of organisation. . . . The expert is invaluable as long as his enthusiasm is directed into the right channel, and provided that his restricted view is not allowed to guide policy.\* There are, however, signs in the outcry for a large provision of torpedo boats . . . that he is passing somewhat beyond his sphere. . . . The cult of the torpedo boat, like that of the coast-defence vessel, which has inflicted some utterly useless craft upon the British Navy, leads directly and logically to the localisation of the national strength . . . and to the dangerous weakening of the right arm of the Empire."

This article brought many letters of approval from the Navy, and Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton wrote the same day from Greenwich :

"I presume the article in to-day's *Times* is yours . . . and most heartily I congratulate you thereon, and as imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, I send you a draft of a letter I wrote yesterday . . . to put into shape to-day. I need not say that you have completely taken the wind out of my sails, which I am very glad of."

\* This appeared in the Great War before which a school of thought concentrated upon material had been too influential.

In the *United Service Magazine* of October, I again pointed out that

“in the far-reaching operations of a great naval war, it [the torpedo boat] can play a very small part. It is essentially the weapon of the weaker naval Powers, eagerly adopted without any war experience, because it appeared to commend itself as a cheap substitute for a sea-going Navy. . . . The torpedo boat must be vigorously attacked.”

Of this article Captain W. H. Hall, R.N., wrote on October 5: “I have just read your article on the Naval Manœuvres with great satisfaction. It is a word of warning to our service (not before it was wanted) which I hope will bear fruit.” Such were some of the encouragements received from the Navy at this period.\*

The organisation and administration of the Army and Artillery matters supplied subjects for large numbers of articles and correspondence of which the letters of “Vetus” may have been the most important. These six letters† represented an earnest attempt to trace the admitted evils from which the Army was suffering to the administrative chaos prevailing at the War Office, and to formulate effective remedies. The confusion of Staff work at Suakin had deeply impressed me. I had made a careful study of the whole subject and of the causes—in part of old standing—while seven years at Whitehall and service in three foreign stations had brought practical experience of the working of the War Office machine at home and abroad. The letters were suggested by Major-General J. Sterling, a severe critic with great knowledge of Army matters, whose friendship I had gained in 1885, and who shared many of my opinions.

The Hartington Commission had laid down that “the complete responsibility, to Parliament and the country, of the Secretary of State for the discipline as well as for

\* Admiral Sir Anthony Hoskins told me later that he thought my work had helped the evolution of the destroyer which proved its intrinsic value in the Great War.

† The *Times* beginning November 5, 1891.

the administration of the Army must now be accepted as definitely established." This, the most weighty of all the numerous bodies which had been called upon to reform the War Office, had pronounced the existing "condition of affairs" to be "unsatisfactory and dangerous." In May, 1887, the Report of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's Commission on the Ordnance Departments, one of the most able and certainly the most scathing of the many exposures which had—for a moment—shocked the public, was issued. After proving up to the hilt that the administration of the Ordnance Departments was hopelessly inefficient, this Report strongly recommended that "the office of Master-General should be revived so far as the management of Stores and Manufacturing Departments is concerned. The Master-General should be a soldier of the highest eminence." This proposal was the natural result of an exhaustive inquiry into a long series of failures which had caused the country to fall behind other Powers in artillery progress and had given rise to great public anxiety.\* The effect intended was to restore in principle the old Board of Ordnance which had served the Navy and Army well throughout the French Wars. After the Crimean War, the office of Master-General and his Board were abolished, and their multitudinous duties were lightly tossed over to the Secretary of State, as were those of the Secretary at War in 1863. "No organisation of the enormous department thus created seems to have been attempted. The administration was left to chance, and the chaos which ensued led to the appointment of Lord Northbrook's Committee in 1869."† That Committee recommended the appointment of a Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, to be a soldier of high standing and the technical adviser of the Secretary of State on all questions relating to *matériel* of war, rapidly becoming more and more complex. A cardinal principle of administration was enshrined in these

\* Sir J. Stephen's main conclusions were: "There is no definite responsibility. . . . The great defects of the existing system are three—first, it has no definite object; second, it has no efficient head; third, it has no properly organised method of dealing with technical questions."

† Letter III.

proposals. Both these reports were ignored, and in May, 1887, the Commander-in-Chief was charged with holding and issuing to the Army all warlike stores, while the Manufacturing Departments were placed under a minor political personage and divorced from the authority nominally responsible for Ordnance policy and from the life of the Army. The Quartermaster-General had, in earlier times, been an important personage; but Lord Wolseley, in evidence given in 1887 to the Commission on Civil Establishments, stated that this high official had become "merely an officer without really any duties to do. He has been kept up for some time past." In 1888, the Adjutant-General was officially described as "Chief Staff Officer of the Commander-in-Chief," who "will exercise control over the duties of the military department and in the Commander-in-Chief's absence is empowered to act in his name." In this year, Lord Wolseley secured an Order in Council charging the Commander-in-Chief with "obtaining, holding, and issuing to all branches of the Forces, food, forage, fuel, and light."\*

Centralisation at the War Office had now reached its zenith, and there was nothing comparable in any other military system. And yet the Hartington Commission had declared that "the present functions of the Commander-in-Chief's Office appear to us to be of so varied and important a nature as to make it expedient that they should be sub-divided." My diagram, which was carefully prepared, illustrated centralisation *in excelsis*, and, as I pointed out,†

"The whole of the enormous mass of work, for the discharge of which the Secretary of State assumes responsibility, is now divided between two departments—those of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Financial Secretary. The functions of the former are appalling in their extent and variety. He is the sole responsible adviser of the Secretary of State on military subjects of every description. Administration and executive command

\* *Life of Lord Wolseley.*

† Letter III.

alike centre in him. Supply, fortification, weapons of war of every class with all their adjuncts, patterns of every kind of store, rest upon his decisions. His responsibility extends from questions of Imperial policy to the adoption of a new handspike. He alone can advise upon the measures which may be necessary to reinforce the Army in India or the plan of operations of a small war. The strength of the 110-ton gun depends upon his fiat, as do the calibre and site of every piece of ordnance in every fortified port at home and abroad. The distribution of the British Army at home and throughout the Colonial Empire is ruled by his opinions.

"The above, however, are only a few of the duties of the Commander-in-Chief. He is responsible for the whole organisation, discipline, and training of the Army and its staff, of the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, etc. . . . Directly under the Commander-in-Chief is placed another great military official, nominally responsible to him for all the duties for which he himself is nominally responsible to the Secretary of State. The Adjutant-General is, in fact, a dual personage. As 'Chief Staff Officer,' he directly controls all the vast and varied departments supposed to be controlled by the Commander-in-Chief; at the same time, he personally supervises certain of them."

The War Office had become an enormous bottle with a narrow neck represented by the Adjutant-General and the Commander-in-Chief. The inevitable result was that

"in matters great and small, this intolerable centralisation works evil throughout the British Army, destroying the initiative of its officers, annihilating responsibility, rendering incompetence undiscoverable in posts high and low, strangling progress, denying scope to the mechanical genius of the nation, and entailing waste and inefficiency.

"In a single sentence, Bacon has gone to the root of all sound administration. 'Preserve likewise the rights of inferior places, and think it more honour to direct in chief than to be busy in all.' Herein lies the secret of ruling an army."



I do not think this indictment was overdrawn, and it was justified by outstanding facts. Lord Wolseley, while Adjutant-General and "responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for the efficiency of the military forces of the Crown," had asked this pointed question :

"When shall we have thoroughly professional officers, devoted to the rough usage and operations of real war rather than to the hurdy-gurdy marching-past side of a soldier's life in peace? . . . If we blindly insist upon preparing for a past condition of war, which can never be reproduced, our army will be most certainly found wanting in the day of trial."

Lord Wolseley further indicated his opinion as regards our military position in September, 1892, in the following words :

"When shall we succeed in thinking out for ourselves what changes are required in our military system, in our drill, training, tactics, and equipment, untrammelled by notions and prejudices which, sound and good a century ago, are now as out of date and behind the science and inventions of the day as would be the bows and arrows of the Middle Ages? We have now plenty of most intelligent and highly educated officers capable of modernising our Army; but they are sat upon by the bow-and-arrow style of General."

With all this and more I was in whole-hearted agreement; but the preposterously centralised system which then dominated the War Office stood directly between Lord Wolseley's vision and its realisation. His views on administration were thus expressed in January, 1897: "The whole principle of Army administration is that of working up through converging channels which finally meet in one man charged with the supreme military command." \* This "whole principle" was said to be that governing great business undertakings.

\* *Life of Lord Wolseley.*

Lord Wolseley's views, embodying the confusion of command with administration, were thus diametrically opposed to the whole spirit of the reforms which I was then urging. The reference to private business methods seemed peculiarly unhappy, and I instanced the successful administration of the London and North-Western Railway, which was markedly decentralised, as being in many respects closely analogous to that of a War Department.

The final letter \* was devoted to a complete plan of War Office Reform on broad lines, conforming to the principles laid down by the Hartington Commission, but filling up certain gaps which that body had neglected. A "Council of Imperial Defence" under the Prime Minister was provided to deal with "great questions of Imperial policy" and "to bring the Cabinet face to face with professional opinion." The work of the War Office was divided among five heads dealing respectively with "Personnel, Matériel and Transport, Thinking, Finance, and Central Office." The office of "General Officer Commanding in Chief" was retained only because I believed that public opinion was not ripe for its abolition; but the executive command was taken out of the War Office and vested in General Officers at home and abroad. Directly under the G.O.C. in C. were placed Inspectors of all Arms. A "Master-General of the Ordnance" was created to deal with all questions of *matériel*, including artillery, fortification, barracks, transport, and clothing, while to a "Chief of the Staff" was assigned the "thinking" branch, administering the General Staff, and handling intelligence, mobilisation, and organisation, with a Colonial section to watch over military matters in the Empire. The five heads were to form a "War Office Council" and to be "coequal."

This briefly was the system for which I pleaded strongly more than thirty-five years ago. It was faulty in certain respects, as I afterwards realised; but I believe that the main principles were sound. There was one curious result. Some one, whose name I never knew, and who was

\* December 10, 1891.

ignorant of the authorship of the letters, reprinted them in pamphlet form at his own expense with a Preface by General Sir G. Chesney, K.C.B., M.P.," who wrote :

"The letters of Vetus contain a scathing exposure of our present state of military maladministration, its extravagance, waste, and inefficiency, set forth in terms strictly within the facts; they trace these evils to their source, and they provide a direct and practical remedy. . . . The letters are unanswered and unanswerable, for the mild optimism of the late Secretary for War (Mr. Edward Stanhope) passes by all the grave counts of the indictment, and his successor (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) practically admits the case, although he is not prepared to undertake the labour of reform."

Sir G. Chesney was an experienced administrator, and at the time his verdict gave me great encouragement. Two other letters followed, and I was involved in a controversy with Lord Haliburton, a stout upholder of the *status quo*, in which—perhaps unjustifiably—I thought that I prevailed.

This effort failed absolutely. Two more inquiries, one of them dealing with the war in South Africa, which painfully illustrated the defects I had striven to point out, were to follow; but twelve years passed before a drastic "reconstitution" of the War Office, in which I was destined to take part, was decided upon by Mr. Balfour. If I have devoted too much space to this episode in my working life, it is only because the amazing system of military administration which had been allowed to grow up has been forgotten; but the centralising tendency to which it was due will, perhaps, never wholly disappear.

My contributions to the *Times* during this period,\* numbering over 600 † including reviews and letters, would fill several volumes. As regards the subjects of which I made a special study, my old friend Mr. G. E. Buckle

\* Fourteen and a half writing years excluding the time at Malta.

† Including contributions to *Literature*, a forerunner of the *Literary Supplement*.

always gave me a free hand, and in letters, over such pseudonyms as *Navalis*, *Miles*, *Custos*, *Civis*, *Reform*, I could range over wider fields. In 1889, I happened to strike the question of the Venezuelan frontier, which seemed to bear the seeds of future trouble. I then proposed a well-defined line, having ascertained that Don Guzman Blanco, the President, would regard it favourably; but the official decision characteristically amounted to "Let sleeping dogs lie." We had relied on the Schomburgh line which had never been formally accepted, and in 1895, President Cleveland suddenly raised this question in peremptory and disturbing terms.\* We cared nothing for the exact trace of the boundary, so long as the legitimate interests of British Guiana were not affected; but the Monroe doctrine was involved; a part of the American Press saw red, and the tension became acute. In five letters beginning December 23, 1895, I tried to clear the situation, and pleaded for two Commissions, American and British, to make an independent examination and then to meet in Joint Session under an American president. The *Times* in leading articles (February 17-18, 1896) gave some backing to these suggestions. I now forget how the matter was settled; but it taught me many lessons and indicated the difficulties of maintaining frank Anglo-American relations which, since 1888, I had at heart.†

When war between the United States and Spain appeared imminent, I pleaded strongly for a peaceful settlement. "The doubt whether all that the United States require cannot be obtained without forcing the issue ought to be definitely resolved before a shot is fired" (April 19, 1898). Later, when the position of Spain was plainly hopeless, I suggested conditions of peace:

"Cuba to be evacuated in nine months, and its future form of government to be determined by the people. The Philippines to be restored to Spain on condition

\* As I wrote to Mr. Moberly Bell on January 3, 1896: "How alike a Kaiser and a democratic President are after all!"

† The *St. James's Gazette* ignorantly and mischievously announced that the question could easily be settled by sending the fleet to the American coast!

that they should never be ceded to any other Power, the United States to have the right of pre-emption if Spain desired to abandon them. Porto Rico to be ceded to the United States" (June 3, 1898).

According to the *Times* correspondent at Madrid, these suggestions attracted "considerable attention"; but the cession of Porto Rico was strongly opposed. Later, I again pleaded for peace, pointing out that the honour of Spain was untarnished, and that "the prolongation of a struggle obviously hopeless" could only exasperate her antagonist: "Has not the time come for Spain in her own interests to take a first step?" (July 9, 1898). Porto Rico was lost to Spain; but I am not sure, in the light of subsequent events and present controversies, that the restoration of the Philippines would not have been an advantage to the United States, though the admirable work of General L. Wood in the islands and a valuable object lesson to Americans would have been lost.

Our Minister at Peking had written decisively: "The balance of power in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li must be redressed by a lease of Wei-hai-wei on the same terms as the Russian occupation of Port Arthur." I regarded the offer of Wei-hai-wei as an astute move on the part of the Tsung-li-Yamen, and in seven letters, beginning April 4, 1898, I argued against the creation of a fortified base in the Yellow Sea.

Views strongly held as a result of prolonged study, incline one to be combative, and there were many sharp controversies, which, perhaps, I then enjoyed. Sir John Fisher recognised *Navalis*, and sometimes wrote an enthusiastic assent or a request for more.

When the new edition of the Encyclopædia was planned, I undertook about 110 articles, at first under the editorship of Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, and subsequently of Mr. Hugh Chisholm. Some of these articles I distributed among experts, assigning their length and general arrangement, which entailed much work and heavy correspondence.

While my main literary output in these years found its way into the *Times*, there were nearly 300 articles, reviews, or letters, in more than twenty other papers, exclusive of work for the magazines. The *Speaker* was started as a Liberal weekly in 1890, and in its ten years of existence I was responsible for more than 140 contributions ranging over many subjects. I cannot remember how I came to write a series of articles for the *Pioneer* of Allahabad, and for the *Pilot* long since dead.

These intensive literary efforts, often involving thirteen or fourteen hours' work a day, were made possible only by my wife, who not only took everything off my hands and bore with my mental absorption, but in all difficulties and disappointments was an unfailing harbinger of hope and encouragement. They left a permanent mark on my after life in which I recognise a warning. I lost all personal hobbies as well as the power of enjoying recreation. Sketching, which had been a pleasure, dropped away, and only music, in which my daughter was engrossed, remained for my few spare half-hours. Even now I cannot wholly escape the haunting sense that some commitment is hanging fire, or that some item of research is overdue. It should be a cardinal rule of life to hold fast to some form of recreation, as an essential distraction of the mind, which may be sorely needed and irrecoverable in old age.

## CHAPTER XIII

### AUSTRALIA, 1901-8

My greatest hope had been that, after seven years of close association with the Colonial Office, I might obtain a Governorship. My good friend, Sir Robert Meade, not long before his death, conveyed the offer of Lagos,\* which I declined, on his strong advice. The years passed on at Woolwich, and my chances seemed to have vanished. Suddenly, on my fifty-third birthday, in 1901, I received a letter from the late Sir M. Ommanney, offering me, on Mr. Chamberlain's behalf, the Governorship of Victoria, which I gratefully accepted, though feeling that it was rather too late to begin a colonial career. As, however, my future now appeared to be settled, I resigned my commission in the Army with great regret, and my military life of thirty-three years thus ended. It had been broken by many divagations, for which I was not forgiven ; but I had served with troops in every rank up to that of Colonel, and also on the Staff, and I had been enabled carefully to study the complex structure and the traditional peculiarities and anomalies which characterised the old British Army and differentiated it from all others.

There is perhaps no greater change in outlook and work than that which comes with translation to a Governorship in a far distant part of the Empire, and as the time of our departure drew near, my wife and I felt increasing diffidence. Nominations are not accepted at their face value in Australia, and the Premier of Victoria privately asked the opinion of Sir Andrew Clarke on our qualifications—the last quarter from which an impartial report

\* Now incorporated in Nigeria.

could be expected ! His reply was shown to us, and we were oppressed with the difficulty of living up to the high standards he promised. There was, however, encouragement which we valued. At the farewell dinner I had to speak for the first time, with great trepidation, as a Governor-designate. When it was over, a philanthropist came up to me and said, "There is a man here who is ready to bet ten to one that you'll do." Then the Lieut.-Governor and Chief Justice, Sir John Madden, wrote in the kindest terms, adding that "the keen interest you have shown in the Federal movement, now happily accomplished, renders it peculiarly fortunate that you should be coming to Australia at this juncture." And the Premier, Mr. (afterwards Sir) Alexander Peacock, wrote guaranteeing us "the very heartiest welcome." We had shoals of letters expressing congratulations and trust, among which was one from Lord Knutsford on October 25, with warm wishes, adding, "How pleased our dear friend Meade would have been at your success !" All my naval friends wrote in the same strain, but expressing regret that I was to be so far removed from England.

The first plunge into our new life was made somewhat trying by a little *contretemps*. The *Orontes* needed coal, which, by the laws of South Australia, could not be put on board till after midnight on a Sunday. This was relaxed to 11 p.m., up to which hour the coaling party lay comfortably smoking on the lighters alongside ; but the result was that we reached Port Phillip nearly four hours later than had been provided for in the programme. The day was excessively hot, and the Members of both Houses had been cruising in the *Hygeia*, to which we were transferred soon after passing the Heads. Here we had a little levee on the quarter-deck, where the President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker presented the Members and their wives. We were conscious of being very carefully scrutinised. A long walk on the pier was followed by a drive through the Melbourne boroughs, with successive stops at platforms where the Mayors read addresses of welcome,



and I tried to make what the Press calls "suitable replies." The effort was exhausting, and I think that another two Mayors would have been too much for my nerves. At last came the swearing-in ceremony, happily short and simple, before a large assemblage which had long been waiting. We were then warmly welcomed by the Governor-General and Lady Hopetoun, and a large dinner party at Government House ended the day. It was all somewhat bewildering; but the heartiness of our reception was unmistakable. We learned that the good people of Victoria were ready to meet us at least halfway—an assurance that we three strangers would find a happy home in the new land.

We struck Australia at an interesting time. The Commonwealth was beginning to get into its stride, and its relations with the States were a little delicate. The Labour Party was asserting itself, and adult suffrage was not yet taken seriously in other quarters. And over all brooded the South African war and a drought cycle, causing financial stringency, which would have depressed a less hopeful people.

From the defence point of view I knew Australia well; but far more had now to be learned. Our greatest wish was to be of some use in our new life, and we found ourselves quickly plunged into engagements of all kinds which filled our days with work and interest. There were innumerable functions of an official and social character, trips to distant country gatherings, institutions to open and assist, and always speeches to be made. Australians enjoy speaking, in which they are proficient, and the toast lists at country towns were of formidable length. My record was listening to thirty-five speeches and making six in four days. I recall a trying experience at a luncheon in a tent adjoining that which contained poultry exhibits. There was one cock with a powerful voice and an uncanny perception of when to use it, who punctuated our periods in a disconcerting manner, and was more successful in "getting a laugh" than some comedians. With no experience of public speaking and a horror of banalities,

much study and thought were always necessary to find what might be helpful on widely different occasions. There was also—at first—the doubt as to what a Governor might say. I suppose that, in the distant past, the Colonial Office may have done something to earn the suspicions of its motives which survive in Australia and elsewhere. The suggestion that a Governor has been sent with a mission to persuade or cajole a community into some course desired by Downing Street, or that he is trying to interfere in domestic affairs, may be fatal to his usefulness. There were some non-politicians in Victoria who urged me to speak out on what might be regarded as illegitimate subjects; but I was most careful, and only two charges of indiscretion were forthcoming. When the railway strike appeared menacing, I entered a plea for peace, which was at once attacked as unconstitutional. I had, however, taken the precaution of telling the senior Minister present in Melbourne exactly what I proposed to say, in which he readily acquiesced. On another occasion, I had been asked to address the Australian Natives' Association on the Navy, and I took pains to bring out the great lessons of our naval history without any direct reference to possible Australian policy. Senator Higgs at once scented an attempt to influence the Commonwealth, and proceeded to put down a vote of censure, which a high authority pronounced to be "distinctly opposed to the spirit of the Federal Union." Strong support of my action was at once forthcoming. Mr. (now Sir) W. Irvine, the Premier of Victoria, wrote to me :

"I have read your lecture on the Navy and the Nation very carefully and with the greatest interest. It seems to me that the review of the naval history of our country in its relation to Imperial development and national security . . . carries with it the most convincing demonstration of the lesson on which you insist—a lesson which has not yet been learned by the people of Australia—that the Navy must always be prepared to act on the offensive and to act with all its parts in unison. I have been unable

to find anything to which any reasonable man could take exception as trenching on party politics."

The Commonwealth Ministers were equally sympathetic, and Sir John Forrest wrote: "I was so very pleased to be at your lecture, and was most interested. It should be printed in pamphlet form, for it is not only a succinct account of the naval power of our country for 1,000 years, but it is expressed in a way that gives it, in my opinion, great literary value." And he undertook to arrange to meet the motion of Senator Higgs. This little incident, which illustrated "Labour" psychology in Australia and has latterly been paralleled in our own Parliament, had only the effect of making my lecture widely known.

One chance of helping the State directly came to me. Its financial position had been most unfairly attacked, and in February, 1903, I took the opportunity of a large agricultural gathering at Romsey to make a detailed statement with the cordial approval of my Government. I was able to show that, in spite of the depression caused by the long drought, Victorian finances were perfectly sound. My speech found its way into the *Times*, and assisted in restoring confidence in the economic situation of Victoria.

The work involved in continual speech-making was very hard, but it was repaid by the generous appreciation of Mr. Irvine, who wrote after my effort at Romsey:

"Let me take this opportunity of saying that I hear nothing but the most favourable report upon the mode in which you are accustomed to deal with matters of public interest. The people are not slow to recognise the value of your able and instructive addresses, and you will not, I think, consider it an impertinence for me to say that they have given you an authority in the public mind which few Governors have possessed."

My brief period of office in Australia covered several experiences of great local importance. In August, 1902, Mr. Peacock's Government resigned after a defeat in the

Legislative Assembly, and Mr. Irvine, after forming a Ministry, asked for a dissolution. This is the one occasion when a Governor is called upon to exercise his political discretion ; but there are well-known rules and precedents for his guidance. He has to be satisfied that the public interest demands, and that the general feeling in the State would support, an appeal to the electorate. I learned the views of the Premier and consulted Sir John Madden, whose knowledge of political conditions was profound. Any doubts were thus dispelled, and Mr. Irvine at once wrote :

“ We all felt that in asking you to let us have your answer on a question of such moment yesterday afternoon, I was asking you to decide very rapidly upon a matter in which you might reasonably have demanded much longer time for deliberation. On behalf of my colleagues and myself, I desire to say that we appreciate very highly the great consideration which you showed to the Government, as well as the clear recognition on your part of the undoubted fact that half the moral effect of such a blow depends upon the promptness with which it is administered.”

Our party labels do not quite accurately fit Australian political conditions, but the new Government, which the electors supported, was more Conservative than its predecessor.

In April, 1903, there was a serious strike of engine-drivers, arising from the refusal of the Government to allow their Union to affiliate with the Trades Hall—the point at issue in the Police strike fomented by Socialists in London in 1919. The men were public servants, well paid and pensioned, and they had counted unwisely on weakness in the Government, which proved sternly resolute. The signalmen happily remained staunch, and the main line of action was to get one or two trains to run at once, and to increase the service as quickly as possible. The strikers never had any public sympathy, and the drivers of the first trains out of Melbourne were met with flowers, fruit, and collections at the country stations. The

firmness of the Government was perfectly successful, and by May 19 the surrender was complete. The strike did not last long enough to cause food shortage in Melbourne; but it was a warning not to be disregarded. The sequel was instructive. Four members of the strike committee came to me to plead for an amnesty for their colleagues. They were most friendly and perfectly frank in explaining that the rest of the committee were unaware of what was being done, and that they alone were responsible. It was clear that the engine-drivers had been misled or intimidated, and I have often wondered since whether, in the case of some of our disastrous strikes, the proceedings may have been similar. If the Executive Committees of our Trade Unions kept full and correct minutes of their meetings, as a "capitalist" Board is bound to do, curious revelations might sometimes be obtainable.

Mr. Chamberlain's fiscal proposals at first reached us in crude form, and Mr. Deakin, the Commonwealth Attorney-General, impulsively telegraphed to the *British Australasian* in London: "Federal and all State Governments approve Chamberlain's proposal." We had not been consulted, and on May 19, 1903, I wrote to the Premier: "It would be a somewhat serious matter if any misunderstanding were to arise as to opinion in Australia which might lead to misunderstanding when the real issues of this complicated question have to be faced." Sir Arthur Havelock wrote to me that the Tasmanian Government was opposed to the proposals as then understood; but we were anxious to avoid any appearance of conflict with the Commonwealth Government. Eventually a telegram was sent to our Agent-General explaining that the Victorian Government "has not so far expressed any view in favour of or against the proposal," which, in fact, had not been considered by the Cabinet. The moral was plain. A telegraphic statement as to the opinion of a Dominion or of a foreign country can rarely be accepted as accurate. Such opinion may require a long time before it is declared in a form which can be trusted, and no Government, quâ Government, can be in a position to make a

premature pronouncement. The appalling mistake of the Allied Governments in 1918-9, in accepting President Wilson's views as if American opinion was solidly behind them, should never be forgotten. Public opinion in those now distant days was not sufficiently educated to follow Mr. Chamberlain's lead, which may yet be fully vindicated.

In the chequered political history of Victoria, conflicts between the two Houses had often occurred, and in 1903 the Government was faced with another. The Upper Chamber was elected by constituencies not differing greatly from those on which the Lower House depended ; but the members of the former had consistently refused to accept salaries. The difference between the two was marked. In soberness and ability of debate there was no comparison, and the Legislative Council was an effective check on unwise measures. On the other hand, extremists in the Assembly, courting popularity, sometimes introduced legislation which they expected—and hoped—would be rejected. One of them, in a moment of expansion, was heard to exclaim, "Thank God for the Upper House," and in our own Parliament there have been somewhat similar symptoms. The conflict between the two Houses in my time was at length adjusted by a conference of "managers" from both, who sat *in camera* ; otherwise there would have been no agreement. The results were embodied in a Constitution Bill, which involved much correspondence with the Colonial Office, as the Law Officers of the Crown differed upon a material point, and I was much relieved to receive a communication from Sir M. Ommanney : "I have to-day your telegram that the Ministry is prepared to take the full responsibility, and the Act will receive the Royal Assent at the Council on Tuesday next." I believe that the constitutional reforms have worked well, and to me this little experience was illuminating.

Mr. Irvine's Government accomplished much good work. The administration of the State Railways, which were losing £1,000 a day, was put on a sound footing by Mr.

(afterwards Sir) T. Tait, strongly recommended to me by a great American authority. He was invited from Canada, and instituted some salutary reforms. The Victorian system included lines which were purely political in origin, and it was necessary to close them for a time. The Government further gave consideration to the electrification of the suburban lines, which was afterwards carried out with great advantage to the public.

In the Federal sphere two important Bills dealing with naval and military matters came before Parliament in 1903, piloted by Sir John Forrest, the Minister of Defence—a fine type of an Australian pioneer and explorer.\* He consulted me freely at all stages, and I think I was able to be of use, though we did not get all we wished. On October 19, 1903, he generously wrote: "Now that the Defence Bill is passed, I must write and thank you for all the kind and willing assistance you have given me during the past year in framing and fashioning it, so as to make it a useful measure, and at the same time pass the Legislature."

The question of the rival trans-continental railways was beginning to be explored, and I unhesitatingly placed the North-South line first in order of importance for several reasons. The Southern line, connecting Coolgardie with Adelaide, was decided upon and constructed. The other line has just been begun. We now know much more about Central Australia than in 1903. There is far more water than was believed, and the coming railway will open up a huge new area, possibly well mineralised. On military grounds, the connection between South Australia and Port Darwin was, I believed, essential.

We were deeply impressed with the fascinations of Australia. If the miracle of spring and the glories of autumn are absent, there are ample compensations. The

\* Sir John Forrest was the initiator of the great scheme for conveying water in pipes from Perth to the West Australian goldfields, which he had the satisfaction of opening in January, 1903. As he wrote to me after the ceremony: "A load was lifted off me, and I felt relieved from anxiety which pressed upon me for years." He was the only Australian to receive a peerage, but he died on the homeward voyage, to my great regret.



*[By permission of the High Commissioner.]*

UPPER MURRAY RIVER, CORRYONG, VICTORIA.

*[To face page 161.]*





too-little-known scenery in Eastern Victoria through which I drove is exceedingly beautiful, while the Gippsland Lakes, which we all visited, have a charm of their own, and always the distinctive plant and bird life is an unending source of interest. At the cottage under Mount Macedon, whence the early explorers first looked upon Port Phillip, ceremony could be dispensed with, and for a time each summer we revelled in the freedom of the country. Our visits to Sydney and to Hobart were made delightful by Sir Harry and Lady Rawson and Sir Arthur and Lady Havelock, and the gatherings for the Melbourne Cup Festival, when the State Governors stayed with the Governor-General and ourselves, remain among my happy memories. Racing is an important national institution in Australia. I was too old to master its intricacies ; but I could at least appreciate the excellence of the arrangements at Melbourne, and the amenities provided for all classes, which I have never seen equalled.

My longest tour took me through the bush country, visiting the irrigation settlements of Mildura and Renmark on the way to Adelaide, and studying the peculiar behaviour of the River Murray. Twice we nearly lost our way, and horsemen appeared from nowhere to guide us. For miles the country was like a yellow desert with occasional patches of salt-bush ; but just before leaving I again went to Mildura to open the railway, passing through grass four feet high. The long drought had broken. Nature with giant strength had wrought a transformation, and a long spell of good seasons bringing prosperity was to follow. The primary production of Australia is vital, all else being subordinate ; but the huge majority of the people are town-dwellers, and there, as here, politics are dominated by electors who know nothing of the needs of the land. Here lies one of the most baffling problems of the future. Will the white democracies be able to feed themselves ? Could we now find men capable of the wonderful work of the pioneers of Australia ?

In Melbourne there was always unemployment, though work in superabundance was available in the country.

The efforts of the Government to provide it were thwarted, because the men quickly drifted back to the city. On the banks of the Yarra, the unemployed—electors of what was then perhaps the most democratic country in the world—were wont to assemble on Sundays to make speeches and sing songs of the Red Flag type denouncing the bloody tyrants who oppressed them. The wave of Socialism, started in the Trades Unions by William Lane about 1883, had ebbed before my time, and I saw some of the Socialist settlements—long derelict—on which the Victorian Government had been induced to waste money. Lane himself had drifted to Paraguay, where his Socialist colonies proved abject failures. Imperialism seemed in 1901-3 to be making some way, but Socialism was also gaining ground through the agency of the Trades Unions. In 1904, Australia had a "Labour" Government, the first in the Empire, but with a minority in Parliament, anticipating by twenty years the experience of the United Kingdom.\*

The peace of Vereeniging ending the war came as a welcome relief, and our celebrations were worthy of the occasion. I attended impressive services in both cathedrals, and the great public meeting which I addressed in the Town Hall, where the Union Jack was profusely displayed, was a notable manifestation of loyalty and of dignified enthusiasm. The South African War was never popular in Australia, which, however, liberally contributed to its success. The telegram "unmounted men preferred" could not easily be forgotten, and a sense of military ineptitude, attributed to the War Office, was prevalent, which explains the cartoon in the Melbourne *Punch* just before our departure (here reproduced).

It fell to me to welcome the officers of the visiting squadron of Admiral Kamimura at a public dinner, and

\* In 1924 all the States of Australia except New South Wales had "Labour" Governments, and in 1928 the Socialists formed the strongest party in the House of Representatives. The wave of Socialism advanced and receded; but in Queensland, which was swamped in 1915, it remained in power with disastrous economic results, and later New South Wales followed. *The Socialist Movement*, Dr. A. Shadwell.



“THE DEFORMED TO BE REFORMED.” [Melbourne Punch.]

*The “Assifer” (War Office)*—“But, my dear sir, you don’t want all those implements merely to alter a button, or re-arrange a bit of gold braid.”

*Surgeon Sir George Clarke*—“What you want is a new head, my man, and you’ll have to submit to the operation.”



to entertain them at our house, while a charming reception was prepared for us on board the flagship, where most interesting performances were given by the bluejackets. I thus caught a glimpse of the Japanese Navy, which I had studied carefully when writing for the *Times* on the war with China. I learned enough to be certain what would happen when Admiral Togo's fleet met that of Admiral Rodjestvensky. On leaving, Admiral Kamimura telegraphed to me expressing delight at his experiences in "dear Australia." The Japanese behaved admirably, and I think that the visit was useful in mitigating the distrust of our Treaty with Japan, which I found in some quarters.

In November, 1903, a pair of swallows built their nest in the deep verandah just above my study window, and I suggested to my wife that this portended a change. I had received a letter from Sir J. Fisher intimating cryptically that there was a serious intention of reforming the War Office, and I find that I wrote to him on August 31, 1903 :

"The cable tells me that the War Commission Report has made a profound impression. . . . I can't turn up the Hartington Report, but I know it pointed plainly to danger. I was afraid that the strong passages would get cut out. There is a notion that the successful general is the only man who can frame a system of administration. This is almost always false. Von Moltke had seen nothing except desultory fighting in Asia Minor, when he began to turn the German Army into a great weapon of war. A namesake of mine—almost forgotten—ran Napoleon's War Office. . . . I should like at least to have a chance of assisting, before I am too old."

I had no idea that I should be called upon to deal with the subjects on which, since 1885, I had written profusely, when the unexpected happened. On November 4, I was struggling with the difficulty of finding something that might be useful for an impending speech, when my Private Secretary brought in this telegram :

"It is most important to obtain your services on a Committee of three of which Lord Esher and Sir John Fisher are members to advise on the reorganisation of the War Office. This will involve your departure from Melbourne at the earliest possible moment. I greatly hope your reply will be favourable.\*

"ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR."

Our daughter had left us in April with Madame Melba to study under Marchesi, and our thoughts centred on Paris; but this sudden summons to break up our Australian home and to leave our friends and all the work that lay straight before us came as a shock to us both. The many farewells were very trying, and I shall never forget the warm expressions of good will which were showered upon us. At the Lord Mayor's banquet on November 9, after paying a tribute to King Edward's successful effort to promote an understanding with France, which I regarded as most important to Australia, I said:

"The great work of the past century has been the foundation of a vast Empire of independently governed States, managing their own affairs, yet loyal to the Crown and possessing interests in common. I earnestly hope that the work of the century in which we live will be to consolidate that Empire, to develop and foster the great untouched resources of our national inheritance, to advance the advantages of the Imperial connection, and, while conserving the freedom of individual units, to promote cordial co-operation among them which will not only benefit our citizens in peace, but will render them safe in war. That is the great practical problem which faces us all to-day."

I then went on to outline a plan for an "Imperial Maritime Council," of which Admiral Sir A. Fanshawe, who was present, had expressed approval, and which I

\* The post had been offered to and declined by the late Lord Grenfell, as he stated in his *Reminiscences*. Thus for the third time I obtained a position which I desired by the lapse of the original nominee.

developed in later years (see Appendix I).\* I ended by saying that :

“ It has been the greatest ambition of my life to render service to the Empire. It is an inspiration—almost a religion. I will do my best to deserve the great honour that has come to me. . . . My wife and I will part from you with real and keen sorrow. Whether we shall come back or not, I do not know ; but we shall never forget the kindness we have received from every one in Victoria. . . . We came to you untried in the experience of an office which is not a very easy one. . . . You met us more than halfway, and you have made these two years among the happiest of our lives.”

On November 19, I was entertained by both the State Houses, which I felt as a great distinction, and I cherish their joint address containing the following expression of confidence and helpful encouragement :

“ We beg to offer our congratulations to Your Excellency on the great distinction of being chosen to undertake a work so important as that which has been entrusted to you, and to express to Your Excellency our confident belief that you will fulfil your mission in a manner which will be of service to your fellow-citizens throughout the Empire.”

We received innumerable letters and telegrams from all parts of the State, and the tributes to my wife, to whom I owed everything, were touchingly expressed. Among many treasured letters I find the following “ from a well-wisher of both you and others and the nation’s good, Jim ” :

\* Mr. Deakin was much impressed by this scheme, and Mr. Asquith, to whom I had written asking that it might be laid before the Imperial Conference in 1907, replied to me on May 6, 1907 : “ At one stage of the discussion in the Conference, Deakin suggested that your proposal should be considered ; but Sir W. Laurier would not hear of it.” I still believe in this plan as a practical and effective means of securing permanent and continuous Imperial co-operation now wanting.



"Loyalty to the Crown has increased with our late reverses . . . as during the boom time when most of the working classes were doing well (we are largely bred from the restless spirits that came with the gold) consequently speculative and self-satisfied, and considered Jack as good as his master and a bit better. Consequently I deem the severe depression a blessing in disguise. . . . I pray that God's blessing may rest on you and Lady Clarke and family in your work for the nation's good, that good and wise laws may be enacted and firmly enforced, that God will bless Their Majesties King Edward and Queen Alexandra (God bless her) that they may be long spared to rule over us."

Mr. Irvine—generous always—made the following statement in the *Argus* on November 7, which was quoted in the *Times* of December 29 :

"No Governor has ever more fully identified himself with the interests of the people over whom he was called to preside. None has ever in a shorter time gained the full confidence and respect of all. He has not spared himself any labour to master the conditions under which we live. While always keeping within the limits which circumscribe the action of a constitutional representative of the Crown, he has invested his public utterances on the many subjects to which he has addressed himself with the living interest that proceeds from active study and wide experience."

Two years of study in Australia changed my whole political outlook and destroyed some cherished illusions. The faith of a Liberal was shattered, and the phrases which I had accepted as principles lost all actuality. I had seen democracy—considerably more advanced than that at home—in full operation, and my confident hopes of Government "by the people and for the people" faded away. It seemed to me that Government by popular assemblies, based on adult suffrage, must ultimately become impossible, and recent symptoms have only confirmed

that impression. Similarly, I had looked forward to some form of Imperial Federation, and in my book *The Last Great Naval War*,\* supposed to be written in 1930, I had assumed the existence of a "National Senate" to which the handling of high Imperial policy was entrusted. Association with Australian statesmen brought home to me the extreme caution and even fear with which they regarded all such projects. On May 9, 1902, in reply to a letter of mine on his starting for the Colonial Conference in London, Sir Edward Barton, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, wrote :

"Whether these conferences will become periodic, it is hard to say, looking at the varying conditions of Governmental and Party life in the many parts of the Empire. But that they will become more frequent is certain, and equally of a surety, each will do more good than its predecessor. Reciprocal knowledge will not only sustain and widen existing affection, but if ever our relations to each other require definition (and there will be the rub) then all this better knowledge will go to render needless the attempt to formulate some things, and will ensure the reception, with greater trust and confidence, of the formulation of others."

Later, on January 8, 1903, Mr. Deakin wrote :

"I share your sentiments towards the Empire most sincerely ; but as every party is destroyed by its ultras, I feel much more apprehensive as to the words and actions of those who 'profess and call themselves' Imperialists than I do in regard to our opponents. The great majority of the Australian people is and will be with us if they are not 'frighted by false fires' of official and impatiently interfering theorists unable to await or understand the great principles of Imperial growth."

My generalisation was that popularly elected Parliaments in the Dominions, accustomed to interfere in the smallest details of Government and flushed with the

\* See p. 110.

sense of power, would never recognise plenipotentiaries in a Council dealing with matters in which they regarded themselves supreme. Subsequently, therefore, when Mr. Chamberlain's plan of an Advisory Council had broken down, I joined the group which Sir Frederick Pollock gathered together, and in March 1907, with Lord Milner, Sir John Colomb, and others, I signed a memorandum advocating a Secretariat \* and an Intelligence Department.

There could have been no better school in which to study the working of democracy in practice than Australia in my time. From experiments, successful or the reverse, under Governments on the British model, but based upon electorates then far more "advanced"—in the Liberal sense—than our own, there was much to be learned. What has happened here could plainly be forecasted, and it is a misfortune that few of our politicians ever followed the course of democratic evolution in the Dominions.

When I returned home, no one except the King, who questioned me closely, showed the smallest interest in the political situation in Australia.

\* This was supported by Mr. Deakin at the Conference of 1907. Now that we have a Dominions Minister, Sir F. Pollock's carefully considered scheme may perhaps be realised.

## CHAPTER XIV

### COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE, 1904-5

LEAVING my wife in Paris with our daughter, then studying under Madame Marchesi, I hurried to London and was met by Lord Esher, who took me at once to the temporary office of our Committee to discuss preliminaries. I brought home some strong views, among which a "Council of Imperial Defence,"\* the creation of a real General Staff, and drastic decentralisation were prominent. Lord Esher was a member of the Elgin Commission, the Report of which with all the evidence I had carefully studied before leaving Melbourne. He was in full agreement with my main objects, and I learned that our instructions gave us a free hand, but specially directed the creation of an Army Council on the lines of the Board of Admiralty, involving the abolition of the office of Commander-in-Chief.

The first section of our Report advocating a Defence Secretariat, was sent to Mr. Balfour on January 11, 1904, with a covering letter justifying this order of procedure.

"We are driven to the conclusion that no measure of War Office reform will avail unless associated with provision for obtaining and collecting for the use of the Cabinet all the information and advice required for shaping national policy in war, and for determining the necessary preparations in peace. Such information and advice must necessarily embrace not only the sphere of the War Office, but those of the Admiralty and other offices of State."

\* See p. 151.

The experience of the South African War had proved up to the hilt that the Cabinet was never brought face to face with responsible military advice, and was not provided with essential information. We made an earnest effort to provide a permanent remedy, premising that, under a Constitution like our own, "responsibility for the efficiency and sufficiency of preparations for war rests upon Parliament and in a special sense upon the Prime Minister. We hold that it is essential to provide the latter with adequate means of discharging his heavy obligations to the Empire." All this Mr. Balfour perfectly realised, and he knew well how to handle the instrument we devised. If during the Great War the Committee of Imperial Defence had been used as was intended, much would have happened differently. When, for example, the operations at the Dardanelles were being considered, it would have been impossible for Mr. Churchill to mislead Lord Kitchener as to what the 15-inch guns of the *Queen Elizabeth* could accomplish, neither being aware that there was a full record of the performance of 16-inch guns against coast defences, and no artillery expert being admitted to the discussions. Nor would a decision on which important events in Mesopotamia depended have been referred to a Committee presided over by the Permanent Under-Secretary of the India Office, an ex-Indian civilian.\* Happily for us the German Great General Staff had secured a preponderating influence, which the Kaiser was incapable of correcting, and the prescient views of Admiral von Tirpitz were for some time ignored.

The unanimity of the Committee was complete, and our Report was delivered on March 7, 1904, and was understood to be accepted by the Cabinet. The King showed the keenest interest in our proceedings, and was kept throughout in close touch with them. The first three sections dealing with the Defence Committee, the

\* The Reports of the Commissions on the operations in the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia, and Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson's startling revelations in *Soldiers and Statesmen*, painfully record the irregular methods of reaching decisions and the tragic results.

Army Council and Inspection, were published on February 1, and there was a chorus of approval from the Press. Later, of course, sharp criticisms, the origins of which were sometimes obvious, were forthcoming from some quarters. Stress was laid upon the surprisingly short time expended in our deliberations, and it was alleged that we had heard no witnesses. We had sat *de die in diem*, and a Committee of three—all being root-and-branch reformers—has certain advantages. We deliberately decided not to take formal evidence, which was already available in huge volume, but to have private talks with a large number of officials in and outside the War Office, whose opinions were briefly recorded by our able Secretary, Colonel (now Lieut.-General Sir) G. Ellison. In this way, we interviewed eighty witnesses in forty-four days, including H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught, Mr. Brodrick, Lord Roberts, Sir R. Buller, most of the Senior Generals, and all the heads of the civil Branches of the War Office. I am doubtful if any Report was more firmly based on evidence; but we were disappointed that Lord Wolseley, perhaps wearied by his many experiences as a witness, was unwilling to appear before us. Much publicity was given to a story that Lord Roberts had been discourteously evicted from the War Office. Whether there was any vestige of truth in this story, I have no idea; but he cordially acquiesced in the abolition of an office which he said he found to be impossible.

The Army Council and the Committee of Imperial Defence,\* of which I was appointed Secretary, were promptly set up, and the Esher Committee was retained in being for several weeks to give any advice that might be required. What was now needed was a Secretary of State for War, who, accepting the decisions of the Government, would set the new machine to work in accordance

\* The Secretariat, which was smaller than the Esher Committee proposed, consisted at first of Captain (afterwards Rear-Admiral Sir) C. Ottley, Captain (now Sir) J. R. Chancellor, Captain A. B. Lindsay (Gurkas), and myself. A civil assistant, Mr. C. Longhurst, was afterwards added. Captain W. C. Nicholson, R.N., replaced Captain Ottley, and Major J. Lyon, R.A., Captain Chancellor.

with the principles we had laid down. Unfortunately, this condition was not fulfilled. Mr. Arnold Forster was new to Cabinet Office and had been a severe critic of the existing Army organisation. Full of energy and with much knowledge of an academic kind, he had evolved an entirely new Army System. A memorandum explaining this plan was sent to meet me at Colombo, and I thought it hopelessly impracticable. Mr. Arnold Forster strove to force his scheme through in opposition to the views of Mr. Balfour and of the new Army Council. My diaries of 1904-5 are full of the difficulties in which the latter was thus placed, and of the methods by which Mr. Arnold Forster tried to gain the support of some of his colleagues. Cabinet decisions were not easily reached in those days, and it became a question whether the Secretary of State or the Army Council would resign. Meanwhile the War Office was a house divided against itself; administration languished, and some of the reforms proposed by the Esher Committee were handicapped at the start.

The Committee of Imperial Defence, on the other hand, under the ægis of Mr. Balfour, quickly got into working order, as Admiral Lord Walter Kerr, on quitting the post of First Sea Lord, emphatically recorded. On October 19, 1904, he wrote to me :

“ I sever my association with the Defence Committee with very great regret. It has been to me most interesting and instructive work and is not likely to be less so in the future. . . . I shall not cease to take the greatest interest in its work so far as it is publicly divulged. I am very thankful that I was on the Committee long enough to see it properly established with yourself to conduct it.”

As Secretary of this Committee for three and a half years, I was for the first time brought close to the cumbrous and creaking machine of Government which works in ways little understood, but partially revealed in biographies and diaries which frequently provide the best clues to political history. It was possible to study the interactions

and the clash of the wills of individuals from which important decisions—right or wrong—eventually emerged.

The objects and the methods of procedure of the C.I.D. were explained at length in a note I prepared for Mr. Balfour towards the end of 1905.

“The Committee has held 79 meetings and has dealt with an immense number of subjects. The Prime Minister has always been present. The Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for India, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer are regular attendants. . . .

“The Professional Members regularly summoned are Lord Roberts, the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the General Staff, the Director of Naval Intelligence. Numerous other experts have been summoned. The Committee can and does send for any available expert opinion it may require. . . . Up to the present time only one representative of the Colonies (Sir F. Borden) has attended the meetings. . . .

“The regular attendants . . . are political and professional in equal numbers. The discussions are quite unrestrained, and the professional members give their opinions with complete freedom. The advantages of an arrangement which gives Ministers the opportunity of cross-examining experts are evident. . . .

“Under the British Constitution, as now operating, it is vital that the Prime Minister of the day should make himself fully acquainted with the larger questions of National Defence involving decisions for which he is inevitably responsible. . . .” \*

I recall these extracts, now more than twenty years old, because many misconceptions grew up in regard to the functions of the Committee, which was represented as diminishing the authority of the Prime Minister and giving too much influence to Naval and Military opinion *vis à vis* the civil Government. My experience, on the

\* Mr. Balfour's view was that the Prime Minister was the only permanent member of the Committee, and this view was reaffirmed by Mr. Baldwin in the House of Commons on February 15, 1926.



contrary, was that the hands of the Prime Minister were greatly strengthened by the work of the Committee assisted by the Secretariat. My duty, as I conceived it, was to bring to his notice any matter which, so far as could be foreseen, might immediately or in the future, bear upon Imperial Defence, and with his permission to prepare and circulate reasoned memoranda upon them, utilising all information that the Secretariat could obtain. It was thus my privilege during this period to be in constant personal touch with two Prime Ministers who, intellectually and temperamentally differing as widely as possible, were the kindest and most considerate Chiefs I ever had the honour to serve.

My correspondence and diaries in these strenuous years contain much that may not now be reproduced. They are often sad reading, because most of my contemporaries have passed away, and others with whom I was then closely associated have drifted out of my life, while matters which once seemed to be supremely important have faded into nothingness in the fierce light of subsequent events. They record interviews with and letters from almost every one who could give first-hand information relating to such questions as the Indian Frontier, Afghanistan, Tibet, Russia, China, Japan, and our Dominions and Colonies. Many questions loomed large in those days, specially, perhaps, Army organisation, Indian Frontier problems, Lord Kitchener's scheme for reorganising the Indian Army, The Hague Conference (1906), the Wireless Telegraphy Conference at Berlin (1906), the Japanese and Russian Treaties, the Baghdad Railway, and our Naval preparations.

As early as January, 1905, the conflict between Lords Curzon and Kitchener assumed a serious form, bringing me many letters from the latter expressed with extreme moderation. There was a misconceived idea of sending out a Commission, which happily came to nothing; but the whole question was referred to the Government of India for an opinion, and on January 26, Lord Kitchener wrote to me :

“This entailed certain delay. It placed the Military Department with their back to the wall and ranged the Government of India on one side of the question. . . . Now, I agree with the Viceroy that, as the case has been referred, the Council will have to see and discuss it. Their decision is of course a foregone conclusion as they cannot go against the Viceroy, and he has told me he is going to oppose my proposals.”

The verdict of the Government of India could be anticipated with certainty, and the result was to transfer a controversy, which H.M. Government must settle, to India, where the spectacle of a sharp conflict between the highest officials was necessarily disastrous, while, there and here, factions were arrayed in favour of one or other of the combatants, and the Press began to take sides. After being considered by a Committee, the question was settled by the Cabinet, which decided on a compromise which did not prevent Lord Curzon's resignation on a side issue. Of this Lord Kitchener wrote on June 22, 1905: “The decision of H.M. Government was a surprise to me. I suppose a compromise can never be quite satisfactory. I shall try my very best to make the system work so that when I hand it over to my successor it may be thoroughly established and have given confidence to those who doubt all Military Administration.” The change of Government caused doubts and delay, and on December 21, Lord Kitchener wrote again: “The Viceroy has not taken the necessary steps to put the new machinery in motion, so now with the change of Government the whole question is hung up and will again, I suppose, be put in the melting-pot.” On January 11, 1906, he wrote more hopefully: “Lord Minto and I are working thoroughly well together. He took a little time to investigate the whole case, and is now convinced I was right.” Not till March 15, 1906, was he able to say: “At last! I really think that next Monday we shall make a start with the new system.” More than a year, involving much unrest, was thus required to settle a question intrinsically simple, because it turned

upon a principle of administration, though it was susceptible of extensive misrepresentation. A Military dyarchy had grown up in India, which could work only when the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Military Member of Council were in general accord. Lord Kitchener's main demands, in his words written to me on December 21, 1905, were these :

“Abolition of the present dual control in the Army, and the existing duplication of work in the Offices, direct access of the principal Military adviser to the Viceroy and the Government of India ; *i.e.* his proposals should not have to be transmitted to the Government through an antagonistic channel that frequently misunderstood and distorted them and conveyed the paramount orders of the Government of India in reply.”

This assumption of antagonism was not wholly justified by experience, as it had happened that the Military Member might amicably dominate the Commander-in-Chief, or conversely, in matters of Military policy ; but the schemes which Lord Kitchener had in view were sure to be opposed by the other member of the dyarchy, and Lord Curzon was averse from depending upon a single Military opinion. The difficulty was turned by appointing a “Supply” Member of Council who was intended not to take a hand in Military policy, and as Lord Curzon's nominee was not accepted, he resigned. My view, at the time, was that certain radical changes were required to bring the military administration of India up to date, and that Lord Curzon's misgivings might thus have been allayed.

On October 24, 1904, returning from Folkestone, I read in the train the first account of the firing of the Russian Fleet on our trawlers in the North Sea. That it was all a stupid mistake\* was perfectly clear. In our naval manœuvres, I had seen an island off the coast of Ireland mistaken in a bad light for H.M.S. *Benbow*, and I was well aware of the inexperience of Admiral Rodjestvensky's

\* It was not at first known that the Russians had fired into one of their own ships causing casualties.

command. On reaching the Office, I at once wrote strongly to the Prime Minister in this sense. He took the question into his own hands; the Cabinet was unanimous, and arbitration was promptly arranged, the Russian Government undertaking to give more in compensation than the Committee, presided over by my old friend, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, was willing to award. This awkward incident had a disturbing effect at the moment, and there were some risks; but the Press, as a whole, showed moderation, though there were demands in some quarters that the Russian Fleet, which crawled on to its doom at Tsushima, should be ordered back or attacked. The whole pitiful story was told later by a young naval constructor on board the Russian flagship, and there is no doubt that the ridiculous rumour of the presence of Japanese torpedo boats in the North Sea was rife in the Fleet. Who originated that rumour? In my diary of September 18, 1906, I find this: "Drury [Rear-Admiral Sir C.] told me he had seen a humble letter from the Tsar directly after the Dogger Bank incident and that, for reasons of muddle or carelessness, it was never published."

Some other entries during 1905 refer to matters of importance at the time.

"Gave Mr. A. J. B. copy of memo laying down basis of Army Organisation" (March 1).

"Sent for by Mr. A. J. B. at 11.30. Went through A[rnold] F[orster] scheme and told him the thing was impossible" (March 10, 1905).

"Wrote on renewal of Treaty with Japan" (April 10).

"Committee meeting. Japanese Alliance. Government apparently prepared to go far" (April 11).

"Mr. A. J. B. told me Japanese had proposed Treaty on lines we discussed. . . . Received draft Treaty and wrote note upon it" (May 26).

"Received draft Japanese Treaty as revised by Cabinet. Sent note proposing two amendments to Lord Lansdowne" (June 1).

"Anglo-Japanese Treaty published, comments favourable" (September 27).

"Letter from Mr. A. J. B., who is of opinion that the time is propitious for an understanding with Russia" (October 12).

"Wrote draft agreement with Russia" (October 18).

"Sent P.M. draft agreement with Russia" (October 20).

"Mr. A. J. B. and Sir C. Hardinge arrived to discuss Persian Railways. Sir C. H. remained, and I showed him draft Treaty with Russia. He said he would be prepared to negotiate it at once, and he believed the Russians would accept it" (November 1).

On July 20, the Government was defeated by three votes, and the shadow of a political *bouleversement* hung heavily over the following months, while lively speculations as to the succession began to appear. At length, "Mr. A. J. B. came for one and a half hours. Told me he was going to resign" (November 30). The Chamberlain split in 1903 had shaken the Government, and throughout 1905 it showed signs of weakening. There was harmony in the Cabinet; but Ministers, and Mr. Arnold Forster especially, developed some sharp differences of opinion outside. As Lord Grey has written, the Government before the end of the year was "exhausted and tired." \*

Much was accomplished, but not all I hoped. Lord Lansdowne had placed our relations with France on a happy and permanent basis. A new Treaty with Japan had been signed, and both these achievements of Mr. Balfour's Government were to prove of inestimable value later. The foundations of an agreement with Russia were laid; but I doubt if Mr. Balfour or Lord Lansdowne would have approved the quasi-partition of Persia with which it became entangled. Many questions of Imperial importance were closely examined, and new light was brought to bear upon them, while some decisions which had far-reaching effects were facilitated by the new system. As Mr. Balfour wrote to me on January 25, 1906:

"If our two years' discussions with Kitchener (which

\* *Twenty-Five Years.*

under the old system would never have taken place or would have been taken under conditions which would have made a rational decision by the Home Government impossible) do not convince them [the Liberal Government] of the need for a C.I.D., nothing will."

This could have been said of other questions which were burning in those distant days, and notably of the invasion scare with which Mr. Balfour valiantly grappled. This moss-grown question had been investigated by the Duke of Devonshire's Committee in 1903, with reassuring results, and it was Mr. Balfour's hope to lay it to rest by a carefully argued speech in the House of Commons based upon a fresh examination by his Secretariat in consultation with the Admiralty. It was decided to use French ports for purposes of illustration, because our relations with France were such as to prevent any possible misunderstanding, and the greater distances of the German ports would add to the time during which transports must be exposed at sea. This speech \* was delivered on May 11, 1905, and, with a subsequent memorandum on raids, was absolutely justified by the crucial experience of the Great War.

It stands on record as an example of Mr. Balfour's grasp of one of the many subjects which he studied in these two years. The invasion scare, though a purely Naval question, had always been raised in military quarters; † but the Admiralty had not invariably spoken with the precision which was forthcoming in 1905 and later. In 1910, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir A. Wilson, plainly stated that, "even supposing that, by some extraordinary chance the transports were able to reach our coast, their presence must be known when they arrive there, and long before half the troops can be landed the transports would be sunk by submarines and destroyers which are stationed along the coast for that purpose."

\* Reprinted in pamphlet form.

† In a useful booklet, to which I contributed an introduction, Mr. (now Sir) H. d'Egville briefly summarised the evolution of this question, *The Invasion of England* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1905).

Mr. Balfour's speech undoubtedly had an effect upon public opinion at the time ; but, on July 20, 1907, he wrote me a long letter enclosing notes \* which purported to show that the hypothesis of invasion from French ports was inadequate, and that "the security of our shores now was much less than the public were disposed, on the authority of the Defence Committee, to believe." These notes were examined in conjunction with the Admiralty and the General Staff, and the results were summarised in my Memorandum of August, 1907, in which, after exposing some fallacies and discussing the three phases of invasion, it was stated that "the crucial Naval phase remains, and it cannot be admitted that Naval progress has relatively handicapped the superior Naval Force in dealing with a defenceless flotilla on the sea." All this helps to explain the difficulty of inducing the general public to believe in what Lord Wolseley called "the unstable element." It would be easy to show how gravely the invasion scare hampered our operations in the Great War from first to last, as the Germans, like Napoleon, desired.† Most unfortunately for the nation, the Admiralty had departed from the views put forward in 1905, and those of the First Sea Lord in 1910. In 1916, after the naval raids had indicated what would happen to a great fleet of transports, it was considered that 450,000 men were required for Home Defence, though this number was never reached. Even after the Battle of Jutland, the Admiralty would not undertake to deal with an invasion by 160,000 men ; but towards the end of 1917, it was thought that 70,000 was probably a maximum.‡ I have found no traces in the German publications of any plan of invasion,

\* These notes had received the imprimatur of Lord Roberts, Lord Lovat, Sir Samuel Scott, and Colonel Repington, but were obviously put together by the last-named, who had not long before poured scorn on the invasion scare, as I recalled, writing as "Navalis" in the *Times* on October 5, 1906. These were his words : "Buttonhole one of these old gentlemen in Pall Mall ; stop them and ask them why they ask us to pay for 640,000 men mostly organised to do nothing at home ; ask them when last England was invaded and why ; ask them who is going to invade us and how," etc., etc. (*Imperial Strategy*).

† *Soldiers and Statesmen*. The view of the General Staff that this was a naval question seems perfectly sound.

which must have led to a first-class disaster as von Tirpitz would know. Would the Admiralty have permitted 70,000 British troops to embark for the Levant if a far superior fleet to our own was in the Mediterranean ? Now that Air attack is a real menace, fears of invasion by sea may perhaps subside.

One other circumstance may be recalled because it gave rise to misconceptions. Lord Roberts, with wonderful energy and characteristic patriotism, was warmly championing the National Service League and wished that the Government should accept its somewhat nebulous proposals. This was not possible except as part of a general scheme of re-organisation ; but Mr. Balfour undertook to appoint a Sub-Committee to examine the whole matter. Lord Roberts refused this offer, wishing to separate from the C.I.D. in order to be free to carry on the propaganda of the League.

Army re-organisation was excluded from the purview of the Esher Committee. Mr. Balfour, however, took up the whole question and appointed a Sub-Committee, on which I served, to draw up a general scheme ; but nothing could be done because the way was blocked by Mr. Arnold Forster's projects, and to change the Secretary of State for War at this period was plainly impossible.

The question of the Belgian guarantee had specially interested me after my mission in 1890,\* and with Mr. Balfour's permission, I prepared and circulated a memorandum explaining in detail the nature of the Treaty obligations to Belgium, and of "collective guarantees in general." In regard to Belgium, I wrote in August, 1905 :

"In the event of a second Franco-German War, military exigencies might induce the Germans to violate the Neutrality of Belgium. The inducement is certainly stronger for Germany than for France, which has much less to gain from such violation. Such statements as that of the German Minister at Brussels do not exclude the possibility of the violation of Belgian territory for an

\* See p. 88.



alleged temporary purpose. British interests are now more than ever opposed to the violation of Belgian territory, while no reliance could be placed upon the other co-signatories of the Treaty—Russia and Austria.

“In the event of a Franco-German War, therefore, Great Britain would be compelled to take the same action as in 1870, and France, at least, would doubtless be prepared to accept the same Treaty as was concluded by Mr. Gladstone’s Government in that year. As, however, the German point of view has changed, the need of preparation for active measures in defence of Belgian neutrality would be much greater now than in 1870.”

On September 14, 1905, Mr. Balfour wrote: “I think the formulation of the question regarding the neutrality of Belgium is excellent, and I think it important that the General Staff should prepare a memorandum on the subject.” Events justified my plain warning; but I little thought that, at this very time, the von Schlieffen plan,\* which was based upon the violation of Belgian territory, had begun to take shape.

I had criticised our system of Submarine mines as being generally unsuited to our requirements,† and I wished to secure consideration of the whole question, which was essentially one for the Navy. Mr. Balfour agreed that a questionnaire, which I drafted, should be sent to the Admiralty. The answers were such that it was impossible to continue the system which was, therefore, handed over to the Navy.‡ I think that it can justly be said that, in no single case, would the Submarine mine defences, as then planned, have proved of any value in the Great War, while, in some waters, they would certainly have been dangerous.§

\* General Count von Schlieffen, described by General Ludendorff as “one of the greatest soldiers that ever lived,” left office in 1906, by which time the plan must have been worked out in full detail.

† See p. 106.

‡ It was unfortunate that the lessons from the Russo-Japanese War, as to the use of sea mines, were not learned by the Admiralty, which was not prepared, when War broke out, to provide these mines on a large scale.

§ Sir Charles Dilke, with whom I used sometimes to discuss Imperial questions in those days and whose judgment was not always as wise

German spying was actively at work in 1905 and later, and reports reached me from many parts of the country. Some were imaginary ; but, in five cases investigated by Inspector Stockley, there could be little doubt. In a note sent to the Prime Minister on January 12, 1905, I drew attention to these cases all relating to Naval stations. I did not attach great importance to espionage of this kind in time of peace, and I wrote that,

“spying has become a mania with the Continental Intelligence Departments, where information of every kind is diligently collected. . . . On the other hand, I do not believe that this information is necessarily of much value when obtained.

“While, however, it is impossible for us—even if it were necessary—to accept the elaborate precautions which Continental Powers have taken, I think that we should make investigations of this kind as unpleasant and expensive as possible. We should also let it be known that we are aware of what is going on.”

Nothing effective could be done under existing laws, and I was doubtful whether Parliament would assent to an extension of the Aliens Act, to give “power to deport any foreigner found spying in the neighbourhood of defence works.” The best remedy appeared to be to direct the local police to give close attention to the movements of the paying guests who were thus at work, which would make their operations “less easy and pleasant.” This I believe was done in some cases with effect. When War came, our customary negligence was exchanged for a fit of spy mania which sometimes tended to be ridiculous ; but the measures taken soon became effective, and I do not believe that our enemies derived any real advantage from such espionage as went on in 1905 and later.\* A

as his information was extensive, in a far too flattering estimate of my services published just before I left England, regarded the abolition of military Submarine mines as a blot.

\* If, however, we had been subjected to a German invasion, which was impossible, the local knowledge thus accumulated would have proved surprisingly complete, as happened in Poland.

far greater danger and one infinitely more difficult to avert was the disclosure of information as to Naval and Military plans of which there were disturbing examples.

The question of garrisoning Gibraltar and Malta by marines, which was first raised by Sir John Colomb, a pioneer in matters of Imperial Defence, was favourably regarded by the Admiralty at this period, and Lord Cawdor wrote to me that a scheme was being prepared for discussion. There was much to be said for this plan, which, however, is open to certain objections of a quasi-political character. My diary records: "Ottley about Wei-hai-wei, etc. Told me J. F. wished to abolish the marines and keep three battle-ships' crews at Gibraltar. Madness" (October 10, 1905). The destruction of the Marines, which aroused strong opposition in high quarters, was most happily averted; but the failure to secure discussion of the proposal to place the Mediterranean fortresses under the Admiralty may have been due to Sir John Fisher's ill-conceived attempt.

One of the happiest associations of my life was now to be severed. It was a privilege to serve directly under Mr. Balfour, seeing him constantly and enjoying his full confidence. The value of the work he accomplished with the machinery of his creation will never be known. There was no question, directly or indirectly concerned with Imperial Defence, on which he did not bring to bear the quickest intellect I ever encountered, and the fact that eighty-two meetings of the Committee were held under his auspices is evidence of his unremitting care. No Prime Minister has ever given so much personal study to Imperial Defence in all its aspects. On parting he recommended me for a G.C.M.G.;\* but I value most the generous terms in which he acknowledged the help I strove to give him.

\* Among the numerous kind letters and messages I received was a telegram from Mr. Deakin: "Commonwealth Congratulates" (December 9), which gave me special pleasure.

## CHAPTER XV

### COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE, 1906-7

THE sudden advent of new Ministers, especially if inexperienced, creates a changed psychology in all the great Departments of State, and brings the clash of new wills to bear upon all public questions. Would the Prime Minister abolish the Committee of Imperial Defence, and, if not, what would be the attitude of the heads of the four offices with which it was mainly concerned? Sir Edward Grey had served an apprenticeship at the Foreign Office and well knew the nature of the work which he had undertaken. Mr. Haldane had no knowledge of military matters, and Mr. Morley was wholly ignorant of India and her difficult problems. Lord Tweedmouth was not in good health and was unlikely to mitigate the crude schemes which Sir John Fisher was constantly evolving. What would happen? The late Government failed to re-organise the Military Forces only because of the tragic irruption of Mr. Arnold Forster.\* Would his successor complete a task which the Elgin Commission had shown to be long overdue? My diary records the earliest portents.

“Haldane came here [I was a prisoner with a cold] to say he was appointed S.S.W. Long talk on policy; promised all possible help” (December 9).

“Haldane again at 2.15 p.m., followed by Mr. A. J. B. at 3.30 p.m.” (December 10).

“Saw Sir H. C.-B. for the first time as P.M. Said he had decided to carry on the C.I.D.” (December 18).

\* See p. 176.

"Sent for by Sir Edward Grey. Interesting talk on the situation, Belgium, etc." (December 19).

"At I[ndia] O[ffice]. Talked to Morley for half an hour, C.I.D., Indian questions, Tibet, etc. Left him précis of C.I.D. minutes" (December 20).

"Saw Asquith, explained working of C.I.D." (December 21).

All this raised hopes in the Secretariat which were not disappointed, and it was not long before Members of the Army Council told me that the change at the War Office was a relief. I had known Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman for some time, and he had occasionally asked for my views.\* I could cherish the hope of being able to modify the distrust which he had formerly expressed † in regard to such work as that upon which the C.I.D. was engaged.

Mr. Haldane quickly started upon his studies in Army organisation and made changes in the Army Council which he wisely decided to use. As a basis for discussion, I prepared a Memorandum on "Military Organisation" (January 31, 1906), which may still possess some little value as it includes a detailed enumeration of all our Military Forces then existing. Accepting the views announced by Mr. Balfour on invasion and raids, it was possible to assign specific duties to the four Military Forces.

"If we seek to protect ourselves from invasion by Military means, we shall be driven to a conscripted Home Army. If we palter with the question, assuming naval protection at one moment and military protection at another, or an indefinable combination of both, our preparations will continue to be capricious, illogical, wasteful, and delusive."

\* Thus he wrote on May 17, 1899: "I should be very glad to hear something of your views on the China position; perhaps you could come here [6, Grosvenor Place] after Whitsuntide?" This led to a very interesting talk.

† See p. 103.

The "Primary Duty" of each force was thus assigned :

<i>Regular Forces.</i>	Service over-sea.
<i>Militia.</i>	2nd Line Army.
<i>Yeomanry.</i>	Mounted force for 2nd Line Army.
<i>Volunteers.</i>	Local Defence.

Subject to these general definitions, the functions of the respective Forces were given in detail. My main proposals were based upon the abolition of the Army Corps \* and the creation of a large Division † as the superior Military unit in peace, six being "held in readiness in this country for service over-sea."

On these lines I drew up a tentative organisation for the Regular Army. In February, I prepared another Memorandum dealing with the Militia, which in the South African War had supplied 115,000 men for service abroad in spite of "most unfavourable conditions." A complete plan of organisation and training was suggested, "the main object" being "to preserve the closest touch with the Regular Army, while providing a separate and distinct administration for the citizen force in peace." In April, I attempted to deal with the Volunteers on similar lines, giving a sketch of their evolution from 1802 and after the revival in 1859. A re-organisation of the Yeomanry to bring it into harmony with the main scheme was also suggested. By this time, Mr. Haldane had been attracted to the idea of a Territorial Force administered by County Associations, which had been proposed some years previously,‡ and in this third Memorandum I wrote : "I have purposely avoided using the term 'Territorial Army' in connection with the Forces to be administered by the County Associations. . . . The Territorial Forces can at best only provide materials from which an Army can be smoothly and rapidly created in time of War." This may have been too sweeping a generalisation. The

\* Eight Army Corps long figured delusively in the Army List, and were semi-officially declared in 1888 to have been "never intended to do more than expose the weakness of our position" (*The Balance of Power*).

† The composition of this Division was given in detail.

‡ By Colonel (now Lieut.-General Sir) G. Ellison.

Territorial Force did provide units which took the field early in the Great War ; but its capacity was not fairly tested, because Lord Kitchener decided to set up another organisation on a regular basis.

Of the first Memorandum, Mr. Haldane wrote on February 3, 1906 :

“ I have now been twice through your admirable Memorandum. It is curious how closely our lines of thinking display tendencies to approximate. I do not think there is any real difference on points of principle. You have subjected the *raison d'être* of the Regular Army and the present Auxiliary forces to scientific and searching scrutiny and have brought out exact facts.”

This was most encouraging, and on April 9, he wrote again : “ I have just finished the first reading of your Memorandum.\* It is really a great paper ; there stand all our thoughts drilled into battalions ; . . . I keep my further observations for Wednesday ; but I feel that you have laid the foundations now.” Mr. Haldane pursued his unaccustomed studies with much energy, and on July 13, 1906, he gave a general review—nebulous in some respects—of his scheme in the House of Commons, causing some anxiety to the Prime Minister and to certain of his colleagues in the Cabinet.

Where we differed was in regard to the treatment of the Militia, and he naturally turned to advisers prepared to sacrifice the old force, which alike in the Peninsula, at Waterloo, in the Crimea, the Indian Mutiny, and in South Africa in spite of years of neglect, had proved its sterling value. It was the historic achievements of the Militia as an essential support of the Regular Army that specially appealed to me, as they did to Mr. Balfour, who wrote later : “ You already know my views about the Militia, the danger of destroying them, and the possibility of reforming and utilising them. I can assure you those views have not been changed by anything that

\* A later effort to marshal my proposals.

has taken place in the debate on the Army" (April 11, 1907). The champions of the Militia—the Duke of Bedford especially—put up a strong defence, and for some time we hoped that Mr. Haldane might modify his plans. The position of a Minister who backs a definite scheme which few members of his party understand is, however, very strong, and Mr. Haldane's pilotage was most skilful. By November the "general outlines" of his scheme were developed on paper with a draft Bill, and the Prime Minister appointed a Sub-Committee\* to report "whether the scheme thus outlined appears to conform to reasonable national requirements and to be capable of being carried into practical effect." The main features were defined by Mr. Haldane as the organising of the "Military Strength of the United Kingdom in two bodies":

"(a) The Expeditionary Force ready for rapid mobilisation at all times; and

"(b) The Territorial Force capable of supporting and expanding (a) after time has elapsed for giving additional training, and providing machinery by which the manhood of the country could be trained and organised in the event of great National emergency."

Our Sub-Committee was thus precluded from considering any alternative scheme, and after taking all the best evidence available,† the Report, which I drafted, was necessarily guarded. We could not say that the "reasonable requirements of the Empire" would be met, because these requirements had not been laid down authoritatively. We, therefore, "confined our inquiry to the analysis of the present state of facts and to Mr. Haldane's proposed changes, and endeavoured to show in what degree, should the assumptions upon which these proposals are based be verified by experience, the new

\* Lord Esher (Chairman), Generals Sir Neville Lyttelton and Sir John French, Sir John Ewart, and myself.

† Including that of Lords Roberts and Methuen, General Sir I. Hamilton, all the members of the Army Council, Major-General D. Haig, etc.



organisation will improve upon the old " (Report). Where so much was speculative, it was impossible to do more than give a qualified blessing, and we stated that :

" Having regard to the uncertainties involved in a scheme so far-reaching in its scope, we consider that the application should be gradual in order that Parliament and the country may be assured before the existing machinery is abandoned, of the provision of a force superior in quality to the existing formations and of adequate dimensions. Success must depend upon the operation of social and economic forces which cannot be gauged with any hope of accuracy " (Report).

We noted that " under the provisions of the Draft Bill the powers at present capable of being exercised by means of the existing Militia Ballot Act are not applied to the new Force, although there is no repeal of the old statutes." \*

I have given this glimpse of the inner history of the reorganisation of 1906-7, because it went beyond any of its predecessors, and it shows the courage of Mr. Haldane and his advisers. There were many modifications in detail ; but the scheme as a whole held the field at the outbreak of the Great War, when, as I have said,† it was not fairly tested. We owe to it the four Divisions‡ (part of the " striking force ") and the Cavalry Brigades which helped to shatter the " von Schlieffen plan " and to save Paris in September, 1914 ; but an identical striking force was included in Mr. Balfour's scheme and would certainly have been provided by the Unionist Government but for the reason I have given. Some of my misgivings at this time were not justified, and though I still prefer the scheme which I hoped that Mr. Haldane would accept in its entirety, I may be wrong, and at least the Expeditionary Force for which I had long and often pleaded became a reality and the finest body for its size that we ever possessed.

\* These statutes were repealed later ; but the Irish Militia was left unaffected at this period.

† See p. 192.

‡ The 5th and 6th Divisions took the field later.

Tried in the fiery furnace of the Great War, the "Old Constitutional Force," with what Lord Selborne called "the hideous name of Special Reserve," was able to render vital services which the Territorial Forces could not perform. Without the means of expansion which it provided, the regular forces could not have kept the field in such numbers as were rendered available. The "Kitchener Army" was based upon the "Special Reserve Battalions" which supplied it with Officers, N.C.O.'s, and Instructors, while a large part of the total armed forces which were sent overseas from the then United Kingdom were similarly provided and trained by the relict of the old Militia. When, after too great delay, National Service was enforced, it was only a reaffirmation of the principle which had been enshrined in the structure of this ancient national organisation. All this has been inadequately recognised.

While Mr. Haldane's County Associations worked well, though naturally with varied efficiency, one omission had serious results. The great advantage claimed for the Territorial Forces was that of expansion "in the event of a great National emergency";\* but no reserve of small arms was built up, although when Mr. Haldane visited Berlin in 1912, impending danger must have been apparent. It is easy to understand why Mr. Asquith's Government may have been reluctant to take any step in the direction of Military preparation; but small arms could have been obtained without attracting attention, and the want was terribly felt at a most critical juncture. The progressive diminution of expenditure upon armaments under the Liberal Government was remarkable. In 1906-7, the sum allotted to guns and carriages was £734,000, and to small arms £578,500. In 1913-4, these figures had dwindled to £169,000 and £192,000 respectively, although warnings of coming danger were not wanting. The German General Staff doubtless noted this scanty provision and drew erroneous conclusions therefrom. The result of this parsimony was that the

\* Mr. Haldane.

reserves of warlike stores were reduced to a dangerously low level, and as Field Marshal Sir W. Robertson has pointed out, "even the needs of such troops as were already available could not be supplied." \* Mr. Haldane, however, did more than reorganise our Military Forces. The Esher Committee had laboured to emphasise the importance of creating a real General Staff and proposed an organisation in detail; but little progress had been made, and there were signs of reaction. On February 2, 1906, I sent him a strong Memorandum on this subject, ending with the words :

"It is dangerous to assume that we can dispense with a system which is the life-blood of other armies, and that we can create, by improvisation, at a moment of emergency, that which elsewhere is the result of the most careful special training. This is one of the clearest lessons of the South African War."

As an ardent educationalist, he was quick to realise this need, and before 1914 marked progress had been made which was largely neutralised by the immediate dispatch of the principal members of the General Staff to France, necessitating reconstruction later. Most unfortunately no similar effort was made at the Admiralty, and the lack of a properly trained and constructed War Staff will be painfully inscribed on the pages of our Naval history.†

The "conversations" with the French, begun in 1905, were continued by the Liberal Government and regularised at the request of M. Cambon, as Lord Grey of Fallodon has explained. They were never dealt with in the Secretariat, and he is mistaken in thinking that the proceedings "must have been known to those Ministers who attended the Committee of Imperial Defence." ‡ This was so in the case of the negotiations with the Japanese; but I never had official cognisance of the "conversations."

\* *Soldiers and Statesmen*, 1926.

† The escape of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, the loss of the three *Cressys*, and the disaster off Coronel, are among the sad results due to incompetent Staff work.

‡ *Twenty-Five Years*.

There is, however, no need for any apology for the decision of Mr. Asquith's Government, as it would have been lunacy to ban such communications after the establishment of the *Entente* with France, and when the shadow of war already hung over Europe. When the Germans discovered at Brussels the purport of the "conversations," they naturally seized the chance of proclaiming far and wide that we and the French had secretly contrived a plan of "encirclement." This story still appears at intervals; but the elaborate arrangements made between the German and Austrian General Staffs are conveniently forgotten.\*

Some of the results of the studies of the Secretariat in 1904-7, are recorded in over seventy memoranda and notes covering a great variety of subjects ranging from "the capture of the private property of belligerents at sea" to elaborate calculations of the transport required by an army in Afghanistan. More than thirty-six of these papers were devoted to the problems of the Indian frontier, with which I was able, for the first time, to get to close quarters. A volume, which would be full of warning, might be written to describe the copious illusions, the wild schemes and the sharp conflict of Military theories that have darkened counsels, distorted policy, and inflicted heavy charges upon the finances of India. The full story, which will never be told, would seem almost incredible. We owe to the imagination of adherents of the various forward schools, playing upon the Russian menace, such insane projects as the maintenance of 10,000 troops at Herat, the organisation of an Army to proceed to Tashkent, the permanent garrisoning of the five principal passes across the mighty Hindu Kush (the lowest being 11,000 feet and the highest over 14,000), and the occupation of Seistan to anticipate a Russian advance of 500 miles from Sarakhs directed to seize one of the most unwholesome areas in Asia with Quetta still 455 miles

\* "Why not admit what is and must be the truth, namely, that between Vienna and Berlin everything was jointly prepared?" Maximilien Harden in *Die Zukunft*.

away and a desert intervening! Less obviously visionary, and therefore more dangerous, were schemes for throwing five divisions into Kabul and for echeloning the whole field forces of India on the Kabul-Kandahar "alignment." Floods of ink have been expended upon such figments of the military brain, and the forward school won a notable success when Quetta was occupied in 1876,\* and when later the Khojak Tunnel was bored into Afghan Territory, thus, as Abdur Rahman plaintively remarked, "pushing the railway into my country just like pushing a knife into my vitals."† Yet admirable pronouncements, never translated into policy, abound in the literature of these times.

At the Guildhall, on November 9, 1878, Lord Beaconsfield said:

"My Lord Mayor, His Majesty's Government are by no means apprehensive of any invasion of India by our North-Western Frontier. The base of operations of any possible foe is so remote; the communications are so difficult; the aspect of the country is so forbidding, that we do not believe under these circumstances any invasion of our North-Western Frontier is possible."

Nothing could be better; but while this speech was being delivered, our troops were assembling at Jamrud for the attack of Ali Masjid—the opening move in the second Afghan War! Lord Lawrence strongly opposed the occupation of Quetta and any advance of the frontier, as did Henry Durand,‡ who had served in the first Afghan War. Generals Sir W. Mansfield (Lord Sandhurst) and Sir H. Norman were of the same opinion. Fresh from his troubled experiences in Afghanistan, Lord Roberts wrote in 1880: "It was with the greatest difficulty that sufficient supplies could be obtained for my small force [12,000–13,000 men]. At the end of the tenth month, all the food

\* First proposed in 1856.

† This challenge was at once taken by the Russians, who began to advance their railway towards Herat.

‡ Military Secretary to Lord Canning and afterwards Military Member of Council.

within reasonable distance of Kabul had been eaten up." The belief of the Afghans that our withdrawal was compulsory had some justification. At the same time, Lord Roberts declared that "the longer and more difficult the line of communication is, the more numerous and greater are the obstacles which Russia would have to overcome, and so far from shortening one mile of the road, I would let the web of difficulties extend to the very mouth of the Khaibar." Unfortunately these weighty words were modified later.

In 1903, Mr. Balfour explained that :

"Afghanistan is not merely, perhaps not chiefly, valuable to us as a 'buffer State.' It is also valuable because in its present condition, and so long as it possesses few roads and no railways it will be impossible for Russia to make effective use of her great numerical superiority at any point immediately vital to the Empire."

This goes to the root of the matter and might have supplied sound bases of policy.

Lord Kitchener, after the conclusion of the second Japan Treaty, stated his opinion that "though an invasion of India by Russia from her present bases is a possible, though lengthy, operation it is nevertheless extremely improbable." He further referred to "the bogey of the Russian invasion," which "need not affect the elucidation of the Frontier Railway problem," and he wrote to me on January 11, 1906 : "You are quite right ; I am opposed to the wild projects that have been put forward with regard to Seistan," which Lord Curzon in June, 1904, had not thus definitely dismissed. Yet Lord Kitchener's scheme for the redistribution of the Indian Army seemed to be dominated by the Russian menace, and therefore directed to concentration towards the North-Western Frontier. It included two most expensive Cantonments, at Torsappa near the Khyber Pass and Mastung not far from Quetta. It was impossible not to oppose this part of the scheme, and fortunately Lord Roberts had seen the site of the Torsappa Cantonment.

and pronounced it utterly unsuitable. I must have felt relief when I wrote in my diary: "Major Marker with messages from Lord K., who is apparently willing to give up Torsappa and Mastung" (April 9, 1906).\*

During a period of forty years, in which wild schemes abounded, sound views were seldom wanting, but failed to determine policy. I believe this failure to have been due to two main causes. Until the time of Mr. Balfour, there was no machinery in India or at home to ensure the close examination of the visionary projects of individuals who, in one way or another, were able to exercise influence. In the second place, the Home Government was not always able to exercise sufficient control over the Government of India even in matters which might prove to be of direct Imperial concern, while it has happened that momentous schemes were never discussed in the Viceroy's Council. On all these many questions I worked with the help of the late Captain A. B. Lindsay, my Indian assistant. Their aspects have now changed; but, in the archives of the C.I.D., the results of much careful study remain and may perhaps not be wholly useless in the future.

Of the many ex-Indian officials whom I consulted at this period, one stands out above all others. Sir Donald Stewart's judgments were the outcome of a strong, well-balanced intellect, which knew no variableness where Indian military problems were concerned. Only his natural modesty prevented him from being recognised as one of the best soldiers India has produced; but he was hardly more than a name to the public, and his march from Kandahar to Kabul—a difficult and even dangerous operation—is forgotten.

Sir Alfred Lyall sent me the following views in a letter of October 19, 1907, when I was serving on a committee dealing with Frontier matters: "I consider our engagements to defend the N.-W. Frontier of Afghanistan to be

\* Both these cantonments ultimately disappeared; but there were some other features in Lord Kitchener's scheme, and especially the abolition of the Punjab Frontier Force, with which it was not possible to agree.

a pledge which might involve us in incalculable difficulties. . . . My view is, as it has always been, that we ought to avoid carefully entering into closer relations with the Amir, but should endeavour to arrange a formal undertaking with Russia." This view, which I had long held,\* prevailed later.

Among Liberal Ministers, I saw most of Mr. Morley, and my diary records many long talks with him, ranging over all Indian questions. Unfitted in certain respects for the great post which he held, he had a most attractive personality. A delightful conversationalist, with a cynical but not unkindly humour, he would always listen, while rarely giving his own views in reply. Here was a political philosopher and eminent man of letters, an autocrat by nature but a democrat—though with misgivings—by profession, who believed in Parliament so long as he could mould it to his will. The conditions of India with her long and warlike history and immemorial traditions he could never realise, and he acquired a lively contempt of the Indian bureaucracy, which arose from lack of vision and was not justified. I can never forget his unvarying kindness and tolerance of our occasional disagreements; but later a cloud was to arise between us never wholly dissipated.

Many questions connected with the frontier required decisions in 1907, and my diary records: "Long talk with Morley at Club. He seems still undecided about frontier questions, but said he had not the slightest belief in any Russian idea of invading India" (February 27). An important Sub-Committee, over which he presided, had been appointed and was then taking evidence in order to elucidate frontier railway policy. The result was a report which I could not sign as he particularly wished; but he never resented my obstinacy, and wrote: "I understand your feelings of aversion to moving from old landmarks" (May 9, 1907).

In 1907, the dangerous activities of "India House," instituted by the notorious Krishnavarma and the violent

\* See p. 112.



language of the *Indian Sociologist*,\* which was advocating assassination, came to my notice, and I laid the whole matter before Mr. Morley, begging him to take action for the protection of young Indian students in London. I had ascertained the measures adopted by the Japanese to guard their young Nationals in this country, and I pleaded that we should follow their example. In all such matters we are usually careless. Mr. Morley wrote on May 28 that my appeal "touches a real and powerful root of evil and one, like most roots of evil for that matter, most difficult to get at. We are turning over various devices in our minds; but the Atlantic is not easy to beat off your doorsteps." The difficulty in protecting young Indian students from corruption certainly existed; but nothing was done. The *Indian Sociologist* went on urging murder and armed rebellion.† On July 1, 1909, Sir W. Curzon Wyllie ‡ and Dr. Lalcaca were assassinated at the Imperial Institute, as planned at one of the Sunday meetings at "India House"; but Krishnavarma escaped to Paris, and the *Indian Sociologist* continued to appear till July, 1914. Not till August 25, 1909, was a warrant issued against a printer, Guy Aldred of the "Bakunin Press," in connection with this vile publication.

Lord Morley was deeply shocked by the murders, and on July 9, 1909, he wrote to me in India: "It is now thought pretty clear by the police and other authorities, that we have to make our account with a gang—small but all the more dangerous for that—bent on desperate violence. It does not in the least surprise me, and I have publicly said so much more than once." Yet India House could have been broken up at any time, and the *Indian Sociologist* had persistently violated the criminal law.

Sir E. Grey was always ready to make use of the Defence Committee as the following letter indicates: "Have you time to come and see me at the F.O. to-

\* Started in 1905.

† "We repeat that political assassination is not murder" (July, 1909).

‡ Another victim was intended.

morrow [Friday] ? . . . if not to-morrow, then some day next week. I should like the Baghdad Railway and the question of the Garrison of Egypt to come before the Defence Committee" (June 7, 1906).

The Baghdad Railway formed the subject of three Memoranda in which I embodied the studies of the Secretariat and suggested a definite policy now rendered valueless by events. I did not then understand the implications of the great Pan-German movement which began to take form about 1897, and was an important contributory cause of the Great War,\* but my general conclusion in January, 1905, was that "we have the strongest grounds for preventing a Railway from Baghdad to the Gulf from falling wholly under the control of a power which regards its own interest exclusively and which well understands the manipulation of railway rates."

The preliminaries of The Hague Conference of 1906 occupied much of our attention, and I was a Member of a Committee which sat for some time at the Foreign Office to deal with the many questions which thus arose. Being nervous lest the right of capture of the private property of belligerents at sea might be abandoned, I wrote a long memorandum on the subject in May, 1906, selecting the case of a war with Germany for the reason that "Germany has the largest foreign trade and the greatest tonnage of shipping of all the Continental Powers, and both are growing more rapidly than in the case of other nations. Germany has also a steadily growing Navy, which tends to become next in strength to our own." My general conclusion could only be "that we have nothing to gain and much to lose by abandoning the right in question." This memorandum upset the equanimity of the Lord Chancellor (Lord Loreburn), who was a good friend in later years, and I find in my diary: "Attorney-General says Asquith opposed to us as regards capture of

\* From Lord Grey's most interesting book I gather that the Foreign Office at a later date did not realise the ominous aspects of the grandiose and far-reaching Pan-German schemes, which involved the control of Serbia.

private property at sea; Grey in favour [of us]" (February 26, 1907). "Saw Hardinge [Sir Charles, now Lord] about private property at sea. Says we shall be quite firm" (June 8, 1907). If there was any risk that the Liberal Cabinet might have taken the disastrous step of abandoning this time-honoured right of naval belligerents, it passed away.\*

Through these years the spectre of war was never absent; but its distinctness varied in the minds of individuals. On July 6, 1906, Sir John French came to tell me that he was anxious about a Turkish invasion of Egypt under German auspices and wished this question to be examined. The possibilities were carefully studied in detail in the light of all the available information as to the water-supply in the Arabian Desert. I summed up the results in a Note of August 16, 1906, of which the gist was that an invasion in great force was impossible; but that, assuming favourable conditions, about 1,200 mounted men, 20,550 infantry, 5 mountain batteries, and 3 bridging sections might make an attempt to cross the Suez Canal. The foresight of Sir John French was perfectly justified; but the Turkish force under German instruction which made the attempt (January 21, February 11, 1915) did not quite reach these figures.†

International Conferences, now becoming increasingly popular, may be dangerous performances. In the desire to show good will and even in the give-and-take which is necessary, it is easy to make mistakes that may prove

\* If this theory had been adopted before 1914, the Allies would have lost the War. According to Colonel E. M. House it was resuscitated later. His diary, February 11, 1915, states that "Tyrrell [Sir W.] believed that . . . Britain would consent to the absolute freedom to merchant men of all nations to sail the seas in time of war unmolested." On January 7, 1916, he wrote: "Grey is now in favour of the Freedom of the Seas, provided that it includes the elimination of militarism and further provided that we join in a general covenant to support it." I can only read this as implying that Sir E. Grey would accept the Freedom of the Seas, whatever it means, on conditions that all war was abolished.

† The Turks did, however, succeed in bringing 6-inch howitzers across the desert, which I never contemplated, and they were permitted to retreat without being broken up, the unfortunate result being that anxiety for the safety of Egypt continued, and troops sorely needed at the Dardanelles were effectually tethered.

gravely injurious to national interests. The proceedings at Berlin during the International Conference on Wireless Telegraphy in 1906 caused me anxiety, and I sent a warning note to the Prime Minister. A Meeting of Ministers followed, which I thus recorded :

“ Important meeting on W[ireless] T[elegraphy] at 10 Downing Street—P.M., Grey, Asquith, Tweedmouth, Haldane, Buxton, Jackson, and self. P.M. thoroughly sound. I spoke strongly, and P.M. read out my note of yesterday, which Buxton did not like. Result a telegram which ought to open delegates’ eyes ” (Diary, October 29, 1906).

The Japanese supported us and no harm was done.\*

I had first taken up the cudgels for the Channel Tunnel in a letter to the *Spectator* of December 15, 1883, and ever since I have lost no chance of combating such objections as were forthcoming. Twenty-three years later there seemed to be a chance that this question might be reconsidered. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman was willing that I should prepare a memorandum dealing comprehensively with all its aspects, and this was done in June, 1906.

A majority of a Select Committee of both Houses under Lord Lansdowne’s chairmanship had pronounced against the Tunnel in 1883, being influenced by Lord Wolseley’s declaration that “ My contention is that, were a tunnel made, England as a Nation could be destroyed *without any warning whatever when Europe was in a condition of profound peace.* ” † This extreme view was rejected by Lord Lansdowne, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, and General Sir L. Simmons ; and among other distinguished General Officers who did not regard the Tunnel as a national danger were Sir John Adye, Sir Andrew Clarke, and Sir John Stokes. ‡ I argued the whole

\* Admiral Sir Charles Drury wrote to me from the Admiralty : “ I think we are safe on W.T. Just received information that the Japanese Government have given directions to their D.s to support ours.”

† Lord Lansdowne’s italics.

‡ I have curious evidence that Lord Wolseley was at first in favour of a Tunnel ; but his conversion, which was sudden, proved decisive against it.

question at length and explained the simple ways by which the exit from the Tunnel could easily be defended and the Tunnel rendered impassable by a water lock.\* My general submission was that :

“ Whether the economic effect of a Channel Tunnel upon the trade and industries of Great Britain would be advantageous is a separate consideration. There has been no adequate inquiry into this branch of the subject, and clearly unless there were a distinct prospect of national gain, the great expenditure involved could not be justified. Meanwhile, unless the reasoning submitted in this memorandum can be shown to be faulty, the conclusion that a Channel Tunnel would create no new military risks which cannot be avoided by simple measures seems to be inevitable.”

The Admiralty and the War Office were hostile, and the question was never discussed by the Defence Committee, which I regretted. Electrification not only solved the ventilation problem, for which special measures were required in the earlier projects, but added to the security of the Tunnel, if that were necessary. Addressing a number of Members of the House of Commons thirty-six days before the outbreak of the Great War, I pointed out that :

“ If ever we were compelled to send Military forces to France, Belgium, and Holland, through railway communication would be of enormous importance. I need not remind you that, apart from any obligations to France which may exist now or in the future, we have definite Treaty responsibilities as regards Belgium in certain contingencies.”

That the value of the Tunnel in the Great War would have been “ enormous ” will be admitted ; but the military opponents have shifted their ground, and as their present position has never been explained, it is not possible to bring reason to bear upon the objections. I

\* This device also occurred a few years later to Sir Francis Fox, the eminent engineer, adviser to the Channel Tunnel Company.

believe that a Channel Tunnel will be made ; but I shall not see the completion of a project I have steadfastly supported for forty-three years.

It may have been my fault that the relations between the Defence Committee and Admiralty became difficult after the departure of Admiral Lord Walter Kerr and, later, of Lord Cawdor. The new First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher, obtained an order conferring on him special powers never possessed by his predecessors,\* and henceforth he endeavoured to establish a personal control over Naval policy which did not accord with the principles to which he had enthusiastically subscribed as a member of the Esher Committee. I received many letters from senior Naval officers recording the grave misgivings with which they regarded the new *régime* which had the effect of creating a sharp division throughout the Navy. From Gibraltar, on March 16, 1905, Prince Louis of Battenberg wrote :

“ I do cordially agree with all you say, especially the fever which has seized hold of J. F. . . . Also the senseless way in which he insults and alienates our senior men. . . . However, he shall have my views in season and out of season, from high and low altitudes, now that he has asked for them.”

Other letters are too strong to quote ; but they were prophetic.

When Sir J. Fisher's scheme of Naval education appeared making Executive and Engineer Officers interchangeable, I wrote from Melbourne a reasoned protest to Lord Selborne then First Lord. The main objection was tersely stated by Rear-Admiral Sir R. Hall twenty-three years later. “ The time required to equip sea officers to fit them to command H.M. ships with the necessary knowledge of sea warfare . . . left no time for the mastery of engineering ; . . . similarly it was found that the study and practice of engineering demanded the

\* Sir F. Richards had strongly deprecated this course (see p. 102).

whole time of an officer."\* There were other strong objections; but the principle of common entry has distinct advantages.† My great fear was that over-concentration upon engineering and material must produce a tendency to divert the minds of our young Naval officers from studies of first-class importance in relation to war. Lord Selborne most kindly sent a long reply, which did not convince me, explaining the measures proposed to counteract this tendency.

The Fisher scheme was set up in 1903, and two years later the Douglas Committee proposed final separation after the rank of Commander. During the War, it became necessary severely to curtail the time in the engine-room allotted to midshipmen. When the War ended, officers, on obtaining the rank of Lieut.-Commander, were allowed to revert permanently to the Executive Branch. In 1920, it was decided to abandon the ruling principle of the scheme. I believe that the effects of this obscurantist plan, which was opposed by some of our best sea officers, can be traced in the Great War.

The "Dreadnought policy" evolved at a time when our naval preponderance in battleships was overwhelming,‡ appeared to be dangerously misconceived, and I did all that was possible to cause it to be reconsidered. In such a matter, it was natural that the opinions of a soldier should be discounted, and Sir J. Fisher's views, expressed with his wonted vigour, prevailed. The *Dreadnought*, to be built in one year as a *tour de force*, would "stagger humanity," § and render competition hopeless—for the Germans especially, as the Kiel Canal could not then accommodate such vessels. After the change of Government in 1905, I pleaded with Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman

\* The *Times*, December 1, 1926.

† See p. 9.

			Great Britain.	Germany.
‡ Battleships, 1st class, built	..	..	43	16
" "	building	..	7	6
" "	to be laid down	1905-6	1	2

§ This idea was enshrined in a doggerel child's alphabet of the period:

"F is the Fleet that we keep at Spithead;  
It makes every foreigner wish he were dead."

to appoint a Committee to consider the whole question of building policy, which he was inclined to do; but the Admiralty proved obdurate. As I pointed out: "It should be an axiom of our policy never to lead in ship construction, but always to follow with something better," taking advantage of our then distinctly superior speed of ship-building. In a letter to me of May 3, 1907, Admiral of the Fleet, Sir F. Richards, thus stigmatised the "Dreadnought policy":

"It has not hitherto been the practice of the British Admiralty, in international competition in ship-building, to take any such action as has been adopted in the case of that ship. . . . Now we start a great and expensive advertisement for a certain purpose (or 'person' as the case may be) and set up a game of Beggar my neighbour with a vengeance. See the consequences already in United States and Germany especially, which will enormously increase this country's burdens as time goes on. The waste of millions on docks for these creatures has yet to be discounted—but enough."

Other distinguished Admirals wrote exactly in the same strain, and I believe it is now generally recognised that a great mistake was made, entailing vast expense with the result of weakening the relative strength of our Fleet on the day of battle. Of the *Dreadnought*, which I inspected at Portsmouth, I formed a poor impression. "Went over *Dreadnought*. She is full of mistakes due to inordinate hurry and want of study"\* (Diary, September 19, 1906). There is no doubt that, in eight or ten years, the tonnage of the *Dreadnought* might have been reached, but with a far better design, by natural evolution. *Super-Dreadnoughts* were immediately required, and the pace, which we had gratuitously set, was sharply accelerated.†

\* The arrangement of the turrets, which was faulty, was quickly abandoned. U.S.S. *Michigan* of 16,000 tons, designed at this period, was a better ship than the *Dreadnought*.

† In Sir C. (now Lord) Hardinge's dispatch after the visit of King Edward to Germany and Austria in 1908, which was published in the *Times* on November 10, 1924, there is an interesting confirmation of the



Throughout 1906 and 1907, I conceived it my duty to make representations to the Prime Minister as to the strength and distribution of the Fleet. Admiralty information at this period was not always accurate. Thus changes were made in 1907 which were declared in the House of Commons to "add to the fighting efficiency of the Fleet." The main features were, the withdrawal of six first-class battleships from the Fleet in full commission and their allocation to a new Reserve organisation to be termed the "Home Fleet." My able Naval Assistant, Captain (now Admiral Sir) W. C. Nicholson, was able to ascertain the facts, and the result was a note in which I pointed out that :

" If the newly maintained Fleet is to be :

" 1. As much at sea as the Fleet in commission ;

" 2. Maintained in the same state of efficiency as regards docking, repairs, etc., and

" 3. Completely manned by men as fully trained, no economy can be expected.

" If, on the other hand, conditions (1) and (2) are not rigorously fulfilled, it is obvious that there must be a distinct and serious loss of efficiency. . . . Germany now maintains in permanent commission a Fleet of 16 battleships frequently at sea,\* and unquestionably in as high a state of tactical training and technical efficiency as is possible. This, I submit, is beyond all doubt. . . . In addition Germany has four battleships in reserve which are kept in perfect readiness for mobilisation. Under the new scheme, the Channel Fleet will be normally (numeri-

effects of the *Dreadnought* policy which Sir F. Richards and I anticipated. The Kaiser is reported to have said that : " It was in England that the first *Dreadnought* had been built in the greatest secrecy, and on its completion Admiral Fisher at once announced that she was capable of sinking the whole German Navy. These statements had forced the German Government to begin building ships of a similar type to satisfy public opinion." To this Sir C. Hardinge replied : " I admitted that the building of ships of the *Dreadnought* type might in the first instance have been a tactical error, but that that could be no justification for the encouragement of naval rivalry between the two countries."

\* Reported at this time to be paying much attention to the Orkney and Shetland Islands, and taking soundings in these waters.

cally at least) inferior to the German Fleet constantly cruising in the North Sea."

I then drew the moral, pointing out that, if strained relations suddenly arose, certain grave disadvantages must occur. The general effect of the reorganisation of 1907 was to divide the forces in home waters into two parts under separate Commanders-in-Chief—the Channel Fleet and a squadron of six battleships based on the Nore. If a sudden crisis arose, the latter on putting to sea would be exposed to the attack of a far superior German Fleet as Admiral von Tirpitz would instantly realise.

There was more behind. The Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet of eleven ships was in the event of war suddenly to take control over 300, and his charge was to extend to the Equator! The organisation at this period was, I thought, dangerous,\* and a few years later it was radically changed.

Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman gave serious consideration to my representations intended only for his private information; but he inadvertently sent some of them to the Admiralty over my name. When he realised what this might mean, he expressed regret in the kindest terms; but I gathered that there was danger ahead, and that my position had become insecure. Two references in my diary are significant:

"Ponsonby † to tell me P.M. much impressed by my note on the Channel Fleet. Asked me to draft a letter with questions for him to send to the 1st Lord's Secretary" (May 2, 1907).

"Half an hour with P.M. Spoke plainly about Navy; he had sent my questions to the Admiralty. Lord T[weedmouth] had made vague replies; but P.M. said he could get nothing in writing" (May 14, 1907).

\* These matters were afterwards taken up by Lord Charles Beresford, who did not make the best use of his case when it was considered by a Cabinet Committee in 1909.

† Mr. A. Ponsonby, M.P., then Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's private secretary.

The last entry dealing with these questions is : " Saw Ponsonby and gave him paper on ' German menace ' for P.M." (June 27, 1907).

It had been decided to send a Royal Commission to India, and " Morley asked me if I would go to India on the decentralisation question " (July 3, 1907). I agreed on condition that I should return to my post,\* but on July 19, he suddenly sent for me to offer the Governorship of Bombay.† For the third time, the East, which had a fascination for me, seemed to call, and I accepted.‡

Again I was overwhelmed with congratulations, from Naval officers especially, expressing the hope and confidence which are the greatest encouragement that we mortals can receive at crises in our fate.

I look back upon my three and a half years of Secretaryship as among the most important in my career ; because of the insight into Cabinet Government which I gained, while, thanks to the kindness of two Prime Ministers, I was permitted not only to express my views for what they were worth with complete freedom, but to raise any questions to which I attached Imperial importance.

There were times of depression ; but I had always the help and encouragement of Lord Esher, who could view reverses with the philosophical detachment which I lacked. In those years, I think it may be said that the study of the questions involved in preparation for War in the complex conditions of an Empire like our own was begun ; but much remained to be done by my able successors.

The Liberal Government held only sixteen meetings of the Defence Committee as compared with eighty-two in the time of its predecessor ; but useful work was

\* This led to several discussions with Mr. Morley and Sir H. Primrose, who was to be Chairman of the Commission, but resigned and was replaced by Mr. (now Sir C.) Hobhouse.

† Lord Lamington having resigned.

‡ See p. 12. During the Viceroyalty of Lord Dufferin when General Chesney was Military Member of Council, I was telegraphed for to advise upon the frontier defences. It was settled that I was to start in a week, when some difficulty arose, and the War Office declined to release me.

accomplished by many Sub-Committees. I had been specially bidden to try to accustom Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman to methods of procedure, which he was believed to distrust,\* and the letter he wrote on August 13, 1907, after my appointment to Bombay gave me great satisfaction :

“ DEAR SIR GEORGE,

“ I am very sorry that I did not see you before I left London ; but it was hardly worth while for you to come up on purpose. I should like to assure you how much I enjoyed our relations on the C.I.D., how greatly I valued your advice and suggestions, and how complete was the confidence which I had learned to place in your opinion and knowledge of affairs. I was, as you know, always sceptical as to the use and working of the Committee, but I am completely converted. . . . I feel sure you will have a useful and brilliant career at Bombay, where I believe lies the field in which beyond all others you can render good service at this moment.

“ Believe me, with renewed thanks for your great help as a colleague,

“ Yours very truly,

“ H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.”

This generous letter was characteristic of the writer, whose natural bent and training did not dispose him to enter deeply into the matters which seemed all-important to me ; but who had an open mind always calm and receptive.† I had sometimes to see him during Lady Campbell-Bannerman's illness, after sleepless nights, and no signs of impatience or irritation were ever visible. While, as Prime Minister of an Empire, he showed defects due to absorption in domestic politics, he had great qualities too little recognised.

\* See his views on the Hartington Commission, p. 103.

† He sometimes consulted me on matters lying outside my official sphere. Thus on January 27, 1907, he wrote : “ By the way, I should like to know what you think of the inclusion or exclusion of State Premiers in the Conference. That subject is very much up at present and will come before the Cabinet on Friday.” In the conditions of Dominion status, inclusion was not practicable.

## WAR INSURANCE OF SHIPPING

To the last before I left for India, I was engaged on a Committee appointed to consider the War Insurance of Shipping, a subject to which I had given careful thought seventeen years previously.

In the *United Service Magazine* of May, 1890, Sir George Tryon pleaded for a system of National Insurance of the war risks of shipping on grounds which appeared to me to be impregnable. His proposals were attacked, notably by Mr. Gibson Bowles, whose main contentions were that:

“The Declaration of Paris would ruin our ship-owners; would but very imperfectly protect our merchants, and would not protect at all the nation from starvation, or the nation’s fleets from coal famine. . . . Our merchandise would, under the Rule, fly at once, on the outbreak of war, to neutral bottoms, and our merchantmen would then be reduced to impotence.”

“Our Navy would not,” he wrote, “in all probability, find so much as an enemy to fight with. Why should the enemy fight under the circumstances?” The “one thing needful” for our salvation was, according to Mr. Bowles, the abrogation of the Declaration of Paris, with the rehabilitation of privateering. In the *United Service Journal* (September, 1890), I tried to dispose of these somewhat fantastic views by historical evidence drawn from the French Wars and the American Civil War.

In a note written for the Prime Minister on July 4, 1904,\* I had explained the need and the feasibility of a system of National Insurance, and I find in my diary: “Murray [Sir George]† wrote saying the Chancellor of the Exchequer wished me to serve on a National Insurance Committee. I accepted” (April 18, 1906). This Committee, over which Mr. Austen Chamberlain presided, took

\* Sent specially to Lord Balfour of Burleigh.

† Secretary of the Treasury.

evidence, beginning in December, 1906, from twenty-three great shipping, banking, and insurance magnates, from the Admiralty, Sir Robert Giffen representing the Board of Trade, and from Mr. Gibson Bowles and Mr. St. Loe Strachey. Some thoughtful evidence was given by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge and Captain H. Jones, R.N., who grasped the advantage, which I had emphasised, of averting panic at the outset of war, but rightly regarded an adequate Navy as the crux of the whole matter.

Sir Robert Giffen, in reply to my questions, objected to a free indemnity, but was "not at all opposed" to "a Government system of insurance at fixed rates, varying in different zones," which was the essence of a detailed scheme,\* which I laid before the Committee on September 5, 1907. His evidence was valuable; but he saw "no cause for a general rise of prices in consequence of war" (Q. 3058), and he believed that "the disturbance of trade would be so great that the mere rise of freights due to war risks would be practically a negligible quantity" (Q. 3057).

My experience on this Committee was most instructive, especially from the psychological point of view. I derived the impression that most of the witnesses had found no time in their busy lives to study the conditions which a war must create. The evidence was, therefore, conflicting to the last degree, great shipowners and underwriting experts contradicting each other to an extent explicable only by the want of previous consideration. My general conclusion was, therefore, that "many of the witnesses were evidently unprepared by any previous study of a somewhat difficult subject," † with which Captain (now Rear-Admiral Sir) C. Ottley, naval Member of the Committee, stated, in his Reservation on signing the Report, that he was "in full agreement." We were then within seven years of the World War, and glancing through the evidence to-day, one

\* This was an elaboration of my proposals sixteen years previously.

† My dissent.

realises how far the imagination of some experts fell short of actualities ; but none of us could have imagined that the Germans would use submarines to carry on the blackest form of piracy known to naval history.

I was just starting for India and could not take part in the discussion of the draft Report, which dismissed the whole question, and after stating the objections, ended with the words : " We are therefore unable to recommend the adoption of any form of national guarantee against the war risks of shipping and maritime trade, except that which is provided by the maintenance of a powerful Navy." This draft was sent to me at Bombay, where on March 31, 1908, I wrote a dissent, and endeavoured to prove that some of the confused evidence was " distinctly favourable " to my scheme which, being novel to the witnesses, was not fully understood.\* As I said :

" I am also convinced that further reflection, based upon an adequate conception of the principles of the scheme, would have led to a larger measure of approval. . . . I submit that the draft Report does not sufficiently indicate the significance of some of the concessions made in cross-examination."

The question of national insurance of shipping then slumbered, till the spectre of war darkened the political horizon. In May, 1913, Mr. Asquith directed that a Sub-Committee † of the Committee of Imperial Defence should reconsider the whole matter, and laid down that " any scheme prepared must be on the basis of reasonable contributions being paid by the owners of ships and cargoes towards the cost of insurance." This was exactly what I had urged twenty-three years before. The Sub-Committee reported on April 30, 1914, and the Chairman, Mr. F. Huth Jackson, told me that my note of September 5, 1907, had been of great assistance to him.

\* One of the underwriting experts told me privately that, after giving more thought to the question, he considered the scheme quite practicable.

† Lord Inchcape, who was a Member of Mr. Chamberlain's Committee, again gave his valuable services, and had come to consider that National Insurance was practicable.

The scheme, which closely followed mine, was put in force when the Great War broke out, and operated successfully.

On September 28, 1907, I arrived at Balmoral, where Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was Minister in attendance. The King spoke of his growing anxiety in regard to the German menace, which I thought would not become acute until the German Navy had been built up more nearly to our strength. His Majesty had a clear vision of the general situation in India, and on parting gave me sound advice and kindly encouragement. With the Prime Minister I had some interesting talks on the political position, and he bade me "God speed" with an expression of his confidence in my future career. I little thought that I should see neither again.

All my literary connections were now severed. At the request of the late Lord Acton, I had undertaken to write for the Cambridge Modern History the Crimean War and the Anglo-Egyptian periods, which strongly appealed to me. I had planned out my task and begun to make notes when the axe fell. I was able, however, to finish the second and much enlarged edition of my book on "Fortification" before starting. Henceforth Fortification in its technical aspects dropped out of my life, and nineteen years later it was a most pleasant surprise to receive a copy of the new official Manual, "Military Engineering: Defence," with a letter from Major-General H. F. Thuillier, C.B., C.M.G., who, as Commandant of the School of Military Engineering and Director of Fortifications at the War Office, had compiled and issued it. He wrote:

"I have always been a close student of your writings on this subject. . . . The events of the Great War confirmed the accuracy of your views in the most striking manner. . . . I hope that whatever inadequacies you may find in it [the Manual], you will be able to recognise some echoes of the sound military principles in respect of the art of fortification which you were the first in Europe to inculcate, and for too long a time the only one" (May 16, 1926).



Thirty-six years had passed since, after nine years' study, I first published the views which were long regarded as "extreme." The bread cast upon the waters seemed at length to have returned. General Thuillier's kind letter revived many recollections of protracted controversies half forgotten, and brought compensation for some unpleasant experiences.

On October 1, there was a farewell dinner at the United Service Club, Sir F. Richards presiding, when speeches were made which caused the Governor-Designate great anxiety lest he should disappoint expectations.

Leaving my wife and daughter to follow later, I started for India on October 3, to enter upon the most trying period of my life. Mercifully the future is hidden.

## CHAPTER XVI

INDIA, 1907-9

ON October 18, 1907, I landed at Bombay, suddenly plunging into the great new world of India when I was well over fifty-nine—almost too old, as I was to discover, for the physical strain which was sometimes inevitable. Yet there may have been advantages. White hairs—then at least—lent weight to their possessor's influence, and to be older than all my colleagues in the Government service was perhaps a passport to their confidence. I had studied India on paper. Such works as Sir A. Lyall's admirable *British Dominion in India*, Chesney's *Indian Polity*, and Strachey's *Indian Administration* were familiar. For the most recent information I sought an interview with Sir Henry Cotton and read his book *The New India*, from which I gathered only one useful hint.\* My friend, Sir W. Lee Warner, an old Bombay civilian, could give me some general advice with the warning that trouble was brewing in the Deccan. It is well to take to India such knowledge as this, which may give direction to your future studies; but you will quickly find that you have everything to learn. After five and a half years, during which I was an earnest student, there remained much that I could never wholly understand. It is a tragedy that the fate of India may ultimately be decided by elected majorities of whom only an insignificant fraction knows anything of the needs and the conditions of her teeming masses, whose vital interests may be affected by a passing phase in our home politics.

The shadow of plague still lay darkly over the Bombay

\* See p. 282.

Presidency, and before starting I went to the Lister Institute to learn the latest views on inoculation. Here was a question I could take up at once, and in my speech on landing I emphasised the necessity for this method of protection. For the rest, there were many other matters with which I hoped to deal as soon as I could master the situation; but my one great ambition could broadly be stated: "I have come among you in the earnest hope of being able to promote the prosperity and the contentment of the people, and of helping every good cause in the Presidency. To these objects only I shall devote myself." That first night I had a dinner-party of eighty at Government House to which I had directed that as many representative Indians as possible should be invited. Here were, it seemed to me, greater divergencies of racial types than I had found at three international gatherings in Europe. Would it ever be possible to win the trust of so many variants of the genus *homo sapiens*?

My wife and daughter arrived on November 2, the former not well and soon to develop an illness which made it necessary for her to return to England. We had, however, one short and happy Indian experience together before we were parted. There is nothing so delightful as a camp in the cold weather, and on January 23, we all found ourselves in the jungle at Champaner near the borders of Baroda State. Here, overgrown by rank vegetation, are the scattered ruins of a forgotten city which can still show fine examples of old Indian architecture. The sacred hill of Pavagarh, once the fortified stronghold of a Rajput clan, towered over our camp, crowned with a great Hindu temple on the roof of which is a tiny mosque. Pavagarh was captured by Mahmoud Begara in 1484, by Sindia the Maratha Chief in 1761, and by Colonel Woodington in 1803. Centuries of the chequered history of India are enshrined in this little-known spot, where I derived an indelible impression of a land replete with fascination based upon its immemorial past. The delicious cool of the mornings, the sounds of the jungle, and the simple, kindly people who seemed to

welcome our presence among them still linger in my memory.

From Champaner we all went to Ahmedabad, where I made a speech on the necessity for education in science which led to remarkable results, and thence to Baroda, where H.H. the Gaekwar made our visit most pleasant. My daughter and I were taken out in country carts to see a cheetah hunt—a typical Indian sport. A great herd of buck crossed our path, and the cheetah, carried in front on a trolley, was unveiled. Instantly selecting one of the biggest black buck, it started at amazing speed, bringing down its victim, and then being enticed away and again masked for a second run. We were told that, if the cheetah fails in its first attempt, it may sulk for the rest of the day.

Returning to Bombay, it was necessary to fulfil many engagements in which my wife, who was forced to leave me, could not share, and to struggle with the first of six Convocation addresses which always entailed anxious thought, but became easier as my knowledge increased.

On May 11, 1908, I wrote a long letter to the late Lord Knollys, as he had requested, conveying my impressions after seven months of careful study of the political situation. Here is an extract :

“There seems to be an idea at home that there are lulls in the so-called ‘Nationalist’ agitation, and that unless some outward manifestation presents itself, such as the Tinnevely riots or the Muzzaffarpur outrage,\* all is going on well. This is entirely fallacious. The agitation steadily proceeds. It is cleverly conducted and it tends to gain in strength. I do not think it has made any real impression on the masses as yet; but it must tell upon them in time. The object of the agitators is to tell them they are poor because of the drain of money to England, and to inculcate dislike and contempt of Government and of the British people generally. Famines and bad seasons assist a propaganda of this kind, and a

\* Two English ladies killed by a bomb thrown into their carriage.

few good years would go far to counteract the agitation so far as the masses are concerned.

“On the other hand, a large number of half-educated Indians, who can read and write English and have the smattering of knowledge, which is useless for any practical purpose, but is always apt to be dangerous, seem to have become permanently hostile. These people, inspired by a few men of much higher mental calibre, run the seditious section of the Press, and work in various other ways—in schools, as public speakers, as travelling ‘missionaries,’ and as distributors of placards and pamphlets. . . . I am going to prosecute some papers which have lately outstepped the bounds.”

The situation in the Deccan in 1908 was ably described in *Indian Unrest* by Mr. (afterwards Sir) V. Chirol, who at this period showed a remarkable grasp of the anti-British movement then gathering strength under the astute leadership of Tilak, a Chitpavan Brahman of Poona. His principal paper, the *Kesari*, supplied the cue for the most disaffected section of the Press, and its influence extended far beyond the Bombay Presidency.

“His own prestige with the advanced party never stood higher either in the Deccan or outside of it. . . . Tilak commanded the allegiance of barristers and pleaders, schoolmasters and professors, clerks in the Government offices . . . and his propaganda had begun to filter down not only to the coolies in the cities, but even to the rayats, or at least the head-men in the villages.” \*

All this and more I had carefully watched; but not till I was convinced that Tilak's various revolutionary activities must be stopped was action taken. In such cases, the risks that a trial may fail, adding to the influence of the accused and supplying his supporters with a grievance, have to be seriously regarded. My colleagues and I decided that it was necessary to run these risks, and Tilak was arrested on June 24, and sentenced on July

\* *Indian Unrest*, Macmillan, 1910.

22, to six years' rigorous imprisonment and transportation. The trial took place before a Parsi judge, and the jury contained only two Indians, both Parsis, who were terrorised by threatening letters, which also were sent in numbers to Mr. Justice Davar and myself, with horrible details of the manner of our approaching deaths. I noted that these letters ceased directly the sentence was pronounced. In the East, the *chose jugée* is generally accepted if it is understood that there will be no backsliding. It was necessary only to put an end to Tilak's activities, and in order that this might seem clear, I remitted the rigorous portion of his sentence, and directed that a Brahman cook should be provided for him. The effects of this trial were marked. As Mr. Chirol recorded :

"Tilak's conviction was a heavy blow—perhaps the heaviest which has been dealt—to the forces of unrest, at least in the Deccan ; and some months later one of the organs of his party the *Rashtramat* was fain to admit that 'the sudden removal of Mr. Tilak's powerful personality threw the whole province into dismay and unnerved the other leaders.' " \*

There were, however, no signs of general resentment, and while the " moderates " gave me no public support, some of them—in private—told me that they welcomed the action taken. On September 3, I drove through the old city of Poona—Tilak's home—and noted, " People wonderfully cordial " (Diary).

Following the trial, there was rioting in Bombay necessitating my presence there ; but this was expected, and precautions had been taken. The mob never got out of hand, and happily the loss of life was small. It is the duty of a Governor to write a weekly letter to the Secretary of State, and I had duly informed him of the decision of my Government. Lord Morley always sent me delightfully frank letters, carrying on our old relations and telling me of his difficulties and anxieties. Of his translation to the Lords he wrote on May 20 : " I need not

\* *Indian Unrest.*

tell you how much I find myself *dépaysé, déclassé*, and all sorts of other things in the H. of L. But I don't at all distrust my judgment in going there. It gives me about a score more hours of comfortable work per week. And that, you will admit, is no small reclamation of wasted time." He had been at pains to send me reports of too flattering "testimonials" as he called them to my early doings which he pronounced to be "splendid." "You may believe how intensely satisfactory all this is to me" (April 24). On May 8, he wrote :

"The bombs are a disquieting feature—and one of which we shall have plenty more both now and in days to come. They make new difficulties in the way both of political reform and military reductions: to say nothing of provoking loud cries for repression. I suppose that Poona is more likely than Bengal for these diabolic operations."

I wondered how he would regard what might appear in the light of "repression" to one who had no knowledge of the complex circumstances.

On July 3, he wrote :

"By the way, I don't count among welcome things, the proceedings against Tilak. I dare say the course you have taken was inevitable. . . . Still, when all this is said, it may well be that you had no choice. Gokhale, however, told Courtney that it would prove an ugly discouragement to the moderates. This may indeed be true; but then . . . we cannot allow Tilak and his men to set the law at defiance. This must be made plain both in our interest and theirs, for if we get a character for timidity, there's an end of 'Reforms.' "

This last sentence was eminently wise; but later came a postscript :

"Since writing to you an hour ago, I have come across the article in the *Kesari* for which I understand Tilak is being prosecuted. I confess that at the first glance

I feel as if it might have been passed over. But you have means of knowing the *actual effect produced* or likely to be produced. That is the real test of the quality of sedition."

Now the *gravamen* of the charge against Tilak, on which Mr. Justice Davar laid special stress, was that the *Kesari* had extolled the bomb as "a kind of witchcraft, a charm, an amulet," and had rejoiced in the assumption that neither "the supervision of the police" nor "swarms of detectives" could deal with "these simple, playful sports of science."

On July 31, Lord Morley wrote in a different strain :

"I won't go over the Tilak ground again beyond saying that, if you had done me the honour to seek my advice as well as that of your lawyers, I am clear that I should have been for leaving him alone. And I find no reason to believe that any mischief that Tilak could have done would have been so dangerous as the mischief that will be done by his sentence. Of course, the milk is now spilled and there's an end on't."

But there was not "an end on't," and on August 7, after I had tried hard to explain the situation, he wrote :

"Your vindication of the proceedings against Tilak does not shake me. That they were morally and legally justifiable is true enough and that the result may bring certain advantages at the moment is also true. But the balance of gain and loss, when the whole ultimate consequences are counted up, that is the only political fact. Time must show."

Of a speech in which I had condemned outrages in plain terms and appealed for the support of the moderates, he wrote : "That is true enough. But I cannot help asking myself whether it is likely to have the effect that you and I desire." And he read me an interesting lecture on the reticence of Cavour, who held that "*events, not words*



are the real teachers, guides, and masters." Yet Cavour did not live in India, and he who waits on events in the East will learn his lesson too late.

It was most natural that Lord Morley's pride of intellect should induce him to believe that he must know better than the man on the spot, who was quite unable to present on paper the intricacies of the situation, and whose mind had been made up only after months of deliberation. The apparent changes of view which the letters indicate were doubtless due to advisers near at hand, who had great advantages over the distant Governor. The theory—then new to me—that to put a stop to incitements to murder would discourage the "moderates" has persisted since with unhappy results.

Lord Morley's letters go far to explain the inherent difficulty of ruling 320 millions of Asiatics from Whitehall. To the man on the spot, responsible for law and order, the sole consideration is what may seem best for the helpless and inarticulate masses committed to his charge. To the Secretary of State, the fear of trouble in or outside Parliament may be paramount. As Lord Morley wrote: "In truth, I am brought to the case of a regular Janus with one face regarding the many responsibilities of the G. of I., with the other regarding public opinion in England" (May 29, 1908). That "public opinion" can be manufactured in a country where knowledge of the conditions in a far distant land is possessed only by a little minority, became well understood by the Indian agitators, who have thus won notable successes. It is for this reason among others that modern democracies cannot rule Empires.

Lord Morley had no trouble over the Tilak case, and in India the effect was far-reaching. My influence in the Presidency distinctly increased. I was, however, careful to explain that criticism of Government would not be penalised, but that incitements to murder and violence would never be tolerated, and this came to be understood. After 1908, there was little trouble with the Bombay papers, the tone of which markedly improved.

There was, however, an aftermath of Tilak's activities of which the murder of Mr. Jackson, collector of Nasik and, like Sir W. Curzon Wyllie, a devoted friend of India, was the most tragic example. The decadent young Brahman assassin gave the reason for his crime: "I read of many instances of oppression in the *Kesari*, the *Rashtramata*, and the *Kal*. I think that by killing sahibs we people can get justice. I never got injustice myself nor did any one I know. I now regret killing Mr. Jackson. I killed a good man causelessly." So much can an unchecked Press accomplish in India, and I trace the bomb attempt on Lord and Lady Minto at Ahmedabad on November 13, 1909, to the same poisonous source.

On November 6, 1908, I met my wife at Bombay and took her to Mahableshwar, where, after a sudden short illness, she passed away on December 9.

\* \* \* \* \*

On the 23rd my daughter and I started down the coast, visiting Karwar and arriving at New Goa on the 27th, where the Portuguese Governor-General showed us great kindness and arranged a trip to Old Goa. Returning, we stopped at Viziadrug, Ratnagiri, and Janjira. On January 19, 1909, my daughter started on a tour in Northern India, and I left on my first visit to Sind. On March 21, soon after her return, she too was taken, and my strong impulse was to go home.

Our wise forefathers had, however, ordained that an Indian Governor could have no leave,\* and at length I decided to go to Aden and Perim where some important questions needed personal attention. As Lord Morley most truly wrote, "There is no remedy, only strong fortitude and heavy labour."

My first two years in India covered the most trying but also the most educative period in my whole life. I made many tours, visiting five administrative districts and several Native States, entertained much, and gave interviews to an immense number of Indians, who will talk

\* This has now been changed, unwisely in my opinion and in that of Lord Morley.

freely when alone and from whom there was much to be learned. Bijapur, ignored by cold-weather tourists, contains fine monuments of Moghul splendour unique in the Deccan. Here were laid some scenes in *Tara*, Meadows Taylor's Maratha novel, which now had a new meaning for me. Here is a dead city of which part of the imposing walls still stand. The jackals wander where nine Shia kings reigned,\* and built for themselves magnificent tombs rivalling those of Northern India and illustrating a treatment of the dome unknown to Europe. Here also is a huge cast-iron gun, a marvel of its period, challenging the contemporary foundries of the West.

A sadder remnant of the past is Old Goa, which Rudyard Kipling had urged me to visit. The ruins of the vast city where Portuguese Viceroys ruled are lost in the luxuriance of an Indian jungle ; but a cathedral and a few ecclesiastical buildings remain, and priests, darker-hued than Indians, still conduct services which there are none to attend. An open space marks the spot where the victims of a ruthless Inquisition perished. In New Goa, children bearing caste marks sang Christian hymns to greet us. The contrast between the exotic architecture of mediæval Europe and the masterpieces of Eastern craftsmanship at Bijapur was startling. Old Goa seemed to illustrate alike the fall of the Portuguese Empire and the decay of Christianity transplanted to Indian soil. Whether plague or a great rising, provoked by the atrocities of the Inquisition, brought about the doom of Goa, pronounced by St. Francis Xavier to have been hopelessly corrupt in his time, is not clear ; but the blotting out of the huge capital of an intruding Western civilisation conveyed lessons that I can never forget.

The Dharwar gold-mines, from which much was hoped when I visited them, seem to have proved disappointing ; but the mineral resources of India are still imperfectly known, and the wealth of Golconda may lie buried in this sun-baked region. The Deccan is rich in fortification,

\* Bijapur was captured by Aurungzeb in 1686 and the Adil Shahi dynasty ended.

and at Viziadrag I saw the greatest stronghold of the Angria pirates and the remains of their dockyard. At Belgaum, I was deeply impressed by the athletic performances of a Maratha regiment under Colonel de Lisle. The horsemen who carried fire and sword across India have no successors; but the descendants of the warlike Deccani people who gave the *coup de grâce* to the failing Moghul power and might have built up another Empire but for our intervention, seemed to retain military qualities of a high order which their British officers warmly extolled.\* This I tried to impress on Lord Kitchener at Simla.

In these years I came to understand the Presidency machine of government, stretching down from the little executive Council of three, through Commissioners of divisions, collectors of districts, and mamlatdars of Talukas, to the village—the unit of the real life of the Indian peoples. Of the hide-bound bureaucracy which voluble politicians professed to discover I found scarcely a trace. For five or six months in each year the district officers toured throughout their areas inquiring into grievances, settling disputes, and assimilating the lore of the countryside. Nowhere was the contact between the cultivators and the administration more close than in Bombay in my time. All Secretariats tend towards bureaucracy; but this—in India—could be prevented by constantly bringing in new blood from the districts, which I was careful to arrange. There are no officials in the world less bureaucratic than the Indian Civil Servants, where this provision is insisted upon, and entrenched Secretariats, such as those at home and in France, should be impossible in India.

The Decentralisation Commission, of which I was to have been a member, had come and gone, leaving behind a trail of racial irritation which generally follows these roving bodies. The terms of reference unfortunately permitted meticulous inquiries, and the Commission lost itself in such petty details as the duties of village officers, while scamping the main question—the relations between the Central and Provincial Governments—which urgently

\* This regiment distinguished itself in the Great War.

needed revision. The Government of Bombay was unfettered in dealing with many matters of first-class importance, but was involved in prolonged and futile correspondence over trivialities, which the Government of India was incapable of handling. As my Government informed the Commission, there were four classes of administrative acts of the Government of India,

“which render the position of the Local Government difficult, impair its responsibility for the administration of the Province, and weaken its authority. These are :

“1. The refusal to sanction schemes of reform advocated by this Government.

“2. The delaying of much-needed improvements owing to the time occupied in obtaining sanction from the Government of India.

“3. The issue of orders on important questions affecting the administration of the Province without first consulting the Government.

“4. The bringing forward of schemes of reform undesirable or premature in the present conditions of this Presidency.”

Dealing with our actual experiences, we pointed out that :

“A government . . . not permitted to appoint a watchman on Rs.10, debarred from sanctioning a sum of Rs.8 to meet the expenses of a lady doctor, deprived of final discretion in settling the number of orderlies to its police school, and liable to be overruled on the situation of a staircase in a Government bungalow and on the rent charge to be levied from its occupant, is evidently a useless excrescence.”

We deplored the inevitable effects of this crass centralisation upon the masses of India.

“The Government of India is far off, and no one can tell who, in any particular matter, is the Government of India. They [the masses] have no belief in an impersonal Government which they cannot see, or know, or

approach, and they regard it as a blindly moving machine propelled by an unknown force. . . . Much of the indifference to the authority of Government, which is growing up and spreading unrest, is due to this source. All this is done in the name of efficiency ; but the efficiency is unreal. The idea that the population of India is a plastic mass which can be moulded into any form theoretically desirable must be abandoned."

Many changes have since happened ; but I have quoted the opinions of my Government in 1908, because, if effective decentralisation had accompanied the Morley-Minto reforms of the following year, the recent history of India might have been different. As I wrote later,\*

"The work of the new Councils would have been invested with actuality. Real responsibility, financial and other, would have been thrown upon them. Provincial politics would have developed, resulting in emulation certain to promote progress. The steam-roller policy would have ended, and the more advanced Provinces would not have been held in check to suit the pace of the more backward."

There was a sequel to our protests in 1908. It had become clear that the interests of Bombay required a first-class representative in the Viceroy's Council, and that my excellent colleague Mr. (afterwards Sir) John Jenkins was exactly suited for this function. I strongly commended him to Lord Minto. After his appointment as Home Member in April, 1910, our relations with the Government of India became easier, while the following important paragraph in the Durbar dispatch published in December, 1911, was his work :

"The only possible solution of the difficulty would appear to be to give the Provinces a larger measure of self-government, until at last India would consist of a number of administrations, autonomous in all Provincial affairs,

\* *Nineteenth Century*, January, 1917.

with the Government of India above them all and possessing the power to interfere in cases of misgovernment, but ordinarily confining their functions to matters of Imperial concern."

This paragraph, which was naturally claimed by Indian politicians as a concession to Home Rule, represents the gist of many talks with the author. It embodied our views as to the direction which political reform, directed to eventual self-government, should take. Mr. Montagu and his henchmen, by destroying the authority of Government in India at its head, added vastly to the difficulties of the future. The premature death of Sir J. Jenkins robbed India of a public servant of wide knowledge, broad views, and rare political sagacity, whose influence in the critical years 1917-18 might have averted blunders now irretrievable.

There is a large turbulent population in Bombay and the Moharrem was always an occasion of anxiety. In February, 1908, there was a serious disturbance, and the European police fired on the mob in Bhendy bazaar. The City police organisation at this time did not seem satisfactory, and I appointed a Committee of three to draw up a scheme.\* In May, 1909, Mr. S. M. Edwardes returned from England, after studying at Scotland Yard, to take up the Commissionership, and a complete reorganisation of the City police followed. The Moharrem of 1910 passed without hostilities; but the behaviour of the mob, which extorted money from Hindu and Parsi merchants, was so bad that it was necessary to make regulations for the future. Mr. Edwardes, whose knowledge of Bombay City was unrivalled, proposed to close all the streets of the Bohra (Shia) quarter to Sunnis and to prescribe routes for the processions. This regulation, which I was determined to enforce, led to violent scenes on January 12, 1911, when the troops were obliged to fire. I had addressed a meeting of Moslems appealing to them for support, and I knew that their leading men were on the side of the

\* Sir W. Morison, Mr. P. H. Dastur, and Mr. S. M. Edwardes.

Government, as were all the orderly citizens of Bombay. The rioting of January, 1911, was intended as a direct challenge; but it was the last. Ever since, for fifteen years, the Moharrem has assumed peaceable and orthodox forms, and the old lawlessness has vanished. My successor was able to say in December, 1914, that "the disreputable ceremonies which used to disfigure the Moharrem having been relegated to the past, it is now possible to regard the new regulations as having become permanently established." It was, however, difficult to explain all this to distant critics in Whitehall, and the firing by the troops which saved many lives was viewed unfavourably.

On my return from Aden, Lord Minto most kindly offered me the use of a house at Simla, and I left Bombay on May 1, 1909. Lord Morley had expressed a wish that I should go there, significantly adding :

"It will enable you to survey the conditions of Indian government in a way and with a comprehensiveness impossible to find anywhere else. That Simla, with all the name imparts, will lead to edification, I am by no means sure. But then you and I are well acquainted with a good many things at Whitehall of which just the same might be said " (May 26, 1909).

In an enclave among native States, perched upon the lower ranges of the giant Himalayas, is the centre from which for more than six months in the year India is governed. For a parallel one must imagine government of Europe, less Russia, from the Righi Kulm.\* My papers followed me to the Olympian heights; but I had the feeling of being detached from the life of India. An artificial atmosphere seemed to pervade Simla, creating an impression of unreality. One necessary effect of centralisation was made plain. The impossibility of collecting on this remote hill-top adequate knowledge of the widely differing conditions of a sub-continent resulted in power descending to the lower ranks of the official hierarchy. It is hopeless

\* The States of Europe, however, are far more homogeneous, in habits, culture, and ethnological conditions, than the Provinces of India.



for a Viceroy to attempt to give personal attention to problems which may be of great importance to Provincial Governments, and decisions gravely affecting them may be evolved in the Secretariat. I now understood the sources of the torrent of correspondence which often appeared inscrutable to the Government of Bombay.

At Simla, I had the advantage of many talks with Lord Kitchener at Snowdon, his official residence, filled with interesting articles which he had collected, and at Wildflower Hall, his country home at Mashobra, where he delighted in gardening. We had many points of agreement; but, as regards the granting of commissions in the Army to Indians, of which I wished to make a beginning, we could not see eye to eye. On June 5, I received a telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia asking me to arrange with him for a tour of inspection. I pressed this plan strongly, and Lord Kitchener undertook to go on conditions which Mr. Deakin readily accepted.

A month's relief from exacting public duties gave me the chance of one small labour of love. My daughter had hoped to publish a selection of her literary sketches, some of which had appeared in the *Westminster Gazette* and in Australia. I was able to fulfil her wishes and to write a preface with a short story of her life which was produced by Mr. W. Heinemann.\* The chance of winning the affection of the Indian people had been denied to her mother; but our daughter had wonderfully succeeded in the short time permitted to her. As I could truly write: "In India she seemed to have found her real mission in life, and the new ambition which inspired her was to draw the races together in the bonds of the sympathy which she strove to diffuse." †

Not from the Bombay Presidency alone there came touching tributes to her keen insight into the spirit of old India. Two of Mrs. Sarojini Naidu's beautiful memorial verses reflect the impression which she had made upon the quickly responsive Indian mind:

\* *Leaves*, by Violet Clarke. W. Heinemann, 1909.

† Preface, 1909.

“ With eager knowledge of our ancient lore,  
And prescient love of all our ancient race,  
You came to us, with gentle hands that bore  
Bright gifts of genius, youth and subtle grace.

“ Our shrines, our sacred streams, our sumptuous art,  
Old hills that scale the sky’s unageing dome,  
Recalled some long-lost rapture to your heart,  
Some far-off memory of your spirit’s home.” \*

The magnificent snow panorama visible from my temporary home, the gorgeous colouring of the flowers covering the great rhododendron trees, the wonders of Sipi Fair held in a deep valley shaded by huge cedars, the hillmen and women differing totally from the people of the Presidency, and the kindness of Lord and Lady Minto, all remain in my memory. But when, on June 6, I came down the mountain railway and saw at evening the vast brown plains stretching far into the distance, I had the grateful sense of getting back into the life of India.

Heavy work awaited me at Poona, where, on September 9, Lord Kitchener arrived to meet Sir O’Moore Creagh on the following day. Their *rencontre* in my study was at first decidedly frigid ; but Sir O’Moore’s Irish wit quickly relieved the situation, and they retired to perform in private the mysterious ceremony of handing and taking over the command of the Indian Army. Each afterwards told me that the opinions of the other were not the least what he expected ! I persuaded Lord Kitchener with some difficulty to agree to our being photographed, and I sent the result † to Lord Morley subscribed “ The Three Musketeers,” with a description of the meeting of war lords which he warmly appreciated. From Ganeshkind ‡ Lord Kitchener started for Australia on September 10. Before leaving, I asked him what post he would most like, and he at once mentioned the Embassy at Constantinople. With his permission, I conveyed this wish to Lord Morley, pointing out certain advantages. Looking back, I incline to believe that if Lord Kitchener,

\* “ In Remembrance,” *The Bird of Time*. W. Heinemann, 1912.

† Here reproduced.

‡ The Government House at Kirkee which stands close to the battle-field where the army of the Peshwa was broken in 1817.

with his military prestige and great knowledge of the Turks, had held this important post in the critical years before 1914, when General Liman von Sanders, following Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, was astutely building up German influence, much might have happened differently.

I had continued to press Lord Morley to pay a visit to India ; believing that if he could get a glimpse of Indian village life, see a few really representative Indians, and catch the atmosphere of the vast country he was ruling, the effect upon his mind would be a revelation. He was much taken with the plan, which I thought might be combined with a meeting with the Viceroy in November. On October 19, he wrote :

“My Indian trip is over!! Lord Minto thinks that my appearance in India would be altogether inopportune, or worse. If the times were normal, it would, he says, be altogether different. He is sure that I shall not misunderstand, etc., etc. A visit to Bombay alone, in his judgment, is open to immense objection. . . . I have offered not a word of comment on all this to the G.G. himself, and I will not comment on it to you or anybody else. But do allow me to thank *you* most warmly for your often repeated invitations. It would make all the difference and perhaps would save all of us from some mistakes. If times are abnormal, that is all the more reason why we should take abnormal trouble to get full exchange of views among responsible people. Be that as it may, I shall always remember your kindness of intention.”

There was much to be said for Lord Minto's view ; but times are never “normal,” and to a mind like that of Lord Morley even a glimpse of the India he knew only on paper would have been a new inspiration.

In the autumn of 1909, the finishing touch was given to the “Morley-Minto Reforms” with which I was in complete sympathy ; but the details were being settled at Simla by Sir H. Risley and Sir S. (afterwards Lord) Sinha, neither of whom knew Bombay. A maddening corre-



Lord Kitchener.

Sir George Clarke.

General Sir O'Moore Cragh.

"THE THREE MUSKETEERS," GATESHEAD, SEPTEMBER 9, 1909.

[To face page 236.



spondence leading nowhere resulted, until, with the Viceroy's permission, Mr. Jenkins went to Simla. I may perhaps have pressed some points too hard, and Lord Morley wrote: "Forgive me for saying so, but were I in your place, I would not fight too hard over every disputable point with the G. of I. . . . Protest if you like, but do not resist. The G. of I. must win with the last word, even if it be not the wisest" (October 19, 1909). It was impossible to explain that I was not fighting the G. of I., but only two or three officials who knew nothing of the peculiar conditions of Bombay or of Western political methods, and to whom matters of real importance to my Government, which was to set up the Reforms, were of small account. Mr. Jenkins and I, however, eventually secured almost everything we desired, enabling the new Council to be brought smoothly into existence.

In October, I went to Ahmednagar, where I saw one of Lord Kitchener's palatial new barracks, then derelict in a wilderness of spear grass with rifts in some of the roofs due to the prevalent high winds. The site seemed to me unsuitable for a British regiment. Visits to Siroor, Khoregaon,\* and later to Satara followed, and I made the acquaintance of all the local notabilities. A morning spent in a succession of interviews is exhausting, but infinitely instructive.

On November 17, Lord and Lady Minto arrived at Bombay fresh from their trying experience at Ahmedabad, and in my loneliness their entertainment was a great anxiety. On the following day there was a dinner-party of 126 in a great shamiana specially erected. When we were all seated, there was an appalling delay which kept me on tenterhooks. At length it appeared that an Indian sentry had forcibly held up the soup, which he released only by the command of his officer, who could not at once be found! A reception of 1,200 people followed, and it

\* A plain obelisk at Khoregaon commemorates the wonderful defence of the village by Captain Francis Staunton on January 1, 1818, with 500 Bombay native infantry, 250 irregular cavalry and two 6-pounders manned by 24 European gunners against the Peshwa's army of more than 20,000 men. The annals of the Indian Army record no finer exploit.

was an intense relief when Lord Morley, with his usual thoughtful consideration, wrote: "The Viceroy writes me in language of the warmest appreciation of your excellent hospitality and consideration for them. They enjoyed it immensely, and he also mentions what a pleasant, useful, and harmonious talk he had with you" (December 8).

On the 30th, Sir O'Moore Creagh arrived, and we had some useful discussions. His knowledge of the Indian Army and peoples was extensive and peculiar. There were several military matters which had struck me unfavourably, such as the lines of the native regiment in Bombay, which I inspected shortly after landing and noted as "disgracefully bad." We agreed on most questions, and I found in him always a valued friend by whom any suggestions of a quasi-military character were certain to be considered.

On December 31, the worst two years of my life, in which, following many months of anxiety, I lost my wife and only child, ended with a visit to Alibag.

## CHAPTER XVII

### INDIA, 1910-11

THE elections in Bombay passed smoothly, and on January 4, 1910, the enlarged Legislative Council met. The head of a Presidency, in those days, combined the functions of Governor, Premier, and Speaker, which had certain advantages, though it added greatly to the wear and tear of his life. All this has been changed. The Governor is no longer Premier where the pretence of dyarchy is maintained, and a President, now elected, replaces him in the Legislative Council.

At the first meeting of the reformed Council, I thought it might be useful to give a sketch of the evolution of government in Bombay, from the Charter Act of 1833 to the India Councils Act of 1892, which was in operation until the advent of the Morley-Minto Reforms, and I thus summarised the new political situation :

“ The Council has been enlarged from a total membership of 22 to one of 46, and its functions have been greatly extended to enable Members to exert direct influence upon the preparation of the financial statement, to move resolutions, and to ask supplementary questions on matters of public interest. The Council now contains 33 non-official members, of whom 21 are elected. From this brief historical review, you will see that the evolution of the Council has proceeded on natural lines. . . . From purely legislative business the functions of this Council were first extended to advice and representation, and now to direct expression of opinion upon all matters of local finance and administration. The change is not one of degree but one of principle.”



This fairly presents the position of the Council as designed by Lords Morley and Minto, and I interpreted the Reforms as liberally as possible.\*

I thought it necessary to take this opportunity of speaking frankly and sternly on the subject of the murders at the Imperial Institute and at Nasik :

“If persistent and insistent attempts are made to sow the seeds of racial hate, to spread wild falsehoods, to condone or to explain away crime, and even to extol the criminal, then from among an excitable population like that of India, the murderer will assuredly arise. This experience has proved, and where the murderous instinct has been aroused, there has been no discrimination as to the race of the victims.” †

I tried to give good advice to the new Council, ending with the exhortation :

“A fair white page lies open before us. It is for us to see that nothing is written upon that page that is not in full accordance with conscience and honour. We have a reputation to make ; let us work together in the spirit of duty and good fellowship, inspired only by an earnest desire to promote the happiness and prosperity of the people.”

Lord Morley showed much anxiety as to the reception of the Reforms on which he had bestowed great care. He was always obsessed with the ideas that prosecutions for incitement to murder would prejudice their success, and that the “Moderates” formed a large and influential body. In the East, however, stern punishment, if just, can synchronise with sympathetic consideration, and in India as elsewhere “Moderates” can never form an effective political party. Too few of them can resist the moral intimidation which is rampant, and for the most

\* I was entitled to nominate 21 members, including 14 officials, of whom I chose only 9, leaving 12 non-officials, thus creating a non-official majority from the outset.

† It is a fact that the great majority of the victims of assassination have been Indians.

part they adopt a waiting *rôle* ready to attach themselves to the Government or to the Extremists, whichever appear likely to prevail. The worship of the rising sun is enshrined in centuries of the history of India, where power, visibly exercised, will always attract armies of followers. The rapid growth of the anti-government movement is largely due to a long series of graceful concessions indicating that the future lies with the agitating classes.

The Morley-Minto Reforms were greeted with surprised approval. Mr. Gokhale and other leading Indians told me that all their expectations had been surpassed ; but an attack was artfully directed against the regulations which, except in limiting the length of speeches, were less rigid than those of the House of Commons.

These well-conceived Reforms proved eminently successful, and when addressing the Legislative Council for the last time before the new elections, I could say " with perfect sincerity,"

" That the hopes which I cherished and expressed when we first met together have been fully justified by the experience of the past three years. To you fell the honour of inaugurating a most important new departure in Council Government, and you have worthily borne that honour " (Poona, September 29, 1912).

The assertion that the constitutional changes introduced in 1910 were regarded with distrust and disfavour by " the bureaucracy " was false. The Indian Civil Service, which bore the burden of bringing them into operation, never showed the slightest sign of disapproval and strove to secure their success. These changes—like all other legislative measures—proved to have some defects, which could easily have been remedied ; but India was presented in 1910 with a new political system that, if combined with a large measure of Provincial autonomy,\* might have led her gradually and smoothly along the path to self-government. In 1918, the Morley-Minto Reforms were suddenly tossed aside with results

\* See p. 231.

now apparent. I had made the great mistake of opposing the principle of communal representation for Moslems, which was perhaps natural to one brought up in the Liberal creed ; but, before I left India, I learned my error. For many years to come this concession to the powerful Mahomedan minority and to some others will be essential.

From the first, questions of education engrossed my attention, and by visiting colleges and schools of all kinds, I strove to gain personal insight into a system which has hampered progress, and led to many tragedies. The well-known Minute of Lord Macaulay in 1835 had the effect of giving a false start to Western education in India. The objects, as he defined them, were these : " We must do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern, a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect." The needs of the Government, not the uplifting and moral strengthening of the Indian peoples, were thus held out as the goal to be aimed at, and India has suffered ever since, while the difficulty of adapting the educational machine to Indian requirements and to the encouragement of self-dependence is now formidable.

As I pointed out :

" We cannot, by education, transform the ' intellect ' of an ancient people, or reconstruct their ' tastes ' and ' opinions ' in accordance with foreign models. Even if such a proceeding were practicable, it would be eminently undesirable, because a process of artificial conversion which takes no account of inherent genius and aptitudes, is more likely to injure than to elevate a native population." \*

I then explained our conception of the education which India required :

" It is our earnest wish to do the best that our means permit to broaden the mental vision of the people ; to

\* Convocation Address, February 18, 1908.

give them, not knowledge only, but the wisdom which comes from knowledge co-ordinated and transmuted into living intellectual force—the wisdom essential alike to economic progress and to the right ruling of private and public life. Only by education, leavening the mass of the population, and creating gradually the environment which stimulates and inspires, can India be raised to the position which she ought to occupy among the great nations of the world.”

This was a counsel of perfection ; but something was accomplished, though sadly less than I hoped. The whole question of education had become political, and Lord Curzon's vigorous efforts to reform the Universities had been largely thwarted because political motives were falsely ascribed to them. It was most difficult to convince Indian upholders of the very unsatisfactory *status quo* that no thought except the good of the people ever crossed my mind.

On the other hand, my appeals on behalf of science teaching received a wonderful response. The munificence of Indians of all communities enabled a fine Royal Institute of Science in Bombay, and a College of Science at Ahmedabad to be started. When laying the foundation stone of the former, I was able to announce that the generous contributions of Sir Cowasjee Jehangir, Sir Jacob Sassoon, and Sir Currimbhoy Ibrahim, with a Government grant of 5 lakhs, would provide more than 29 lakhs for buildings, including a fine public hall,\* and for equipment and endowment. For the Ahmedabad College of Science, Sir Chinubhai Madhowlal gave 6 lakhs, with 2 lakhs to enable Government to take over the existing Gujerat College. I was also enabled to initiate a College of Commerce in Bombay, and altogether nearly 50 lakhs were placed at my disposal for public purposes.

The extension of rural elementary schools was hurried forward, and in five years over 2,300 were added, while the wretched pay of the masters was increased ; but I

\* To bear Sir Cowasjee Jehangir's name.

opposed compulsory education as being premature.\*  
“Wait until school facilities can be brought within reach of all villages and until the majority of children of school age are under training before seeking to bring compulsion, with its worries and penalties, to bear upon humble parents who would rightly regard it as oppression.” †

Much was done to improve the curriculum and status of the Government secondary schools, and I tried hard to introduce some necessary reforms in the University, which I found to be an unwieldy examining body neglectful of higher education. The path of an educational reformer—in India especially—is strewn with formidable boulders; but amid much discouragement, there was helpful sympathy from some Indians who understood. The introduction to my published speeches by Professor A. B. Latthe, Educational Inspector of Kolhapur State, from which some extracts are reproduced (see Appendix II), shows that the seed I strove to sow broadcast found patches of fertile Indian soil.

On January 15, 1910, I started for a tour of the Native States of Kathiawar, holding a Durbar of Chiefs at Rajkot on the 17th and visiting Nawangar, Gondal, Junagadh, Bhavnagar, and Palitana, returning to British India at Jalgaon too wearied to visit the caves of Ajanta. The fascination of native-governed India is indescribable. Ruling one-third of the whole country and one-fourth of the population, are numbers of dynasties, some of great age, others dating from the internecine strife which attended the break-up of the Moghul Empire, but all guaranteed in their rights, of which they are proudly tenacious, by the British Crown. It is in the Native States that the genius of India can best be studied, and no part of the duties of a Governor is so interesting as his relations with their Chiefs. To learn their needs, and to win the confidence which will permit him to advise them as a true friend, must be his great ambition.

\* I thought Mr. Gokhale's Bill grossly unjust to the rural population.

† Speech at Mahomedan Educational Conference, Poona, August 7, 1912.

Kathiawar, for centuries devastated by marauding armies, and now peacefully progressing, is one of the finest monuments to British rule. If, I thought, Lord Morley could only have been present at the great gathering at Rajkot, he would have learned what an age at the India Office could never teach. To me this tour was an inspiration, and the warm reception from the Chiefs and their peoples was a welcome encouragement.

There were about 300 Native States of every degree under the Government of Bombay, and many of their Chiefs had the right of receiving return visits from the Governor. All this has been changed, and the more important States have been transferred to the Government of India. To some of the Chiefs this may seem to confer an added prestige; but the effect must be that their affairs will fall into the hands of minor officials of the Secretariat, as the Viceroy cannot give the individual care which Governors of Bombay delighted in bestowing upon them.

At Jalgaon I first came in contact with the Bhils, who are slowly emerging from tribal conditions. They not only performed native dances, but acted a play of which the motive was the vagaries of police proceedings, which seemed to provide these primitive children of the forest with infinite amusement. I am afraid that democracy is not at present safe for the light-hearted Bhils.

In the spring of 1910, the succession to Lord Minto was decided. I may have thought that there was a bare chance of my promotion; but I was well aware of four disabilities—age, thirty-three years' service in the Army, my Presidency Governorship,\* and my solitude. I was, therefore, not surprised when Lord Morley wrote on June 10:

"I have at last got to the end of a very tiresome transaction, the appointment of a successor to Lord Minto. I am not sure that I ever had to take part in

\* There is, I believe, no precedent for the promotion of a Governor. Lord Dalhousie was appointed to the Governorship of Bombay with a view to his elevation, but he never took up the lesser office.

anything much more tiresome. The pressure for Lord K. ever since November has been very severe, and from several important quarters, where resistance has been by no means easy. Of course, on the other hand, it would have been still less easy for the supporters of a military appointment to carry it without the approval of the S.S., and in the present case the S.S. would have marked the sincerity of his approval by abdication. When this was realised, the difficulties melted away. . . . Now a word personal to yourself. *You* were vigorously commended to me, as the name that would give most pleasure to the whole host of our best friends in India. This was no surprise to me at all, and it gave me lively pleasure as a mark of the recognition accorded to your qualities and performances. There would have been a loud shout of approval, and it would, I do believe, have been pretty general, tho' not universal. But you are far too familiar with the world of Whitehall and Westminster, not to know the multitude of considerations that a Minister making an appointment of this sort has to take into account, some of them wearing an irrelevant look enough, yet weighty and inevitable. Whether the idea ever entered your own mind, I do not know. It would be no more than natural that it should, that is quite certain. I only want you to know from myself that it entered my mind and long dwelt there as a possibility."

Nothing could have been kinder or more considerate, and I was, therefore, astonished to find a different story in Sir Almeric Fitzroy's *Memoirs*.\*

I cannot now remember whether, in my letter by the next mail, I commented upon Lord Morley's decision; but I find it difficult to believe that he could have said,

\* "Sir George Clarke's peerage led Lord Morley to some observations on his career at Bombay, for which he was responsible. It appears that it was marred by displays of vainglory which had reached such a pitch when Minto came home that he had persuaded himself his claims to the succession could not be overlooked. On Lord Morley writing to him, in the most considerate terms, to explain that it was impracticable, he never took the trouble to answer his letter. 'I then let him drop,' he continued, 'but apparently somebody else has taken him up.'"

"I then let him drop," because I have many subsequent letters which absolutely refute this allegation.

On July 1, at the end of a letter in which he seemed to complain of the extradition proceedings taken against Vinayek Savarkar,\* and especially of the action of the Bengal Government in the case of Arabindo Ghose, Lord Morley suddenly announced a change gravely affecting my position. "I further intend to direct the G. of I. to revert to the older practice of requiring the local Governments to refer to the G. of I. before starting political prosecutions. You will not like this possibly; but it is the only means of making sure of a coherent and co-ordinated policy."

This decision came like a bolt from the blue at a time when I was immersed in heavy work and oppressed by many anxieties, and I recalled my painful experience in the Sudan twenty-five years earlier,† when my career seemed to have come to an end. I had accepted the Governorship of Bombay with the responsibility of maintaining order, but with powers which my predecessors had wielded for many years, and I hoped that I had won Lord Morley's confidence. These powers were now to be suddenly withdrawn, and the significance would be understood in every bazaar in the Presidency. The advantages expected would not be gained. A local Governor could give personal attention to every proposed prosecution, which would be quite impossible to the Governor-General, who would also be ignorant of the local conditions which might require immediate action in one province that could be avoided or postponed in another.

I saw before me a long vista of voluminous correspondence ending in adverse decisions prompted by

\* The legality of these proceedings was argued at length in England. V. D. Savarkar, a Konkanasth Brahman, was one of the most dangerous men that India has produced. He was the leading spirit at India House when the murders at the Imperial Institute were planned, and one of his satellites accompanied the wretched assassin Dhingra to keep him to his fatal resolve. Savarkar sent twenty Browning pistols purchased in Paris to Bombay, and one of them was used for the murder of Mr. Jackson at Nasik. All this and more Lord Morley seemed not to know.

† See p. 63.



subordinates in the Secretariat of the Government of India. Moreover, "coherent" sentences could no more be obtained than in the Courts of this country, and it was even doubtful whether Lord Morley's ukase could be legally enforced without revising the penal code, which conferred powers upon the local governments.

I protested at once by telegraph and letter, no doubt too vehemently, and I frankly said that I might be forced to reconsider my position. This may have been unwise; but I felt strongly, and India is a hot country.

On August 24, Lord Morley wrote :

"I am a good deal afflicted by your letter of August 3. 'The crux of the matter,' you say, 'is the answer to the question, "Have I succeeded here, or have I failed to deserve your confidence?"' If I have succeeded, may I not be trusted a little longer? If I have failed, is it not better for me to go?' I cannot but believe that, on reflection, you will see that this is wholly unfair to me. . . . I don't believe any S.S. ever did more to express my recognition of success—warm, cordial, and persistent recognition of your Indian services."

This was most true; but the two knights were looking at different sides of the shield, and Lord Morley could not see that he was proposing radically to change my position in the eyes of all the diverse peoples of the Presidency, which I again tried to explain. On September 27, he wrote: "You dwell on the 'Indian way of looking at things,' and talk of the Indian view being the only thing that matters. I by no means agree with you in the latter proposition, which really signifies that the only thing that matters is what a particular local Government believes to be the Indian way of looking at things." If only I could have made Lord Morley understand what *izzat* means to *all* Indians, and how they would inevitably regard the sudden withdrawal of one of the most important powers entrusted to a Governor, all might have been well; but this was not possible. The memory of this sharp disagreement with my Chief, which was most trying at the time,

has been softened by the years ; but there is a moral. It can rarely be wise to take away necessary powers from a responsible official, especially when full knowledge of local conditions is denied to the reigning autocrat. My experience has no doubt fallen to others who were perhaps less insistent upon what they believed to be their rights. Unless the man on the spot has plainly shown want of judgment, it must generally be best to trust him, remembering that no correspondence can ever convey the realities of a complex situation to a Minister who has no personal knowledge to guide his decisions.

I finally decided to resign, undertaking to remain at my post until a successor could be provided, when a sudden and obscure turn in the political kaleidoscope transformed Lord Morley into the Lord President of the Council before any orders were issued. In his farewell letter on October 19, he wrote :

“ I look back upon most of the time of our correspondence with infinite satisfaction. In the more recent part of it, I do not find myself so happy, for I seemed to observe a certain departure \* from the principles on which we began our policy. If I had remained, this possible discrepancy might have become serious. As it is, it is not for me now to say more.”

I am afraid that I was never quite forgiven, and I may have been at fault for not making allowances for Lord Morley's training and temperament, which rendered it peculiarly difficult for him to enter into the feelings of a lonely Governor in a distant land of which he knew nothing. To me it was a lesson in administration which I took to heart.

The news of King Edward's death arrived on May 7, and I felt a deep sense of personal loss. All through the years 1904-7, His Majesty had been in close touch with the reorganisation of Imperial Defence then in progress, which owed much to his support and encouragement.

\* It seemed to me that the only “ departure ” was on Lord Morley's side.

In accordance with the orders of the Government of India, the ceremony of proclaiming the accession of King George V took place at Mahableshwar on the Western Ghats. It was a most impressive scene in a purely rural setting. All the Indian and British visitors faced the platform from which the Proclamation was read, and apart—forming a garden of bright colours—was a crowd of the real people of India, the patient cultivators from near and far. To them not a word was intelligible. They were only dimly aware that something had happened which might concern them. So might their forefathers, during centuries of violent change, have viewed with puzzled acquiescence the advent of a new ruler.

On June 15, I was in Bombay presiding over a great citizens' meeting to express the public sorrow at the death of King Edward, and I tried to emphasise the relations of our ancient Crown with the people of India.

“The world is governed by the resultant of great forces, which intensify or check each other, which ennoble or degrade, which make for union or disunion, for peace or for war. We may note the effects of these complex forces. We can rarely or never estimate the exact part which each has played in bringing them about ; but one thing at least is certain. Now, as always in the past, the personal qualities, the qualities which endear the individual to his fellow-men, are supremely important in the highest, as well as in the humblest spheres of action. And when the individual who is loved and trusted is the Sovereign of the greatest Empire in the world . . . we may dimly imagine the potentiality of the force which can be brought to bear on the affairs of mankind.”

After dwelling on the reign of the great Queen, and on the work of peace which King Edward pursued to the end, I said :

“Sorrow unites, and under the influence of a common sentiment, the real brotherhood of man, which we are apt to forget, asserts itself in the presence of death. Here

in India, as in Great Britain, there is a lull, and for a time discords are hushed, as our revered King would most have desired. That the sense of a sorrow, shared by all communities and classes, may help us better to realise our essential community of interests, our common aim to do what is best for India . . . is my most earnest wish."

On November 4, I was married to Phyllis, widow of Captain A. R. Reynolds, 31st Regiment, and youngest daughter of George Morant. She was doubly connected with my late wife, and we had known her for many years. The Cathedral was crowded, many Chiefs and leading Indians being present, and from all parts of the Presidency we received warm congratulations and many kind presents which we treasure. Home life, which for more than thirty-seven years had been the mainstay of all my work, was again given to me. On the 18th, Lord and Lady Hardinge arrived, and the great official dinner-party which followed was made easy. My wife quickly took up the many duties which, in India especially, only a woman can discharge, and henceforth I had in full measure the help long and sorely needed.

On December 14, the Crown Prince of Germany, with a numerous suite, arrived on the *Gneisenau*, destined to find her grave off the Falkland Islands. We had a large party to meet him, at which he proposed the health of the King Emperor, and I that of the Kaiser. His object seemed to be to display frank and unalloyed friendship, not, however, free from inquisitiveness. We had given up our bungalow to him, and just below it was a battery cut off on the land-side by fortifications with the entrance guarded by a sentry. He could see everything; but he apparently resented any restriction, and in the early morning he went down to the beach and easily climbed up into the battery, telling us of his exploit with boyish pleasure. After spending two days with us he started for Hyderabad, returning for a few hours on the 22nd. On February 25, 1911, he came again before embarking, delighted with

his Indian experiences, and gave us a detailed account of his escapade at Lucknow, which upset the equanimity of our officials and alarmed the Kaiser, but seemed to be only an exhibition of youthful exuberance and revolt against supervision. His great idea—he told us—was that the Kaiser should make an Indian tour for instructional purposes, leaving him to act as Regent! His marked friendliness and warm invitation to Potsdam became puzzling to us a year later after his anti-British demonstration in the Reichstag.

In January, 1911, taking my old American friend, Admiral Goodrich, and his daughter, we started on a tour down the Malabar Coast, ending at the Gersoppa Falls, where the Maharaja of Mysore had most kindly prepared a camp. Even at this season, the Falls, over 800 feet in height, were a wonderful sight, spanned by a brilliant rainbow which lasted nearly all day. The long drive from Jog took us through the dense Kanara forests, where the problem of a slowly disappearing population has baffled the Bombay Government. Over this region, in the days when, according to Mrs. Besant and her followers, India was a "Paradise," devastating armies roamed and fought, while the people perished in such numbers that the survivors could not cope with the luxuriant growth of the jungle. Their descendants find Nature still encroaching on their sparse cultivation, and malarial diseases have sadly reduced their vitality. The best course would be to remove them to other areas; but the intense attachment of Indians to their hereditary surroundings makes this impossible, and we could only seek to mitigate their adversity.

There had been a "kill" in the forest ten miles away, and on January 12, my wife and I found ourselves in a *machan* cleverly constructed in a tree at the edge of a clearing. Here we waited patiently for two hours till the noise of the beaters drew near, and for a few minutes there was a thrill of expectation. The tiger, however, had been missed, or perhaps the beaters naturally opened out when they approached him. Only pig, monkeys, and

many parrots crossed our clearing ; but next day the king of the jungle was evicted, sat under our deserted tree for a few minutes—and escaped. So ended my only tiger shoot, though many were open to me. There was no time for such relaxations, and I found the wild-looking crowd of Kanarese beaters more interesting than tigers. In these forests, it was possible to learn something of the life of our forest officers and to reach some definite conclusions as to the Indianisation of this important service.

Returning to Bombay we stopped at many places, seeing some wonderful Maratha forts, and always finding a warm welcome from the good people of the Konkan. At Ratnagiri, we received the ex-King Theebaw with his wives \* and daughters—a pathetic sight. The Longwood of the fallen monarch of Burma was comfortably provided, and the supervision exercised over him was of the mildest ; but he had two unfulfilled wishes. Husbands of suitable rank for his daughters were not forthcoming, and a motor-car was an object of special desire. The Burma Government, however, proved unsympathetic to the provision of young Lochinvars, and I heard that Theebaw quickly tired of his motor which I had at once sanctioned.

On February 8, I laid the foundations of the great Lonavla dam, which now holds up the Sydenham lake, the first of the large reservoirs in the Ghats from which electricity is supplied to Bombay by the Tata Hydro-Electric Company. There was a great gathering, which included the Maharaja of Mysore and other Chiefs who had supported this fine undertaking, and I took the opportunity of dwelling on the importance of attracting Indian capital to Indian projects and on the many benefits to Bombay City of electric power at 0.55 anna per unit.

On May 28, 1910, Sir Dorab Tata had come to tell me that he could not raise the necessary funds in India and

\* Including the ex-Queen, who was largely responsible for the delinquencies which caused his downfall, and was still a terror to his household.

had been obliged to invoke the assistance of a Syndicate in London. I was most anxious to avoid this, and I determined to take the first opportunity of drawing attention to the advantages of "a great Swadeshi project, rendered possible by the trust of Indians in the future of their own country," and certain of success, on condition only of sound engineering and capable management. The chance came, at the opening of the Vishnu Mill at Sholapur on July 2, 1910, when I said :

"There is an excellent hydro-electric project for Bombay, which still awaits initiation. Experience has shown the great value of cheap electricity in connection with a growing city, and it was my great hope that the scheme could be launched entirely upon Indian capital. I am informed, however, that this has been found impracticable, and it now seems inevitable that a great part of the money will have to be raised in England. There are obvious advantages in carrying out such a scheme as a purely Indian undertaking, and I regret that I now see no hopes that this can be arranged."

Within a few days, Sir Dorab Tata came to tell me that all the capital he needed was forthcoming, and only one difficulty remained. The agreement was due to be signed in London immediately, and I suggested telegraphing that, before agreeing to the transfer of the Concession, the Bombay Government wished to know how it was proposed to finance the undertaking. The *amour propre* of the London Syndicate was so hurt by this question, that it threw over the agreement, and the way was clear to by far the greatest Indian private enterprise ever carried to completion. There have been subsequent extensions, and this huge project, due to the vision of Jamsedji Tata and the energy of his sons, is unique in the Old World.

In March, we went to Broach and to Surat, where William Hawkins landed in 1608 to present the letter of James I to the Emperor Jehangir at Delhi, when the East Indian Company was striving for commercial mastery with the "Portugalls." At Surat, some buildings of the



LAYING FOUNDATION STONE, LONAVLA DAM, TATA HYDRO ELECTRIC SCHEME,  
JANUARY 26, 1911.

In centre, left to right : Lady Clarke, Sir Dorab Tata, Sir George Clarke, Lady Tata, Maharaja of Mysore.

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first British factory,\* which Sir George Oxenden defended against the forces of Aurungzeb, still remain ; but the harbour, once the principal gate of Western India, has long ago silted up, and I could hold out no hopes of the restoration which the people desired. A simple slab marks the grave of my distinguished predecessor, Gerald Aungier, the founder of Bombay, who died here in 1677. It was difficult to realise that the present capital of Western India was once subject to Surat, and that for a year it was ruled by Captain Keigwin in rebellion against the tyranny of President John Child.

Bassein Fort, which we also visited in March, was captured from the Portuguese in the middle of the eighteenth century by the Marathas, who left it full of interesting ruins reminiscent of Old Goa. Here, in 1802, was signed an important Treaty embodying a defensive alliance between Lord Wellesley and the Peshwa Baji Rao, who was installed at Poona by General Arthur Wellesley. The second Maratha War quickly followed ; but not till 1819 was the power of the Peshwas and their allies finally broken, and the East India Company became paramount in India.

Early in 1911, the preparation of the camps in Delhi for the Royal Durbar began, and onwards from June 18, the arrangements for Their Majesties' reception in Bombay, involving continuous communications with the Government of India, became a daily care.

On November 13, we left Mahableshtar, motoring down the Ghats to Indapur and visiting Kolad and Amber, to Dharampur, where we embarked for Bombay. I was enabled to see much new country off the beaten track and full of interest.

A partial famine, of cattle fodder especially, then threatened some districts of the Presidency, and addressing the Legislative Council in November, I explained the measures which the Government were taking and pointed out that :

“ Private effort, carefully bestowed, may be most

\* Established in 1612.

valuable, and Government welcome and will assist in the movements which are being organised for this purpose. While we must all regret that any distress should fall upon our patient people, especially at such a time as this, we may well be thankful that the appalling devastation, which failure in the monsoon entailed in earlier days, is now impossible. And while no human effort or foresight can entirely overcome the effect of the operation of higher natural laws, you may be sure that, so far as lies within our power, distress will be averted or alleviated."

Alluding to the coming event, I said :

" We look forward with general joy to the arrival of Their Majesties next week, and we are proud to know that Bombay will be the first City of India to accord a welcome to our King Emperor and Queen Empress. The reception of Their Majesties on December 2, will be a most striking expression of the heart-felt loyalty of their Bombay subjects, and will be worthy of the unique occasion and of our great City."

As the *Medina* approached and wireless messages began to pass, it became possible to complete the details of our preparations. In the early morning of the 30th, I had a rehearsal of the reception at the Bandar.\* There was not the smallest doubt that the citizens of Bombay would give the warmest reception to Their Majesties ; but I was determined to run no risks, and the arrangements made by Mr. Edwardes, the excellent Commissioner of Police, embodied every precaution that we could foresee. It was necessary to take some measures which might have shocked the Liberal Government and caused scenes in the House of Commons ; but they were accepted in the spirit of good sportsmanship by the persons affected, and no protests were forthcoming.

I can never forget my anxiety when for an hour we followed the Royal carriage in procession along a seven-mile route dominated in places by buildings crowded to

\* Repeated on January 9, 1912, before Their Majesties' embarkation.

the roofs, or the sense of relief when all had passed without the smallest untoward incident, amid the cheering of the huge motley Eastern crowds roused to unwonted enthusiasm. All through our slow progress I was wondering if anything had been forgotten ; but, so far as I know, only one mistake occurred. A general on the line of route was wearing breeches with a stripe inappropriate to the occasion, which was not unobserved !

There are no relics of old India in the City of Bombay, and its one antiquarian attraction—the amazing cave of Elephanta—is on an island far across the great harbour. I had suggested to Lord Hardinge that gatherings of Indian children should be arranged to meet Their Majesties, and he cordially replied : “ I entirely agree with you as to the desirability of there being a large and representative gathering of school-children to greet the King wherever he stops, if possible. It is of great importance to look towards the future rather than towards the past ” (January 26, 1911).

We had, therefore, planned a great assemblage of Bombay school-children at which Her Majesty was graciously present. The many hundreds of most attractive little Indians, who suddenly raised a forest of miniature Union Jacks when the Queen arrived, and performed graceful dances, made a charming spectacle.

Expert publicists have sought to depict the indescribable scenes from December 7 to 15. Delhi in its chequered past had seen many pageants of Oriental splendour, but will never again witness the assemblage of all the rulers of India and vast crowds of her heterogeneous peoples marshalled with the ordered precision of the West,\* to do homage to a British Monarch. More impressive to me than the ceremony of the Durbar was the endless stream of brightly coloured Eastern humanity which on the 13th slowly surged past Their Majesties crowned and

\* Everything was regulated in detail at Delhi and with complete success by Sir John Hewett and his able lieutenants. One Chief complained bitterly to me that his followers had been limited to 300, while he felt that 1,000 at least were necessary to enable him to do full honour to the King. But such limitations were essential.

throned on the ramparts of the old Fort. Night was falling, and still the dense masses moved patiently on though many would be too late to see anything. The Fort was filled with Chiefs and high officials; but here were the real people of India who had come long distances from hundreds of humble villages to see their Sovereigns. Beyond vague traditions they knew nothing of the great dynasties which had reigned and fallen at Delhi. Here and there perhaps was a veteran who remembered as a child stories of the storming of the city in 1857, the last of many such scenes, some of them accompanied by appalling bloodshed. What were the thoughts of these multitudes, so little changed since Nadir Shah, the great Persian Warrior, advanced in 1739 from Kabul through Lahore and ordered the massacre of unnumbered thousands in Delhi? That is the enigma of India. What do her peoples think? Can they, with their discordant languages and religions and their sharp racial divergencies, be moved by a common impulse? Will they ever be brought to the universal "civil disobedience" lightly anticipated by Pandit Motilal Nehru, throwing India into general chaos from which there could be no rescue by the Westernised *intelligentsia*?

When possible we stole away from the ceremonial area to visit the remains of earlier Delhis, and notably the once great fortress of Tughlakabad which contains the massive tomb of its founder murdered in 1325. The succession of ruined cities which stretches far out into the plain of the Jumna, each with its forgotten story of dynasties following what Gibbon called an "unceasing round of valour, greatness, discord, degeneracy, and decay," are too little known to hurried tourists. The historical associations of these tangled ruins contrasting with the vivid life of the present Delhi create an overpowering sense of instability. Here are sermons in crumbling stones all preaching the transient futility of human pride and ambition.

## CHAPTER XVIII

INDIA, 1912-13

AFTER the break-up of the great gathering at Delhi, we travelled slowly home, visiting Lucknow, where Sir Leslie Porter very kindly received us at Government House, Cawnpur, Agra, Jaipur, Ajmer, Udaipur, and Chitor. The scarred shell of the Residency at Lucknow, over which the flag of England floats night and day, remains a sacred memorial of the valour and endurance of the men and women of our race. Would that all our Legislators could visit this scene of hopes deferred, of suffering, and of final triumph! More poignant are the memories enshrined in the beautiful monument which covers the fatal well at Cawnpur, where unnumbered British women and children rest in the peace of a luxuriant Indian garden—a hallowed spot that should powerfully appeal to pilgrims of the Empire “lest we forget.”

At Lucknow there is a gallery of portraits of the successive Kings of the Oude Dynasty, stripped of much territory by Lord Wellesley in 1801 and finally deposed in 1856. Beginning with a fine Persian type, there is a gradual degradation with some partial reassertions of racial purity to the repellent presentation of the ruler whose shameful oppressions impelled annexation upon Lord Dalhousie. Nowhere else are the terrible evils of racial misalliances so strikingly presented, and the warning is unmistakable. Within reach of Lucknow there are many places of intense historic interest which we were able to visit.

No words can describe the Taj at Agra seen at sunset. Academic criticism leaves unscathed this noblest memorial


to a woman. There is and there will be nothing like it in perfect proportion and ethereal beauty. Unfortunately, trees had been permitted to deny, from the main approach, a complete view of the tomb of Mumtaz-i-Mahal and Shah-Jehan upon its grand platform. This could be obtained only from across the Jumna, as from the Pearl Mosque in the old Fort distance dwarfs the incomparable *ensemble*.

On the Palace and Mosque of Fatehpur-Sikri, which he quickly abandoned, Akbar lavished all the building arts of his day, and in their rich profusion, Moghul and Hindu genius was significantly blended. The delicate pierced tracery in white marble which adorns the windows of the tomb of Selim Chisti is unsurpassed, and the Southern gateway of the great Mosque is a triumph of architectural magnificence. Happily the hard red sandstone of these splendid buildings is defying the hand of time, and the carving is as sharp as in the days of Akbar. In spite and partly because of the overpowering historical associations of Delhi, I still believe that it would have been best to place the new capital of India at Agra.

The Rajput palace of Amber, the old capital of Jaipur, towering high above a deep lake, which we reached on an elephant, bears the far-reaching impress of the mind of Akbar. The decoration is more distinctively Hindu than that of Fatehpur-Sikri, and the general effect is most striking. The ruins of the old city stud the valley, presenting a scene of desolation in sharp contrast with the busy and unattractive streets of the present capital.

At Ajmer, Sir E. Colvin kindly allowed us to occupy the Residency commanding a wonderful view of a beautiful lake harbouring large flocks of wildfowl with serrated hills beyond, which my wife sketched. The great mosque, over 800 years old, built on the site of an earlier Jain temple, which it partly incorporated, is one of the earliest examples of Mahomedan architecture in India, rich in delicately sculptured decoration; but it has suffered from vandalism, happily no longer possible.

Udaipur made a deep impression on my daughter, who,



A JAIN TEMPLE, AJMER.





after her visit in 1909, thus described it in the last sketch she was able to write :

“ The sun is setting on a scene of surpassing loveliness. The palace walls glow with the reflected gold of the sky. Slowly a soft shade of purple descends over it all ; the shadows of the city turn violet, and the trees in the gardens are a luminous green. The violet hues grow gradually more and more delicate, and it is now an opal city of tenderest colours that is silhouetted against a vivid opal sky. The hills at the back stand out darkly against the sunset, and the form of an elephant, swaying slowly, is lighted by a watch-fire which flickers brightly. There is no sound but the faint splash of oars, and the enchanted city . . . still glowing with supernatural loveliness, appears something intangible, which must crumble away with the fall of night.” \*

The picture is not over-drawn, as we realised in our evening tours of the lake with its wooded shores, to which a flock of wild boar came to be fed, and its little islands filled with graceful marble buildings. The late Maharana of Udaipur, who represented one of the oldest and proudest dynasties in India, paid me an informal visit at the Rest House. He was a fine sportsman, speaking no English, but exceedingly shrewd and well informed, a typical Ruler of the India which is passing away. Western efficiency had made little impression on Udaipur ; but I am not sure that the people are not happier than in our most advanced districts, although villagers in British India always dislike being transferred to a native State.

Chitor, once one of the greatest of Rajput fortresses, was the scene of a terrific siege by Akbar in 1567-8, when the garrison perished, and the women were burned on funeral pyres to escape captivity. The fortifications were partly destroyed by Shah-Jehan and the Hindu temples by direction of Aurungzeb ; but the commanding Tower of Victory still stands among crowded masses of ruins and worthily commemorates the valour of the

\* “ A Dream City.” *Leaves*, by Violet Clarke.

Rajputs, whose gallant resistance to the conquering Moslems brought upon them long wars with cruel sufferings perhaps nowhere more tragic than at Chitor.

In my stay in India, I was able to see few only of the splendid monuments of her great past, and old age has dimmed my recollections; but some impressions will remain to the end of my life. The undying fascination of old India will always be associated with wonder. How, in centuries darkened by unending wars, could the building arts find inimitable expression? Whence, in such conditions, came the imagination and the infinite patience which have bequeathed to the world the exquisite delicacy of decoration unapproached by Greece and Rome; whence the consummate sense of proportion which alone the architects of the Western world could rival? We shall leave to India nothing of beauty except her own memorials, the finest of which, thanks to Lord Curzon, we carefully conserve. Our monuments will be the huge irrigation works and the great railway systems which have raised new cities in deserts and spread prosperity among the people unknown in the days of the Moghul Empire. We can at least claim that our objects were not the commemoration of the grandeur of dynasties, impressed upon temples, mosques, tombs, and fortresses, but the welfare of the Indian peoples and the feeding of millions that could not have existed in the great days of Hinduism and Islam. And to-day the innumerable fortresses of old India stand unguarded or are crumbling into ruins because the *par Britannica* has rendered them superfluous.

On December 31, 1911, we arrived at Bombay, and on January 10, Their Majesties embarked after receiving an address from the Legislative Council. Later from the beach at Malabar Point we watched the *Medina* and her escort slowly steaming out to sea, phantoms in a light mist. A unique experience for India had ended, and there can be no doubt of the profound impression left upon the Chiefs and the fraction of the peoples who were able to see Their Majesties or were reached by their gracious words. But there could be no check to the secret conspiracies,

partly inspired by political objects and partly by foreign agencies, which in November, 1912, nearly succeeded in a dastardly attempt on the life of the Viceroy at Delhi, and have since caused a long train of tragedies.

When we left the Bandar in the King's launch to lunch in the *Medina*, His Majesty asked me if it would be possible to replace in marble the temporary buildings which we had erected to mark the Gate of India, so as to form a permanent memorial. I undertook that this should be done, and the Viceroy promised the assistance of the Government of India. An excellent design was prepared by our architect, Mr. Wittet, and Mr. (now Sir E.) Lutyens made some valuable suggestions which were incorporated. Thanks to a generous gift from Sir Jacob Sassoon, I had eight lakhs over (£50,000) at disposal to carry out the wishes of His Majesty. Behind the gateway, on the area occupied by the amphitheatre built for the spectators at the reception, there was to be a beautiful public garden, backed by a curving loggia in white marble to be added later. Before leaving, I laid a foundation stone on March 31, 1913, and explained the origin of the scheme, and that the design was based on the "fine examples of the combinations of Hindu and Moslem styles which exist at Ahmedabad," adding that :

"At this spot our King-Emperor and Queen-Empress have twice landed. Here His Majesty, with the emotion inseparable from all partings, addressed to the people of India his last spoken message of loving farewell to the Indian Empire. 'May the Almighty ever assist me and my successors in this earnest endeavour to promote its welfare and to secure to it the blessings of prosperity and peace.' Here have landed and embarked men whose names will live in history. Here of necessity must the great Gate of India be symbolised. . . . I deeply regret that I shall never see our Gate of India translated into granite and marble. . . . That this memorial may symbolise the advance of these two great communities [Hindu and Mahomedan] hand in hand toward nation-

hood, under the guidance of British Rule, is my earnest hope."

The orientation of the gateway was afterwards altered to bring it at right angles to the road leading into the city; which threw it out of harmony with the garden scheme, and by requiring a new sea wall added greatly to the expense. I can only trust that the change is an improvement on the plan to which I devoted much care.

On February 5, we arrived at Surat, going on to Dohad in the Panch Mahals,\* where I saw famine relief works in operation. For all districts liable to drought, schemes are held in readiness to start when the Provincial Governments decide that the necessity has arisen, and the flocking of the people to the works supplies a gauge of their needs. At Dohad, terracing was being carried on, and the organisation was explained to me; but the workers had not come in large numbers. Going on to Ahmedabad, I inspected the "cattle kitchens" provided to save the best of the rayats' stock, when grass had largely failed in Gujarat, and my Government was importing it from the Gir forest. I believe that everything possible is now done to avert famine;† but there is always concealed suffering among the classes to which relief works are inapplicable, and this can be alleviated only by private agency in which Indian assistance is invaluable.

On February 21, we made another trip by sea to Janjira, once a pirate stronghold. The old island Fort, where a considerable population lives in a complicated rabbit warren below the water-level, courageously managed a salute from its mediæval ordnance, and the reigning Nawab and Begum gave us a warm welcome. Here was another picture of old India. The Abyssinian (Sidi) pirates, who once ruled Janjira and harassed the trade of the Moghuls, have long disappeared; but racial traits

\* Here Lord Curzon arrived on August 1, 1900, during the terrible famine at that time, and was met by a downpour causing extensive floods.

† The Famine Codes were revised by Lord Curzon, and I think our preparations are now as complete as possible.

from oversea may still be traced among the mixed population of the Malabar coast now peaceable cultivators or fishermen.

On May 9, the Racing Bill was passed by a large majority at a special meeting of the Legislative Council at Mahableshwar. This question had given me great anxiety. There had been tragedies among young Indians arising from losses on the racecourse, and I was gravely dissatisfied with racing conditions. I obtained from Australia full details of the totalisator and determined to make an effort to stop book-making; but my hope to reach agreement with the Turf Club of Western India was disappointed, and Legislation became inevitable. In European racing circles the opposition was bitter, and I believe that the Government of India would have vetoed the Bill but for the strong support of Sir John Jenkins, the Home Member, who was perfectly acquainted with the evils then existing. So strong was the feeling at this time, that it was impossible for me to be present on the Governor's Cup day at Poona in 1911. It was painful to appear in conflict with my countrymen; but all the trouble passed. In 1912 my wife and I attended the Cup races at Poona, and an old custom was restored. With the abolition of the betting ring, the purlieus of the racecourses underwent transformation, and before I left India the secretary of the Turf Club frankly admitted the benefit of the change and said that they would never return to the old régime. Here is the testimony I received after leaving India from one of my few European supporters :

“ If you have an opportunity I think you might tell Lord Sydenham that the Tote has been an unqualified success.

“ The racing has been the cleanest and straightest I have seen in India for years. . . . Moreover, gambling has decreased—the total through the Tote is less than half the field money in the Books, and the loss to the public is the percentage the Club takes, instead of over 50 per cent. taken by the ring.

"We finished the season without any defaulters, whereas Calcutta reports the worst year for settlements ever known. Our highest take in the Tote was yesterday, when we took more than four lakhs—in Bookmakers' times 10 lakhs often passed in the day. The Club's profits for the season are three times more than ever before; and that money is going to increase stakes at Poona by Rs.84,000 and improve Bombay paddocks. . . . I have always said Lord Sydenham was doing a great thing for racing, and I only wish the Viceroy would insist on it being done to all India" (Byculla Club, March 7, 1913).

The striking experience thus forthcoming from Bombay, and especially the decrease in betting, seem worth consideration in this country; but the big bookmaker arrives in India with the racing season and is not indigenous.

Lord and Lady Hardinge had very kindly asked us to Simla in August, and we left Poona on the 10th, arriving at Bhopal next day, where H.H. the Begum, always a friend, had made arrangements for a visit on elephants to Sanchi Tope, the greatest of a group near the little town of Bhilsa. The region is rich in these interesting relics of Buddhist India, which tradition ascribes to the age of Asoka about 250 B.C. The complete overthrow of Buddhism is one of the many inscrutable mysteries of old India. Only in the far North and in Ceylon does the religion of the "Light of Asia" still hold sway. Hinduism and Islam have combined to lay desolate its sacred places, and a great chapter of the history of India has been largely obliterated. But at Sanchi, in the edict of Asoka carved on a rock near the Jain temples of Girnar in the Mahomedan State of Junagadh, and in the unsurpassed caves of Karli between Bombay and Poona, I was able to see notable memorials of an age forgotten.

We found Simla cloud-capped with frequent rain, and rarely the veil lifted to reveal short glimpses of the tremendous panorama of the Himalayas. Here I had the great advantage of talks with Lord Hardinge, who gave me constant support and whose generous farewell letter

I shall always value. It was again possible to discuss military questions with the Commander-in-Chief, Sir O'Moore Creagh, with whom I was in close agreement. But for the second time, in the descent to Kalka, I had the exhilarating sense of getting back from a remote retreat to the India I loved. My diary of August 18, records that our train "killed two peacocks and a buffalo"! At Ahmedabad, I thankfully noted "country looking splendid." Good rains had blessed Gujarat, and our anxiety ended.

Our preparations for departure were well advanced when, on August 20, Lord Crewe telegraphed asking me to remain for an additional six months, to which I readily agreed.

On September 5, I addressed nearly 2,000 students and others at Ferguson College, where the atmosphere was supposed not to be too friendly to Government. Almost exactly two years before (September 8, 1910), I had tried to speak with perfect frankness on political questions to a large audience at the same college. I then wished to impress upon the students and the numerous Indian staff that nationhood is "a fine idea worthy to be cherished and to be worked for. I hope you will hold fast to it." But I explained that it was a comparatively modern idea, that the Greeks and Romans never became nations in the present sense of the word, and that, "while the welding together of the heterogeneous peoples of India must take many generations, every one of you can help towards that great end by co-operating with Government."

It had been alleged that I wished to repress political studies, and I said :

"You perhaps think that Government are unreasonably and oppressively desirous of keeping you from acquiring knowledge of or taking an interest in politics. I wish to assure you that this is not the case. . . . What Government do insist upon is that you should not be induced to believe that politics consist solely in preaching doctrines of hatred which have led direct to shameful



crimes, and that you should not be tempted to believe random assertions at total variance from the truth simply because you see them in print. . . . Meanwhile, I think it most desirable that you should be acquiring some knowledge of real politics in order that, in years to come, you may be able to bring a reasoned judgment to bear upon great public questions in India."

All this and much more plain speaking was not resented, and on the second occasion I took the prevalent conception of democracy and its realities as my text, using the Latin Republics, Germany, France, England, and the Swiss and American Federations as illustrations. "We may fairly infer that recent political movements indicate the failure of democracy to secure the expected benefits. In India, constitution making is not studied,\* and I have been surprised to see colonial self-government advocated as a simple and natural development capable of early realisation." I then explained the constitution of the Australian Commonwealth based on adult suffrage, where the central government had been "placed in power by the powerful Labour organisations which enable the great towns to dominate the country," and I asked :

"Do you really believe that India is already fit for this stupendous change ? Are you prepared with a stroke of the pen to sweep away the entire social system enshrined for centuries in this pre-eminently aristocratic land, and to give equal political rights to every Indian adult ? What will the rulers of one-third of India say to this proposal ? . . . I cherish high aspirations for the future of Indian nationhood. I rejoice in the political advancement which I have been so fortunate as to see and to help. I hope for further gradual progress, and only a very foolish person would set limits to the changes that time will bring. But colonial self-government I frankly confess that I cannot yet see even in visions, because it entails the absolute destruction of all that is most deeply engraved in the life of the people."

\* Since those days, amateur constitution making has become a pastime.

A few years sufficed to nullify all the advice which I sought to give, and which seemed to be taken in good part; but India has not progressed towards nationhood, and in certain respects there has been a distinct set-back, falsifying the hopes which I had formed.

On November 17, my private secretary brought me this telegram from Lord Crewe. "Private and personal. Following from Prime Minister begins: Are you agreeable that I should submit your name to His Majesty for a peerage same time as list at the New Year?" This was as totally unexpected as my sudden recall from Australia in 1903,\* and I felt that the signal mark of His Majesty's gracious approval of my work in India would be a help to me in the time that was left. I replied: "Private. Your private telegram 16th. Would gratefully accept peerage in hope of being better able to serve Empire. Warm thanks to Prime Minister and to you." Our return to England was drawing near, and I seemed to see possibilities of further work when my official life ended. That is all an hereditary title can mean to one who leaves none to inherit.

The secret was kept till the announcement on January 1, 1913, and the first personal congratulations from outside our home circle came from the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Rear-Admiral (now Sir) R. Peirse, which recalled memories of my long and close association with the Navy. We were overwhelmed with kind messages and letters from India and England expressing the pleasure and hope that—more than any personal honours—bring the encouragement which we mortals need.

On January 18, we left in the *Dalhousie*, arriving on the 20th at Karachi to combine a second visit to Sind with a trip to the North-West Frontier. Karachi had made great progress since January, 1909, and there were several important questions to deal with in replies to four addresses. To the Port Trust I could say confidently:

"We stand where the Romans probably traded and where the fleet of Alexander found shelter long centuries

\* See p. 167.

ago. . . . Railways are operating with increasing force in your favour. You can go on creating wharf accommodation \* at a cost which most ports in the world must envy. A great future lies straight before you ; prepare to meet it with confidence and hope."

Karachi has since moved far and is coming to rival Bombay, of which it was once unnecessarily jealous. To the Chamber of Commerce I extolled the great irrigation scheme then apparently mature, adding the caution : " The Indus is a very capricious river, which is stable only at the Sukkur gorge. I therefore consider that the best available experts should be consulted as to the effects of damming the great river and as to the training works which may be necessary to the North of Sukkur."

There is a tendency of the rivers of the Punjab to move westward due to the rotation of the earth, and I have known the Indus, after a sweep to the east, endangering the railway line, then swing quickly over to the west. The barrage has been begun two and a half miles below Sukkur without the precaution I suggested, and estimates, framed by a very able Commissioner, Mr. W. H. Lucas, I.C.S., which formed the economic basis of the project in my time, have been thrown aside. The present scheme, therefore, causes me much anxiety ; but I have failed to secure reconsideration of certain vital features.

At Hyderabad there were many questions to discuss with the citizens, and I hope that the old Fort of the Sind Mirs has been given over to them for a public garden as I urged. There was one pathetic experience. The law's delays in India are sometimes appalling, and one of the Mirs, who had the right of a return visit for the Governor, was involved in a Jarndyce case which, after several years, had reached the Privy Council. I found him in misery and mourning, living an isolated life, in daily expectation of a favourable verdict which did not arrive. The money had all passed into the hands of a

\* In 1913 there was already accommodation for nineteen ocean-going steamers.

Hyderabad lawyer, and I trust that the suspense of the unhappy Mir has long been ended.

Sind, partly desert, with a rural Moslem population differing from Deccanis and Gujaratis far more than Italians from Scandinavians, has its own most interesting problems. There is a fascination which appeals strongly to British officers though not to their Indian colleagues. The proceedings of Lord Ellenborough and Sir C. Napier in 1842 form an unpleasant page in Indian history, relieved only by Sir James Outram's chivalrous championship of the cause of the evicted Mirs, with whom, in 1809, Lord Minto had negotiated a Treaty of "eternal peace."

We visited the surviving ruler of the Talpur family at Khairpur, which alone remains of their once widespread dominion; but Sind has benefited immensely from British rule since the annexation, by the railways and the systems of irrigation on both banks of the Indus, which are to receive a great extension.

The railway journey from Rohri through Bahawalpur to Multan passes through desert country, where the finest of dust searches its way into the carriages covering everything, and the sweeping carried on at every stopping-place provides only a short reprieve. Between Multan and Lahore, we saw the miracles wrought by irrigation in the Punjab, where prosperous towns and green landscapes have grown up in a once barren land. Crossing the great rivers Chenab and Jhelum and passing Rawul Pindi, where my career might have begun,\* we struck the Indus again at Attock.

At Peshawur, on January 28, we were welcomed by the late Sir G. Roos Keppel, then Warden of the North-West Frontier Province and the repository of its many secrets, and we started next day for Landi Kotal in brilliant sunshine. The fine motor road leaves the plain of Northern India after passing the old fortress of Jamrud. Above, on the left, stands the fort of Ali Musjid taken by our forces in 1878, and along the route, on low spurs of the Suleiman range, are guard houses where tiny garrisons

\* See p. 12.

stood to arms for our protection according to the regulations of the Khyber. Along the old road, passed and repassed by the two last of the seven great invaders of India—Babur (1525) and Nadir Shah (1738-9)—loaded camels were slowly moving as they have done during unknown centuries. Mr. Pears, I.C.S.,\* the able political officer who accompanied us, and who proved to be related to my old headmaster at Repton fifty-four years before, had much to tell. Some obscure hostilities, of which we saw nothing, were then in progress, and it is a law of the Khyber that, when these local diversions occur, there must be no firing across the road. The small population lives in walled hamlets at intervals determined by the range of the smoothbore and now disconcertingly inadequate. Viewing the sparse cultivation in these valleys, the occasional raids into the plains are amply explained by the struggle for bare existence which presses hard upon the frontier tribes and has entailed innumerable military operations on the Government of India. That is the main problem of the North-West. How can the warlike Pathans be made self-supporting in the matter of food?

At Landi Kotal Fort, the officers gave us lunch, and an old Chief insisted upon presenting me with an antiquated scimitar. The Khyber Rifles were paraded for inspection—wild-looking men with fine physique and marvellous marching endurance whose fidelity has stood some tests, but has more than once been overstrained. On the 29th we drove through Peshawur, unlike any other city of India because little touched by the influence of the West. Here we saw a large Kafilā getting ready to start for Afghanistan and unchanged through the centuries.

On our motor drive to Kohat we stopped in the Pass to see a rifle factory of the Adam Khels. A Martini carbine barrel was being bored by the agency of a hand-wheel and was wobbling hopelessly in the process. Between this primitive performance and the work of the meticulously accurate lathes at Woolwich, which I had

\* Now Resident at Mysore.



AT THE GUN FACTORY, KOHAT PASS.



AFRIDIS IN THE KOHAT PASS.

JANUARY, 1913

[To face page 272.]



so often watched, there was a gulf of mechanical science. Yet the finished article shown to us was a plausible copy in which even the Government marks were carefully repeated; but, as a weapon of precision, it was a fraud. The frontier tribesmen are, however, now in possession of far better arms. The little crowd which gathered round us contained specimens of humanity strongly Semitic and recalling one's ideas of the prophets of the Old Testament, with here and there a villainous cast of countenance.

Kohat, where the political officer, Major Crosthwaite, had kindly arranged a luncheon party, seemed to be sleeping peacefully among its trees, while the stern mountains, vividly reminding me of the Sudan, looked down upon an oasis. But murderous raids have occurred here, and a recent violent Hindu-Moslem outbreak was stopped by the intervention of British troops—the only sure shield of the tranquillity of India.

It had been necessary for me to obtain the permission of the Viceroy to leave my Province, and on January 11, 1913, he wrote: "I think it so important that people should have a knowledge of that [the North-West] Frontier from what they themselves have seen. Speaking for myself, my visit to that Frontier entirely changed my views on the aspects of certain questions. Perhaps it will be the same with you."

I do not think that the views I formed after careful study in 1904-7 were changed, and they are now of no importance. But I was forcibly struck with the vital need of the most careful selection of officers for service on the Frontier, where personal qualities have unlimited scope, and the men I met deeply impressed me by their understanding of and real liking for the tribesmen. The problems of the Frontier, as its turbulent history shows, can be resolved only by real men such as our race has, in the past, produced in India. If only our legislators could all be imbued with the personally gained knowledge of which Lord Hardinge wrote, the future of India need have no perils. And it would be well if all the denizens of Downing Street were enabled to realise the isolated lives



of their devoted servants exiles on the fringes of the Indian Empire.

On our return journey we stopped at Lahore, where Sir Louis Dane kindly acted as our guide to the historic Moghul monuments, notably the tomb of Jehangir, which distinguish what was the capital of the short-lived Sikh Kingdom.

February 3 found us in camp on the Indus at Sukkur, where I held a Durbar of Sindi Chiefs and leading Zemindars—good people, shrewd and loyal, but backward in education, which I was trying to improve. The failure of the Begara canals had caused some distress, which our engineers hoped to provide against, and there had been insurance frauds by which the simple people had been duped. This outlying frontier of the Presidency, where the Jirga system was still a main preventive of crime, has a primitive fascination peculiar to itself, and I could understand the predilection of our officers for service among the frank and responsive Sindis. In the evening, Bukkur fort on an island in the Sukkur gorge was illuminated, and coloured balloons floated over the broad expanse of the mighty Indus.

At Larkhana, down the right bank, we had another warm reception and a half-day's shooting from an embowered boat on a jheel ten miles away. Our party bagged more than 300 head, including twelve varieties of wildfowl; but I only accounted for twenty.

It seems now certain that the valley of the Indus will yield secrets of a civilisation 5,000 years B.C., linking up with discoveries in Iraq and carrying back the dawn of science and art in India far beyond the topes of Asoka. Prehistoric man seems more and more to be retrieving his rightful place in the long-drawn evolution of which we are inheritors.

On February 9, we anchored off Porbander,\* a Kathiawar State to which I had appointed Indian administrators with satisfactory results. To their address I was able to reply :

\* The birthplace of "Mahatma" Gandhi.

"You refer to the experiment of an Indian administration in Porbander, which, as you say, is rare in Kathiawar. There are some cases in which such an arrangement may not be possible, or may be possible only after a preliminary period under British officers. I am, however, strongly of opinion that the principle of an Indian administration should be accepted wherever the conditions are favourable, and thoroughly qualified administrators are available. The success I have noted at Porbander goes far to confirm that opinion."

I then laid the foundation stone of some cement works in which I had taken special interest, and there was an opportunity of laying stress upon the importance of attracting Indian capital to sound Swadeshi enterprises.

The next day we arrived at Junagadh, where the Nawab—my kind host in 1909—had died, and a period of British administration was essential. I had special reasons for wishing the young Nawab to go to an English school for a time, and this entailed a painful interview with the Begum, who from behind a screen hysterically declared that she would kill herself. The boy wished to go, and I had the pleasure of seeing him in London greatly improved and happy in his school life. The lady did not commit suicide; but instead employed an expensive political lawyer in Bombay to draw up a petition intended for Press consumption. The story that I had caused a young chief to be "kidnapped" duly reached England.

Leaving the port of Verawal, where we barely escaped a violent local tornado, we steamed slowly along the coast close to the ruins of the once fabulously rich and strongly fortified temple of Somnath, sacked with terrific slaughter by Mahmoud of Ghazni—his last exploit.\* How this desolate spot on the Kathiawar coast came to be peculiarly sacred and such a centre of accumulated wealth as to

\* The fabled "sandalwood gates" of Somnath were the subject of Lord Ellenborough's special instructions to General Nott and of his ridiculous proclamation, when some substitutes were brought back, that they had "so long been the memorial of the humiliation of the people of India and had now become the proudest record of their national glory."

attract Mahmoud to a long and difficult campaign through the Rajputana desert and Gujarat for the possession of its treasures, is one of the countless mysteries which India holds close.

On February 12, we were back in Bombay after a tour of just over a fortnight—my only long absence. Heavy work awaited me, and a sixth and last Convocation address entailed much thought. In these addresses, the views which I reached on education in India were frankly stated, and the various steps taken were recorded. On February 19, I tried briefly to trace the chain of great historic events which, out of the rivalry with Portugal, Spain, Holland, and France, led inevitably, in “conditions racial and political which shaped themselves in seas and lands far away,” to British Dominion in India—the gift of sea power.

It had been a reproach to the University that the educated classes in India, conventionally crammed either with Greek or Roman history as chance befell, knew nothing of the story of their own wonderful land. To this neglect, which I strove to remedy, must be ascribed much that has happened. I then sought to review the evolution of education at home and in India where the Universities, started under an Act of 1857, derived a “miserable conception” of their duties from the then new University of London.\* The masterly Resolution of Lord Curzon in 1904 and the Act of that year had, as I pointed out, and as M. Chailley prophesied, failed mainly because of the clamour raised by Indian politicians, who adopted the “parrot cry” that it was intended to “officialise the Universities.” After describing the baneful results of the system of perpetual examinations which “forced both Colleges and High Schools . . . into methods of teaching having no relation to education and harmful to the best students,” I could congratulate the Senate on progress in some directions.

\* Since reformed, as the Indian Universities were not, but still, according to Lord Ernle, unable to “initiate, promote, supervise, or co-ordinate a comprehensive University policy” (*Morning Post*, April 12, 1926).

“ We now have a rational curriculum, which will require revision, . . . but is a marked improvement upon the patchwork which previously existed. You have abolished compulsory English history which no other Indian University adopted, which was strongly condemned by the Universities' Commission, and the teaching of which was described by your distinguished late Vice-Chancellor \* as ‘ a farce.’ You have just abolished the Previous Examination, another speciality of Bombay, a step which I urged about four and a half years ago.”

My attempt to “ assign to the Matriculation examination its proper place ” had failed ; but the Senate had

“ greatly improved the Matriculation course, and you have accepted the Senior Cambridge and Oxford Examinations and the European High School Examination, on certain conditions, as equivalent to the Matriculation. . . . Ample work lies before you into which financial considerations do not enter. Forget, I beg you, the unhappy preamble of the Act of 1857, and keep ever before your minds the highest University ideals.”

Learning by rote has been the curse of education in India, † and my last word of advice to the undergraduates was : “ What you may have learned or are learning by rote will be absolutely useless. Everything that you have learned so as to cause a reaction upon your minds, opening out new fields of thought which you can exploit for yourselves, may prove invaluable.” †

When Mr. Montagu visited India as Under Secretary of State in 1913, I had a long talk with him on March 1, during which I strove to explain the situation, as it appeared to me ; but I found him reticent, and a speech which he made in the House of Commons subsequently came as an unpleasant surprise. It was my particular wish that he should have a glimpse of the administration from the inside, and I arranged with a most able collector

\* Dr. Selby.

† The retentive memory of Indian students has too often been exploited by inefficient or indolent teachers with ridiculous results.

to receive him at a winter camp, where he would have learned something of the real life of the people and of famine relief. This was all settled when he telegraphed that he was detained at Hyderabad,\* and the plan fell through to my great regret. He thus lost an experience which might perhaps have influenced his policy.

We had paid our farewells at Poona in September, and our last days in April were occupied with partings, which are always painful. A citizens' meeting had been held on March 17, at which a Memorial Fund was initiated to take the form of the completion and endowment of the College of Commerce and of a statue. The Chief Justice, the late Sir Basil Scott, was in the chair, and fourteen speakers, including ten leading Indians, referred in the most generous terms to the work I had striven to accomplish. The Mahomedan and the Parsi communities separately entertained us, the Indian Merchants' Chamber and Bureau presented a special address, and our final farewell to Bombay took place at a great gathering at the Municipal Gardens. My last words were :

“ We part from you with sadness, but with hope. May Bombay City and Presidency fulfil the high destiny which lies before them and continue to advance as in the past, all communities co-operating with each other and with the Government for the common welfare, and may God bless all the warm-hearted people whose kindness has lightened our burden and whom we shall never forget.”

On April 5, from the deck of the *Arabia*, I watched the tangled range of the Western Ghats dissolving in mist. Atropos, with her ruthless shears, had suddenly cut all the threads which I had gathered during my most strenuous years, and India, where a great part of my life lies buried, was to become a memory which time would soften into dim outlines. To an ex-Governor, the “ land of regrets ” leaves much heart-searching. Did he omit to do what

\* By a shooting expedition. Later, in 1918, a similar attempt was made by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieut.-Governor of the Punjab, which also failed.

might have benefited the peoples? When were his actions right or wrong? All work of permanent value needs time to bear fruit, and a Governor must hand to the care of others the tender plants he strove to nurture. It is better so; but regrets are inevitable. Looking back after fourteen years, I can say only that I tried to give my best to India, that I received in return warm support and kindness unstinted from all classes, and that to the end of my life I shall cherish affection for Indians and admiration for the devoted servants of the Empire who labour in the heat for their welfare, and who—British and Indian—made possible all that I tried to accomplish.

## CHAPTER XIX

### INDIA—WORK AND SOME REFLECTIONS

THREE Indian Chiefs asked permission to publish my speeches, and this was done by my good friend the late Maharaja of Kolhapur, who made the first request.\* They embody the fruits of much earnest study, and record alike the views at which I arrived on most public questions, and the efforts made to translate them into action. My views and actions have since been grossly misrepresented by Indian politicians; but these speeches prove conclusively that my main political object was to enlarge the opportunities of the Indian peoples, and to lead them by sure steps towards self-government. This was, I believe, the aim of every Governor in India in my time.

From the first, I gave careful attention to the medical needs of the Presidency. On December 19, 1907, two months after my arrival, I invited a number of Indian Editors to Parel Laboratory, where the Haffkine anti-plague serum was manufactured. They saw the whole process, and the operation of inoculation was performed before them. I then begged for their co-operation in a campaign for prophylaxis, and I appealed to them to regard me as a friend who wished for their criticism, but hoped it would always be "constructive."

On January 16, 1908, the Medical Officers of Native States, in response to my invitation, assembled at Parel and showed great interest in all that was explained to them by Captain Liston, I.M.S., whose work in connection with plague and malaria has never been adequately recognised.

\* The compilation by Rao Bahadur Dongre, B.Sc., L.C.E. Professor at the Rajaram College, contains 160 of the more important speeches and addresses.

I pleaded strongly for their help, and suggested that they should invent another word to replace inoculation which connoted the communication of disease, whereas the anti-plague serum was a steriliser. Again on January 20, I met another gathering of Indian Editors, to whom I said :

“The power of the Press is growing in India. This power carries with it heavy responsibilities in all countries, but most especially here. I appeal to you to take your responsibility seriously. You can do a great and important work in helping to educate the people and in giving them information to assist in promoting improved methods of agriculture, and in fostering the industries we are all anxious to develop. . . . Truth is not always palatable; but it endures, and every truth you tell your readers is a gain to them. When you are sure of your facts, by all means criticise. All governments make mistakes, and constructive criticism is as good for them as for individuals.”

I think that these meetings did assist the anti-plague campaign, and may account for the consideration I received from the Indian papers as a whole.

On March 25, 1908, I initiated a Medical Congress, opened on February 22, 1909, and made successful by the officers of the I.M.S., and especially by Major (now Major-General) W. E. Jennings, the able organiser. Our little Medical Exhibition on the Bombay Maidan paid its expenses and left a surplus. Some of the papers read were of great value, and the American and Japanese delegates thanked me warmly for their experiences.

The Medical Registration Bill establishing a Medical Council—a first attempt to check unprofessional practices, then not uncommon—was opposed by some politicians, but it had substantial Indian support, and I hope that it has proved useful. A malarial survey of Bombay, which I started, supplied some needed information which has been followed up, and I trust that the King George V Anti-Tuberculosis League, inaugurated at a public meeting on April 3, 1912, has prospered. My Government



had the advantage of larger funds than its predecessors, and with assistance from the Government of India, we were able to provide increased hospital accommodation and to help municipalities in carrying out water-supply schemes and sanitation on a considerable scale.

The only practical hint derived from Sir H. Cotton \*—that toll bars ought to be abolished—was not forgotten. This form of taxation pressed hardly on the poorest cultivators, who, failing ready cash, sometimes left an instalment of their scanty clothing in pawn. We made budget provision for the gradual extinction of these anachronisms, which must long have disappeared.

The Forest offences in the Central Division seemed excessive, mainly because some areas were unnecessarily so classed. I appointed a Committee of three † to inquire into this matter, with the result that nearly 500 square miles were freed from forest restrictions and handed over to the Revenue Department to be used for grazing or tillage. This, following the release, since 1908, of 102 square miles in the Poona District, led to a notable decrease of humble offenders. I believe that more might be done in this direction where land has no real value *quâ* forest.

The progressive development of Bombay was one of my earliest cares, and by consulting public bodies and prominent citizens, I secured general agreement on some main points, though, as always happens in India, opposition developed when action became necessary. A grave defect was the constriction of communication north from the Fort area, which the new avenue must have relieved. Proposals to reduce the breadth of this important roadway, which is barely adequate, had to be firmly opposed.

Salsette, to which my attention was drawn by Mr. (now Sir) M. Visvesvaraya, an able Brahman engineer then in Government service, seemed to have been neglected, and I appointed a Commissioner to study town-planning

\* See p. 219.

† Mr. (now Sir) G. Curtis, I.C.S., Mr. (now Sir) H. Murray, Forest Service, and Sardar Rao Bahadur Mirikar, all members of the Legislative Council.

there, which was intended to lead to a general Bill passed after my departure.

My predecessor, Lord Lamington, had asked me to take up the question of the Reclamation at Colaba which nature clearly contemplated. A complete scheme which I studied in detail was drawn up by my old pupil and right-hand man in the Public Works Department, Mr. W. L. Cameron, C.S.I., in consultation with Mr. Kidd.\* The Government of Bombay could then have borrowed at  $3\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., and the estimate of the value of the land to be reclaimed was made by a citizens committee. I am convinced that this scheme—designed to be carried out by successive steps—which the Government of India vetoed, was thoroughly sound; but the War would have changed the conditions. Later, when the rate of interest had risen to  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. free of income tax, and all costs had greatly increased while land values in the Colaba area had fallen, the scheme was sanctioned, and faulty engineering contributed to a lamentable fiasco; but the Reclamation must be completed.

A Governor can accomplish no more useful work than by using all his influence to assist agriculture and its handmaiden, the co-operative movement. I note a tendency—essentially political—to complain that we have neglected agriculture in India. This charge is false. Our first care was to avert famines, and we have brought nearly 30,000,000 acres under irrigation—an achievement unapproached in pre-British India.† We then turned to the technical improvement of agriculture, and the new college which I opened on July 19, 1911, under the able direction of Dr. Mann, was doing excellent work, while demonstration farms and other methods of teaching were being steadily developed. It is characteristic of the educational outlook in India that, when my Government established a degree in agriculture, the first anxiety of

\* Then of Lowther and Kidd and experienced in works of this kind. We discovered at an early date that to undertake this work *as a whole* at one time was financially impracticable. I did all that was possible to convince the Government of India of the need, but in vain.

† Moghul and Afghan Emperors made canals, but only for their pleasure gardens.

candidates was whether they would also be permitted to take an LL.B. ! The Government of India continuously carried on valuable research work beyond the means of the Provinces, and everywhere our district officers took a keen interest in the vital industry of the land. Good progress was being made when the whole question was transferred to town-bred Indian Ministers, and the trained British experts began to disappear. The steam roller of another Royal Commission is now to pass over India. Information well known to the local Governments will be extensively and expensively collected over an area as large as Europe, less Russia, and far more diversified in soil, rainfall, population, and conditions of tenure. What would be regarded as futile in Europe is deemed practicable and full of promise in India. For many years, British experts and British impulsion will be necessary to maintain scientific progress in India, which already shows signs of languishing. Those who regard India as still backward in agriculture—as is the case—have no idea of the attachment of the rayat to immemorial methods, nor of the educative machinery which we have already set in motion.

Irrigation is perhaps the greatest material boon that we have conferred, and as Minister for Public Works I did all that was possible to further extensions. The great Sind project \* remained for my successor to inaugurate ; but the Nira Right Bank Canal, which will secure some of the most arid tracts of the Deccan against famine, was sanctioned and begun.

In the domain of municipal politics, my Government made marked advances in the popular direction. In all the larger towns the number of elected members was raised to two-thirds, and the right of electing Presidents was freely conferred. I regarded this step as a necessary measure to bring more Indians into touch with public affairs ; but in some cases efficiency suffered, and it was painful to be forced, in 1910, to suspend the Municipal Council of Ahmedabad and of two other towns later, for gross irregularities. The facts were published, and there

\* See p. 270.

was scarcely a breath of adverse comment. Local Government in India, as at home, succeeds only where there are enough men with public spirit and knowledge of business to manage the affairs entrusted to them, and where a strong and capable Chairman is available. If these conditions are fulfilled, as does not always happen in India or elsewhere, local Government is a useful school for training to higher responsibilities.

The cold-weather visitor, who travels over well-managed railway systems, sees fine cities and finds order everywhere prevailing, rarely realises the small *personnel* by which these outward and visible signs of progress have been created and are maintained. Nor does he form any idea of the violent forces almost everywhere latent, or of the small margin of security on which the Government relies. In my time, the influence of the local British Officers generally sufficed to check outbreaks of Hindu-Moslem hostilities at the outset. Since the power and the prestige of the Raj have been effectually undermined, communal animosities have assumed dangerous forms, and never has the ill-feeling between the two great religions been so bitter and so violent as now. Among the powerful Mahomedan minority, the sense of permanent political inferiority to which the Government of India Act inevitably gave rise, is beginning vaguely to be felt by the humbler followers of Islam, and must tend to increase if the pseudo-democracy which we have set up is extended. Home Rule would bring about a restoration of Mahomedan power over a great part of India after a period of anarchy and bloodshed.

Our administration in India, having regard to the huge extent of the functions it undertakes, was the cheapest and the most sparingly staffed in the world. The machine in a Province was simple and direct. The members of the little Executive Council of three, increased to four by the addition of an Indian in 1910, divided the departmental work among themselves, and I held the Political and Public Works Portfolios. Orders issued on the authority of the "Governor in Council" required the approval of two

members, and for this purpose the Governor was second member for all departments. Questions of general policy were discussed by the Council as a whole. Two days a week were spent by the Governor at the Secretariat, where all the Secretaries brought their papers and any of his colleagues could see him. On other days, urgent papers were brought to Government House or transmitted through the Private Secretary, who with a little Indian Staff dealt with a large correspondence on which he took the Governor's orders, or personal drafts in matters of importance.

Here is the record of the subjects which came up for consideration at some stage in one day's work in Bombay, after interviews with two members of Council and the new Sheriff :

1. Motors for Electrical Inspectors.
2. State of a Judge's bungalow.
3. Improvement of Council Hall, Poona.
4. Reclamation scheme.
5. Barsi water-supply scheme.
6. Amendment of Irrigation Act.
7. Distribution of tail water. Hydro-electric scheme.
8. Improvement Trust finances.
9. Leases at Materan.
10. Appointment of a land valuer. Government of India to be approached.
11. Improvement of pay in Secretariat.
12. Raid from Goa into our territory.
13. Payments to Aden Chiefs.
14. Expenses of Rajkot Durbar.
15. Custody of a Chief's daughter.
16. Cutch-Morvi Customs, dispute. (A hardy annual.)
17. Moving a joint Administrator from Porbander.
18. Loan of three Police Officers to Baroda.
19. Powers of Chief of Savantwadi.
20. Financial position Jamnagar. Proposed railway.
21. Letter to naval C. in C.
22. Companies Bill draft.

23. Funeral expenses of a Thakur.
24. Question on education to be put in Council.
25. Railway extension survey.
26. Appointment of Conservator of Forests.
27. Appointment of Professor of Law.
28. Acceptance of trowel by a Collector.
29. Release of a convict.
30. Rearrangement of Colaba station.

I do not think that this was an exceptional day's work, and it shows the great variety of subjects which come before a Provincial Governor, who by innumerable interviews and tours in the districts can keep in close touch with affairs and is enabled to consult and to gauge Indian opinion.

The routine work was surprisingly free from the trammels of red tape, and the stickiness to which all Secretariats are liable could always be eased by a slight impulse from the Governor. When delays occurred, they were generally due to references to the Government of India, which in my time was a slow-moving machine. In the case of some reform advocated by one Province, and in no way affecting any other, it was not unusual for the Secretariat to address a *questionnaire* to every Government in India, resulting in from one to two years' delay, due to the theory that a uniform rate of advance over this vast area was possible and desirable. Writing to Lord Morley from the Bombay point of view in 1909, I named three matters as worthy of his special consideration, placing "decentralisation" first. He replied on November 14, 1909 :

"All you say about a future policy is, in my judgment, weighty and important, and I go with your three points though I should alter the *order* and put them thus: (1) Finance; (2) Decentralisation; and (3) Indians to have more posts. And of these I regard (1) as a *long way* the most important. If the election and my strength and the stars retain me here, it is upon finance that I mean to concentrate."

The little Provincial Cabinet was recruited as vacancies occurred on the recommendation of the Governor, which was never rejected. Sir J. Muir Mackenzie, Sir Steyning Edgerley, Sir J. Jenkins, Sir W. Morison, Sir M. Chaubal, Sir R. Lamb, Sir G. Carmichael, and Sir Claude Hill were successively my valued colleagues, with whom it was a pleasure to work and to whom I am deeply indebted. An administration so composed violates every principle of democracy; but it may perhaps be admitted to have certain advantages in the smooth continuity which it ensures to the transaction of public business. As each member of the Executive was equipped with long experience of the work to be performed and as he was selected only on ground of special fitness, the conditions which alone guarantee success in great private undertakings were precisely fulfilled. The astonishing progress of India since the Government was transferred to the Crown is thus explained.

In five and a half years of close study, it was possible to arrive at some definite conclusions as to our Government as a whole, which I explained in the *Times* in a series of four articles beginning in December, 1913.\* I could say with truth that :

“There never was a time when so many Indians had a voice in so many branches of the administration, could so effectively present their views, or were able to count on such sympathetic considerations. Government was never so gentle, so quick to learn and to redress grievances, or so zealous in labouring for the public good. Never were the public servants of India so hard-worked, so anxious to initiate measures for the benefit of the people, and so diligent in striving to make them successful. Local self-government has passed mainly into Indian hands to make or to mar. The control of education in some important aspects has been committed to Indian bodies. If in the High Courts, the European element is in a majority, the administration of law in the lower stages is predominantly

\* See p. 303.

Indian. The Sircar, once abrupt and peremptory, now shows an anxiety to please and a readiness to consult Indian opinions which were formerly unknown."

The Morley-Minto Reforms were then working well, and the authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report—an amazing medley of fact and fiction—which was designed to submerge them, were constrained to admit that "whenever the Government has met with anything approaching solid opposition, on the part of the Indian members [of Council], it has, except on matters touching the peace and security of the country, generally preferred to give way."

I believe this to have been a faithful picture of India when the Great War supervened. An intensive propaganda, in which Mrs. Besant played a conspicuous part, was, however, started to mislead public opinion here and in India, and to create impressions violently conflicting with plain facts. As in Parliament and outside there were few who understood the machinery of Government or the conditions of the heterogeneous peoples of India, the preposterous theory of a tyrannous bureaucracy engaged in repressing the beneficent aspirations of Indian patriots and thwarting their plans for the public good from selfish motives, quickly gained adherents. The easy accessibility of democracies to propaganda, now reduced to a fine art, is tending more and more to render sound statesmanship impracticable.

A philosophical historian, knowing both countries, may some day trace the astounding similarity between the methods of agitation in India and in Ireland since the Union. In both, the orators contrasted a golden past, in which a people exceptionally brilliant and high-minded stood foremost among mankind and enjoyed a boundless prosperity destroyed by an alien Government, with a present depicted in darkest tones. In both, national patriots, anxious lest the masses should ascribe benefits to the alien Government, laboured to discredit boons freely forthcoming. In both, the agitating demagogues



squabbled freely and intrigued against each other. While these and other startling resemblances can be traced between our Irish and Indian problems, there was one fundamental difference. The intruding foreigners in India who became landowners, were the conquering Moslems, and from the Indian agitator's point of view there was little to be made of the land. One of our principal and always difficult tasks in India, has been to prevent the conversion of the rayats into an agricultural proletariat, servants of the money-lending and lawyer classes. This endeavour has been strenuously resisted by Indian politicians.

There were defects in our Government which were tending to disappear, and India will never again be so well ruled as before the passing of the Montagu Act. Already the cost of the administration is mounting, and there has been, as in Ireland, the notable inflation of Secretariats which invariably accompanies democratic advance.

Three grave mistakes, all perhaps irremediable, must be admitted—the Legal system, Education, and the permanent settlement of Bengal. Yet all were the outcome of good intentions. In his excellent *History of Ireland*,\* Sir James O'Connor has pointed out that "one of the inherent defects of the Union was that it tended to inflict upon the backward country institutions, splendid and liberal in themselves, unfitted for it." This can be said with far deeper meaning of our Raj in India. In a country dominated by caste, it was a fine achievement to establish the principle of equality before the law; but our legal system, and the civil code especially, operates cruelly in the case of the poorest classes to whom the manifold resources open to the well-to-do are denied. According to the *Times*, "important cases usually lasted five years from the institution of the action to the final decision of the High Court."† The masses of India are abnormally litigious, and the result of our system has been the creation

\* *History of Ireland, 1798–1924*, by the Right Honble. Sir James O'Connor. E. Arnold and Co., 1925.

† March 6, 1924. Much longer delays have occurred.

of an army of lawyers, expert in discovering legal quibbles,\* who live a parasitic life upon the peoples. This vakil class, the product of our Universities, has been foremost in open and secret movements to evict its creators, and the more pseudo-democracy is inflicted upon India, the greater will be its powers. M. Chailley, the most acute of our foreign critics, was quick to note that "inexplicable acquittals encourage crime and ruin the prestige of the dominant race." †

Education has been the cause of unnumbered tragedies extending to many humble homes. We have sent out some great teachers who were able by their personal qualities to leave a deep impress on young Indians, as did Sir Syed Ahmed of Aligarh. It has followed, however, from the false start made by Macaulay ‡ that our system of education took a shallow Western literary form, and the Universities turned out swarms of "failed B.A.'s" and others for whom neither Government nor private employment could be found, and who were ill-equipped to render the services which India needed. For them bitter disappointment was inevitable, souring many young lives and quite naturally causing such literary aptitudes as had been acquired to be used to swell the chorus of hostility to Government. M. Chailley's criticisms of our educational system were certainly justified. Some necessary reforms have been accomplished since he wrote; but more are needed, and may now be impossible. The political successes of the alumni of the Universities have been so great as to convince them that no important changes can be necessary.

In Bengal, Lord Cornwallis was induced by Philip Francis (Junius) to make the grave mistake of converting the farmers § of the land tax (Thekedars) into freeholders subject to a permanent settlement, although the culti-

\* In my time, Bengal boasted of the possession of 10,000 lawyers when there may have been legitimate work for 2,000.

† *Administrative Problems of British India*. Translation by Sir W. Meyer, 1910.

‡ See p. 242.

§ Some of these farmers were hereditary chiefs, who like them had been liable to reassessment, but were converted into landed proprietors subject to fixed charges now wholly inadequate.

vators had been part owners. Elsewhere, we have carefully conserved the old systems of land tenure, while maintaining the ancient right of the State to land revenue reassessed on definite grounds after fixed periods. The effects in Bengal of want of care in ascertaining the precise conditions of land tenure were to degrade the cultivators to the position of helots and to deprive the Province of the revenue due to an immense enhancement of values. Incidentally, it followed that our officers were never brought into close touch with the rural population of Bengal, which helps to account for much that has happened in that Province.

It is significant that the Indian propagandists, who have laboured to spread false impressions of Indian conditions among our democracy, should have fought shy of some really weak points in our armour. In this apparent reserve, they closely followed the example of a succession of agitators in Ireland, who dwelt with fervid eloquence upon famine, destruction of industries, impoverishment, excessive cost of alien Government, and other grievances which Sir James O'Connor has effectually exploded. The explanation in both cases is the same. The attack on the alien Government as the source of all evils was mainly conducted by persons eager for power for themselves, which existing political conditions did not adequately bestow.

There are pages in the history of our relations with India prior to 1857 which we may wish to forget. We have made mistakes to which all administrations, whether alien or indigenous, are liable; but, for more than sixty years, our Government can fearlessly be compared with all others in its impartiality, and disinterested efforts for the advancement of the masses. History records nothing which can approach the British achievements in India, and the world will never see the like again. *Si Monumentum quaeris, circumspice.* Turkey, China, Persia, and Afghanistan give some idea of the position in which India would have stood to-day, but for what Mr. Gandhi regards as "The Satanic Government."

## CHAPTER XX

### HOME—THE PRE-WAR PERIOD

ON April 20, 1913, we arrived in London. My forty-five years of Government service had ended, and all to whom this experience comes well know the feeling of sadness and the many reflections which follow the laying down of harness long worn. I was nearly sixty-five and in need of rest after five and a half years of anxious and exhausting work, but in hopes of being able still to be of some use to the Empire.

Again, as in 1903,\* only the King showed interest in the impressions I had derived, and questioned me closely on the situation in India. I hope that this apparent indifference of State Departments to the views of their servants when *functi officio* is now passing away. It may have been due to apprehension lest the opinions of an ex-governor, who had ceased to be part of the official machine, might conflict with policies which had taken root in a Department; but it certainly has not been beneficial to Imperial interests. The conclusions freshly arrived at from personal study in a distant part of the Empire cannot always be valueless.†

It was delightful to be back among old friends, and to see the ever-fresh miracle of an English spring; but I seemed to find changes in national characteristics which

\* See p. 172.

† As a rule, the temporary political head of a State Department and the administrative staff have no personal knowledge of the countries with which they are daily dealing. The Secretary of State for India has a Council, which always embodies Indian experience; but men who have shown any independence of thought are usually excluded. In a scheme for the reorganisation of the India Office which I sent to Lord Hardinge at his request on April 27, 1912, I proposed interchangeability between the administrative staff and the Indian Civil Service, but nothing ever resulted.

were disturbing. The increase of publications and of publicists appeared startling. The instructors of the nation had multiplied exceedingly; but amidst much smart writing there was, I thought, less seriousness of vision than formerly, with a general tendency to ignore or evade subjects of national importance and to emphasise and embellish frivolities. The poisonous plant of Socialism showed strong growth, and "Labour" had already taken a turn which was to lead to disastrous results. Curious new organisations were springing up, which threatened to divide and distract public opinion and augured ill for the future.

The world was hastening towards its greatest tragedy, and in England there were few warning voices. In India, I had found it impossible closely to follow events in Europe; but I had noted as ominous the great increase in the German standing army after 1911 and the feverish efforts of the Kaiser and Admiral von Tirpitz to build up the navy. I believed war to be inevitable, but that it would be postponed till the German Fleet was more nearly on an equality with our own. Meanwhile, we were cutting down armaments, and a number of ships, soon to be urgently needed, had been scrapped, while reductions at the Royal Arsenal were causing skilled artisans to take service with Krupp. Speaking at the Foremen's Annual Dinner on November 1, 1913, after referring to the experience of the Arsenal in 1899-1901, when the demands of the Army were exacting, I expressed the hope that "the War Office realised that another war might be upon us, the strain of which would be far greater than that of the South African War. . . . In such a war, the Ordnance Factories might have to serve the Navy as well as the Army." I also referred to the recent dismissal of workmen from Woolwich, and pointed out that a large increase of establishments might become necessary.

Lord Roberts, Mr. Leo Maxse, Mr. Blatchford, and General von Bernhardt were the truest prophets at this period, during which the speeches of Ministers, who were presumed to possess full information, seemed eminently

reassuring.\* Lord Haldane, the German expert of the Cabinet, declared at Holborn on January 15, 1914, that "Europe was an armed camp, but an armed camp in which peace not only prevailed, but in which the indications were that there was a far greater prospect of peace than ever there was before. No one wanted war." Many other leading Liberals seemed to be equally convinced that the angel of peace was abroad,† and as in the spring of 1870, when Bismarck had determined upon war, the nation as a whole was regardless of coming dangers. Ingenious writers, like Mr. Norman Angell (Lane), following the lead of M. Bloch, were striving to prove that war was now impossible, and pacificism was fashionable. Meanwhile, the Great General Staff at Berlin was putting the finishing touches to the somewhat belated von Schlieffen plan to which they were profoundly attached, and their only doubt was whether we were likely to stand by France. Nothing was neglected at this time by the thoughtful and painstaking Germans which might embarrass the Empire and tend to split opinion when the issue, peace or war, would have to be determined. England at this period was being subjected to a subtle propaganda, far in advance of Bismarck's methods as described by the ingenuous Dr. Busch. This I quickly came to understand, and ever since I have devoted careful study to subterranean forces and written perhaps too voluminously on all these subjects.

There were four dinners of welcome, and at that of the Northbrook Society I gave some of my impressions of India.

"In spite of astounding progress in trade and industry and of the fact that there was no branch of administration in which Indians did not now share, there were grave

\* We now know from Prince Lichnowski's revelations that a Treaty extremely favourable to Germany was being incubated in which the Wilhelmstrasse suddenly seemed to lose interest.

† As late as July 28, 1914, Mr. Lloyd George, in the House of Commons, forecasted "substantial economy" in Naval expenditure, and said he saw "signs, distinct signs of reaction" against armaments "throughout the world."

symptoms which it would be madness to ignore. . . . Now and for many years to come it was only under strong and steadfast government that India could advance in prosperity and could gradually acquire the essential characteristics of nationhood. If only all the educated classes would unite in such practical work as social reform and would abandon useless and dangerous political agitation, the progress of India would surprise its most ardent advocates."

Eight leading Indians were present, and my speech seemed to be received with enthusiasm.

On April 20, 1913, Lord Curzon wrote to greet me on my return from India in the most generous terms: "The way in which you have pushed Bombay along, fought the battle of education, conciliated but led all parties, and subdued disorder, constitutes a fine record of which you may indeed be proud." This in few words accurately summed up all I had striven hard to accomplish in India, and it was confirmed in detail by independent Indian opinion.\* It was necessary for Lord Curzon, as a member of the Coalition Government, sharply to oppose my criticisms of its policy in the House of Lords; but he was a good friend, and later I was to serve under him for six months in a difficult capacity.

My wife and I took the holiday which we both needed, paying visits in Scotland and the Lakes, followed by a motor tour to the fascinating old Elizabethan house of Combe† near Dulverton from which I took my title, and thence along the beautiful valley of the Exe, through Devonshire, Wiltshire, Dorset, and Hampshire.

My unwonted leisure soon became irksome, and I had begun to wonder if the Government would give me any work, when, on September 26, Lord Morley wrote begging me to be Chairman of a Royal Commission on Venereal Disease. "I am commissioned by the P.M. to invite you to preside over the Commission, and I hope very earnestly that you will do the Government and the country this

\* See Appendix II.

† An old Sydenham property long passed into other hands.

great service. . . . Pray do not disappoint us." This was the very last task that I should have chosen; but such an appeal could not be resisted, and I hoped that my acceptance, for which Mr. Asquith warmly thanked me, would lead to further public work for the Empire.

The Commission—a large body including varied elements—sat first on November 7, 1913, and held eighty-six meetings, finally reporting on February 11, 1916.\* I found my duties difficult and often unpleasant; but I was able to secure a practically unanimous Report, which is a mine of information embodying valuable statistics. No one who has not conducted an inquiry of this nature can realise the trials of a Chairman. The most important of our thirty-five Recommendations were adopted by the Government and have had remarkable results.† To carry on the work, the medical members of the Commission started a "National Council for Combating V.D.," of which I was President for five years, entailing much time and thought. This body—subsequently the British Social Hygiene Council—which was formally recognised by Government, has rendered valuable service to the nation. The Report of my Commission marked a turning-point in the attitude of Government and the public towards a grave social question. To me this experience was an education in a new sphere.

In reply to a letter telling him the gist of my Report Lord Morley wrote to me for the last time, and incidentally recorded his views on the War. "I fancy that I am not altogether of your mind as to the origin and issues of the War. The worst of it is that the Ministers who blundered into it are the men who will have to chain the devil up. By no means do I confine my distrust to Wilhelmstrasse and Ballstrasse" (December 25, 1915).

\* The witnesses numbered eighty-five, to whom 22,296 questions were put, but the outbreak of the war prevented the attendance of some German experts and notably Dr. Ehrlich, the inventor of 606.

† The Registrar-General's Review for 1924 stated that the mortality from syphilis had fallen to 33 per million, the lowest incidence recorded, and emphasised "the striking nature of the fall" since 1917 when our measures began to take effect.



On March 23, 1914, Mr. (now Sir) C. Hobhouse asked me to be Chairman of a small committee \* to inquire into an Irish grievance—the discontinuance of the call of the Cunard steamers at Queenstown. This inquiry involved nautical details of great interest. The clear evidence of the experienced captains of the *Mauretania* and the *Olympic*, whom I examined at length, was admirably given, and contrasted with the vague complaints of the Irish witnesses whom it was difficult to keep to the point. The most attractive evidence was that of the late Sir T. Lough, who contended that Ireland should be “better served than any country in Europe, because it is more favourably placed by nature and has a more intelligent people” (Q. 1,252). He also assured us that “the Irish are such a patient people; they put up with all their inconveniences, and they expect to be better treated in the other world to make up for it” (Q. 1,274). The Committee reported unanimously in March, 1915, and was unable to redress the Irish grievance; but before this the War had altered the whole situation.

My position as a Naval and Military critic had long been filled up; but there were some heresies to be combated in view of the approaching war, and my old relations with the *Times* were happily renewed. Thus, in the months of peace which still remained, I found myself again in literary harness, and some of the views I sought to proclaim—for the first time over my name—were to prove strangely prophetic. The dangerous theory of “freedom of the Seas” was again trotted out, and in three letters headed “Private Property at Sea,” † I strongly maintained the principles for which I had fought in 1906.‡

“The inevitable effect of abrogating the right to capture private property at sea would be to remove a powerful force which tends to create reluctance to go to War on the part of mercantile Powers. . . . To throw

\* Major E. M. Dunne, Mr. (afterwards Sir) T. Devitt, and Mr. T. H. H. Swinney, M.I.C.E.

† *Times*, October 28, November 5 and 11, 1913.

‡ See p. 203.

away what might be our most effective weapon would be an act of national madness.

"From the humane point of view, the capture of private property at sea is a mild measure compared with what 'international agreement' and custom tolerate on land.\* . . . As the late Lord Chancellor pointed out in a letter to the *Times* of October 14, 1905, 'no operation of war inflicts less suffering than the capture of unarmed vessels at sea.' This does not mean that the resulting economic pressure may not be severe."

This question was raised later in German interests, and the painful experience of the failure of our partial blockade during the War cannot yet be forgotten.

That, if we were involved in war with a Great Power, the invasion scare would be raised and our naval policy hampered, had been always a nightmare to me, and I had written copiously on the subject.† When, therefore, a letter appeared in the *Times*, purporting to be written by a friend of "Colonel von Donner und Blitzen," and evidently intended again to set up this threadbare bogey, I felt obliged to hit hard. The authorship of the letter was obvious; but I preferred to assume a German origin, and in the "German Strategist at Sea," I wrote: "Is it really well for a German land officer to lecture a nation, whose whole history has been built up by the exercise of sea power, on the 'theory and practice' of invasion?" (*Times*, September 13, 1913). This pseudo-German had relied on certain happenings in our Naval Manœuvres of 1912 and 1913, which, unsatisfactory as the schemes were, told a different tale. He had also contended that the "defending admiral" would have to keep his battleships "out of harm's way—if he can—until the torpedo menace is lessened." I pointed out that "while the defending admiral is reduced to masterly inactivity . . . his opponent is apparently free to move his battleships at

\* This was in answer to Mr. Charles Stewart, an advocate of the abandonment of our great weapon on grounds I believed to be untenable.

† Conf. *The Last Great Naval War* and "Can England be invaded?" *National Review*.

will, or at least to send large numbers of transports to sea undeterred by our 'torpedo menace.'” The moral of it all was that the German strategist had enunciated fallacies of a peculiarly dangerous kind and had advocated lines of policy which, if adopted, would infallibly and seriously weaken the British Navy.

I recall the effusion of the friend of “Colonel von Donner und Blitzen” as a typical specimen of the mischievous work of publicists, who, by appealing to popular nescience, succeeded in gravely hampering our operations in the War. Who can say how many gallant lives might have been spared if six divisions had been sent to France in August, 1914, or if the weak sector held by the 5th Army had been reinforced before March, 1918? \* What might have been the effect of releasing Commodore Tyrwhitt's fine destroyer flotilla in time to act against the High Sea Fleet at the Battle of Jutland instead of tethering it uselessly at Harwich?

The ever-verdant Channel Tunnel controversy re-appeared in December, 1913, and I again entered into the fray, later addressing a group of Members in the House of Commons on the subject.†

My principal literary efforts, however, at this period appeared in three long articles on “Warship Design,” and four on the “Indian Peril.” In the first of these series, I begged for an expert Committee to consider naval design and building policy in the light of war experience. This course I had pressed upon Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman six years previously. Nothing of the kind had been done since the useful inquiry which preceded the Naval Defence Act of 1889. My main thesis was that :

“In place of orderly evolution guided by reason, there have been spasmodic new departures, followed by reversions to type, but again repeated as if past experience was of no value. Tremendous changes have been introduced—

\* Mr. Churchill, in his 4th volume, has stated that the troops sorely needed were held back because Mr. Lloyd George believed that he could not prevent their being used for offensive purposes.

† See pp. 110, 205, 206.

changes far too great to rest on the unsupported opinions of a single Board of Admiralty. . . . The most cursory study of the erratic forms which shipbuilding policy has assumed since the introduction of steam and steel reveals with startling clearness a total absence of guiding principles."

It was easy, in the second article ("Misread Lessons"), to substantiate this broad generalisation by historical examples of which the cult of the ram and the "single knock-down blow theory," following the misreading of the battle of Lissa, was typical. As I pointed out, a number of unsatisfactory ships would never have disfigured the Navy List, if the available experience of War had been carefully studied. In the amazing vagaries which characterised our handling of the question of armour, it was impossible to detect any scientific direction. "With us, armour belts have expanded or contracted in length, breadth, and thickness, and have crawled up and down the sides of our ships with baffling agility."\* The *Dreadnought*, projected in hole-and-corner fashion, was a classic example, embodying features previously abandoned, and her successors showed astonishing vacillations of policy. "It is not here contended that one of these systems was right and the others wrong, but that the amazing instability of opinion, even since the *Dreadnought* was designed, proves that now, as formerly, no principles which war experience could support have ever been arrived at." Some of the lessons of the Spanish-American War, and especially those of Tsushima, had never been assimilated.†

In these articles, I tried to lay down some fixed principles of naval war.

"From the days of the Armada to those of Tsushima, the gun has proved to be the only weapon by which decisive naval victories can be won. There is no reason

\* The French, from the days of *La Gloire* onwards, showed much more consistency in this respect.

† Admiral von Tirpitz applied to the construction of the German Fleet far more study of war than could be traced at the Admiralty.

to suppose that this condition will be changed in the near future. We may, therefore, safely lay down as a law of naval war that tactics must now, as always in the past, be directed to bringing the greatest number of effective guns to bear upon an enemy at effective ranges in the shortest possible time. . . . Another lesson, enforced by the unbroken experience of naval war and worthy to be regarded as an immutable law, is that victories can only be won by the offensive—strategic and tactical—and that defensive ideals are futile and dangerous. . . . Lastly, it is to be remembered that the present tendency is towards over-concentration of thought upon the technicalities of *matériel*. Our system of training is producing specialists of all kinds; but it does not lead the best brains of our young officers to the study of such matters as have been dealt with in these articles" (*Times*, Oct. 15, 1913).

Looking back, I can see that these three articles contain traces of discussions with the late Sir W. White, who was much more than a naval constructor, and I believe he would have agreed with them. They were written to court criticism; but nothing appeared except a letter from "Another Correspondent" in which the writer claimed that the Dreadnought policy embodied, "in a larger measure than had hitherto been the case, the views of naval officers. . . . The special committee appointed to consider this question of design had the immediate benefit to be derived from the naval war between Russia and Japan." I replied perhaps too sharply \* and pointed out that "the country was committed to the Dreadnought policy with the knowledge of very few naval officers † and before the battle of Tsushima was fought" (May 27, 1905). There were several important tactical "fallacies" in this letter of which symptoms were to appear later, and I reminded my critic that,

"atmospheric conditions may at any time impose a maximum limit of range far less than that which he

\* *Times*, October 29, 1913.

† See the views of Sir F. Richards, p. 209.

contemplates as advantageous to the British Navy,\* and that the object must be to establish superior hitting power at all ranges at which actions are likely to be fought. . . . To base tactics on chance hits at extreme ranges to be obtained when the ship is engaged end on is to reduce naval science to gambling."

The fallacies expounded by "Another Correspondent," which recalled some of Lord Fisher's views, proved to be more widely prevalent than I thought. These articles, in which I pleaded for a close study of the potentialities of aircraft and of the submarine and of the means of attacking it, are not entirely obsolete to-day. If the inquiry which I urged had taken place, the appalling waste of building power to which we were committed by Lord Fisher's Baltic project and his two super-Dreadnought battle cruisers that could never render any useful war service,† might have been avoided. Light cruisers, the building of which had been suddenly stopped by Lord Fisher in 1904-5, but happily resumed later by Mr. Churchill, and especially destroyers, were our greatest war needs.

The four long articles entitled "The Indian Peril," ‡ were written to place frankly and plainly before the public my impressions of India before they had become blurred. I dealt at length with our wonderful work in India and with the condition of her peoples, with the causes and consequences of Unrest, with "Nationalism and its Purposes," and finally with the "Duty and Policy of the Government."

Here can be read the clearest warning of all that has followed :

\* Conf. the Battle of Jutland.

† The *Renown* and *Repulse* had been laid down as battleships of *Royal Sovereign* type. The designs were altered by Lord Fisher after the action off the Falkland Islands, converting them into battle cruisers with an increase of 130 feet in length and a reduction of armaments to get high speed. This entailed complications of all kinds and great delay. These vessels were afterwards re-armoured. A nondescript type of armoured cruiser with high speed followed, *Glorious* and *Courageous* (18,600 tons and four 15-inch guns) and *Furious* (19,100 tons), nicknamed the "*Good Gracious*" class, which was of no war use. We were always short of destroyers, which might have been built in much larger numbers.

‡ *Times*, December, 1913. This was not the title I chose.

“A small section of the population is working strenuously and successfully to bring about the alienisation of the vast unwieldy masses. That is the ‘Indian Peril,’ and if it is not understood in time there will be a rude awakening. . . . Let the conscientious democrat at home reflect upon the tumultuous forces latent in 295 millions of people wholly uneducated and inheriting in part at least strong fighting instincts, split not only vertically into discordant elements deeply permeated by traditional enmity, but horizontally into thousands of castes, and quickly roused to violent fanaticism. Let him ask himself what power is to prevent this stupendous mob from blood-stained anarchy if British rule is weakened or removed.”

The growing disaffection was, I pointed out, in part due to a lying propaganda which “is not confined to India, but has become international. Not only are there active centres of disaffection in Europe and America, but in places where no knowledge exists and prompt exposure need not be feared, addresses are delivered by Indians in which atrocities attributed to the Government are vividly described.” Even a Member of the House of Commons, after visiting the Central Provinces, was able to declare that the Government exact 75 per cent. of the yield of the land, the average assessment in this Province being in fact about 9*d.* per acre! Our duty, as I conceived it, was clearly marked out. “The welfare of the 295 millions of helpless and inarticulate peoples, not the momentary gratification of a handful of literates, must be the first object, as its furtherance is the first duty of Government.” I ended this series of articles with an appeal to

“politicians and publicists at home to take reasonable care to ascertain the truth and to assume that Britons in India have just as keen a sense of justice and of duty and as much sympathy as are given to Britons elsewhere. And may they not seriously consider whether the aspirations they encourage really represent a burning zeal to make ‘the bounds of freedom wider yet,’ or a growing desire for power by a small section of malcontents who have

imperfectly assimilated some Western ideas? The great question is—Can a democracy govern a vast Eastern Empire? Upon the answer, which must be forthcoming in a few years, the ruin or the sustained and quickened progress of India depends.”

That answer is now beginning to be recorded, as some future Gibbon will discover.

The pacifist publications of Mr. Norman Angell and his pupils at this period were significant and not without influence. It seemed a duty to combat them. At the R.U.S. Institution on January 16, 1914, I took the Chair to support General Sir E. Barrow in his powerful exposure of the gross fallacies of *The Great Illusion*. In the absence of the author, a Mr. Langdon Davies, one of the most bellicose speakers I have ever listened to, attempted to defend his oracle. Such statements as that “Physical force is a constantly diminishing factor in human affairs” and the travesties of history in which Mr. Angell revelled could easily be dealt with. The Union Government of South Africa, in July, 1913, had been face to face with a dangerous revolution in Johannesburg when the presence of Imperial troops, promptly used, availed to prevent grave injuries to life and property.\* While we were speaking, that Government was confronted with another great emergency, and was again dependent upon organised force to avert anarchy. As I said: “The lesson is plain for us all to read. To possess organised force and to make it clear that you are prepared to use it in good time is the most humane policy that a Government can adopt.” According to *The Great Illusion*: “If a nation remains military it decays; if it prospers and takes its share in the work of the world, it ceases to be military.” The answer was obvious. According to this theory, “Germany, Russia, and Japan must be beginning to decay or they must be ceasing to be military. . . . Which is happening? . . . For us at the present time . . . to reduce our standards of preparation for war would be a certain sign of the

\* See Report of Commission of Inquiry.



madness with which the gods afflict nations and individuals whom they wish to destroy." Less than seven months later we were at War.

In April, 1914, by special request, I reviewed Mr. Angell's latest work *The Foundations of International Policy in War and Peace*.<sup>\*</sup> This book was less aggressive and more illusive than its predecessors. History was again shockingly maltreated; but Mr. Angell, after labouring to represent military force as futile, was now ready to admit: "Because I do not believe in force, I do believe in defence—that is to say, I do not believe in allowing the other man's force to settle any matters in dispute . . . in preventing force being used, the soldier's work is useful." I entered a plea for the inclusion of the sailor, and claimed that "if the 'defence' in which Mr. Angell believes does not imply defensive strategy or tactics when it comes into play, this remarkable passage concedes all that reasonable students of Imperial defence can demand."

On August 3, I replied in a letter to the *Times*,<sup>†</sup> to Mr. Angell's final effort to keep us out of the War.

"Mr. Norman Angell has for some years been engaged in a propaganda of dangerous fallacies. . . . Confronted by circumstances which falsify all his theories . . . he promises us that 'if we keep out of this War' we shall escape losses and we 'might conceivably for a long time be the strongest Power in Europe.' He imagines that the crushing of France followed by a German 'absorption of a Belgium, a Holland, and a Normandy' would only have the effect of creating intolerable 'embarrassments' and therefore loss of naval and military strength to Germany. . . . I do not believe that any sober Briton will accept tremendous risks on the chance of the extravagant theories of *The Great Illusion* being vindicated.

<sup>\*</sup> The organ of the Garton Foundation.

<sup>†</sup> "Mr. Angell's Illusion." In the same issue of the *Times*, a Privy Councillor, describing himself as "a man in the street," protested against our taking part in the War. "I cannot for the life of me see why on earth this country should be dragged into war . . . for a European quarrel which only very, very remotely affects us, and the sooner we say so the better!"

"If we are called upon to act, it will certainly not be because we have 'yielded to the war madness' of which we have given no signs, but because our national honour now and our national existence in the near future may demand that we should take our share of loss and suffering whatever it may be.

"If we prove false to our best traditions and dead to our responsibilities as a great nation, we may incur the resentment of our Over-sea Dominions and the passionate dislike and contempt of the European Powers, which would, within a few years, be translated into active hostility. There are worse evils than war at the present time."

At midnight on the following day, the Empire was at War, and I record my views at this time because I believe they expressed the strong sentiments of every loyal citizen which decided our action at this crisis.\* During the pre-war period, while in Germany General von Bernhardt and others were striving to stimulate "will to power," many writers here were labouring to weaken and confuse our sense of honour and to paralyse the Government. Later, when we were fighting for our life, the deadly effects of this propaganda appeared in a series of strikes unparalleled elsewhere. M. Liseron's scathing lines, addressed in 1915 to *Les Mineurs Gallois*, who had fallen under alien influences, still have a pregnant meaning. They began :

"Et qui donc êtes-vous ? Vous, mineurs d'Angleterre ?  
 Pour vous placer plus haut que les lois de la guerre !  
 Plus haut que le devoir et que l'humanité !  
 Plus haut que le pays ! Plus haut que l'équité !"

In a letter entitled "Burdens of Industries," † I first attempted to refute the dangerous economic fallacies to which the Independent Labour Party was already committed. Their two main principles were :

1. The land, being the storehouse of all the necessities of life, should be declared and treated as public property.

\* Conf. Lord Grey's *Twenty-five Years*.

† *Times*, July 3, 1914. Following letters from Sir Hugh Bell and Mr. Hill,

2. The Capital necessary for industrial operations should be owned and used collectively.

Of these "childish delusions," I wrote :

"How any person of ordinary intelligence can accept this artless programme, I fail to understand. The land of the United Kingdom is not 'the storehouse of all the necessities of life,' and the land, scattered throughout the world, which enables our people to live cannot become their 'property.' The effect of transferring all industries to the management of 'parish, district, borough and county councils' can be imagined with little effort. . . . Who will pay the rates and who will lend money when all land is 'public property' and all capital is 'owned and used collectively'? The last proposition [of the I.L.P.] is the climax of economic imbecility. By transferring 'all public burdens to unearned incomes' with a view to extinguish them, the State would obviously court swift bankruptcy. . . . Surely it may be worth while to combat them [the fallacies of the I.L.P.] by the inculcation of elementary common sense in our schools and colleges. It does not require the accomplishments which Lord Macaulay attributed to his school-boy to understand that you cannot get something out of nothing."

Henceforth I laboured in the cause of economic sanity, writing and speaking whenever a chance presented itself; but we seem to have moved further from that goal with results already disastrous.

My strange but always cordial relations with Lord Fisher were quickly resumed. On May 14, 1913, he had written congratulating me on my peerage, and adding, "I had not the slightest idea of your going to India, but I see now it was a good thing," which I could not understand. He was then busy incubating many plans on which he frequently consulted me. On June 27, 1913, he sent me a number of papers advocating an immense development of submarines, the main advantage being "the small crews required" which suited a non-conscript nation. It is, he wrote, "quality not quantity that we provide.

... Tirpitz has privately acknowledged that this is an incontestable superiority we possess." I replied with a long and closely reasoned criticism of a policy which I thought hopelessly wrong, and he wrote again on June 30 : "I really am immensely indebted to you. If you will allow me I will send you further notes when I have elaborated a reply to your criticisms. . . . You raise some very important new points of view. I am so very glad I got you to read these papers before I went further with them." This was typical of several other schemes, one of which was a monster submarine with a heavy gun.\* Again I remonstrated at length, and heard no more. The "further notes" were never forthcoming, and the special interview for purposes of discussion, sometimes suggested, never took place. Others were consulted in the same way; but none could have taken more pains than I bestowed upon these brain waves. I have wondered since whether I could have dissuaded Lord Fisher from what he called "my main strategic plan"—the impracticable Baltic Expedition, of which I afterwards wrote : "Even if the Scandinavian countries adhered to the Entente, which was most unlikely, the attempt to maintain a great fleet, with a host of transports in the Baltic while the High Seas Fleet existed would have led to a national disaster."† I never heard of this plan in the pre-war period and my reasoning might have failed; but if the Admiralty, at a time of tremendous strain, could have been spared concentration upon a chimera, some happenings would have been different.

In June, 1914, within two months of the War, Admiral Sir Percy Scott suddenly produced in the *Times* a portentous manifesto which recalled the project of Lord Fisher just a year earlier. The whole British Fleet was to be exchanged for submarines except "a few fast cruisers

\* This was apparently the germ of the *M* class with a 12-inch gun which was not used in the War.

† "Mr. Churchill's Defence," *The English Review*, December, 1923. The military objections were almost equally strong. Mr. Churchill on August 19, 1914, had rashly written to the Grand Duke Nicholas that "the operation of sending a British Fleet into the Baltic is feasible."

provided we can find a place to keep them in safety during war time." He declared that "all recent naval manœuvres" proved that "battleships are of no use for defensive or offensive purposes," and in a subsequent controversy, he pointed frequently to the opinion of a midshipman as conclusive in this sense. His strategy contemplated sealing the Straits of Gibraltar by submarines, in order that "Turkey, Greece, Austria, and Italy" could not get out of the Mediterranean to attack our trade, thus leaving all our shipping in the Mediterranean and our normal route to India and the Far East defenceless. The submarine flotillas would be accompanied by "scouting aeroplanes always high up. . . . If an enemy is sighted, the gong sounds and the leash . . . will be slipped."

All this and more of the same kind appeared to me "disastrous doctrine," and in two prophetic letters, "The Apotheosis of the Submarine" and "The Future of Navies" (July 14), I tried to bring Sir P. Scott's theories "to the test of the knowledge and experience which we have at our disposal at the present time." As regards the wholesale conversion of the Navy into under-water craft, I wrote: "To assume that, while all the trade of the world must continue to be carried in surface ships of increasing tonnage, all naval warfare will be restricted to submarines is to my mind a fantastic dream." Sir P. Scott, accepting aeroplanes as indispensable adjuncts of the submarine, had "ignored the fact that the former may prove dangerous opponents of the latter," as happened. After noting the limitations of the submarine, my general conclusion was: "The introduction of the submarine entails a new risk upon fleets at sea. The measure of that risk we have at present no means of determining with accuracy; but, judging from all past experience, it will prove much less than the protagonists of the submarine now imagine." This controversy, to which several authorities contributed, was quickly to be resolved by the stern experience of War. As regards the attack upon warships, nothing happened as Sir P. Scott prophesied. There were losses largely preventable; but Lord Balfour and Lord Lee were able

to declare at Washington in 1921 that as against warships the submarine was a failure. All that I then wrote, with one exception, was justified. Sir P. Scott had produced the evidence of a "foreign naval officer" that submarines would be used against defenceless shipping on the high seas, on which I commented :

"I do not believe that the sentiment of the world in the 20th century would tolerate for a moment proceedings which have hitherto been associated only with piracy in its blackest form. Consideration of humanity apart, there are strong reasons for believing that this relapse into savagery would not serve the purpose of the Navy which so far degraded itself."

Sir P. Scott's forecast was right and mine was wrong, and yet the black piracy committed by submarines eventually brought in "the New World to redress the balance of the Old," and to seal the defeat of the Central Powers.

Our short fifteen months of peace at home, bringing numerous social engagements, now ended ; but, with two public duties to discharge, and the resumption of literary work, I seemed to have got back into my old sphere of activities to which the House of Lords had been added.

## CHAPTER XXI

### THE GREAT WAR

AT midnight on August 4, the Empire was at war, and the vast majority of our people at home and abroad had no idea of the issues involved. How and why the world conflagration started will be argued at length for many years. Already the jarring output of historians, professional and amateur, honest and otherwise, is enormous, and whether any verdict will ever receive general acceptance is most doubtful. All that can be said with certainty is that the lighting of the fire was due to great forces—political, economic, and psychological—which happened to combine at this particular juncture, and their resultant was decisive. The voluminous diplomatic records detailing the views taken by the various European Governments in the time preceding and following the assassinations at Serajevo are for the most part beside the mark. The earnest searcher for truth must go far deeper in his quest for first causes. What interests, national or sectional, were likely to be served by the martyrdom of Europe, abhorrent to the French as to the British people? The theory that the piling up of armaments in previous years made the cataclysm inevitable, only carries back the inquiry a stage further. Why were navies and armies—except our own—feverishly increased? The impartial historian cannot fail to discover three outstanding and indisputable pieces of evidence which he dare not ignore.

1. For many years the warlike German people\* had been carefully prepared by a State system of education, backed by professors and publicists of every degree, for

\* Warlike since the time of Tacitus, who noted their military aptitudes.

European dominion and taught that it was a duty to impose their superior culture by force upon mankind.

2. The great pan-German scheme, which no one has so clearly explained as M. Chéradame, had matured at the end of the nineteenth century. It contemplated economic supremacy from Hamburg to Basra with German control in many countries. It could be realised only by war, and Serbia stood in the way. If accomplished it would confer vast wealth upon a section of Germans and unlimited prestige upon the military caste.

3. In August, 1914, no Power in the world was so perfectly prepared for war as Germany—not by armaments alone, but by subtle propaganda, a great spy system and economic penetration in other lands.\* No other Power had secret weapons, such as a torturing gas, prohibited by the Hague Convention, and the giant 42 cm. (16·8 inch) howitzer ready to be used against an enemy.

I knew the position of our armaments and resources, and I had a fair general idea of those of the Central Powers. I felt certain of the fine response from all members of the Empire to the call to arms which I had foretold in fiction;† but it was impossible to escape misgivings. The war in South Africa—a trivial undertaking in comparison with what lay before us—had been gravely mismanaged, and Mr. Asquith's Cabinet seemed ill-equipped for the direction of our greatest fight for existence. I had, however, formed anticipations which proved delusive. I underestimated the military forces which the Germans put into the field at the outset, and also those which later they were able to create. I did not foresee the immediate adoption of the unratified Declaration of London, and I, therefore, relied upon the services which the Royal Navy was perfectly able to render in cutting off the supply of essential commodities. I believed the French mobilisation

\* In 1914 we suddenly awoke to discover that some of our key industries, and especially those vital to war, had passed into German hands, and that the tentacles of the octopus had even reached Australia. All this seems to be forgotten already.

† See p. 108.



plans to be more fully developed than proved to be the case, and I trusted to the sustained solidarity of the huge Russian armies even in face of discouragement.\*

I was just sixty-six and no longer capable of standing physical strain ; but all the matters which had formed the principal studies of my life were now to be brought to the test of War, and I hoped that I might still be of use in council. This was not to be. I offered my services at once in any capacity to Lord Kitchener, Sir E. Grey, and the India Office. On August 8, 1914, Major Fitzgerald wrote : " Lord Kitchener, who is overwhelmed with work, has asked me to write and thank you for your kind letter of congratulations and to say that it is most good of you to offer your services which he gladly accepts, and should an opportunity be found for using them you may be sure he will avail himself of it." The " opportunity " never came.

Sir E. Grey wrote a kind personal letter, but held out no hope, and from the India Office I was informed that nothing suitable to my position could be found, though I was ready to accept any post in which my experience might be turned to account. This was the bitterest disappointment of my whole life. It may have been thought that my long naval and military studies were out of date ; but the successful conduct of war depends upon great principles unaffected by changes in armaments, and some of them were to be flagrantly violated. I thought, perhaps without warrant, that at least I might have been able, as in more than ten years at the Colonial Defence Committee and the Committee of Imperial Defence,† to ensure the bringing before the authorities who would direct the world-embracing operations all the facts and the lessons of the past which would be vital to sound decisions. This did not happen. I found myself with two public tasks to complete,‡ some patriotic organisations to assist, and such

\* The dogged pertinacity of the Russian soldier is written large in the pages of military history ; but I had failed to note the significance of the attempted revolution of 1905 or the gathering of the dark forces which in 1917 deprived the Allies of their greatest source of fighting man-power.

† See Chapters VII, XIV and XV.

‡ See pp. 296-298.

little influence in the House of Lords, on the platform, and in the Press as I could command.

During the sombre war period, I wrote 90 articles and letters in the *Times*, over 130 in other newspapers and magazines, and delivered many speeches,\* in the endeavour to strengthen the nation's will to win, to help public opinion in the Empire and in the United States to understand the character and significance of the changing scenes in the gigantic drama which slowly unfolded itself, to combat pacifism, and to press upon our Rulers the steps essential to victory.

I record a few extracts from these multifarious efforts because they may still have a bearing upon Imperial affairs.

Two days after the War began I laid down conditions of success of which the first was :

“We must employ without stint and under the direction of the best brains at our disposal all our resources in every part of the world, sparing no effort and cheerfully accepting the necessary sacrifices.

“In the second place, we must stand absolutely united till the storm and stress are over” (*Times*, August 7, 1914).

Looking back, it cannot be said that these two conditions were wholly fulfilled. The idea of limited liability, which Lord Kitchener helped to dispel, was prevalent at the outset. Defeatist tactics which began at an early period, and developed with German inspiration as cruel sacrifices and bitter disappointments accumulated, were continuously at work to the advantage of the enemy.

In an article entitled “1805 and 1915” in the *Times* on Trafalgar Day, 1915, I sought to draw public attention to the facts that “great stores of cotton and other necessities of War had passed into the enemy's hands,” and that the British Navy had “not been allowed to exert such influence on supplies as our forefathers enforced in reply to the Berlin decree” of Napoleon.

\* Apart from speeches in the House of Lords (see Chapter XXIII).

This article brought me into correspondence with the late Sir William Ramsay, who manfully fought against the obscurantism of the Cabinet in regard to cotton.\* Later, in an article headed "Cotton and Explosives," I explained the functions of nitro-cellulose in the manufacture of propellants and of some explosives, and pointed out that cotton—now a vital need in war—had been declared contraband by Mr. Seward in 1861, only because it conferred purchasing power on the Confederate States. The whole surplus American crop of 1914 could have been bought by the Government at a price which would have yielded a handsome return; but not till July 15, 1915, could the late Lord Emmott inform the House of Lords that "supplies going to Germany in the last month or two months" had been "curtailed." The moral of all this was plain :

"It is, however, certain that if the imports had been stopped, or severely curtailed, from the beginning, the duration of the War would have been sharply limited, and it is not easy to believe that, if the facts as to the relations between cotton and munitions had been appreciated, effective steps would not have been taken in good time."

In a letter to the *Times*, published on September 4, 1914, I contrasted events with those of 1870, when the capitulation of Sedan followed twenty-nine days after the first battles on the frontier. The same time had elapsed since Liège was first attacked; but

"between the German invaders and Paris, the Allies interpose an army of about a million men who have become more concentrated in the last week. This army has suffered local reverses and it has been pressed back; but no portion of it has been broken, cut off, or entrapped. Its *moral* is unshaken. . . . Over-confidence now, as always, is unwise; but, comparing 1914 with 1870, we

\* A political "expert" had misled the Cabinet into believing that the ingenious Germans could easily find a substitute for cotton. This was pure delusion due to the ignorance which Sir William Ramsay sought to dispel. On a vital question the advice of real experts was not taken.

and our gallant Allies may derive encouragement and hope in these hours of national anxiety."

Eight days later came the crisis in the supremely important battle of the Marne, and the Germans were hurled back in some disorder forty miles to the Aisne. On September 15, I briefly reviewed "The First Phase" of the War in the *Times*. General von Kluck narrowly escaped being cut off, which might have happened if our 5th and 6th Divisions had not been held back, and

"over a front of 80 miles, the German armies are in retreat, liberally shedding prisoners, guns, and transport. . . . It seems clear that the crisis of the Western campaign has passed . . . and that the essential first step in the war on two fronts (the capture of Paris) which the Germans have been carefully preparing for years has absolutely broken down."

In a long article in the *Times* in January, 1915, I surveyed events on sea and land during the five months in which "all the military operations . . . have turned upon the successful use of sea power, based upon the Grand Fleet in the North Sea."

This remained the primary condition to the end of the War, and could have been modified only if the High Seas Fleet had been destroyed at the Battle of Jutland. Battleships, most of which were never in action, formed the solid bulwark upon which all the operations of the Allies depended.

Our forefathers did not realise that Nelson's "storm-beaten ships"\* far from our shores stood between Napoleon and European dominion. More than a century later, the British Navy again stood between the Allies and a far more dangerous enemy; but the terrific fighting in many theatres of war naturally tended to draw attention from the Grand Fleet in the mists of the North Sea. I, therefore, over and over again tried to remind the nation that upon British sea power the whole course and issue of the War absolutely depended.

\* Mahan.

Addressing the Grand Council of the Navy League on March 24, 1915, I said : " Everything which the so-called ' Blue Water School ' claimed for naval force has been more than justified. . . . Sea power is now infinitely more effective than when Thucydides put the phrase into the mouth of Themistocles and far more effective than even Nelson, its greatest exponent, could have imagined." After explaining how the control of the sea was asserted in the great French wars, and what was happening all over the world at this time, I asked :

" Do we all realise, do even our gallant Allies fully realise, the tremendous influence which the storm-beaten ships in the North Sea have exercised upon the War ? . . . In one sense, perhaps they [our seamen] have done their work too well, because it is due to what His Majesty the King so well described as the ' sure shield ' of the Navy that our people, secure in their homes and occupations, have not all realised, as they must be made to do, that our whole strength is required in the great cause for which we are fighting."

Lord Fisher, who at this period was begging me to " write more frequently for the *Times*," seemed deeply impressed by this address, and wrote asking for copies " for the six mandarins I have in view."

In a letter to the *Times* I tried to recall some of the " leading features " of the Declaration of London.

" Foodstuffs, which the Germans would not require for the short and sharp campaign on which they counted . . . could be made conditional contraband without notice. On the other hand, and most significantly, it [the Declaration] placed (1) Raw cotton, a vital ingredient not, as has been most erroneously stated, of high explosives but of propellants ; (2) Rubber, essential for motor transport and other military purposes ; and (3) ' Metallic ores,' indispensable to the manufacture of munitions, in the category of commodities which were not to be contraband in any circumstances."

I went on to point out that the Declaration facilitated enemy supply through neutral ports by abandoning the rule of "continuous voyage" which the Federal States enforced in the Civil War, and that incidentally it justified excuses for sinking captured neutral ships.

My general contention was that :

"The historian of the future will certainly say that, in this strangely conducted War, the tremendous weapon of our sea power was enfeebled when the nation had the direst need for its fullest exercise, and he will add that the Declaration . . . contributed to this deplorable enfeeblement. The Zeppelins and the monster howitzers, the poison gas and the liquid fire, which the Germans had thoughtfully provided, were trivialities compared with the exclusion of cotton from the list of contraband" (*Times*, December 4, 1915).

Any one who studies this "remarkable instrument" in the light of events must admit that it was exactly adapted as an insurance if the German plan of a short campaign miscarried. We were undoubtedly out-manceuvred by the astute Germans in our peace negotiations, because our Rulers must have been obsessed with the idea that we were far more likely to be neutrals than belligerents.

In a speech at the Royal Colonial Institute, I again referred to this terrible initial mistake. "The War might have been ended before this if there had been any clear idea how our sea power ought to be used" (January 11, 1916). A week later I pleaded for rationing of neutrals although the harm done was already irremediable.

"If you ration the neutral countries and say they can have from us their ordinary peace allowance of goods with a percentage over for goodwill, the natural presumption is that anything over this is intended for our enemies, and then you can stretch a complete chain against the passage of such goods" (*Daily Mail*, January 17, 1916).

The failure to use our supremely powerful weapon

seems to have weighed heavily on my mind, and again and again I find references to it in my copious writings at this period. I may perhaps be pardoned for recalling this to-day; because the lesson is one for all time, and I am not sure that it has yet been taken to heart.

In the House of Lords, two parties confronted each other, one having all the power and all the secret information, the other, with at least equal ability, playing the part of interested onlookers. This led me to ask pointedly :

“ Are we waging this tremendous conflict with half the brain-power at our disposal? And . . . is it impossible that, relegating the party-system to the piping times of peace, the ripest experience, the clearest vision, and the soundest judgment should combine to ‘ assist ’ our Sovereign in securing the triumph of our cause ? ” (*Times*, January 11, 1915).

The first Coalition in the summer of 1915 for various reasons fell far short of my hopes, and developed later into a disastrous political combination.

In the first of many articles in American papers dealing with the changing aspects of the War, I tried to emphasise the moral effect of the flagrant German violations of the Hague Convention.

“ Any State which accepts without protest violations of international agreements can only be regarded as acquiescing in a crime against the whole family of nations. . . . The wholesale violation by the German Army of the pledges entered into by the German Government and that of the United States for securing the humane treatment of non-combatants is not a matter of doubt. . . . Who can doubt that a strong protest from their [the U.S.] Government would have carried weight at the German Headquarters ? ” (*Public Ledger* of Philadelphia, April 18, 1915).

This outspoken appeal was not resented, and many Americans, in the Eastern States especially, shared in these views.

In a long article cabled to the *New York Tribune* on December 10, 1915, I surveyed the events of the War, ending with a general appreciation :

“The Germans have crushed little Belgium ; but they were unable to conquer Serbia without Bulgarian assistance. They can point to no single great success against the armies of the Allies. This contrast throws the military failure of Germany into sharp relief. Behind the Armies of the Allies stand their free peoples, who have learned what German methods mean and who now know that everything they prize most is at stake. They may have to face reverses. They will certainly have to make great sacrifices. But they stand united and grimly determined to right the wrongs of Belgium and Serbia and to ensure that never again shall German militarism set Europe in flames and threaten the liberties of mankind.”

Four months later I tried to warn the American public of what the defeat of the Allies must mean. “On the issue of the War, the supreme interests of Americans depend. If the Allies could be crushed, their turn would quickly come” (*New York Times*, April 30, 1916). The supreme direction of the War became a source of grave anxiety, and I sought to recall some first principles. Von Moltke had wisely written that “it is almost impossible during a campaign to remedy an error in the primary concentration of the troops,” and that “no plan of operations can, with any certainty, go beyond the first encounter with the enemy.” Here, it seemed to me,

“the functions of a Government in regard to War Strategy are defined. When an expedition is decided upon, or a new direction is given to naval or military forces, the responsibility for the decision must rest upon Government. The duty of formulating a plan of naval or military operations lies with naval and military experts. It is for civilian Ministers to examine the plan in the light, not only of the available information, but of previous war experience, which may be the only guide to sound judgment.



The successful prosecution of the plan will depend upon the action of several departments of State, in full co-operation, perfectly synchronised, which Cabinet organisation alone can secure."

Some authorities might go beyond this in allocating powers to the Naval and Military chiefs ; but, in the case of democratic governments, I think that this definition of responsibility is inevitable. I then went on to point out that :

"Methods evolved in times of peace have plainly broken down. The procedure recently described by the Prime Minister was certain to fail. That it has not led to disasters is providential. A fluctuating Committee of 11 or 12 members, largely preoccupied with other work, for the most part unaccustomed to study naval and military questions, and depending ultimately on the acquiescence of the whole Cabinet, is necessarily incapable of directing the greatest of wars. . . . Those who have urged that the entire conduct of the War should be entrusted to a Council of six Ministers at most may not regard this arrangement as perfect. They hope only that, by such means, concentration upon the supreme national need, and adequate study—day by day and hour by hour—of the varying phases of the situation, leading to sound decisions and prompt action may be secured" \* ("A Parting of the Ways," *Times*, November 1, 1915).

I wrote much more in this sense later, and when the effect of divided councils on the Western Front became painfully apparent, I urged that :

"Either a generalissimo with complete authority must be appointed or executive powers must be conferred upon the Council of the Allies at Versailles. This is the real *crux* of the matter. Failing the former alternative, the main thing is agreement between the Commanders-in-Chief which can only be secured by their presence at a

\* Some of these views have been confirmed after eleven years by the painful revelations of Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson in *Soldiers and Statesmen*, Cassell, 1926.

Council provided with all the information available. Triangular communications between Paris, London, and Washington can only lead to misconceptions, delays, and failures" (*Times*, February 2, 1918).

Little more than a month later the Germans began their most dangerous attack, and the generalissimo became obviously inevitable.

Many other questions, not directly naval or military, occupied me in these years of storm and stress. I was anxious as to the ca'-canny methods which prevailed in some quarters even during the War, and I feared what might happen after the Peace. Mr. Lloyd George, as Minister of Munitions, had just addressed the Trades Union Congress, giving some deplorable facts,\* and ending with the appeal: "Do not set the sympathy of the country against Labour . . . when the poor old land is fighting for its life." I thought that a broader moral could be drawn, as Mr. Lloyd George had pleaded only that "this sort of thing ought to be dropped during the War," and I therefore wrote with an eye to the future :

"If in times of war it is necessary that free and honest labour should prevail, is not the principle worthy of adoption in peace? What may not the industries of Britain have lost; what poverty may not indirectly have been caused by the deliberate restriction of output? How many hopeful careers may have been destroyed by the demoralising attitude of mind engendered by calculated dishonesty—treason as much to the individual as to his country? Is the denial of a man's right to do what he is fully capable of doing compatible with the elementary principles of liberty? Such questions may be asked, and before the 'great battles' which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald promises 'when peace comes,' political leaders may be found who will speak the truth without flinching. That is the best, perhaps the only hope, for the future. When

\* He declared that the output could be increased "in some places by 30 per cent. and in other places by 300 per cent." if Trade Union regulations were dropped, and he spoke of the "conspiracy to keep down output."

‘the poor old land,’ exhausted and sorrowing for the loss of its bravest men, has to rebuild its commerce and restore its shaken economic fabric, there will be dire need of whole-hearted workers in every calling of life—workers who will scorn the ‘conspiracy to keep down output’” (*Times*, September 14, 1915).

Again, nearly a year later, I tried to give warning of what the return to peace conditions must involve. “When the War ends, the reconstruction of the fabric of national prosperity, under the burden of a colossal public debt, will be the most urgent of problems. . . . In the lean and strenuous years which lie before us, industrial strife would entail national disaster” (*Times*, September 8, 1916). And after another year of War I again tried to warn the nation, when promises of a new era fit for heroes were being liberally held out by politicians.

“If we fail to read aright the plain writing on the wall, then when the War ends we, like Russia, may awake to find plans of reconstruction diverted into the disastrous methods of a Socialist revolution. And owing to the intense political and economic complexity of our Empire, the consequences would be far more ruinous and the possibilities of recuperation far more remote” (*Sunday Times*, September 29, 1917).

Who will now say that these and many more warnings were superfluous?

I believed that the strain upon munition workers could be relieved by more scientific methods for which I pleaded:

“The training of athletes has been elevated into a science. In the Army, the conditions of marching with a view to obtain the maximum distance with the least fatigue to the soldier have been studied with valuable results. In the field of factory labour, little or nothing has been done. . . . At this time of supreme national effort, it is vital that the conditions of labour should be such as to prevent cumulative fatigue . . . to conserve the

energies of the workman, and to enable him to give his best to the service of the State without mental or physical deterioration" \* (*Times*, September 29, 1915).

In December, 1915, at the instance of Lord Lansdowne, I was appointed Chairman of the Central Tribunal to deal with appeals from all the local Committees engaged in administering the inadequate National Service Act. The Tribunal was a well-composed and most harmonious body. Some general principles were laid down by the Government for its guidance; but our decisions were final. Our work brought home to us what conscription entailed, and we had sometimes the painful reflection that our decrees would cause hardships in humble homes and possibly the ruin of some small undertakings. The inevitable effects of the War in certain aspects were vividly brought home to the Tribunal.

More painful, from a different point of view, was our experience of the numerous conscientious objectors who appeared before us in person. We encountered quasi-religious bodies of which I had never heard, such as Christadelphians and International Bible Students,† whose adherents, though unable to produce any valid documentary evidence of their tenets, were stoutly opposed to rendering war service. It was a revelation of perverted psychology to be brought face to face with able-bodied young men who declared that they would not intervene by force even to defend their mothers, and that nothing would induce them to serve in a hospital where wounded soldiers were being tended. Were these persons sincere or not? I could not tell; but it was evident that some of them had been most carefully tutored. The more "advanced" pacifists were relegated to non-combatant organisations, such as that created by the Society of Friends, which accomplished much useful work; but a few became hunger-strikers in prison and objects of sympathy to sentimentalists. The "Moderates," who did not refuse service

\* I also raised this important question twice in the House of Lords.

† Disciples of the late "Pastor" Russell.

entailing no personal danger, were more easily accommodated.\* I was thus able to see the practical effects of the propaganda which I had regarded with deep suspicion.

I had been in communication with Lord Curzon, regarding the apparently chaotic conditions which seemed to prevail in our Air Forces, and on April 18, 1916, he wrote to me: "I have myself repeatedly addressed the P.M. about the constitution of an Air Board. . . . The omens are rather more favourable than they have been." At his urgent request, I joined the Board under his Presidency which was formed in May, when Lord Derby's Committee broke down after eight sittings. This required my whole time, and I was reluctantly forced to give up the Chairmanship of the Tribunal. On May 21, Mr. Walter (afterwards Lord) Long wrote conveying "on behalf of the Government as well as my own account, our very warm thanks for your hard work and for all the ability and care you have brought to bear upon the discharge of most difficult duties."

Again, as often before, I found myself suddenly plunged into a new world of activities now dominated by the innumerable problems of Air warfare. The Resolution of the War Committee, which I helped to draft, formed the charter of the Board; but owing to Admiralty objections, it was not so definite as Lord Curzon desired. The Board was composed of two Admiralty and two War Office members, Major J. L. Baird, M.P. (now Lord Stonehaven), to represent it in the House of Commons, and Sir Paul Harvey, Secretary.

Air Force, from the first, became a power, always increasing, in the War; but, as a startling innovation, it did not fit in with existing systems of administration. At the War Office, its importance and special requirements were recognised, and a "Director-General of Military Aeronautics"—the late Major-General Sir D. Henderson, a most able officer—was added to the Army Council. At

\* Some conscientious objectors secured immunity with high wages, in munitions factories, thus violating all the principles they professed.

the Admiralty, on the other hand, Mr. Churchill had taken the Air Service into his own hands, and effectively if irregularly supplied an impetus which lapsed on his departure. There were far-seeing Naval officers who understood what aircraft might mean to the Navy; but too many senior Admirals at this period lacked this prescience, and the results were deplorable.

The R.N.A.S. in August, 1914, was mainly a land force working from shore bases. Later it largely duplicated the R.F.C. in purely military operations, while the development of a Fleet weapon was unfortunately delayed. From these conditions, many difficulties arose, and a most instructive book might be written explaining the successive steps in the organisation of our Air Forces, which has not yet crystallised into permanent forms.\*

The R.N.A.S., when our Board began its duties, had some distinct technical advantages over the sister service. Its capable and energetic officers were better able than those of the R.F.C. to obtain engines and planes from private manufacturers with whom they had been more closely connected in peace, and their scientific knowledge was greater. The R.N.A.S. was, therefore, better equipped in some respects than the R.F.C., which, however, owing to pressing demands from the front, was developing more rapidly. At the Admiralty, the "Director of the Department of Air Services" was under the First Sea Lord; and four Lords were separately responsible for administration and equipment.† Lord Curzon's Board was at once aware of hostility on the part of the Admiralty which, unlike the War Office, refused information, and could not provide us with a member able to speak for the R.N.A.S. I derived the impression that no superior direction of this important Arm existed, that no definition of duties, which clashed at several points, had ever been made, and that our achievements in the Air, at least to the end of 1916,

\* The controversy as to the control of the Naval Air Arm still continues.

† As a distinguished naval airman wrote at this time: "Collectively, I believe, we are not getting much more than 1s. in the £ value from all our undertaking. . . . One looks with envy at the organisation work and freedom from red tape of the R.F.C."

were due entirely to a small group of exceedingly able officers naval and military, and to the gallantry of young pilots who suffered terrible losses.

The anomalies at this time were surprising. At the Battle of Jutland, it was possible only to send up a single sea-plane,\* although, at many stages, air reconnaissance would have been invaluable and might have altered the course of events. Yet a *naval* bombing squadron was established on the Eastern frontier of France! There was no mutual arrangement between the Air Forces for home defence against air attacks then frequent. Moreover, at a period when invention was strongly stimulated, there were five independent bodies dealing with proposals for technical advances.

The Air Board, which had no executive powers, laboured under great difficulties, but can claim to have accomplished some useful work. Among many other matters, we arranged for a transfer from the R.N.A.S. to the R.F.C. of a number of aeroplanes then urgently needed in France, made provision for supplies of engines and machines to the Russian Government, and carried out careful inquiries into long-range bombing and home defence against aerial attack, while advocating a number of necessary measures which were afterwards adopted.

This was a short period of intensive education. I was brought into personal contact with officers from the front, manufacturers, and all the leading air experts of the time; but my only glimpse behind the scenes of the conduct of the War was terribly depressing. Everywhere there seemed to be a lack of direction for which the great energy and ability of individual air officers, and the devotion of our young pilots, could not wholly atone. Some of my old artillery studies were of use for the last time, and I was able to hasten the production of the incendiary bullets which proved fatal to hydrogen-inflated Zeppelins, and after the destruction of one of these

\* From the *Engadine*. The sea-plane carrier *Campania* went to sea at 1.30 a.m. on May 31, 1916, and was then ordered back to port, although she could have caught up the Grand Fleet without great difficulty. The *Menelaus* Kite Balloon ship remained at Scapa Flow.

monsters at Cuffley, to secure the immunity of the wreckage from disturbance until a set of drawings had been made of its structure. My one specific contribution to the operations was to urge the bombing of the bridge over the Maritza at Burgas which I remembered from my journey in 1886,\* and which was an important link in railway communications between Germany and Constantinople.†

At length Lord Curzon's long Report, embodying a survey of the situation and making some important proposals for the future was completed. It was inevitably somewhat polemical, and as in addition to advocating certain changes at the Admiralty, it urged that the Board should be made responsible for the supply of aircraft, which the already powerful Ministry of Munitions desired to monopolise, hostility developed in the Cabinet.

On November 28, 1916, Lord Curzon, Major Baird, and I met the Prime Minister and some of his colleagues at 10, Downing Street, when we stoutly defended our proposals without success. On the 30th, we had a private interview with Mr. Asquith, and again upheld our principles. Later my diary laconically records: "Air Board apparently done for" (December 11, 1916), as happened, though I can only guess at the reasons.‡ Mr. Lloyd George's bomb now burst in the Cabinet, and a new Government took office in which Lord Curzon became Lord President of the Council; Major Baird remained spokesman for the Air Services in the House of Commons, and another Board was formed, under the new Ministries and Secretaries Act, 1916, with Lord Cowdray as Chairman. The Air Ministry, which we advocated, was created under the Air Force (Constitution) Act, 1917, Lord Rothermere becoming a Secretary of State. In my whole life, I had never learned so much in so short a time, and it was a

\* See p. 84.

† This was an easy operation for sea-planes, which had only to follow the course of the Maritza for fifty miles from the sea. The bridge was bombed on a single occasion; but its destruction was not accomplished as I had urged, and I am doubtful if any useful result was obtained.

‡ Lord Curzon's Board was apparently wrecked, as had been Lord Derby's Committee, by the hostility of the Admiralty.



bitter reflection that this knowledge could not be turned to effective account.\*

My only consolation was Lord Curzon's encouraging letter written on December 10, 1916. "Without you, I could have done little. With your aid I think we have accomplished (or are on the eve of accomplishing) a good deal. . . . Perhaps, in the days to come, though no one gives us credit now, people may recognise that our six months' work laid the foundations of a powerful and successful system." †

My brief experience of Service under Lord Curzon left me with the impression of a powerful intellect associated with an avidity for hard work which I have never seen equalled in any Minister. He found it difficult to be tolerant of slackness or stupidity; but some alleged defects of temperament were mainly due to persistent ill health which he bore uncomplainingly to the end. I have had to take work to him when he was in bed and suffering acutely, but able to force himself to give his mind to matters of duty. Like many University-educated rulers he lacked training in science, which was needed in dealing with the technical questions of the Air, and is, I believe, essential in most fields of public activity.‡ As a chief, he was always considerate and open-minded. A rare administrator and a great patriot, he did not fit easily into our present forms of democracy, and his experiences in Mr. Lloyd George's Coalition Government must often have been painful.

For some time a school of thought had existed, diametrically opposed to the best naval opinion, and to all

\* I was, however, appointed Chairman of a Sub-committee to report on the regulation of civil aviation of which Mr. H. G. Wells was a member, whose principal anxiety was that the State and not private enterprise should dominate this form of aerial activity. The Report of this Sub-committee was completed on December 7, 1917.

† One sequel was that our Air Board was attacked in the House of Commons on April 4, 1917, by Mr. Churchill, who, however, stated that "the Admiralty had stifled" it. At Lord Curzon's request, I wrote a "Vindication" in the *Times* of April 9, bringing out the facts, which are of little consequence now.

‡ In an address on "Education, Science, and Leadership" given before the British Science Guild at the Mansion House on June 19, 1918, I tried to enforce this moral.

the principles for which I had fought. The new naval creed was not made public in a form which could be attacked ; but occasional glimpses were attainable. Thus, the advantages of speed were extolled not because it might be used to force an enemy to action, but because it would permit the British Navy to choose its fighting distance and to engage with a minimum of risk.\* The faster fleet can of course " open the range " when pursuing an enemy, as was done in the action off the Falkland Islands, or when steaming on a parallel course. If, however, a slower enemy desires to close, the faster fleet can only choose its range by running away, as had been hinted, though this was not clear to the lay mind to which the power of " choosing the range " naturally appeared attractive.

In September, 1916, about four months after the Battle of Jutland, of which only confused and quite inaccurate accounts were available, Mr. Churchill, with characteristic courage, committed the leading tenets of the new school to paper in the *London Magazine*. He declared that the " lay mind " had failed to understand that " the action of the British Navy is essentially offensive and aggressive " ; but he begged the nation to rest satisfied with " our silent attack on the vital interests of the enemy.† . . . No obligations of War oblige us to go further. . . . There was no strategic cause," impelling us to fight off the Danish coast. " What harm does it do us if the German fleet takes a promenade at sea ? " If, however, our fleet sought an action, our principal reflection " ought " to be : " What a lot we must have in hand," since only " the most conservative calculations of strength " and the " consciousness of overwhelming superiority " ‡ should induce us to accept " the additional risks " of fighting at a distance from our bases. Mr. Churchill's view of the Battle of Jutland was, therefore,

\* Conf. Lord Fisher's letter to von Tirpitz, " You're the one German sailor who understands war ! Kill your enemy without being killed yourself." *Memories*. (This letter was apparently not sent.)

† Which had been inoperative in the critical first year of the War and later. See pp. 315, 316.

‡ Who would agree upon a definition of " overwhelming superiority " ?

that "naval history records no prouder assertion of fighting superiority."

It was impossible not to comment severely on the peculiarly dangerous nature of the doctrines thus crudely expounded, and in a letter headed "Sea Heresy," I attempted briefly to recall the example of the old masters of naval war.

"It may fairly be said that these new theories of naval strategy violate the whole teaching of the great masters of war. Drake, begging to be allowed to attack the Armada off the coast of Spain, Hawke, electing to fight in the dangerous waters of Quiberon Bay, and Nelson, wearing out the last year of his glorious life in burning eagerness to bring his adversary to action, forgot to ask themselves 'what harm' would be done if the enemy 'took a promenade at sea.' . . . Now, as always, the one supreme naval object is to capture or destroy the enemy's armed ships whenever and wherever they are accessible. Mr. Churchill strangely fails to realise that nothing would exercise a more profound influence on the situation, present and future, than a decisive and final fleet action. His implied conclusions are that the present naval situation is perfectly satisfactory, and that we should not fight unless 'the most conservative calculations' lead to the 'consciousness of overwhelming superiority,' failing which we should 'fall back upon the safe and far stronger position of forcing the enemy to come right over to our coasts.' If ever Boards of Admiralty and naval commanders became imbued with ideas of this kind . . . we may bid farewell to the dominion of the Sea" (*Times*, October 4, 1916).

Only "Flag Officer" replied to my criticisms, which sound naval opinion supported, and I reiterated that :

"If the great seamen of the past had paused to consider 'what harm' the enemy might do . . . or whether they might rest 'quite satisfied' without fighting, there

would have been no British Empire to oppose the Prussianising of the world to-day.\*

“ All I wish to emphasise is the difference between the spirit on which all the most glorious traditions of the Royal Navy have been built up and certain quite recent theories, destructive of that spirit and unsupported by war experience. That a ‘ Flag Officer ’ can suggest that some ‘ limiting distance ’ should be laid down beyond which the action of our Fleet should be debarred is a proof of the spread of heresies that, if allowed to prevail, will imperil the foundations of the Empire ” (*Times*, October 10, 1916).

A shattering victory off Jutland would have altered the whole course of the War, enabling us to seal the exits of the U-boats and to enter the Baltic, while creating profound discouragement in place of exaltation in Germany. Such a victory might have been won, but the new naval psychology made it impossible.

The first account of the battle issued by the Admiralty, which presented the public with a totally false impression, gave me a shock which I can never forget ; but late at night I received reassuring news by telephone. The details of this great naval tragedy are now known.† The tremendous weight of the far superior Grand Fleet was never brought to bear upon the enemy. The new school, as Napoleon said of his Admirals, had “ drawn a picture ” which proved to be illusory. No submarines were present. British torpedoes were more effective than those of

\* The theories which Mr. Churchill had imbibed date back, I believe, to about 1906. They had some curious points of resemblance with the naval policy of Lord Howe, which, mercifully for the nation, Nelson flung aside.

† The first revelation of the truth came from America, whence Captain T. G. Frothingham, U.S.R., sent me his illuminating monograph, *The Truth about Jutland*, published in 1920 and embodied with amplifications in his *Naval History of the World War*. The latest Admiralty Charts and Review, for which I pressed over and over again in the House of Lords, fully bear out Captain Frothingham’s diagnosis, which completely upset the opinions formed in the Navy Department at Washington. The crucial phase of the battle was reached when Admiral Scheer returned eastward to find his “ T ” crossed by the most powerful fleet the world had ever seen, including twenty-four intact post-Dreadnought battleships. All else is of secondary importance.

the enemy, and we alone used sea-mines, laid by the *Abdiel*.

Our heavy losses were mainly due to structural defects in the battle cruisers, which Admiral von Tirpitz had carefully avoided. The gloom of the failure was relieved by the gallantry of the young destroyer commanders, caught at night, in cruising formation and unwarned, by the High Sea Fleet. The series of isolated actions which followed as the Grand Fleet steamed eighty miles to the south of Admiral Scheer's nearest line of retreat, the devotion and resourcefulness of our submarine officers in the Dardanelles and Baltic, and the shining exploit at Zeebrugge were worthy of the finest achievements of the old Navy.

I assume that the doctrines which prevailed at the Admiralty in 1914,\* and have left an ineffaceable mark on naval history, have now been obliterated by the stern teaching of War; but I am not sure whether the nation has yet learned its most pregnant naval lessons.† The disabilities of the Grand Fleet, painfully brought out in Lord Jellicoe's book (*The Grand Fleet, 1914-16*), which must have weighed heavily upon his mind, prove that what I had called the "material school," obsessed by megalomania, had neglected some essential studies in the Art of War.‡

\* Lord Jellicoe's important letter of October 30, 1914, presaging the tactics actually adopted at the crisis of the Battle of Jutland, received the formal approval of the Admiralty. No blame, therefore, attached to individuals. A perverted psychology prevailed and in the circumstances no great naval victory could have been won.

† In his third volume, Mr. Churchill shows that he has greatly modified the opinions which I ventured to criticise in 1916.

‡ It was discovered that at short ranges our torpedoes ran too deep, and this had to be remedied after some excellent chances had been lost.

## CHAPTER XXII

### THE GREAT WAR—*continued*

Two tremendous events closely coincident—the so-called “Russian” Revolution and the entry of America into the War—made the year 1917 decisive. The *coup d’état* effected by the orator Kerensky with the assistance of a soldiers’ and workers’ Soviet, was effusively acclaimed by the Government as the starting-point of intensified military activity by the Russian Armies.\*

On March 19, Mr. Lloyd George said: “These events . . . will result not in any confusion or slackness in the conduct of the War, but in closer co-operation between the Russian people and its Allies in the cause of freedom.” And on March 22, the Coalition Government informed Prince Lvoff that the Kerensky revolution was “the greatest service . . . yet made to the cause for which the Allied peoples have been fighting since August, 1914.” What the sudden destruction of a centralised government must mean should have been obvious, and I pointed out that “it is unfortunately clear that the Revolution is following the course which all students of history expected” (*Sunday Times*, August 22, 1917). History, however, was not a strong point with the then Prime Minister. Conditions in Russia rapidly became chaotic. The dictator issued three decrees which, with the support of German propaganda, started a rot in the fine Russian

\* Much that was written at this time was painfully reminiscent of the obscurantism exhibited when the corrupt committee of Union and Progress carried out a *coup d’état* in Turkey and when the Chinese set up a ridiculous Republic. I find in my diary that on June 8, 1917, I lunched at Brooks’ with Sir W. Mather to meet Messrs. Baddeley and Hagberg Wright as authorities on Russian affairs. Both were emphatic as to the happy prospects of the new régime, and I failed to convince them that chaos with bloodshed on a great scale was inevitable.

Armies that had gallantly and at huge sacrifice helped to save France in 1914. General Brussiloff, however, delivered a successful last attack, and to make certain, the German General Staff conveyed Lenin and his accomplices in a "sealed train" with large funds to the doomed land.\* Trotsky, released by our Government at Halifax, and a strong contingent of revolutionaries from New York immediately followed. The Terrorists proceeded to evict the Girondins, who had made straight the way for them, and after November, 1917, Russia was given over to murder, torture, and spoliation on a scale never imagined by Tamerlane.

On March 3, 1918, the infamous peace of Brest Litovsk was signed to the accompaniment of the rattling of General Hoffmann's sabre, and the largest of the Allied Armies disappeared from the theatre of War. Was it an over-statement that, "not by arms chivalrously used, but by lying propaganda in all lands, have the present advantages of Germany been gained"? (*New York Times*, December 9, 1917).

Just in time, but only by reason of the gross miscalculations and impolicy of the Germans, the New World came to ensure their defeat. In January, 1917, President Wilson, in his exchange of notes with Berlin, seemed bent upon arranging a "peace without victory," and as I wrote :

"The mental detachment arising from an excess of idealism or from domestic exigencies, may account for the President's dangerous attempt to commit the United States to the theory that peace without victory is essential to the future of the world—a theory which involves the negation of the moral law and the triumph of the forces of brutal aggression" (*Sunday Times*, January 28, 1917).

At this juncture, the late Lord Courtney, who represented a section of Liberal opinion, wrote to the *Times* upholding Mr. Wilson's idealism and exhorting us to "do something" and "to aim at more," while asking whether the

\* General Ludendorff has explained that he felt misgivings, but assumed that the Civil Authorities knew what they were about.

President would "concede something to our weakness. What are we prepared to concede to his call?" This seemed to refer to the "Freedom of the Seas," which Colonel House was incubating, and I replied to these suggestions, which I thought disastrous: "In such circumstances as we can at present foresee, the conditions of our national existence make it alike dangerous to 'do something' and unnecessary to 'look carefully at' Mr. Wilson's 'demand' " (*Times*, February 3, 1917).

Two months later, America was at war, and President Wilson announced to the Senate that "we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored and violated." This conclusion, if belated, was eminently just, and I pointed out that "no more convincing reasons for committing a great nation to the arbitrament of war have ever been penned. 'Let it suffice,' wrote Bacon, 'that no State can expect to be great that is not awake on any just occasion of arming.'" In the same article, I dealt with the new situation and added that

"during the many years in which the sanctity of the Monroe doctrine has depended mainly upon British sea power, the two Navies have fraternised in all parts of the world. . . . Their seamen and our own understand each other; the co-operation will be cordial and perfectly effective" (*Sunday Times*, April 8, 1917).

This co-operation was to be strikingly manifested.

The causes of the sudden change in the American attitude towards the War are evident. From the first the German and Austrian Embassies at Washington had been used as bases of operations by the Central Powers greatly to their advantage. This, however, was not enough, and plans to sabotage American munition works were foolishly entered upon by Count Bernstorff and his myrmidons. The damage effected was unimportant; but some Americans were killed, and the Middle and Western populations received new object lessons which they understood. The revelation of the Zimmerman



secret messages, most fortunately deciphered in London, disclosing a German plot to embroil the United States with Japan and Mexico, proved the last straw, although it was, as I wrote, a "stupidly futile plan." \* It would have been possible for the Kaiser's advisers to retain the neutrality of America by adopting a more conciliatory tone, by making concessions in regard to their piratical warfare, and by leaving American industries alone. By the end of 1916, however, the Great General Staff had come to believe that the indiscriminate sinking of shipping was certain to prove decisive against us. This was a more attractive policy than sacrificing men at Verdun or on the Somme, and President Wilson's apparent reluctance to move suggested that an unwarrantable risk might safely be taken. "The Germans," wrote Captain Frothingham, the American naval historian, to me, "lost the War because they were Germans." When at length the die was cast, they failed to form any idea of what a great unwarlike nation could accomplish in a short time, because their military authorities had not studied the Civil War.† Thus their great military effort, begun in March, 1918, and stemmed by British valour, came too late.

After April, 1917, I wrote frequently and by request in the American papers. Thus I ventured to advise immediate concentration on a great Air Force. "The greatest service America can render is to send the largest possible force of aeroplanes into the field in the shortest possible time. If the Allies were possessed of an absolute sufficiency of aircraft, the enemy could be expelled from France and Belgium quickly and with certainty" (*New York Times*, June 21, 1917). An immense effort was made at huge cost, and American pilots greatly distinguished themselves; but I believe that no aeroplane of purely American manufacture and design ever went into action.

Before and during the War, propaganda directed to deceive Americans in regard especially to Ireland and

\* *Sunday Times*, March 4, 1917.

† Like our Foreign Office in the matter of the blockade.

India, was rampant, and I tried frequently to warn our friends in the United States. Thus the *Chronicle* of New York gave prominence to the following :

“ There are two great questions which it is most important that Americans should understand, and desperate efforts are being made to induce them to believe glaring falsehoods about both. I refer to Ireland and India, which have curious points of resemblance.\* The more one lives, the more one feels the vast importance of knowledge and truth and the paucity of both.

“ Viewing this appalling war, I am not sure that the pen has not been quite as powerful as the sword, and that Germany may not owe more to the former than to the latter. Is it the carelessness and irresponsibility of a great part of the Press in all countries that tend to make us all inclined to disregard the search for truth ? Or is it the ease with which news is obtained that makes us too lazy to check its quality ? ” (August, 1918).

This gigantic evil has made great advances since the War, and Moscow is now the principal, but not the only, centre of the cleverest propaganda yet devised. Democracy, by vastly increasing the number of credulous and uninstructed persons who count politically, has tended to make domestic and international affairs in most countries the sport of the subtle propagandist.

Political conditions in India became gravely ominous during the War period, and I found myself involved in the greatest and most unsuccessful fight of my life. In October, 1917, Sir John Hewett suggested that I should inaugurate an “ Indo-British Association,” which was done at a large meeting at the Cannon Street Hotel on October 30, when telegrams in support from all parts of India were read, and excellent speeches were made by the late Mr. J. C. Shorrocks, Sir John Hewett,† and Commissioner Booth Tucker of the Salvation Army from

\* See pp. 289, 290. There is no doubt that the success of Irish revolutionary propaganda in America inspired Indians to similar methods.

† In the absence of Sir Arthur Lawley, who was detained by his duties in France.

different points of view, but all replete with sympathy for the peoples of India. After describing the situation, where Mrs. Besant had united the extremists in a Home Rule League and three Provincial Governments had been over-ruled in attempts to curb her sinister activities, I said :

“ We have seen the dangerous results of weakness of government in the past two years in Ireland, and we also see the appalling results of the collapse of government in Russia, where the population is only half that of India. . . . But we have not seen the end in either of these cases, and if we disregard these tremendous warnings, we shall deserve the disaster which will surely befall us. . . . We have met to-day to inaugurate a British-Indian Association, which will have among its objects the safeguarding of the interests of the Indian peoples, which at present are absolutely inseparable from the continuance of British rule. . . . It [the Association] can help to dispel some of the ignorance which prevails among us, and it will also help to counteract some of the gross misstatements which are being widely circulated at the present time.”

The Resolution unanimously passed by the meeting was : “ That an Association be formed in London under the title of the Indo-British Association having for its objects the protection of the best interests in India of British and Indians alike.” On these lines the Association worked hard until the passing of the Government of India Bill made opposition useless. We issued many pamphlets, including a collection of touching appeals from non-political and lower caste communities, which Mr. Montagu and his advisers ignored. We also suggested a constructive policy under nine heads, and our last publication, *The Crumbling of an Empire*, records chronologically the steps by which the disastrous Bill was reached and connects cause and effect.\*

I saw Mr. Montagu several times before his fateful

\* If the true history of one of the most momentous measures that ever passed through Parliament is ever written, some of these publications will be found indispensable.

tour in the winter of 1917, and tried to place Indian conditions before him in their true light. On October 18, 1917, he wrote :

“I have to thank you very much indeed for your kindness in sending me the proofs. There is much in which we are in complete accord. It is most kind of you. If at any time you find an opportunity of communicating with me further about reforms, I shall always be glad to hear from you.”

This encouraged me to write a letter full of suggestions and warnings, just before he started for India, and he replied from Calcutta on December 12, 1917 :

“Many thanks for your letter which contains many valuable and interesting suggestions.

“I am proceeding with caution, and feel that the task to which I have set my hand is too difficult to permit of hurrying matters. I can only thank you for your kind contributions.”

Whether, at this early period, Mr. Montagu had got beyond a vague idea of transplanting democratic institutions of a particular type to a vast country where not a vestige of a democracy was to be found, I do not know; but when his amazing Report was published some sources of inspiration were apparent.

On July 4, 1918 (my 70th birthday), I went with a deputation\* to the India Office, and we laid our views frankly before Mr. Montagu and Sir W. Duke, who appeared quite unable to confute them.

In writing and speech † I strove earnestly to warn the country of what would happen in India. It was all in vain. At a time when the Empire was fighting for its life, and calm consideration could not be given to Indian questions, we forced upon ancient Eastern peoples an exotic system of Government in a form which is plainly breaking down in the West, where, however, such a

\* Sir Charles Armstrong, Sir John Hewett, Sir Charles McLeod, Sir William Garth, Mr. J. C. Shorrocks, Mr. A. D. Jackson, and myself.

† See Chapter XXIII.

preposterous artifice as the dyarchy has never figured in any constitution.

The work of the Indo-British Association and my speeches—dictated solely by warm sympathy with the peoples of India—were grossly misrepresented by Indian politicians, who affected to regard them as reactionary and opposed to Indian progress. It was painful to lose many friendships which I valued, and to find that, on a public occasion, a Chief who had often stayed in my house and expressed full agreement with my views, was evidently anxious not to be seen in my company.\* The fate of my statue for which in 1913 I gave many sittings to the late Sir Thomas Brock—most charming of sculptors—has its humorous side. His work was exhibited in the Academy, but remained in the studio after his death, because no one would take delivery. At last this was arranged, and the statue, with a pedestal made in Italy to Sir T. Brock's design, arrived at Bombay and was stowed away in a Government godown! Will time—and understanding—bring a gentle revenge?

The first Imperial War Council, in which Representatives of the Dominions and India became for the time Cabinet Ministers, made a strong appeal to me, and in the *Montreal Star* of February 26, 1917, I wrote that, while effective co-operation in bringing the War to an end would be the "first object," more might result.

"Intimate interchange of opinion must smooth the way to a joint handling of the great problems which will follow the War.

"The Empire has shown alike the strength of its patriotism and the weakness which is necessitated by counsels unshared. The future depends absolutely upon union, not only of hearts, which the War has strikingly proved, but of action in securing full development of our splendid Imperial resources for the benefit of all British citizens, and for the consolidation of our defensive power and our economic position.

\* Some Indians have always understood, and I still occasionally receive grateful letters.

"All to whom the ideal of a United Empire, playing a noble part in promoting the progress and liberties of mankind, is an inspiration will realise that the attainment of this ideal has been rendered possible by common sacrifice and common sorrows, and that the opportunity may never recur."

I cannot think that this opportunity was grasped in the confusion of policy and lack of leadership which followed the War, and the difficulties have now greatly increased. The "tide in the affairs of men" and of nations which, if "taken at the flood," can generate triumphs of statesmanship, may never return; but the development of our Imperial heritage as the only sure source of future prosperity, is now widely proclaimed.

After the breakdown of the Zeppelins, there were a number of air raids including four in three weeks in May and June, 1917, and three in succession on the nights of February 17, 18, and 19, 1918. The total loss of life was considerable; but the enemy pilots never descended low enough to accomplish any military purpose. The effect was to create widespread indignation, and I had many requests for opinions on the measures that should be taken. There was then no proper co-ordination of home defence. The Air Ministry was not yet established; there were two distinct Air Forces, and it seemed "vital that their co-operation should be ensured."\* I strongly pressed for public warnings, and this necessary step was at length taken; but I opposed the suggestion of reprisals, which I believed would be ineffective.

"If we were able to counter every raid by an immediate attack in equal or greater force upon Berlin, it is possible that the desired moral effect might be produced; but this is impracticable. . . . The alternative is defence at home which means attack and always attack. If on the 7th inst. we had been able to put a squadron of fighting machines in the air, the enemy's formation would have been broken up, and his loss must have been severe. . . .

\* *Evening Standard*, June 28, 1917.

We have yet to learn how air power must be organised, administered, and handled" (*The Observer*, July 15, 1917).\*

The organisation at this time was faulty in many respects, and opportunities were certainly lost, although the insistent demands from the front rightly claimed priority. "We must strain every effort to increase the number of our fast fighting machines at home." I pressed for an organisation which would ensure that our fighting machines should be able quickly to go into the air, that an officer with adequate authority should be present, and that "at every air station in the British Isles, the same disciplinary conditions as exist behind the lines in France should obtain" (*Evening News*, July 9, 1917).

The Report of Lord Cromer's Commission on the fiasco in the Dardanelles and that of Lord George Hamilton on the disaster in Mesopotamia, gave painful insight into the conduct of the War, and but for the all-pervading strain upon the nation at this time, would have produced a profound impression. The root causes of two of the outstanding tragedies of the War were carefully investigated. Both were shown to be absolutely unnecessary, and I tried to drive home the pregnant lessons to be learned from the Reports. The "conception" of enabling the Navy to range over the Marmora and appear before Constantinople was

"thoroughly sound, and given prompt decisions based upon the rich experience of war, there is strong reason to believe that a notable success, which would have exercised a powerful influence on subsequent events, would have been obtained. . . . The final decision must, in a democracy, rest with Civilian Ministers; but it is the first duty of the Prime Minister to ensure not only that the best expert views are brought to bear upon all naval and military proposals, but to examine the basis of such views and to satisfy himself that they rest on known facts and actual war experience. This primary duty was not

\* One of six articles in several papers.

performed. There was no discussion worthy of the name, and the experts seem to have been playing a game of cross purposes. . . ." (*Sunday Times*, March 11, 1917).

"The Civil Minister, Mr. Churchill," said Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, in evidence, "was very keen on his own views. . . . He kept on saying that he could do it without the aid of the Army." Admiral Sir Henry Jackson seems to have approved the attack on the outer forts, but considered an attempt by the Fleet alone to force the passage was "a mad thing to do." Lord Fisher strongly disapproved, but failed to give his views to the War Council, and there was a dramatic scene. On the other hand, the Prime Minister informed the Commission that the War Council was "entitled to assume" that Mr. Churchill's view "was the considered opinion of the Board of Admiralty as a whole," which was not the case.\*

The Gallipoli Peninsula could easily have been seized and held by a moderate military force if, which is doubtful, the plan could have been kept secret, and at Washington it was confidently expected that this would be done. The premature and useless "preliminary bombardment" of the outer forts on November 3, 1914, gave the Germans warning, and the long delay after the arrival of the expeditionary force at Mudros provided ample time for the erection of formidable defences, which could not be taken. The landing at the toe of the Peninsula was one of the finest exploits in our military annals, and the final withdrawal of our forces was a masterpiece of organisation; but the losses and the suffering entailed upon the troops by this most tragic failure were appalling.

The same causes led to the same results in Mesopotamia, where, however, decisions were rendered more difficult as the Government of India was primarily involved. That Government at first did not appear to grasp the implications of the War, and Lord Kitchener was constrained to write: "I do not think you yet quite realise in India what

\* Writing to Lord Fisher at the end of February, 1915, I suggested this explanation, and he replied: "Your surmise as to Dardanelles is right; but my lips are sealed" (March 3, 1917).



the War is going to be. If we lose, it will be worse for India than any success of internal revolution or frontier attack." The successive steps by which Lord Crewe's policy—"In Mesopotamia a safe game must be played" (April 24)—was exchanged for the inconceivably rash plan of an advance, with troops, described by General Townshend as already "tired" and having no reserves behind them, were explained in detail by the Commission. A task was attempted for which the forces available and the medical provision were hopelessly inadequate. As the Report, which was fearlessly outspoken, truly stated: "The result of the era of economy before the War was that the Army was inadequately equipped, not only for an oversea expedition, but even for frontier requirements." Hence arose the terrible suffering of the wounded after the retreat from Ctesiphon in November, 1915—suffering happily elsewhere unexampled. The warnings disregarded, the ignorance of the main facts of the situation, alike in India and in Whitehall, and the irregularity of the proceedings, combine to make the Mesopotamia disaster unique in the chequered history of the War. The military failure was retrieved by the brilliant campaign of General Sir Stanley Maude, and the gallantry and endurance of the British and Indian troops shine through the gloom. But Lord G. Hamilton's Report remains, as I described it, "one of the most painful documents ever made public. It is a revelation of confused counsels, administrative muddling, and some sheer incompetence" (*Evening Standard*, June 28, 1917). Is it certain that the lessons of these two Reports—both now forgotten—have been taken to heart?

On August 17, 1917, Lord Curzon offered me a seat on the Second Chamber Conference, and I owe to him the last of more decorations than I have deserved—the G.B.E.—with which I was invested by the King on September 27, 1917. The Conference under Lord Bryce entailed many sittings, and floods of talk frequently most depressing. We were in general agreement as to the kind of Second Chamber needed. What was called "the Cross-Bench

mind " was held up as the ideal to be attained ; but when constructive proposals were under consideration, divergencies became painfully apparent. On the Liberal side, fear lest the Second Chamber should be too weak conflicted with the traditional theory that strength was inadmissible except in the case of a mainly elected House. Lord Bryce was an admirable Chairman, who brought together the practice and experience of all other countries, which his great learning could illuminate. His Report embodied an ingenious scheme based upon constitutional theories, which human nature and racial characteristics may always invalidate ; but unanimity was unattainable. The leading Conservative Members \* dissented from the main proposal, and Lord Loreburn, Mr. Scanlon (the Irish representative), and I from the scheme as a whole. Lord Bryce, in several letters, begged me to give " at least a Second Reading approval," which I found impossible.

There have been grave warnings of danger to the Constitution since Lord Bryce's Conference completed its labours, and the Second Chamber question has again become burning ; but the Report of 1918, which was not favourably received, has passed into oblivion. Accumulating proofs of the failure of democratic principles have somewhat changed my own views, and I now believe that the Upper House should be composed of about 275 hereditary Peers elected by the whole body (for a period of not more than ten years, and eligible for re-election) and about 75 nominations, of which some should be automatic selections.† The repeal of the Parliament Act—a fatal measure dictated by temporary political expediency—is now impossible ; but improved methods of certifying money Bills are essential, and the Upper House should in other cases have full powers of delay with a General Election as the last resort. I have, however, little hope that such a solution will find favour, because prejudice against the hereditary principle remains ingrained although

\* Including Lord Lansdowne and Lord Balfour of Burleigh.

† This closely follows the proposal of a Committee of the House of Lords in 1909 ; but Dominion Representatives should be included.

all recent researches go to prove the outstanding importance of heredity and all experience proves the futility of popular election.

The Conference brought me into close association with Lord Loreburn, with whom I differed on many matters. He had written a book to refute my views on the capture of private property at sea.\* On the causes and the prospects of the War, we could not see eye to eye. To him it was always a harrowing reflection that, as he used to say, the older men were responsible, and upon the younger fell all the loss and suffering. He had—so I thought—an exaggerated idea of the might and solidarity of the Germans, and maintained that, whatever happened, they would never make a revolution. The naval and military operations conveyed little to his mind, and a warm heart inclined him to pacifism. Yet we had much in common. He was the least politically minded of the public men I have known, in the sense that political considerations were to him subordinate to the higher claims of national interest. He viewed the unravelled Marconi scandal, of which he knew more than he could tell, as the beginning of a train of evils, and he regarded the sale of honours as a prime source of public corruption. His experiences in the Cabinet, which he left in 1912, left him with some strong antagonisms, as to which he was outspoken. I had written as to our representation on the Peace Conference and other matters, and he replied on November 22, 1918: "I put it quite straight to the L[ord] C[hancellor]; but I am not confident of any good result, and I doubt his having any weight in the appointment of our representative. . . . The story about the penetration of the English market by subterranean influences seems to be quite established and very objectionable." He then referred to "the frightful mistake which the Coalition and the Party leaders are making in shirking all genuine attempts to put down the 'Sale of Honours.' Really that is the key to the whole fabric of public corruption." Of the momentous (coupon) election then impending he wrote :

\* See p. 203.

"I expect the Coalition candidates will win with a large number of Labour men. Asquith & Co. will make nothing of it. What I lament is the probable absence from the next House of independent men. The ties of Coalition and Labour will bind them all. To my mind the real danger is that the caucuses will overcome all independence in Parliament." \*

This forecast was largely justified during the reign of the Coalition. After Lord Loreburn left London to settle at Kingsdown House, we never met again; but he occasionally wrote me long letters which I valued.

Lord Carnarvon's Commission, which reported in 1879,† had laid down as an axiom, on evidence which I thought inconclusive, that convoys were no longer possible, and in my imaginary naval war, I purposely reverted to this time-honoured method of protecting commerce.

In February, 1917, I wrote to Lord Curzon pressing that the matter should be reviewed, and he replied on the 28rd: "The question of convoys has been considered. You know the drawbacks. (1) The pace of the convoy is that of the lamest duck. (2) We have not enough destroyers." I believe that some naval opinion was always in favour of convoys,‡ which were formally adopted by the Admiralty in June, 1917, but not in full working order till October. The system had the great tactical advantage that it forced the German submarines to act in known positions where means of attacking them could be provided. Definite and certain risks were, therefore, imposed upon the U-boat commanders. Von Tirpitz said of the system that it "constituted a tremendous achievement on the part of the English." And Captain Persius, the German naval publicist, declared that "the most important agency in frustrating the submarine was the convoy system."

From the time when Lord Milner took office in Mr. Lloyd George's first Cabinet, I wrote freely and frankly to

\* In New South Wales and elsewhere this has happened.

† See p. 39.

‡ The American naval authorities held this view.

him knowing that he would listen, as his many letters to me proved. Thus, he wrote: "Many thanks for your long and excellent letter of December 25 [1916]. I lay to heart what you say, and hope to profit by it. One or two points on which you lay special stress are already being attended to." In July, 1917, I emphasised the danger of the subversive propaganda then widely prevalent and the need of informing the public. He replied on July 30:

"The subject is extremely serious, and is never out of one's mind, although I comfort myself with the reflection that this nation with all its faults—perhaps owing to some of them—is very much less easy to stir up with idealistic tosh than either French or Russians. . . . I am entirely in favour of publicity and letting the general public—which I believe is sound—know as clearly as possible what mischief is going on subterraneously. . . . With regard to the Russian situation, I find myself, as I often do, in complete accord with your appreciation."

Lord Milner's view of our relative immunity from the influence of "idealistic tosh," which is still widely held, has not been borne out by experience since the War. No country has suffered so severely from imported Socialist propaganda as our own, and we have yet to reap the full effects.

In October, 1917, I sent him a long memorandum dealing with the position on the Western Front, and he replied on October 28:

"With regard to the Memorandum you have sent me on this subject, I have taken expert advice. I thought it prudent not to go direct to the War Office Chiefs, but to avail myself of a channel through which I was sure that the substance of the Memorandum would reach them. . . . My friend's view is that the two main points in the Memorandum \* . . . are both good points."

\* The lack of touch between the staff at G.H.Q. and the troops in the fighting line, and the need for some changes in training with a view to inculcate greater reliance on the rifle and on open order fighting. On these lines, the American Army was trained, and General Pershing has stated that "the development of a self-reliant infantry by thorough drill with the rifle and in the tactics of open warfare was always uppermost."

My diary on February 17, 1918, records: "Milner sent for me to discuss Versailles military conferences; very interesting talk." In November, 1917, as a result of a Conference at Rapallo, a political Council of the Allies to deal with questions on the Western Front, had been set up at Versailles, with a Central Military Committee to supply technical advice. These arrangements were not working as expected, and we discussed them at length. I learned that Lord Milner's mind was turning towards unity of command, which I thought essential, and which after the overwhelming of the 5th Army a month later, he was instrumental in establishing.

On March 18, 1918, he wrote: "Drop me any hints you can. I always mind them. If I don't always answer, you will understand." Lord Milner's last letter, written on March 25, 1919, in reply to a request that he would address the British Science Guild, is significant.

"My whereabouts are altogether uncertain, unless that blessed Peace Conference breaks up in a 'row,' and it is impossible to be sure that that will happen before May.

"Unity of command won the War. There is no unity of command at Paris, but the greatest conflict of counsels."

On November 11, 1918, I wrote in my diary: "Armistice signed. Peace at last. What now?"

Upon all who closely followed the changing scenes in the great tragedy and had not the relief of active participation, the War must have left an ineffaceable mark. My wife and I tried to become immersed in all work that offered; \* but the sense of helplessness in face of national calamity was often overpowering. Even the peace of our

\* The principal bodies with which I worked at this time or later were: The Belgian Field Hospital (President); National Council for Combating Venereal Disease (President); British Empire League (Chairman); British Science League (President); Y.W.C.A. (Treasurer); Safety First Council (President); Indo-British Association (President); Empire Land Settlement Committee R.C.I. (Chairman); Royal Life Boat Executive (Member); Association of Technical Institutes (President one year); British Empire Producers Organisation (President).

Kentish garden, where we could watch Nature silently fashioning miracles of beauty in lavish yet microscopic perfection, failed to bring freedom from the haunting consciousness of the continuous destruction of our best manhood. The reports of the guns in Flanders were often audible, and on the night of September 29, 1917, the pulsating drone of a Gotha sounded close overhead, as if the pilot was circling round seeking his way in the fog that prevailed.\* There were periods of depression when the unalloyed devotion of our dogs, blissfully unconscious and revelling in their accustomed pleasures, was a solace.

When time shall have lent proportion now lacking, the historian will be forced to decide that the World War marked the zenith of our Empire in patriotism, patient endurance, and gallantry on sea and land and in the air never surpassed in its annals. No other Empire has ever been able to find 4,000,000 volunteers willing to take up arms for the defence of its honour. Will this greatest of epics serve as an inspiration to generations to which the World War can only be a tradition ; or will the organised efforts, which in many guises are being directed to undermine national patriotism, succeed in causing it to be regarded as an aberration largely mythical ? When peace came, I had passed my seventieth year, and I first realised that old age had come.

\* Two bombs, fortunately for us incendiary, fell within 50 feet of our house in London.

## CHAPTER XXIII

### THE HOUSE OF LORDS

ON June 5, 1913, I took my seat in the House of Lords, my sponsors being Lord Harris, a distinguished ex-Governor of Bombay, and Lord Welby, a friend of more than twenty years.\* The blight of the Parliament Act of 1911 lay heavily over the historic House, as I quickly realised. Reduced to the position of one of the weakest Second Chambers in the world, it contains statesmen as able and experienced as any in the House of Commons, and has at disposal far more practical knowledge of Imperial affairs. It cannot reject or amend any measure certified—by the Speaker alone—as a Money Bill, and its power is restricted in all other respects to a delay of at most two years—a power most difficult to exercise. The constitution of the realm can now be subverted behind its back. Such amending powers as remained in theory were sharply curtailed in practice. Important Bills were sent up from the House of Commons at the fag end of the Sessions, when there was not time for full consideration, and it was impossible to press any amendments opposed by the Government. Further, it was not unusual for the Government to warn the House of the danger of conflict with the Commons, which during the War period was unthinkable. It followed that measures of such vital importance as the Representation of the People Bill and the Government of India Bill, which in other days would certainly have been amended or postponed by a strong majority of the Upper House, received its nominal assent.

\* This old-time ceremony, perhaps now doomed, is preceded by a short rehearsal under Garter in the "Moses Room," and I have five times taken part in it.



The evil consequences of Mr. Asquith's breach of the Constitution upon the nation and the Empire will in time be understood.

In these circumstances, it was inevitable that many peers ceased regularly to attend the sittings, that the active members were profoundly discouraged, and that the unreality of the proceedings was often painfully depressing.\* Such perhaps was the experience of the Roman Senators under Septimius Severus and his successors.

The Association of Independent Unionist Peers with which I worked had an organisation which enabled it to raise debates on some occasions and to play the part of an opposition to a limited extent. The effect of the Lloyd George Coalition of 1916, and especially that of 1918, was, however, to involve leading Unionist peers in policies of which otherwise they would have been formidable opponents, and thus further to weaken the Upper House when fearless exercise of its functions was most needed. It was in these unnatural conditions that the Union was destroyed by Unionists.

Throughout these fateful years, there was always a group of peers who urged that Germany should be fought as France was fought by the Chatham Administration in the Seven Years' War; who were strongly opposed to a huge increase in the electorate when the nation was fighting for its life, and to what Mr. Montagu called "a very dangerous experiment" in India; who denounced the sudden surrender to the Irish revolutionaries; who protested against the establishment of a "Russian" Trade Delegation in the heart of the Empire; and who advocated measures against the corruption of our people by German and Bolshevik agencies working for the destruction of the Empire. Some Gibbon of the future may explain why our protests and warnings carried little or no weight with three successive Governments.

At Lord Midleton's request, I delivered my maiden

\* Incidentally it was natural that our debates were inadequately reported by the Press.

speech on Sanitation in India (June 9, 1913), in the course of which I said :

“ The [Indian] masses have not the slightest belief in modern sanitary science, and even the educated classes are only beginning to trust our scientific methods. . . . The greatest quality needed in an Indian administrator is patience. . . . I feel that initiative and the impulse to sanitary measures must come mainly from the local Governments. . . . We want to encourage Indian women to take up the medical profession because they can do work which is absolutely denied to men.”

Before the outbreak of the Great War, I made in all fourteen speeches, in one of which, on the India Council Bill (July 7, 1914), I sought to emphasise basic facts which later were to be ignored by Parliament. Thus I pointed out that “ the Pathan of the North-West differs far more from the Tamil of the South than a Norwegian from an Italian.” And I added that “ Europe, compared with India, is a homogeneous aggregate of peoples.”

Three speeches were devoted to Ireland, where a dangerous situation had arisen in regard to the position of Ulster under the Home Rule Bill. The King’s Speech on February 10, 1914, breathed an earnest desire for a peaceful settlement, and Mr. Asquith in the debate seemed to hold out hopes of the exclusion of the Northern Province. On March 9, he impressively announced a scheme for a referendum by counties and county boroughs, which were to be excluded if they so decided for six years, and then to be automatically included. A more objectionable plan could hardly have been suggested, and Ulster took alarm. The attitude of the Government then abruptly changed, and at Bradford on March 14, Mr. Churchill, in a menacing speech, delivered “ in an outspoken and characteristic fashion,” \* said that there were “ worse things than bloodshed, even on an extensive scale.” The 3rd Battle Squadron and a destroyer Flotilla were suddenly moved to Lamlash, and preparations were

\* Lord Oxford and Asquith’s *Fifty Years of Parliamentary Life*, 1926.

made to employ about 25,000 troops. The Curragh incident followed, and on March 20, Brigadier-General Gough reported that, if active operations against Ulster were "initiated," fifty-nine of seventy-two officers in the 3rd Cavalry Brigade would "prefer to be dismissed." All ideas of coercing Ulster were now at an end, and the Government had to retreat behind the smoke-screen of "unfortunate misunderstandings" never fully explained. It is now forgotten that a catastrophe of the first magnitude, due to the reckless policy of the Liberal Cabinet, was narrowly averted just before the outbreak of the Great War.

All this was most alarming to me, not only from the point of view of the Army and of the Empire, but because I was convinced that a European War was impending. I therefore strongly protested against the coercion of Ulster, which was abhorrent to the Unionist peers. "We cannot use force to coerce Ulster. . . . If Home Rule were established under the auspices of martial law, the only result would be a train of evils too appalling for us to contemplate. . . ." (February 12, 1914, on the address in reply to the King's Speech). Referring again to the Army and Ulster on March 30, 1914, I said: "The preaching of antagonism between the people and the Army which exists for their protection can only lead to irreparable disaster to our Empire."

After the outbreak of the War, I spoke much more frequently. The conduct of the operations, in the first two years especially, was such as to cause the greatest anxiety to all students of the problems which suddenly became vital, and only in Parliament could reasoned criticism be brought directly to bear on the Government.

Thus the effect of the application with minor modifications in August, 1914, of the Declaration of London, inflicted irretrievable injury upon the nation and the cause of the Allies. This instrument, the provisions of which I have explained elsewhere,\* had never been ratified.

\* See p. 318. The declaration was aptly described by Lord Parmoor: "There never was an International Code less fair to a maritime Power or to an island country than was the Declaration of London" (House of Lords, December 20, 1915).

It was accepted by the House of Commons and rejected by the Upper House.\* Was this initial step of Mr. Asquith's Government constitutional? The results were soon apparent. For many months the Germans were continuously supplied with commodities which, when their plan of a short campaign broke down in September, 1914, became essential to the future prosecution of the War. This scrap of paper, by prolonging the War to more than four years, had to be paid for at a staggering cost in precious lives and treasure, apart from other ills from which we are now suffering grievously.

The late Lord Portsmouth, after consulting me, raised some questions regarding the Declaration on December 1, 1915, and Lord Lansdowne explained the modifications introduced, which led the veteran Lord Halsbury to pronounce it "dead." Every step taken in the mutilating process was, however, made difficult, because it could be represented as a breach of a formal undertaking, and, while increasing stringency was forced upon the Government, the blockade was never really effective until America joined the Allies in April, 1917.†

At a time when heavy fighting was engrossing public attention, the fact that Germany was quietly acquiring vital war resources was too little realised, and over and over again I tried to protest against the gaps in the blockade. On December 20, 1915, I pointed out that

"it was not until August [1915] after the War had been going on a year that cotton‡ was made contraband. . . . Early in the period of the War, the German Government itself undertook measures for shipping part of the American crop of 1914. That was, I believe, told to our late [the Pre-Coalition] Government, who were at the same time offered an option on so much of that crop

\* Partly, I believe, in consequence of the patriotic efforts of Mr. Gibson Bowles.

† One of the early acts of the American Government was to commandeer Dutch shipping which upset the equanimity of some neutrals. As Mr. Page wrote on March 8, 1918, "We became just as remorseless in disregarding the rights of small nations as G. B.—according to our numerous blockade notes—had been."

‡ See p. 316.

as would have secured the ready acquiescence of the Southern States [of the U.S.A.] cotton interests in making cotton contraband at that time. More than that, the price was so low that it would have been an excellent investment."

I reminded the House that the American Civil War had furnished us with admirable precedents for enforcing the most stringent form of blockade in exactly analogous circumstances, and I ended by urging that "the most humane course in the interests of the Civilised World was that our sea power should be used to the utmost extent."

Believing that the American precedent was not generally understood, I moved on February 22, 1916, that "this House considers that, in conformity with the principles of International Law and with the legitimate rights of neutrals, more effective use could be made of the Allied Fleets in preventing supplies, directly conducing to the prolongation of the War, from reaching enemy countries." It seemed to be desirable briefly to describe the measures taken by the Federal Government in the Civil War, and I said :

"The action of President Lincoln when the Northern States were fighting, just as the Allies are fighting now, for national existence, does, however, supply international precedents of the utmost importance. Briefly, what the Federal Government did at that time was this. It proclaimed a blockade of the whole Confederate coast; it boldly extended the doctrine of continuous voyage, and made foodstuffs and everything that the Confederate States needed for carrying on the War absolute contraband. The practical, though not the technical, effect of that was to set up a long-distance blockade, which included neutral Mexican ports, our port of Nassau in the Bahamas, and also our port of Bermuda. In the leading case, that of the *Springbok*, which came before the Supreme Court of the United States, it was decided that the ship was legally captured because, though she was bound for Nassau, the presumption was that her cargo was to be

transhipped there for Matamoros or for some Confederate port. Nassau is more than 1,000 miles from Matamoros and 150 miles from the nearest point on the Florida coast, and Bermuda is 800 miles from Charleston ; but Rotterdam is only 150 miles from Emden and about 200 miles from the mouth of the Elbe."

The analogy seemed complete,\* and it is difficult to believe that President Wilson's Administration could have resisted the precedent of the *Springbok*. Lord Beresford supported the motion, which was opposed by Lords Lansdowne and Crewe on behalf of the Government. The former said that "under our present system, we stop everything we can from reaching the enemy"; but he announced that the Government intended to put the whole management of the blockade in the hands of a Cabinet Minister. The Lord Chancellor (Lord Buckmaster) had "no hesitation in saying that Abraham Lincoln was quite right when he extended the then existing principles of International Law so as to make them cover the doctrine of continuous voyage." What was right and proper for the Federal States appeared, however, to be impracticable for the British Empire when also fighting for existence.

On many other occasions I brought to notice figures of supplies actually passing into Germany, some of which were given to me by the late Dr. A. D. Waller, F.R.S., who was a careful student of this question. I am doubtful if these many attempts, in which Lord Beresford shared, to make the blockade a reality were of any avail.

Admiral Consett's † revelations in *The Triumph of Unarmed Forces*, ‡ showing that supplies of many kinds and even currency liberally passed through neutral countries into Germany from *British* sources, threw a new light on the manifold leakages of the blockade. Here was a trade of great importance to the enemy, which American observers naturally viewed with amazement, and which

\* Except that the Federal Government was not for some time in a position to enforce its blockade, while our Navy was perfectly competent.

† Naval Attaché in Scandinavia during the War.

‡ Williams and Norgate, 1923.

the Government could have ended by a stroke of the pen. It seemed to me necessary that these detailed allegations should be disproved or investigated, and I put down for June 27, 1923, the question: "To ask H.M.'s Government whether it is proposed to issue any explanation of the statement and statistics published by the late naval attaché in Scandinavia in his book *The Triumph of Unarmed Forces*." I pointed out again that "cotton which was vital to the manufacture of propellants and copper which was essential to the rotation of shells were both poured into Germany—literally poured." In a single case to which I referred, a cargo of 6,000 tons of copper went viâ Malmo to Stettin, sufficient to "make driving bands for 6,750,000 field shells." I briefly recalled some of the startling evidence adduced by Admiral Consett, which proved that an exceedingly profitable trade was carried on by British subjects with Germany through neutral countries. The reply, read by the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, but I believe drafted in the Foreign Office, declared that "it is not considered that any good purpose would be served by reopening this intricate and difficult subject," and went on to blame Admiral Consett for using information acquired in his official capacity.\* The book, it was held, should be left to "the verdict of history," and therefore deeply buried as far as the Government was concerned.

Lord Grey, whose eye troubles had prevented his reading the book, revived the old plea that interference with cotton—made contraband when it was too late—might have caused the American Government to put an embargo on munitions from the United States. Lord Denbigh alone pointed out that the ex-Foreign Secretary had ignored "trading with neutral countries for the benefit of the enemy which went on from our own country," and formed the gravamen of Admiral Consett's charges. I again reminded the House of the failure to buy the cotton crop and of the rigid principles of blockade enforced

\* Such knowledge was freely and effectively used by Mr. Churchill and other authorities.

in the American Civil War; but no further answer was forthcoming. I failed to arouse interest in this matter; but I had the satisfaction that the Government spokesman came round to the cross-benches and said: "The Admiralty is with you," as I knew to be the case. Behind Admiral Consett's revelations lie scandals which will never be exposed.

On the outbreak of War, the Germans promptly proceeded according to plan, to intern our nationals, even including persons detained by health reasons, and the conditions of internment were sometimes worse than unpleasant. The Asquith and first Coalition Governments, on the other hand, showed extraordinary leniency towards the subjects of belligerents. Prominent persons were allowed to be naturalised. German businesses were very slowly and not always effectively wound up, and in India appeared to be immune. So far had German penetration into our trade and industries been gradually allowed to proceed, that the difficulties of the Government in dealing with these matters were admittedly considerable. It seemed to me that greater stringency was essential, especially as organised efforts to weaken the national *moral* were in progress which could be assisted by Germans who appeared to remain entrenched in this country. From January 27, 1916, I continuously laboured to produce evidence of laxity at home and in India, and to urge as strongly as I could that the Government should give the country necessary protection. At length on July 18, 1916, Lord Islington, in answer to one of my questions, informed the House that "the Government of India, in order to secure complete power over these [German] firms, is issuing two ordinances," and I said: "I am sure the House will welcome the two ordinances of the Government of India; but the war has been in existence nearly two years." \* Lord Salisbury's comment was: "I think that it is extremely doubtful whether the Government of India would have done anything at all in this matter except for Lord Sydenham's questions."

\* The dilatory proceedings of the Government of India contrasted sharply with the prompt action of the Australian Government.



As late as July 8, 1918, I informed the House that "there were three great German banks in the City not yet wound up." "The managers, who are free to walk about London, are extremely able Germans who have a great deal of very secret knowledge." Seven days after the Armistice, I warned the House of the danger of allowing German penetration into our commercial life to be resumed. "We shall be mad if we permit that penetration to go on in future."

Throughout the War, the idea of a "Hidden Hand" was prevalent sometimes in exaggerated forms; but any one who carefully watched what went on, could not avoid the impression of a certain impalpable tenderness to German interests which has never been explained. No reciprocal consideration was ever visible in Germany; but in Austria the treatment of our nationals was generally considerate, and in Hungary they met with kindness.

The War years were charged with the fate of India. If the full story is ever written, it will appear that War conditions alone made possible the successive political manœuvres by which the Government of 320,000,000 Eastern peoples was launched upon uncharted seas. To Indian questions, many of my speeches during this period were devoted. The valuable assistance freely given by the Princes and Chiefs to the Imperial cause has been worthily recorded. The Indian Army fought gallantly in four theatres of War, and the mutinies of regiments at Singapore, in Ceylon, and at Rangoon were due to alien corruption locally applied. Recruiting, in the Punjab especially, surpassed all expectations. Old India and Martial India made a magnificent response to the call to arms, and the resources of the great Eastern sub-continent proved vastly important to the military operations.

The opportunities offered at a time when our Government was working under great strain were not lost upon the Indian political malcontents. Mrs. Besant, abandoning theosophy for politics, succeeded in forming a Home Rule League uniting factions which had come to blows during a meeting of the National Congress at Surat in 1907.

Circumstances favoured her projects, and nineteen members of the Legislative Assembly issued a truculent manifesto which, in December, 1916, received the support of the National Congress and the Moslem League. On December 7, Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister, and after the resignation of Mr. Chamberlain,\* he appointed Mr. Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India—the most momentous of his many selections. Mr. Montagu had just previously denounced our Government in India, which, with little knowledge of the administrative machinery, he declared to be “too wooden, too iron, too inelastic, and too antediluvian.” He went on to demand that we “ought to remodel . . . this century-old and cumbrous machine.” The ignorance of this speech was typical of what was to follow. The “century-old” Government had been completely remodelled in 1858, and again in 1910, by Lords Morley and Minto, whose extensive Reforms † were not yet in full working order; while the existing “machine” was infinitely less “cumbrous” than that which Mr. Montagu proceeded to erect. On August 20, 1917, he announced in the House of Commons that the Government proposed to undertake “the progressive realisation of responsible Government,” and that he would proceed to India to incubate his proposals.

Here was strong encouragement to the violent agitation which was in progress. If only Mr. Montagu could be made to see eye to eye with Mrs. Besant, the ambitions of the small group of partly Westernised politicians might be realised. Meanwhile, her paper, *New India*, having implicitly endorsed assassination, the Government of Madras—apparently with the sanction of the Secretary of State and the new Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford—interned the revolutionary lady in her own bungalow at Ootacamund, whence, after hoisting her Home Rule flag, she telegraphed that, if released, she was “ready to co-operate in obtaining a calm atmosphere” during Mr. Montagu’s approaching visit. This ingenious suggestion, backed by a demand from

\* Following the Report of Lord George Hamilton’s Committee.

† See pp. 239, 240.

her political allies, couched, as I said, "in language which might have been used by the German Foreign Office to Venezuela" (October 24, 1917), was promptly accepted, the new Secretary of State overriding the protests and discrediting the authority of the Government of Madras. Here was the first of a series of concessions to organised clamour, each followed by intensified agitation.

To all who knew and loved India the situation in 1917 appeared alarming. There had been rebellion in Ireland, whither the Germans had sent Casement, as they had dispatched Lenin and Trotsky (Bronstein) to Russia. The Kerensky Government, which Mr. Lloyd George had effusively acclaimed,\* was leading Russia towards chaos and a Bolshevik (Marxian) dictatorship. Events in Ireland and in Russia had been noted in India, where the Home Rule party was labouring to stir up race hatred and to bring Government into contempt, with the result of many outrages. I therefore put down a notice for October 24, 1917: "To draw attention to the present situation in India, with special reference to the internment and release of Mrs. Besant." I reviewed the situation at length, and after alluding to the Home Rule plan and Mr. Montagu's apparent intentions, I said: "There are no freer people in the world than Indians under our rule, and such oppression as exists is that of Indians by Indians. It would be increased a hundredfold if we handed over the reins to the small body of Brahmans and lawyers whom Mrs. Besant is trying to lead." I reminded the House that her paper *New India* had been condemned by three Judges of the High Court of Madras, two being Indians, and that one of them had characterised an article she had published as "pernicious writing which must tend to encourage assassination." I explained the circumstances of her release in response to a truculent demand, and I said that the effect, following her telegram to the Secretary of State, was to take her "into a sort of partnership" and to alarm loyal Indians and our own countrymen. Finally, I pointed out that analogous proceedings had proved

\* See p. 335.

disastrous in Ireland, and in Russia where "Government has for the present lapsed and anarchy prevails. . . . No greater warning of what revolution may mean has ever been given, and conditions in India closely resemble those in Russia except that the Indian peoples are less homogeneous." Lords Lamington, Lansdowne, and Midleton followed in substantial agreement with my speech. Lord Islington, Under Secretary of State for India, and Lords Crewe and Curzon defended the Government. The first-named declared that "the recent action taken by the Government of India constituted in no sense an act of timidity or of vacillation in the face of clamour of extremists, or of sentimentality." Lord Crewe thought that, in the circumstances, "the release of Mrs. Besant was wise." Lord Curzon said: "With his [my] general statement of the principles of government in India, and with his particular charges against the abominable and wicked things that have been said in various publications in India by this lady and other persons, I am in entire agreement." But he held that the House ought to acquiesce in the decision of the Secretary of State and the Government of India. My reply was: "You have Mrs. Besant interned after a violent agitation accompanied by threats, and then released without making any promise of amendment. What can an Eastern people think about that?" The Coalition Government with its large majorities in both Houses could not be warned, and the public generally, engrossed by the War, and by the revolutionary Representation of the People Bill then before Parliament, was naturally unable to give serious attention to India.

On November 7, 1917, the German agents Lenin and Trotsky carried out their *coup d'état*, and Russia was quickly converted into a shambles and became a centre of world revolutionary infection and a malignant enemy of the British Empire. In this month, Mr. Montagu started for India to visit some of the principal cities in quest of inspiration. In the previous year, Mr. Lionel Curtis—the Siéyès of the present day—after consultation with the India Office, had proceeded to India, where, in a

series of "Open Letters to the People of India," he launched his dyarchical scheme, which was to be embodied in the new Constitution. The pieces were now set in a great game played with consummate skill by Mr. Montagu.

In the spring of 1918, the Secretary of State returned, and the "Montagu-Chelmsford Report" was issued. The Viceroy must have been absorbed in multitudinous duties arising out of the War which reached a dangerous phase in March. Mrs. Besant and her friends made the best of their opportunities, and the organisations which could claim to represent the real peoples of India, were only able to send pathetic appeals which the perambulating Secretary of State ignored.\*

The authors of the Report asked for criticism,† and in a long speech on August 6, 1918, since justified by events, I tried to explain the proposed dual system of Government under which one part of the Cabinet was responsible to Parliament and the other to elected majorities in Provincial Legislative Councils. For an analogy, one must imagine a Conservative Government of which half the members, holding important portfolios, were responsible to the Trades Union Congress. The only safeguard in the case of a deadlock between the dyarchical groups was the veto of the Governor subject to appeal to the Government of India.

There was much in this classic Report which was eminently wise, because it accurately explained the conditions of the people of India and their total unfitness for Home Rule; but the new Constitution as outlined flagrantly conflicted with facts plainly stated. Possibly realising this, the authors affected to "believe that, in deliberately disturbing the placid, pathetic contentment of the masses," they would secure the "highest good" of India. In other words, they expected, by destroying the peace of India, to create conditions favourable to self-government! My natural comment was that hitherto it

\* See p. 340.

† Later it was represented that no material changes in the proposals were possible on account of the high authority of the signatories.

had not been "regarded as the duty of the Viceroy and Secretary of State to disturb India," and that "the catastrophic possibilities of discontent among 315,000,000 people" did not seem to have occurred to the authors. The Report, I said, did not proceed on "lines of evolution, but of revolution." In the conditions contemplated, the Indian Civil Service would inevitably deteriorate, and "the effect of these proposals, if they are adopted, would be first to lead to administrative and then to political chaos." As the views of the Provincial Governments and of the working classes were not embodied in the Report,\* its aim "seemed mainly directed to find means of placating" the Home Rule League "which numbered, according to its President, 52,000 persons." I ended by moving for Papers giving the opinions of the Provincial Governments, for a selection of Addresses to the Viceroy and Secretary of State presenting both sides of opinion, and for the Report of Mr. Justice Rowlatt's Committee on Sedition in India which had been delivered to the Government of India in April and published there in July, *after* the issue of the political Report.

With such great issues at stake, I think that my plea for full information was justified; but I only obtained a promise from the Under Secretary of State that copies of the documents should be placed in the Library of the House. Lord Islington said: "In these days, there is really no sufficient justification for reprinting them and presenting them to Parliament."

On October 23, 1918, Lord Midleton moved that a Joint Select Committee of both Houses should be appointed to consider the Report. A brief summary of the Rowlatt Report had appeared that morning in the *Times*, and I used the startling evidence it provided in a speech in which I said:

"When troubles arise (as they will if the Montagu-Chelmsford Report is adopted), we shall quickly discover

\* The Provincial Governments were not consulted until *after* the publication of the Report, and were then faced with the agreement of the Secretary of State, the Viceroy, and their respective councils to an experiment to be applied chiefly to the Provinces for which they were responsible.

that the masses have nothing left to look up to with respect, and we may find ourselves obliged either to restore our paramount power, or to look on and watch the ruin and undoing of our marvellous work in India."

Lord Midleton's motion was opposed by the Government and defeated in a small House by four votes, being supported only by twenty-one peers. This was unfortunate, because a critical examination of the Report, with its curious mixture of facts and incongruous proposals, might have led to a different Bill. I still think that, if the peers had been able to study the evidence produced by Mr. Justice Rowlatt and his two Indian colleagues,\* Lord Midleton might have carried his motion, and a reasoned discussion of the principles of Mr. Curtis's dyarchy, which was never possible, might have been secured.

The next act in the tragedy was the preparation of the Bill which the House of Commons resolved to refer to a Joint Select Committee. In moving on June 30, 1919, that "this House do concur," Lord Curzon made a remarkable speech in which he laid down three vitally important principles to which he intimated that he personally adhered :

"I would try in all my arrangements and acts to keep alive and not in any way to daunt or to quench the spirit, the traditions, and the efficiency of the Indian Civil Service.

"I would do nothing to impair or diminish the authority of the central government in India.

"My third principle would be that nothing should be done to weaken or diminish the protection that is given to the poorer classes in India, and they are the vast multitude of the population, by the British Raj."

Here spoke the statesman who had studied the life of India and well knew that there was danger ahead. At the time, this speech seemed reassuring to all who regarded Mr.

\* The curious delay in giving this Report to the public at home after it was presented to the Government of India, which was ascribed by the Under Secretary of State "to a mistake—a very reprehensible mistake"—in India, was distinctly unfortunate.

Montagu's proceedings with alarm. I had reason to know that Lord Curzon agreed with my views, and I am certain that if he had not been a member of Mr. Lloyd George's second Coalition, his authority and oratorical power would have prevented the House of Lords from adopting a Bill which flagrantly violated all the great principles which he had laid down.

The story, which I have tried to tell, is an outstanding illustration of the way in which the handling of Imperial affairs may depend on temporary political conditions. The "coupon election" of 1918 determined the fate of India, although the ill-informed electorate had no idea that this issue was involved.

Two perambulating Commissions under Lord Southborough, who had no knowledge of India, were set up to fill in certain details in Mr. Montagu's scheme, and their Reports, which assumed the acceptance of the principle of dyarchy, had the effect of further committing Parliament in advance. The way was now clear for the Joint Select Committee, of which I was a member, and the pieces were again well set for the game which followed. Lords Ampt-hill and MacDonnell and Colonel (now Sir) E. Yate were not included,\* but Mr. Montagu appointed himself and Lord Sinha, the Under Secretary of State,† though their Bill was to be examined. The "Labour" Member was Mr. Ben Spoor, who, with Colonel J. Wedgwood, had visited India at Mr. Montagu's suggestion, and informed the political malcontents that their Party was solid for Home Rule. In attendance upon Mr. Montagu was Sir J. (now Lord) Meston, said to represent the Government of India.

A crowd of Indians, among whom Mrs. Besant assumed

\* The members were, the Duke of Northumberland, the Marquess of Crewe, Earl of Selborne, Viscount Midleton, Lords Islington, Sinha, Sydenham, Mr. F. D. Acland, Mr. (afterwards Sir) T. Bennett, Sir H. Craik, Mr. Montagu, Major Ormsby-Gore, Sir J. D. Rees, and Mr. Ben Spoor.

† The raising of Sir S. Sinha to the peerage in order that he might take charge of the Bill was an inspiration. Very few peers understood that a clever Bengali lawyer of the Kyasth caste was the last person who could speak for the Indian peoples, and all his utterances, therefore, most naturally acquired disproportionate weight. On several occasions, he gravely misled the House.



prominence, had come to speak for various political organisations, sometimes overlapping. Lobbying on a large scale was prevalent, and it would have been amusing, but for all that lay in the background, to watch the fraternising of Brahmans, the most privileged class left in the world, with "Labour."

The Committee sat for four months and heard nearly seventy witnesses. Much of the evidence was valueless except as recording the well-known opinions of the small English-speaking class which aimed at governing India. The rural and working-class organisations could not send delegations for want of funds, which the India Office to which they appealed was unable to provide. Important classes such as the Zemindars, and the fighting races, which nobly supported the Imperial cause in the War, while the political party was striving to embarrass the Government, were never heard.\* It was not possible for the Princes and Chiefs, governing one-third of India, whose interests would be affected by the Bill, to give evidence, and only H.H. the Aga Khan, representing an unorthodox subdivision of a section of a branch of the Moslems of India, was called, and appeared to have revised the views he held strongly when I left India. No Indian who could not speak English appeared as a witness.† "Imagine," I subsequently said in the House, "setting up a Committee to gauge the opinion of Irishmen on Home Rule and taking only the evidence of Irishmen who could speak German." Most unfortunately Dr. Nair, the leader of the non-Brahmans of Madras and Southern India, whose views I knew,‡ died before his evidence could be taken.

The position of officials serving in India was delicate, as they could not take a strong line against the theories to which the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, whom the

\* I made a vain effort to obtain evidence from these classes. There was at this time a batch of fine Native Officers at Hampton Court who were anxious to give evidence, and all belonged to the yeoman class, the backbone of India.

† Some of the shrewdest Indians I met knew no English.

‡ Dr. Nair, at my request, had written a leaflet for the Indo-British Association in which his views are recorded.

former had spoken of as his "Agent," had committed themselves. Moreover, the problems of Western forms of Government were naturally unknown to them. There were, however, many plain warnings in the evidence of Sir Michael O'Dwyer and Sir John Hewett—both experienced ex-Lieut.-Governors—which might well have given pause to the Joint Committee, while the arrogance of some of the Indian witnesses might have suggested caution. All this was unavailing. Mr. Montagu, with the able assistance of Sir J. (now Lord) Meston and Lord Sinha,\* displayed dexterity which I was forced to admire. The Bill emerged in a more dangerous form to the peace of India than the original draft. Large concessions were made to the Indian political delegates, and the Central Government was made subject to a two Chamber Parliament, with nothing but the Viceroy's power of veto and certification as a safeguard for the interests of the masses, thus violating Lord Curzon's second and third basic principles. An attempt was made in the Committee to conserve the authority of the Central Government which was defeated by the votes of three Unionist Members.

To me these four months during which I watched developments, which I believed to be fraught with danger to the Indian peoples, were a prolonged nightmare. I divided the Committee six times, finding myself in a minority of one on four occasions. The Report, which few Members of either House can ever have studied, gives curious hints of misgivings. Most Unionist Members distrusted the preposterous dyarchy—unknown to political history—and we expressed some pious opinions of no value when political power has been conferred and can be exercised by hostile elements. In this we followed the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, which declared that the "system" to be set up in India

"presupposes in those who work it such a perception of, and loyalty to, the common interests as enables the decision of the majority to be peaceably accepted. This

\* Both now appear to have modified the views which they held in 1918.

means that majorities must practise toleration and minorities patience. There must, in fact, be not merely a certain capacity for business, but, what is much more important, a real perception of the public welfare as something apart from, and with superior claims to, the individual good. The basis of the whole system is a lively and effective sense of other people's rights."

Admirable sentiments ; but having regard to our own experience and that of all countries in which democracy is enshrined, it was madness to "presuppose" that they would permeate the Indian peoples and make the Montagu-Chelmsford plans, of which they were stated to be "the basis," a triumphant success.

Our Report rashly suggested that "the principle of proportional representation may be found particularly applicable to the circumstances of India" ; \* but we were "firmly convinced that a complete and stringent Corrupt Practices Act should be passed and brought into operation before the first elections to the Legislative Councils." This was wise, as was the sympathetic treatment which we urged should be given to Public Servants in India, who might find their position impossible.† "It would only be fair to these officers that they should be offered an equivalent career elsewhere, if it is in the power of H.M. Government to do so, or, in the last resort, that they should be allowed to retire on such pension as the Secretary of State in Council may consider suitable." "After hearing evidence," the Committee excluded Burma from the operation of the Bill.

"They do not doubt but that the Burmese have deserved (!) and should receive a constitution analogous to that provided in this Bill. But Burma is only by accident part of the responsibility of the Governor-General of

\* I was at this time in favour of P.R., the mathematical aspects of which appealed to me ; but I have since come to regard it as certain to make effective government almost impossible.

† This had later to be fought for, and I do not think that full justice has yet been done.

India. The Burmese are as distinct from the Indians in race and language as they are from the British."

The turn of Burma was to come later, and this pertinent reminder was forgotten.

The Government of India Bill was hustled through the House of Commons and was read a second time in the Lords on December 11, 1919, by which time the dangerous rebellion centred in the Punjab had occurred, changing the situation. Extreme urgency was pleaded; it was hopeless to move the rejection, and the debate was wholly inadequate to the gravity of the occasion. Speaking on December 12, after Lords Carmichael and Crewe had supported the Bill, I said *inter alia*: "For some time past, we really have not had full information of proceedings in India. We do not know what is the position on the North-Western Frontier. The public have never understood the nature and extent of the disorders in the Punjab. . . . Nor does the public realise in the least the dangers from Bolshevism." Lord Sinha, in moving the Second Reading, had likened the Bill to "a little grain of seed which would in time grow into a gigantic banyan tree, under the shade of which the peoples of India would live in peace and happiness." This simile was peculiarly inapt. The Bill was not a "little seed," and the banyan tree, under which India had made amazing progress, was to be uprooted. I replied that "I cannot see that picture. What I feel is that the Bill will endanger the peace of India and may delay the progress of India towards self-government." I pointed out that more than 85 per cent. of the people were agriculturists who had never asked for this legislation, that the Bill contained "a whole host of illusions," that it imposed upon India "a form of government totally at variance with customs and traditions which dated back thousands of years," and that democracy was "incompatible with the existence of the caste system." I also gave reasons why the dyarchical plan could not work. After me spoke Lord Selborne, Lord MacDonnell, who wished to postpone the dyarchical

experiment,\* Lord Midleton, Lord Meston, and Lord Curzon. The Ex-Viceroy pronounced the Bill to be a "great and daring experiment" under which the whole standard of Government would "tend to fall"; but, as a member of the Coalition and Leader of the House, he gave it his qualified blessing.

As important amendments in the House of Commons had been excluded by the Kangaroo closure, Lords Ampt-hill and MacDonnell and I determined, as a formal protest, to move a series of amendments which we divided among ourselves.

It was a melancholy performance. To a late hour on December 16, 1919, in a small House, we went on moving and sometimes dividing to be hopelessly defeated, our best result being 7 to 27 votes on a proposal of Lord Ampt-hill to provide some representation for low-caste people. Even an amendment to exclude from the Councils ex-Government servants convicted of offences was rejected. I vainly attempted to introduce statutory provision for the protection of Government servants as the Joint Select Committee desired, and I moved an amendment on behalf of the London Chamber of Commerce. Our efforts were futile, and Lord Sinha frequently declared that our proposals properly belonged to the Rules, which were then unknown and which it was made impossible to change. We then recorded our protest upon the archives of the House in accordance with an old custom. Will it ever be dug out by some future historian exploring the causes which led to the adoption of one of the most momentous Bills which ever came before Parliament—a measure which will have effects far beyond the boundaries of India?

The die was now cast; but the practical operation of the Act depended mainly upon innumerable Rules which were not before the House in the crucial debate. On July 15, 1920, therefore, Lord Ampt-hill moved:

\* This was, of course, impossible. It resulted from the dexterity of Mr. Montagu that the dyarchy was so tangled up in the Bill that Mr. Lionel Curtis's theory could never separately be discussed.

“That this House regrets that no time has been granted for the study and discussion of the draft Rules . . . and is further of opinion that the haste with which the Bill was forced through Parliament last year, together with the present perfunctory treatment of the draft Rules, constitutes a grave infringement of the rights of Parliament.”

I believe that this verdict will be accepted by any future historian who masters the proceedings; but Lord Ampt-hill's motion was of course hopeless. In the debate I said :

“In another place, the Bill was passed by the application of the Kangaroo closure, and most important amendments were not allowed to be moved. In this House, no adequate debate was possible, and vital amendments were disposed of in a hurry. Now we are asked to pass these Rules *en bloc*, many of them containing matters of the utmost importance affecting the future of the peoples of India. It was not an easy thing to debate the Bill itself . . . because it was dependent upon a whole mass of Rules, which were not before us. We have now the first instalment of the Rules, but only the first instalment, and it is a volume larger than the Bill itself. I suppose I was lucky; but I received my copy yesterday morning, and I am not confident that at present I have mastered it as it should be mastered. . . . This premature attempt to force democratic institutions upon the most aristocratic country left in the world can only have disastrous results. It will place, and it must place, large political powers in the hands of the small minority of English-speaking persons whose objects have been plainly avowed. They will be able, as they have said, to create impossible conditions in the Provincial Governments and then to urge that the only solution is complete Home Rule.”

In March, 1921, Burma was subjected to the Montagu Reforms, which I strongly opposed, summing up my appeal in these words: “In the last speech that Lord Beaconsfield made in this House, he said: ‘The key of India is

in London.' I believe that London has lost the key of India, and I beg the House not to throw away the key of Burma." The appeal was unavailing, and Burma also was subjected to a form of Government to which her people are totally unsuited.

On July 31, 1924, an important debate was raised by Lord Peel, ex-Secretary of State, who had given notice "to call the attention of His Majesty's Government to the present situation in India; to ask for a full statement of policy; and to move for papers." The Conservative Party was now in opposition, and Lord Curzon spoke for the last time on Indian affairs. He said :

" They [the Reforms] have not satisfied the legitimate aspirations of those for whom they were intended. On the contrary, they have encouraged and embittered their hostility. They have dispirited and alienated the Indian Civil Services. They have produced a general impression in India of weakness on the part of the Central Government. I am not aware that you can point to a single class of the population of India that has benefited by the introduction of the Reforms, and in many parts they have led to that shocking recrudescence of racial and caste antagonisms to which a noble Lord on this side alluded. . . . All the passions of the ancestral cauldron are boiling up again, and you see what is at the back of it all. What democracy means to these shrewd people who look below the surface is not a fair chance for the Moslems, which means Brahman ascendancy, and that means the ascendancy of a highly accomplished oligarchy framed on the strictest lines of creed and caste."

Who can say that Lord Curzon's diagnosis was inaccurate, although he did not live to see the far greater "recrudescence" of communal violence that has since been manifested? At his wish, I spoke before him. The Secretary of State for India had referred on the instruction of "a high authority on Indian politics" to Mr. C. R. Das \*

\* Mr. Das was one of the most uncompromising advocates of evicting us from India and an apologist of political assassination; but just before his death he modified some of his extreme views.

as "second only to Gandhi himself in saintliness of character," and I pointed out that, if Lord Olivier had known India, "he would understand that saintliness is a solid political and economic asset, and if he would take the trouble to look up the antecedents of the Mahdi who laid waste the Sudan, he would understand the essential truth of that proposition." I then spoke strongly upon "the outstanding results of this great democratic experiment," of the "crumbling away of the Services," and of our loss of prestige throughout the Far East, aggravated by the abandonment of the Singapore naval base by the Socialist Government. In the lobby, Lord Curzon told me that only he and I had dealt adequately with the situation in India.

On April 6, 1925, Lord Ampthill, in moving terms, drew attention to the position of the uncovenanted officers "to whom the Lee Commission made no reference," and again I tried to plead for the sympathetic treatment of these services which "touch the lives of the poorest people of India at every point and are an integral part of the great machine which our forefathers constructed. . . . If the withering . . . goes on in small and great services alike, we shall certainly find that it will be impossible to govern."

Speaking on the Government of India (Civil Services) Bill on July 9, 1925, I returned to the case of the officers overlooked by the Lee Commission, though recommended for "the protection of the Secretary of State by the Joint Standing Committee." Their case, I said, "is not altogether dissimilar from the abandonment of the loyalists of Ireland. . . . I think our honour is as much bound up with supporting these men and giving them protection as it is with the defence of the loyalists who have suffered so terribly in Ireland in late years." On April 6, 1925, I had also made a general appeal to the Conservative Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead:

"I most humbly suggest to the noble and learned Earl that the time has come to consider only the welfare



of the people of India and no longer to make gestures or to give concessions to a very small and irreconcilable minority. If the noble Earl will think first, last, and always of the welfare of the masses of India, for whom we are wholly responsible, he can help to give back peace and progress to India before it is too late."

This was the end of continuous efforts during twelve years to make known what I believe to be the real requirements of India and to plead the cause of the 300 millions who know no politics and who still look to British officers for justice and sympathy.

Apart from many speeches on the Reforms and their consequences, I strove to bring other Indian questions to the notice of the House, to obtain information, to give warnings, and to keep the interests of the Indian peoples in the forefront of our policy. Among a large number of such questions, I find pleas for granting land to Indian soldiers who served in the War (July 22, 1915) and for King's commissions to Indian officers who had distinguished themselves (July 25, 1918). On November 4, 1919, I spoke on the peace negotiations with the Afghans, which I regarded with misgivings. The Amir, on May 23 of that year, had written a "subservient" \* letter to the "honoured President of the Russian Republic" saying that "in raising the standard of Bolshevism, Russia had earned the gratitude of the whole world." This led me to remark: "It looks as if Afghanistan might become a dangerous centre of propaganda in the East, and that will add to our troubles in India." † On March 2, 1921, I protested strongly against the reduction of our forces in India, and especially the destruction of eighteen fine Indian Cavalry Regiments with high traditions and gallant services on their records.‡

\* The Government of India Dispatch.

† More than eight years have passed, and I believe that this danger is now realised.

‡ The actual figures were at length given by Lord Winterton to Sir Charles Yate, M.P., on July 12, 1923. The proposed reductions were :

Compared with then strength ..	7,506 British	4,791 Indians.
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"	"	strength in 1913	13,205	"	14,609	"
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The great importance of the changes is evident.

Some years must pass before an accurate judgment on the full effects of the revolutionary changes introduced by Mr. Montagu with the authority of the Coalition Government can be pronounced. All parties in the State having been committed to this policy, it is natural that the dangers of the situation should be minimised. Information from India is scanty, and only the gravely embittered relations between Moslems and Hindus cannot be concealed.\* This mutual hostility is fundamental, dating back a thousand years; but that it must prove fatal to the successful operation of democratic principles enjoining majority rule, which a warlike minority, cherishing traditions of conquest and political power, will never tamely accept, remains to be realised. As fatal are inherent conditions in non-British India comprising one-third of the area and one-fourth of the population. To the Princes and Chiefs, who represent the immemorial instincts and traditions of Old India, political principles of purely Western origin are naturally distasteful. Every native State holds a Treaty or Sanad defining its relations with the British Government, which under Home Rule or Dominion status would become worthless. The attitude of the Indian revolutionaries to these States was explained in a vile leaflet printed in England and entitled "Hear, O Princes," which threatened destruction if they did not join the anti-British movement.† To prevent opposition from them, it was necessary for Mr. Montagu to arrange a *concordat*,‡ which, in return for acquiescence, held out hopes of greater freedom from the supervision of the Paramount Power. In many States, the Political Agents,

\* On July 29 last, a great Hindu Zemindar wrote to a friend in England :

"Such is the mischief that Montagu has done in this country, creating regular bloodshed between Hindus and Mohammedans who used to live in perfect amity before. Mohammedans are killing Hindus because they are Hindus and for no other reason, and *vice versa*. . . . Our lives are not safe even for a day amongst all this cry for Swaraj."

† This pamphlet was, I believe, sent to every Chief in India, and one of them handed it to me.

‡ Conf. Chapter X of the Report, which radically changed our relations with the Native States, and was issued without any consultation with the Provincial Governments which were in direct control of political relations with a large number of these States.

if wisely chosen, were the friendly advisers of their Chiefs, able by tactful suggestion to check oppressive measures by the Durbars. This was changed, and already the effects are becoming evident. The troubles which have arisen in the great State of Hyderabad, following those in Nabha and Indore, might have been averted in time under the pre-Montagu system. They are symptomatic of what must recur, because, while most Native States are and will continue to be well governed, the protection of their people rests ultimately upon the British Government and upon Parliament. The hostility of the Indian Assembly towards them has been plainly manifested, and the Viceroy was compelled to certify a Bill directed to the protection of their Chiefs against seditious libels.\* The relations of the Native States with an Indian Government in which British authority had ceased to be dominant would give rise to the gravest difficulties tending to civil war.

Meanwhile, all who seek to keep in close touch with Indian affairs are aware of a gradual disintegration of the great public services leading to an increase of crime and corruption.† It was Lord Curzon who said: "Take the Indian Medical Service—a splendid service which in my day the best men from the Medical schools competed to enter. It is killed and dead, and the utmost that the noble Viscount Lord Lee of Fareham has been able to do is to propose its resurrection in another form."‡ The handling of the questions of public health, vitally important

\* The blackmailing of Chiefs by papers published in British India was a notorious evil in my time, and some of them complained bitterly to me; but it was then most difficult to prevent.

† A wave of crime has passed over once peaceful Burma causing great anxiety to the Governor.

‡ House of Lords, July 31, 1924. Lord Lee had been Chairman of a Committee directed to consider the position of the Services and to mitigate their fate. Incidentally, this Committee accelerated the pace of Indianisation of the Services. Before long, there will be only about 900 British officers in the Indian Civil and Police Services to maintain law and order among a population of 320 millions, while British recruitment in the now "Provincialised" Public Works, Education, Agriculture, Forest, and Veterinary Services has definitely stopped. The Medical Service awaits reconstruction. The consequences of all these changes will disastrously affect the Indian peoples.

to the masses of India, will surely suffer, and this melancholy description applies in varying degree to other services on which the progress of India wholly depends. Politics and faction are now rampant in India; while more than 300,000,000 of inarticulate peoples, who ask only for peace and order to enable them to carry on their hereditary avocations, are beginning to wonder vaguely what is happening to the Raj. Swarajists and Responsivists intrigue against each other, uniting only in the effort to eliminate British authority—the only authority which Indians as a whole could respect—and political parties in the elected bodies seem certain to settle down on communal lines, which must tend to aggravate racial and religious antagonisms.

Some results of the policy inaugurated in 1917 are indisputable. The new constitution, which the House of Lords was assured would bring political contentment, has been and is being strenuously attacked by the politicians whom it was intended to placate. The dyarchy has been frankly abandoned in two Provinces. Elsewhere, the Governors have been able to work only on unitary lines—the negation of Mr. Curtis's theories. But the outstanding result is a harvest of death. Many more Indian lives were lost under Mr. Montagu's dispensation than in the whole period since the Mutiny. That is the great tragedy of India.

## CHAPTER XXIV

### THE HOUSE OF LORDS—*continued*

It had been understood that, while the War lasted, only urgent domestic Legislation would be undertaken. In violation of this salutary principle, three measures of first-class importance—the Government of India, Representation of the People, and Education Bills—were introduced, all needing the careful consideration which, in the circumstances, was impossible.

The second of these Bills, read a second time in the House of Lords on December 17, 1917, added to the electorate 6,000,000 women whose admission to the franchise had never been submitted to the constituencies. Our best manhood was away fighting for the Empire. Here, if ever, was a Bill which the House of Lords could claim the right to postpone. There was a large gathering of peers, most of them hostile to the Bill. Just before the division, leading members of the Anti-Suffrage League, of which Lord Curzon was President, met under Mrs. Humphry Ward in the "Moses Room" in a state of perturbation. What would happen?

I spoke fifth in the debate, and as Lord Peel, in introducing the Bill, had made use of a rather unfortunate expression, I said: "The noble Viscount, in his speech, stated that this Bill is 'a destroyer as well as a creator.' I believe that he is right, and that in this Bill there are the germs of a disease which may bring about the destruction of our Empire." I stated that "the measures, which have been proposed to confer the franchise upon . . . practically all the men who have saved the Empire during the terrible times that we have gone through, will be most warmly welcomed in your

Lordships' House, and throughout the country." I then recalled the fact that on February 3, 1915, the late Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) said: "'It would not only be idle, but I think it would be offensive to the nation to proceed at such a time with controversial legislation.' . . . There can be no doubt whatever that this Bill embodies a revolutionary change of the most controversial character." As regards the women's vote, I maintained that

"the admission of 6,000,000 women must within a very few years entail, by the political processes with which we are familiar, the vote for all adult women. . . . Could such a triumph of feminism be a real national advantage? . . . One immediate effect would be to add largely to the forces of Socialism, which will ruin every commercial or industrial country that submits to their operation."

The House of Commons, which had passed the Bill, did not, I argued, adequately represent the will of the people, and many of its younger members were serving in the field.\* I ended by pleading for the rejection of the Bill:

"Nothing would be more in accordance with the highest traditions of the House of Lords' great past than that one of its last important acts should be to vindicate the principles of the Constitution, and incidentally the theory of democracy, by insisting that no revolutionary change shall be made until the will of the people has been clearly expressed at a General Election."

Lord Curzon, in winding up the Debate, laid stress on the implications of the Bill. He said:

"I wonder whether there are any noble Lords in this House who really think that we are going to halt at the age of thirty, and at the number of six millions? It is like Canute calling upon the waves of the ocean, and upon the incoming tide not to lave his sacred feet. In my judgment, not twenty years, not fifteen, and not ten years

\* I believe that a majority was opposed to the Bill, and I know that many Members hoped the Lords would throw it out.

will pass before the six millions become ten millions, and very likely twelve millions."

I never heard a more powerful speech against enfranchising women; but it ended with a grave adjuration to the House not to enter upon a conflict with the Commons. This appeal unquestionably determined the division. A hostile majority of listeners yielded a minority of 71 to 134 in the lobbies, a number of peers abstaining from voting. So passed, at a dangerous period in the War, and without any mandate, even from the depleted constituencies, the most revolutionary measure that we owe to the Coalition Government. Surely the House of Lords ought to have held up this fateful Bill.

In the following year, the House was called upon to pass Dr. H. A. L. Fisher's Education Bill. Here was a subject to which I had given much thought and, as Chancellor of two Universities and Member of the Senate of another, I had gained some practical experience. The Bill, as usual in these cases, dealt more with administration and with an improvement of the position of the teachers, which was overdue, than with education. It abolished the remaining schools at which parents gladly paid fees, while adding hugely to the prospective burdens of the taxpayers. It did not even mention Science, the elements of which I held to be essential as a groundwork for clear thinking and for the self-education that counts for more in life than school teaching.

Speaking on July 31, 1918, I said: "In this Bill, I do not see one single guarantee, or even the hope held out, that the kind of education which produces character will form a part of the education of the future." In the Committee stage, I moved several amendments directed to introduce elementary science,\* to fix the minimum

\* *Nature* called attention to the fact that, as I said, the word "Science" was not allowed to appear in a Bill which dealt with cookery. In an able presidential address delivered in the Zoological Section of the British Association on August 6, 1926, Professor L. Graham Kerr, F.R.S., stated: "I am of course one of those who believe that the almost complete exclusion of Science from the elementary education of the young over a prolonged period has been a real tragedy."

hours for physical exercises, to embody training of the Boy Scout and Girl Guides type, and to retain the schools at which fees were paid. These and other amendments, for which much could be said, would, I believe, have remedied some of the palpable defects of Dr. Fisher's Bill. Lord Lytton on behalf of the Government declined to accept them.

The immediate response to the far-reaching concessions announced in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was "open rebellion" \* in the Punjab which broke out at Delhi on March 30 and at Amritsar on April 10, 1919. The story of the successive secret conspiracies in the key Province of India and of the great rebellion has been lucidly told by Sir Michael O'Dwyer.† The rebellion was far better planned than the Great Mutiny, and again persistent efforts were made to seduce the Indian troops. Arrangements were planned on a great scale to cut the railways supplying the troops on the frontier, who were to be attacked by an invasion from Afghanistan—the first since 1796. The Afghans, with whom we were supposed to be at peace, moved at the end of April, too late after the prompt action taken in the Punjab; otherwise the peril would have been the greatest we have yet had to face in India.

"This rising," I said in the House of Lords on August 6, 1919, "was unlike anything that has happened since the Mutiny," and I pointed out that the cry "Kill the English" had been raised, and that the mobs had been led by English-speaking Indians clad in European dress.

Again, as in 1857, our officers in the Punjab saved the situation; but very different treatment was meted out to the small band which, under "one fearless Irishman," as I said, proved worthy of their great predecessors. The Government of India, alarmed by a sudden emergency, promised the Punjab authorities "full countenance and

\* The definition adopted by the Government of India when gravely alarmed by events.

† *India as I Knew It*. Constable, 1925.



support" even in the case of "most drastic action" being taken. This definite promise was ruthlessly disregarded.\*

General Dyer's stern action at Amritsar, taken after three warnings, saved many thousands of Indian and British lives and broke the "rebellion." At Simla, the satisfaction was—for the moment—intense, and the General received promotion and was selected for a special task on the frontier—the relief of Thal then threatened by the Afghan Commander-in-Chief Nadir Khan. At Amritsar, the citizens, who had been saved from murder and wholesale spoliation, showed warm gratitude to General Dyer, and the Sikhs at the Golden Temple bestowed upon him their greatest honour. Prompt inquiry would have brought a crowd of Indian witnesses to testify to the emergency and to bless our authorities in the Punjab. But politics supervened, and the Hunter Commission began its imperfect investigations seven months after the event, by which time propaganda here and in India had done deadly work. The result was the greatest travesty of British justice in my lifetime.

The ostensible object of the Commission was to ascertain facts; but the men who saved North-Western India and much more were treated as defendants, were subjected to long hostile cross-examinations by three expert Indian advocates, Members of the Commission,† and were unprovided with legal defence. A report by General Dyer was altered. Though Indian shorthand writers are notoriously inaccurate, the evidence in some cases was not sent to witnesses for correction,‡ while

\* It is interesting to compare the action taken by the present Government when faced by the general strike last year. In the *British Gazette*, it was declared that: "The following announcement is made by H.M. Government: All ranks of the Armed Forces of the Crown are hereby notified that any action, which they may find it necessary to take in an honest endeavour to aid the Civil Power, will receive, both now and hereafter, the full support of H.M.'s Government."

† One of these members of the Commission, placed in the capacity of a judge, had previously libelled Sir Michael O'Dwyer in public and been compelled to retract.

‡ General Dyer stated that he did not recognise some of the evidence put into his mouth.

intimidation was rampant before and during the proceedings. The political object being apparently to represent the "open rebellion" as a local rising which did not justify the strong measures taken in the Punjab, the Commissioners were directed only "to investigate the recent disturbances in Bombay, Delhi, and in the Punjab." They, therefore, never pursued their inquiries to Peshawur and Calcutta, where evidence of the wide extent of the great conspiracy could easily have been obtained, and *they refused to accept such evidence when it was offered.* They further declined to examine the detailed judgments of the Courts which had tried hundreds of the rebels. They even failed to discover that at another Indian city 800 miles away the loss of life had been at least as great as at Amritsar. They were nevertheless able to report that "on the evidence before us, there is nothing to show that the outbreak in the Punjab was part of a prearranged conspiracy to overthrow the British Government in India by force."

Thus a tainted verdict followed, and pains, penalties, and censures were liberally dealt out to the Punjab officials. The careers of General Dyer and of some other officers, including stalwart Indians, were ruined, and the House of Commons accepted this gross injustice!\* It was a triumph which the Indian agitators had deserved by their astute proceedings. I attribute this Parliamentary judgment in part to the fact that the public was prevented from learning the truth about the great conspiracy. The issue was one which women, a new and important element in the electorate likely to be swayed by sentiment, might not understand, and Members with no knowledge of India would naturally reflect that it might be difficult for them to defend General Dyer's action before women voters. This may be an unwarranted conclusion; but

\* It was left in doubt whether the Government of India or the Secretary of State was the final judge. The latter in the House of Commons, on July 14, 1920, expressly stated that he exerted "no sort of influence" on the decision; but on the same day, Lord Sinha replied to me that "telegraph correspondence . . . resulted in certain modifications in the original draft" of the punitive dispatch. On July 21, I pointed to this apparent discrepancy and Lord Sinha replied that there was "no conflict"!

when, in 1921, the Government of India was faced with another rebellion, which might easily have been prevented, political considerations, arising out of the experiences of 1919-20, enfeebled the action taken. During the protracted operations against the Moplahs, 10,000 Indian lives were lost, and unspeakable outrages upon Hindus occurred, causing Indian politicians to demand more drastic action. All this passed almost unnoticed by the public.

In the House of Lords, a full-dress debate was arranged, and Lord Finlay undertook to move: "That this House deplores the conduct of the case of General Dyer as unjust to that officer and establishing a precedent dangerous to the preservation of order in face of rebellion." \* The four days' debate began on July 19, 1920, and was worthy of the occasion. Of sixteen speakers, ten opposed the motion; but the closely reasoned speeches of Lords Finlay, Sumner, and Midleton, and Lord Salisbury's able winding up, strongly appealed to a House in which political expediency is not paramount. Lord Finlay's motion was carried by 129 to 86 votes, the Primate and two Bishops being in the minority.†

The judgment pronounced by the House of Lords has since been completely vindicated by a British judge and jury. The "Dyer case" was forced to the front by the defendant's counsel in the libel action brought by Sir Michael O'Dwyer against Sir Sankaran Nair, and for the first time sworn evidence and orderly legal procedure were available. The conclusion of Mr. Justice McCardie, confirmed by the jury after a hearing of five weeks, was: "That General Dyer, in the grave and exceptional circumstances, acted rightly, and in my opinion upon the evidence, he was wrongly punished by the Secretary of State for India." This was the issue argued by Lords

\* This was proved in the case of the Moplah rebellion later.

† I had made careful notes for a speech directed mainly to bring out facts proving the wide extent and elaborate organisation of the rebellion, of which the public had never been made aware. It was a disappointment to be crowded out by a late accession of Government speakers to the list; but such things are inevitable.

Finlay and Sumner before the House of Lords ; but again politics supervened. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and his Secretary of State for India, Lord Olivier, proceeded to discredit a British judge, here and in India respectively, because, as legally bound, he fearlessly expressed views which did not accord with their political opinions. As an example of interference by the Executive with the Judiciary, which had been regarded as dangerous to liberty, this incident was ominous ; but no protest was forthcoming. General Dyer and other officials in the Punjab have been formally acquitted, but no steps have been taken to do justice to them. I felt it an honour to present to the General on April 8, 1921, a Memorial signed by the British women in India,\* who well understood what they owed to him.

The Coalition policy in Egypt closely followed that in India, and the fine work of Lord Cromer, which spread prosperity throughout the Delta since our occupation in 1882, seemed to be endangered. The success of violent agitation in India suggested similar methods to the Egyptian Nationalists, and Lord Allenby was compelled to suppress a rising as a result of which Zaghloul Pasha, who was largely responsible, was interned at Malta and, like Mrs. Besant and the rebels in the Punjab, quickly released. Following the Indian precedent, Lord Milner arrived in Egypt in December, 1919, as head of a Committee to make a Report, which, it was feared, might, like that of Mr. Montagu, have the effect of committing Parliament.† The situation caused anxiety to the Independent Unionist Peers, and on November 4, 1920, Lord Salisbury made an effort to discover the intentions of the Government. I spoke on this motion, and anticipating what had happened, I gave warning that the relations of British troops with a self-governing State would be "most delicate," and that if the country were handed over to a

\* Sent to the Indo-British Association for presentation.

† This did not happen. Lord Milner's Report was shelved, and eighteen months later the Government made a Treaty differing from that proposed and less satisfactory. It is, however, doubtful whether Lord Milner's Treaty would have been accepted.

native Parliament, "based on democratic principles which Egypt had never known," our prestige in the Sudan would suffer. Self-government, I pleaded, should come by "gradual and well-considered steps," and unless the interests of the Fellahin could be safeguarded it should be withheld. As I said: "We cannot place Egypt in a position of independence without solid guarantees for the just government of the uneducated masses for whose welfare we are directly responsible." A rising in the Sudan, instigated from Cairo, was ably handled by our authorities at Khartum, and the assassination of the Sirdar necessitated drastic measures. A Government and Parliament controlled by the Wafd (Zaghloul) Party now reigns in Egypt, where political and other corruption extensively prevail; but the main questions—the status of the Sudan, the location of British troops, and the recognition of our imperative duty to protect the lives and property of foreigners throughout the Delta—will before long demand solution.\* Meanwhile, the fine work of Lord Cromer is being undone. In Egypt, as in India, the *damnosa hereditas* of the Coalition Government remains to be liquidated, and the public seems to have forgotten that the fate of both still rests heavily upon Parliament.

The policy initiated in Palestine by the Balfour Declaration sharply conflicted with the Treaty concluded by Sir H. MacMahon with the King of the Hedjaz, and ignored the later proclamation framed in consultation with the French authorities and posted in every village immediately after General Allenby's conquest. I could not accept the claims of the "small body of Eastern Jews," † subsequently reinforced by Western Zionists, to a little land conquered in part only from its old inhabitants and held for a period corresponding to the Roman occupation of Britain, and I feared the effects, political and economic, of a large influx of Jews from Russia and Central Europe

\* At the inquiry held into the riots at Alexandria it transpired that Egyptian regular troops fired upon Italians, and only British forces saved a serious situation.

† Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader, at Cannon Street Hotel, on September 21, 1919.

upon the Arab population. When the terms of the Mandate, which seemed to go beyond the Declaration, were made public, I felt obliged to criticise the policy of the Coalition Government. On June 29, 1920, I moved : "That there be laid before this House the Report of Sir Herbert Samuel on the conditions of Palestine after his visit there, and the Report of General Lord Allenby on the Easter riots at Jerusalem."\* In my speech, I said that

"Although their [the Zionists'] rights are based upon a particularly ruthless conquest, we respect and we wish to take into account their strong sentiment. . . . We cannot, however, go back three thousand years, and we must consider the rights of the present inhabitants of Palestine. . . . Jerusalem ranks next after Mecca amongst the holy places of Islam. . . . I need say nothing of the many places in Palestine which the whole Christian world holds in reverence. . . . The Arabs of Palestine are a prolific people. Are they to be barred out of the land of their fathers ? "

On June 21, 1922, a direct issue was raised by Lord Islington, who moved that the Mandate was "unacceptable" to the House, and "should be postponed until such modifications have been effected as will comply with pledges given by His Majesty's Government." I spoke again, following the maiden speech of Lord Balfour in the Upper House, and striving to make clear the discrepancies between the Mandate and our undertakings to the Arabs. The motion was carried by 60 to 29 votes undoubtedly because the case against the terms of the Mandate could not be answered.

The political and economic future of Palestine remains to be determined. There has been a great influx of Zionists resulting from the large funds poured into the country—from America especially—which has produced an artificial situation.† The Easter riots of 1920 and the

\* This information and an important report by Major-General Sir C. Palin, for which I pressed, were never given to the public.

† In November, 1926, Dr. H. Pritchett, after visiting Palestine, reported to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that the Zionist

Jaffa riots of 1921, in which Bolshevik placards were freely exhibited, passed almost unnoticed. In August last, the *Times* correspondent at Jerusalem reported that the "Zionist Executive" had been troubled by unemployed, who demanded "regular jobs or repatriation," plainly stated that Bolshevism lay in the background, and added that "the authorities are now checking Communist propaganda." That Bolshevism has been imported into the Holy Land, as I said might happen, and that it will increase if economic difficulties arise, is beyond question.

The Covenant of the League of Nations, which I regarded with suspicion, was never discussed in either House, thus illustrating the fact that momentous policies may escape investigation in Parliament. On March 19, 1918, when the Germans were about to launch a dangerous attack on our 5th Army, Lord Parmoor moved a resolution: "That this House approves the principle of a League of Nations and the constitution of a tribunal whose orders shall be enforceable by an adequate sanction." Regarding this resolution as extreme, I put down as an amendment:

"To omit all the words after 'House,' and insert 'while ready, when the War ends, to give the fullest consideration to any measures directed to maintain the peace of the world, is of opinion that it would be premature, at the present time, to record acceptance of the principle of a League of Nations.'"

Lord Curzon on behalf of the Government said that, "while Lord Parmoor's suggestions go too far for us in one direction, the proposals of my noble friend Lord Sydenham go too far in the other." At the last moment, Lord Bryce intervened with another and more adroit amendment: "To omit all the words after the words 'League of Nations' and insert the words 'and commends to His Majesty's Government a study of the conditions

Enterprise was "artificial" and due to the "enthusiasm of well-meaning men who apparently fail to appreciate the problems and difficulties, or the interests of the existing native population."

required for its resolution." This cautious amendment was adopted by the House.

On July 22, 1920, Lord Parmoor called attention to the provisions of the ill-conceived Covenant \* and asked if they had become operative. He pleaded for some "effective limitation of the principle of national sovereignty," for the inclusion of Germany in the League and for a revision of the recent Peace Treaties, suggesting that the Council at Versailles should abdicate in favour of the infant League. Incidentally, he castigated the newly liberated Poles for daring to defend their country against the Bolshevik Red Army, instead of submitting their case to arbitration. Lords Bryce and Haldane followed approvingly, and I then ventured to express my belief that the League of Nations would "at the best only prevent small wars, which could be averted in other ways," and might even lead to war, my principal objections to the Covenant being that :

"We have already . . . the British Family of Nations, which is now being assailed by an organised conspiracy of very long standing. We have seen the deadly effects of propaganda. . . . By means of propaganda, the League might become a centre of dangerous intrigue against the British Empire. We were told the other day by the noble Lord, Lord Islington, that we ought to think internationally. . . . The only international thinking that is likely to attract large numbers of people is that of the Red International, which I believe the League of Nations might be exploited to assist. . . . In every State in the world constitutional government is now at stake. While that is the case, can it be the right time to try and impose a form of supernational Government ? "

On March 14, 1921, I spoke again on this important question, pointing out that "there may be great complications and some indignities imposed upon the British Empire by the operations of the League of Nations."

\* One of the great legal authorities of the House of Lords told me that he could not "make head or tail" of some parts of this extraordinary instrument.



I do not think my solitary warnings made any impression; but the disturbing proceedings at Geneva in 1926, and still more their implications, have undoubtedly served to reveal the League as an international irritant, while its Labour Bureau has shown signs of the exploitation I foreshadowed. Both Sir Austen Chamberlain and Lord Cecil were moved to deliver strong protests against tendencies which will inevitably increase. The presence of representatives of the Dominions on the Council of the League, which is now probable, might mark a further stage in the disintegration of the Empire.

The wrongs inflicted on two little peoples forgotten at Versailles made a strong appeal to me. The Montenegrins, our Allies in the French Wars, were the first to join the Entente Powers in August, 1914. They had enjoyed an independent existence for 500 years, having alone of the Slav tribes of the Balkans resisted the conquering Turks, who in 1529 and 1683 unsuccessfully besieged Vienna, and they had evoked the warm admiration of Mr. Gladstone. They fought gallantly in the first phase of the Great War, helping to relieve the stress upon the Serbians; but they were at length overwhelmed by an Austrian Army. For these reasons doubtless, the Montenegrins received specific promises of the restoration of their independence.

On January 6, 1917, Mr. Lloyd George declared that "the day of the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro will also be the day of deliverance of the world." On January 20, Mr. Asquith said: "Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro must be restored and reconstituted. England is pursuing constantly her policy with all her might . . . until the restoration of Serbia and Montenegro into independent kingdoms." On July 4, 1918, President Wilson wrote to King Nicholas: "I think that your Majesty and the noble and heroic people of Montenegro will not be cast down, but will have confidence in the determination of the United States to see that, in the final victory that will come, the integrity and rights of Montenegro shall be secured and recognised."

After the Armistice, Montenegro was occupied by French forces, and on November 24, 1918, M. Poincaré wrote to King Nicholas that the presence of these forces would contribute "*sans doute à hâter ce moment, que Votre Majesté appelle de tous ses vœux. Dès qu'il sera venu, le Gouvernement de la République sera heureux, Sire, de faciliter votre voyage de retour.*"

Could more definite pledges have been made to the ill-starred Montenegrins? On the withdrawal of General d'Esperey's forces, the Serbians took command, and the martyrdom of Montenegro began. An election was staged when the pick of the little people was in exile or fugitive in the mountains, and by gross intimidation a vote for annexation to Serbia was extorted. A rising followed, suppressed by a reign of terror, and horrible outrages long continued.

Such was the story I tried to tell on March 11, 1920, and on other occasions. The House had no official information, and the publication of the Report of Count de Salis, our representative, for which I pressed, was refused. My general conclusion was that:

"The Great War is said to have been fought in order to give justice and security to small nations. Both have been denied to the smallest nation and one of the oldest in Europe. . . . There is no small State which has stronger claims on the Allies than Montenegro, which as its reward has suffered martyrdom since the Armistice."

There was no official material for an adequate debate. Lord Gladstone supported me as a filial duty, and Lord Bryce spoke sympathetically; but my efforts were in vain. Lord Curzon suggested the prospect of a Federal Serbia in which Montenegro would form an autonomous Province; but the policy of unification has prevailed at Belgrade, and the non-Serbian populations of the Jugo-Slav Kingdom have already proved refractory possessions.

On January 24, 1920, Mr. Ronald McNeill and I introduced a deputation from both Houses to Mr. Lloyd George,

when we brought the situation in Montenegro to his attention. He seemed to know little about the matter, but told us that the case had never been fully stated at Versailles,\* where M. Pashitch had the field to himself and evidently created an impression. Russia, the once-powerful protector of Montenegro, having been destroyed by the Bolsheviks, the poor little State has been wiped off the map of Europe, and an independence of five centuries has ended with the heavy yoke of Serbia. Such was the reward of our smallest and supremely gallant Ally in the Great War. The verdict does not rest upon any decision taken at Versailles, and I have never been able to fathom the forces hostile to Montenegro which were plainly visible in Press propaganda.

The rock of Heligoland was transferred to Germany, without any stipulation against fortification, with the result that it played a considerable rôle in the War. In the Agreement of 1890, however, it was provided that the islanders should retain certain privileges enjoyed under our long rule. M. Delcassé, in 1915, seems to have suggested to our Ambassador that we should take back Heligoland † as the people wished. The Agreement ended automatically with the War, and at Versailles nothing was done to conserve the privileges which the Prussian Government withdrew.

On November 10, 1920, I put a question as to the lapse of the Agreement and asked whether in that case "His Majesty's Government can secure the continuity of the rights of the islanders, as well as other conditions affecting British interests, which were provided for in that Agreement." After I had tried to explain the situation and to plead the cause of the islanders, Lord Crewe spoke sympathetically, but could hold out no hopes. It was subsequently arranged that he should forward their petition to the League of Nations, where it remains.

The gratitude of the Montenegrins and of the Heligo-

\* This was not the fault of the Montenegrin Government, which claimed representation in vain.

† "He agreed that it would be folly to leave Heligoland in the hands of Germany" (*Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame*, April 2, 1915).

landers for efforts which failed was touchingly expressed. The latter, who had noted a speech I made at a lecture by Dr. Cornish to the R.C. Institute, wrote to me on January 14, 1919: "Great interest was aroused amongst the inhabitants of Heligoland, where your Lordship's three decisive suggestions\* were published. . . . We do sincerely hope as a kind of reparation for the Exchange in 1890, that England will reconsider our case." Hansard did not reach the islet; but after my strong letter in the *Times* of January 22, 1921, the Heligolandiers wrote again on February 1:

"Very many thanks for your very kind letter. . . . Thanking you once more for your warm interest in our affairs, we remain,

Your humble Heligolandiers."

Among the surprises which leaped out of the Pandora box at Versailles was the peculiarly harsh treatment of the Hungarian nation, which I have never been able to explain. If any enemy State deserved consideration it was Hungary, unwillingly drawn into the War and quite unable to extricate herself. The Grand Inquisitors, however, seem not to have thought of making the punishment fit the crime, of racial claims, or of the economic future of the territories they arbitrarily carved out of the map. Hungary, cut down to one-third of her area and population and subjected to other disabilities, finds it most difficult to live an independent existence, and I felt strong sympathy for a proud nation with a long history, now ringed in and threatened at pleasure by the well-armed Little Entente whose peoples are inferior in culture. Lord Newton, on several occasions, drew attention to the hard fate of the Hungarians, and I tried to support his efforts on their behalf. This brought us letters from Hungarians, who were most grateful for our attempts to bring their case to the notice of the House of Lords. I have frequently

\* Neutralisation, return to British rule, transfer to Denmark. My own preference was for the third course, which could easily have been taken at Versailles.

been asked for contributions to their Press ; but it has been possible only to counsel Magyar unity, thrift in the administration, and above all patience.

Austria, also reduced at Versailles to the position of a State economically inadequate to its needs, will doubtless become part of the Reich, and I cannot believe that the present frontiers of Hungary, which exclude some of the best Magyar blood, will endure.\*

It fell to me to play a humble part in two pieces of Legislation. In February, 1920, a Committee presided over by Lord Parmoor to investigate the operations of the great Industrial Assurance Corporations, issued a scathing Report which fell flat. The Government did nothing, and Lord Parmoor begged me to take up the question, which properly belonged to him, but might have been expected to rouse the "Labour" Party to strong action. About 5,000,000 Life Assurance policies, taken out by poor people, as the result of the activities of an army of agents, lapsed annually, the premiums paid being confiscated. I explained at length the main facts brought out by Lord Parmoor's inquiry, which revealed exploitation of the manual working classes on a huge scale by extremely wealthy bodies, pointing out that while, under Mr. Lloyd George's Insurance Act of 1911, "everybody was to get ninepence for fourpence, in this particular case, what the poor people got was very nearly fourpence for ninepence." My experience as director of a Mutual Assurance Association was a help in dealing with the technicalities of this class of business, and I adduced specific cases of cruel hardship affecting ex-service men which had been brought to my notice. After my protracted and tiresome importunity, an unexpectedly drastic Bill was introduced in August, 1921, and passed the Second Reading. No general support was forthcoming from any quarter ; the powerful Corporations affected offered strong resistance, and the Bill was withdrawn. In February, 1923, after I had again pleaded

\* The attitude of the Great Powers when Hungarians were being murdered and tortured by Bela Kun, the emissary of Lenin, and the mission of General Smuts, which began and ended in his railway carriage at Buda Pest, are inexplicable.

for action, another and considerably modified Bill arrived, which, under the advice of Lord Shandon, I supported through its stages. This Bill became law in the same year, and I understand that, in certain respects, it has improved the position of the poor policy-holders; but I am not convinced that all the abounding evils disclosed by Lord Parmoor's Committee have been ended.

At the request of Colonel (now Sir) C. E. Yate, M.P., I took charge of his little Bill to ensure that, in certain cases, demands for rent should specify the amounts due to rates. On June 24, 1919, I spoke on the Second Reading, laying stress on the prevailing fallacy that rates do not affect municipal voters, and on July 3, the Bill passed, the Government according benevolent neutrality. I do not know whether any useful results have followed; but the principle involved is sound and important. The reckless expenditure of some municipal councils, now grown into a public scandal, is largely due to the inability of non-ratepaying electors to imagine that they have an interest in forcing local authorities to practise economy.

The Irish policy of the Government caused growing anxiety to the Independent Unionist Peers. The murderous outbreak of April, 1916, instigated by the Germans and the anti-British organisations in America, was promptly suppressed, and there were some signs of a general resentment against this gratuitous crime. I believed that the application of compulsory service at this psychological moment would have met with no great opposition and might have had steadying results. Speaking on March 12, 1918, I said that the Government had "lost the great chance of applying compulsion when I believe it would have been accepted. Since that time, the Sinn Fein conspiracy has grown in strength. . . . Weak government is always unpopular, and it always loses its natural allies. That is happening in India as well as in Ireland." Thinking that it was still possible to adopt the policy of compulsion, I said on April 18, 1918: "At a time when Irishmen are being conscripted in America, in the United Kingdom, in Canada, and in New Zealand, it is most

difficult to believe that Irishmen in Ireland will not be ready to support their own kinsmen in the War."

Conditions in Ireland grew worse, and on June 27, 1918, I urged that at any cost order should be restored and the conspiracy broken. "No Government can neglect its essential function without incurring the nemesis which inexorably dogs weak and wavering footsteps." When at length the forces of the Crown held the conspiracy by the throat, and if unhampered, could have restored peace and order, a Treaty was signed at 2.20 a.m. on December 6, 1921, with rebels whom shortly before Mr. Lloyd George had denounced in unmeasured terms. The surrender was discussed on December 16, in the debate on the reply to the King's Speech, and as the interests of prominent Unionists were involved, there was some reluctance to speak plainly. From the Imperial point of view, I felt this surrender very strongly, and my speech was marked by no restraint.

"So far as I can see, the directors of the Red Army have obtained almost everything they demanded, and they are placed in a position to declare a Republic.

"We shall not in future be able to control the great harbours of the Irish Free State. . . .

"I see no valid guarantee for the lives and property of the tens of thousands of Southern Irish loyalists. . . . The pledges given to loyal Ulstermen have not been kept. . . .

"The noble Marquess who leads the House laid great stress upon the effects of the Treaty as securing permanently good relations with the United States. . . . Can any one believe that the Hearst Press\* . . . will change its tone because of this Treaty coming into existence? . . .

"I think that the moral results may be even more disastrous. We proclaim to the world that crime, if it is only carried far enough and carried on by means of a Red Terror, can count upon success. That has been

\* The Hearst Press has recently changed its tone, and the proprietor announced his intention to advocate co-operation between America and Great Britain subject to significant limitations.

already noted in India, in Egypt, and wherever, either inside or outside, organised forces directed against this Empire exist."

And I added: "We all crave for peace; but peace has never yet and never will be obtained by the victory of crime."

Was this and more too strong? \* The future, which I shall not see, will be the judge. The Treaty was followed by an orgy of murder and arson from which the Irish loyalists and the gallant Royal Irish constabulary, for whose safety no guarantees had been taken, suffered cruelly. On June 22, 1922, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, a great Irish patriot and a soldier statesman, was assassinated on his doorstep in London. Assuming that the Government had deliberately decided to grant Dominion status to the Irish Free State, I still maintain that the precipitate evacuation of Southern Ireland was a grave mistake, and that the forces available, if reasonable precautions had been taken, would have been ample to maintain law and order during a gradual transfer of authority.

On my return from India in the spring of 1913, I was, as I have said,† painfully impressed by the growth of revolutionary Socialism. German propaganda was at work in preparation for the War, and was intensified later with lamentable results shown in a series of strikes directed to hamper the action of the national forces. General Ludendorff has explained his ideas and hopes of what might be accomplished on our home front. I, therefore, frequently attempted to warn the House of Lords of this source of danger to the Empire. Thus, on November 23, 1915, I urged the teaching of Patriotism, pointing out that objections on the ground of inculcating militarism were baseless. "We need have no fear of German militarism in this country." On July 19, 1916, a debate was raised by Lord Haldane on the training of the nation which offered an opportunity, and I said:

\* A leading Irish peer said he agreed with me; but that it was impossible for him to speak so strongly.

† See p. 294.



“There are some things which we may still learn from Germany; but we have in her bureaucratic system of state education a warning for all time of what we ought to avoid. . . . We too have felt and suffered from the wave of materialism which has arisen in late years. . . . When peace comes, we shall have to rebuild our national prosperity on a broader basis than we have yet known. We shall then have the most urgent need of self-denial, of thrift, and above all of honest hard work. . . . Surely education in the future can be made to teach the dignity and honour of labour, and the disgrace of idleness in all classes. . . . Shall we again see heated oratory directed to fomenting class hatred and suspicion? If so, then no system of national training can be devised which will enable us to face the lean and strenuous years that lie before us.”

Speaking again on National education on June 12, 1917, I said: “I believe that the men who have faced death on sea and land in this War and those at home to whom sorrow and suffering have been brought so near, will wish that their children should be taught the higher law.” And after explaining what was going on in Socialist Sunday Schools, largely under alien inspiration, to corrupt our children “even in time of war,” I asked: “Has not the State the right to protect its children against moral as well as against physical poison? If the State has not the right to stop this poisonous teaching, surely it is all the more necessary to provide by a form of State education some kind of antidote.”

On February 25, 1919, in the debate on Industrial Unrest, I again gave warnings of the evil work of the Red Sunday Schools in inculcating Bolshevism, and I declared that “the revolutionary movement in Great Britain was going on long before the War and has received an immense impetus since the War.” I pleaded that “full publicity” of the terrible situation in Russia should be given,\* and that

\* The Foreign Office at this time had masses of information, including ghastly photographs taken by British officers; but it was never published as I believe Lord Curzon wished.

revolutionaries in this country "preaching doctrines of murder and civil war" should be carefully watched. Lord Peel, the Under Secretary of State for War, in winding up the debate on March 4, minimised the danger and said he thought that there was not "any precedent of a great nation which had sunk into civil struggle after having victoriously engaged in a war." This comforting belief has no certain warrant in history, ancient or modern.

On many other occasions, I dwelt on the danger of revolutionary propaganda especially to our young children, giving the actual words used in a Red Sunday School; but, on July 5, 1922, Lord Birkenhead rebuked me as an alarmist, and said I reminded him, "of course I mean only intellectually," of the Fat Boy in *Pickwick*.\* My rejoinder was: "From the speech of the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, I should really think that there was no revolution in Ireland and that there had been no conspiracy leading up to that revolution." The Episcopal Bench, to which I once appealed directly, gave no help; but other peers, and especially the late Lord Long, shared my fears, and in July, 1924, Lord Danesfort introduced a Bill, which I strongly supported, to check the teaching of sedition to children. The House of Lords passed this Bill; but it remains in the air.

The admission by the Coalition Government of Bolshevik "Trade Delegations" into the heart of the Empire at the beginning of 1920 alarmed me, because I regarded it as certain to facilitate revolutionary movements already at work. On February 24, 1920, Lord Selborne drew attention to "the demand by the Labour Party that the Government should carry out its policy," and I said:

"The Government have now proposed to start trading with the co-operative societies in Russia. These Societies,

\* On June 13, 1923, Lord Birkenhead made a speech in the House distinctly alarmist in tone, in which he asked: "What is the menace of Socialism? Is it exaggerated? Is it a chimera?" And he went on to refer to "the incredible danger of the situation with which we are confronted." This had long been my contention.

like everything else in Russia, are controlled by Lenin. . . . If you trade with Government institutions, you must surely recognise the Government that controls them. I need hardly say that there is no truth in the story that Russia contains an enormous amount of food supplies ready for immediate export. . . . Is it possible that we can become receivers of stolen goods,\* or can receive concessions from a Government which is maintaining itself by robbery, torture, and murder? Yet . . . Mr. Lansbury, by wireless, 'earnestly' beseeches the Prime Minister to give the hand of comradeship to the Bolsheviki and declares, after a few days in Russia, that they are 'clear-headed, honest, and humane.' . . .

"The Soviet Government is not only a non-Christian Government; it is a ferociously anti-Christian Government. . . . The plan of destroying Christianity and producing world anarchy is at least 150 years old. . . . If our policy were now to be directed or deflected by Labour, then our national honour would be . . . fatally compromised, and I believe the future of civilisation would be gravely imperilled."

The Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, said that we were "wholly in error" if we discerned "the slightest symptom that any modification in the policy of the Government in relation to Russia had been produced from first to last by any pressure of any kind by the Labour party." Be this as it may, the Trade Delegation flagrantly violated the stipulations of the Agreement, and the results of its presence in London were immediately apparent.

It is significant that on May 21, 1920, the "Hands off Russia" Committee in the *Daily Herald*, pressed for a twenty-four hours' general strike to force the Government to deny assistance to Poland, and that on August 1, 1920, the Communist Party of Great Britain was inaugurated at a Conference held at the Cannon Street Hotel. Krassin, the head of the Trade Delegation, had been accompanied by Kameneff (Rosenfelt), who was the inspirer of the first

\* This happens as was proved later in our Law Courts.

“ Council of Action ” (Soviet) set up at a conference of “ Labour ” Organisations on August 9.\*

At the beginning of 1924, the Soviet dictatorship was recognised by the Socialist Government, and a political mission settled at Chesham House with privileges which have been shamefully abused. When the Conservative Government took office, I spoke strongly on the dangers involved : “ I know of no precedent in history for entertaining in this country the Agents of a hostile power, and I maintain that the Government at Moscow is, on its own showing, at open war with the British Empire ” (December 10, 1924). There are now over twenty Soviet institutions housed in London, and at last the effects of the attack upon the Empire at home and abroad directed from Moscow are beginning to be realised. The results of the work of these agencies, largely alien, to which I tried to draw attention on many occasions, have been made manifest more quickly and more widely than I expected.

From 1913 to 1925, my work in the House of Lords occupied a large part of my time. I find that I spoke, sometimes more than once, on about 225 days, and the preparation of notes for these many speeches always entailed care and anxiety. The House is the most generous and tolerant Assembly in the world—the only Assembly left in which all questions can be calmly discussed. The House of Commons, in recent years, has carried interruptions and the bandying of coarse language to ominous excess, and most popularly elected bodies are infected with the same malady.

I am doubtful whether any one entering either House of Parliament after sixty and untrained can attain a position of influence. The non-politician has everything to learn and must find difficulty in accommodating himself to unaccustomed conditions in which political expediency may conflict with his strongest convictions of what is vital to Imperial interests. When my brief Parliamentary

\* *The Socialist Network*, by Mrs. Webster. Boswell Printing and Publishing Co., 1926.

career began, I received the kindest encouragement, from Lord Lansdowne especially ; but I feel that I lacked the dexterity and that age denied the adaptability which are requisite for success. Yet, in these twelve years, I gained some experience in Parliamentary methods and learned lessons which came too late.

In all modern legislative Assemblies, much must necessarily be done behind the scenes. In all, the trained lawyer has immense advantages, and the technicalities in which many Bills are involved often confer upon him a dominant authority. To the student of psychology, the House of Lords is extraordinarily interesting from its many contrasts. The hereditary qualities of the scions of the old ruling families can still be traced. Better than other Members, they understand the ways and traditions of the oldest Assembly left in the world, and their intimate knowledge of the countryside is a great asset. With them remain in some measure intuitions of the statesmanship which the opportunism inseparable from democratic institutions has almost destroyed when it was most needed for the conservation of the Empire. It is inevitable, if bewildering to the novice, that the frequent changes in the personnel of Government should have the effect of turning formidable critics into doughty champions. Analysis of the division lists indicates a certain instability of opinion, but also some significant departures from Party allegiance. Consistency, which Emerson called " the bugbear of little minds," could sometimes be found on the cross benches. It is a popular delusion that the House of Lords rests unaffected by changes which react—more obviously—upon the elected Chamber. The passing of outstanding figures like Lord Curzon, Lord Camperdown, who was a needed mentor in the matter of procedure, and Lord Balfour of Burleigh, with the withdrawals from active work of leading personalities due to the tyranny of Time, produce distinct effects upon the tone of the debates. The sudden emergence of a Socialist Front Bench soon to take the place of the Liberal Opposition in accordance with convention, and the creation since 1912 of 110 new

peerages, seemed to work a transformation palpable though not easy to define. Even in my short experience, I thought that by the end of 1925, a House differing markedly from that which I entered in 1913, had come into being. This is perhaps one of the many fancies which require to be combated in old age.

## CHAPTER XXV

### THE AFTERMATH

THE heroic period, during which the nation put forth its greatest effort, and all classes took part in War work of every kind, ended with the Armistice. Reaction in many forms from the tremendous strain was inevitable; but the full effects could not be foreseen. The political and economic systems of Europe and our own had been shaken to their foundations as if by an earthquake, and trade was utterly disorganised. Alone among the European Allies we had the advantage that our territory had escaped the ravages of War; but our financial losses, direct and indirect, exceeded those of the other combatants. Never did the British people stand in such dire need of leadership, while the Peace Conference imperatively demanded statesmanship of the highest order.

Neither was forthcoming. The Coalition received a new lease of power, and was dominated by Mr. Lloyd George, who, by training and temperament, was unfitted for the intensely difficult tasks to be undertaken. The Unionist leaders were unable to disentangle themselves from the toils of a demoralising political combination, and the Prime Minister, as was his wont, took counsel from irresponsible *protégés* and directed a private Foreign Office of his own construction. When he started with an army of followers to act for the British Empire at the Peace Conference, it was certain that irregularities would be rampant.

Unfortunately for the settlement of Europe, President Wilson had determined to take part in person, also with a large and promiscuous contingent of advisers, among

whom responsible American statesmen were conspicuous by their absence. Possessing little knowledge of European affairs, and placing schemes for a "New World Order" to be attained by a League of Nations, which Colonel House and others had been incubating, in the forefront of his aims, President Wilson's personal intervention was embarrassing to the last degree.

From these conditions, a whole train of evils followed. The unique position of the first American President to cross the Atlantic gave rise to formidable illusions. He could dominate the Conference, on one occasion at least, by threatening to return to America. He could insist upon making the League of Nations, which he had never thought out, an integral part of the Treaties, and energies urgently required for the settlement of Europe were, therefore, squandered upon endless discussions on the terms of the academic Covenant. And when all was over, it was discovered that he had no warrant to speak for the American nation, which proceeded to repudiate the Treaties and to forbid adherence to the League. A supplementary tripartite Treaty, guaranteeing security to France, therefore, fell to the ground, creating a deplorable impression upon the French people to be partly relieved later by the Treaty of Locarno, substituted for the Protocol elaborated at Geneva which was plainly impossible.

Among the results of the Versailles Conference, is the attitude of suspicion and aloofness in regard to the European nations which now characterises American policy and has produced natural repercussions. The prevalent misunderstandings between the New and the Old World, which are mutually disturbing, need not have arisen.

Of the actual proceedings behind closed doors at Versailles or in the *coulisses* of the Temple of Peace, we have had peculiarly unpleasant glimpses. The cynically piquant revelations of Mr. J. M. Keynes had the effect, as he evidently intended, of bringing the methods of the Conference into contempt. Here is one picture not easily forgotten :



"Not infrequently Mr. Lloyd George, after delivering a speech in English, would, during the period of its interpretation into French, cross the hearthrug to the President to reinforce his case by some *ad hominem* argument in private conversation, or to seek the ground for a compromise—and this would sometimes be the signal for a general upheaval and disorder. . . . My last and most vivid impression is of such a scene—the President and the Prime Minister as the centre of a surging mob and a babel of sound, a welter of eager impromptu compromises and counter-compromises, all sound and fury signifying nothing, on what was an unreal question anyhow, the great issues of the morning's meeting forgotten and neglected; and Clemenceau silent and aloof on the outskirts—for nothing which touched the security of France was forward." \*

In such disorderly fashion did democracy at length evolve plans for the settlement of distracted Europe, and who can wonder at the results of which the Treaty of Sèvres, destined to disappear, was the most obviously preposterous? †

Of all this, I knew little at the time; but I heard enough to cause me great anxiety. Adventurers of several types gathered in Paris to prosecute aims of their own with some measure of success, and leakages were extensive, while propaganda was not neglected. The contrast between the dignity of the proceedings of the Congress of Vienna, which gave peace for forty years, and the confused wrangling at Versailles, painfully illustrates the decay of statesmanship in the intervening century.

As after the peace of 1815, our country experienced a brief period of pseudo-prosperity due in part to inflation

\* *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (Macmillan, 1920). In America, voluminous details of an intimate character have been published in the course of the controversy over the Conference; but President Wilson's private correspondence has so far been withheld.

† Signor Guglielmo Ferrero, the brilliant Italian historian, states that Signor Nitti, after signing the Treaty of Sèvres at San Remo, exclaimed: "Gentlemen, I have concluded one of the most fatal and calamitous Treaties in history" (*Four Years of Fascism*). This gloomy forecast was justified by events.

of the currency. During the War, wages mounted, in some cases inordinately, and the manual working classes enjoyed comparative affluence, while the sudden enrichment of a large number of individuals became everywhere noticeable. On the other hand, many middle-class households were impoverished, and the deaths of thousands of able bread-winners, who were making their careers, added what Mr. Edgar Wallace calls a "crashed class," while the Liberal attack on the hereditary landowners was becoming more and more effective. Thus a silent, but infinitely important, revolution in our social structure has been accelerated by the War.

That "lean and strenuous years" \* lay straight before us, and that the great development of industrial activity leading the world, which far more than redeemed the economic losses of the French Wars, could not be repeated was clear to all students of national affairs.

Reaction, following the exhausting strain of the War, produced a revulsion against hard work, and the nation sorely needed the leadership which could make the truth clear and inspire to new efforts as the only road to salvation. Such leadership, as I have said, was wanting at this crisis in our history. Mr. Lloyd George—almost a dictator—was absent for long periods engaged in manipulating the erratic Councils at Versailles. Waste, which had been reckless during the War, continued after the Armistice, and stern retrenchment, which might then have been applied, soon became impossible in a democracy which had not been taught to understand realities.

Long before the War, great forces had been stirring which received a powerful impulse and now threaten to become unmanageable. The Socialist world revolutionary movement which blazed out in France in 1789, following the War of American Independence, was due to cumulative causes stretching back into history.† The same causes produced ferment in the middle of last century

\* See p. 324.

† See *World Revolution*, by Mrs. Webster (Constable, 1921), where the evolution of militant Socialism is carefully traced.

from which Disraeli expected a greater cataclysm than the French Revolution. Only the fringes of the storm, which then swept over most European States, reached our islands, where their significance as portents of a far-reaching Socialist upheaval in course of development was never understood. Even before the Great War, the writing flamed from the wall, and there was no Daniel among our political leaders to interpret the meaning. The wave of national patriotism which passed over the land in 1914-8 and reached heights never paralleled in our island story, failed to submerge revolutionary activities which, with the support of pacifists of every degree, had never before been so plainly manifested. No combatant country was so heavily hit by strikes as our own, and the injury inflicted upon the nation was incalculable. The Germans, who, in and after 1848, suffered severely from the world revolutionary movement, turned it to full account against the people from whom they had most to fear, and when the clash of arms ended, industrial war, culminating in the calamitous coal strike, continued with intensified vigour. The Railway strike of 1919 was misleadingly described by Mr. Lloyd George as "the outcome of an anarchist plot"; but the tendencies of his oratory\* and measures for which he is primarily responsible prove that he has never attained any idea of the nature of the world forces for which the War provided new opportunities. Such opportunities must have arisen in any case, as history shows; but the capture of the whole resources of the huge Russian Empire supplied these forces with immense powers of aggression never before approached, and the Government of the Kaiser was a prime agent in letting loose new agencies directed to the destruction of civilisation. Lenin and his fellow-conspirators proceeded to apply the doctrines of Babeuf and earlier subversives† on a gigantic scale, murdering or driving into exile the best elements in Russia and

\* The Limehouse speeches and others were exactly what the world revolutionaries would most desire from an influential politician.

† Elaborated into a pseudo-scientific system by Marx.

confiscating all the enterprises, Russian and foreign, which were making rapid progress in 1914. These new agencies quickly asserted themselves outside Russia. In Austria, Hungary, Bavaria, Italy, and Bulgaria, the experiences of 1848 were repeated; but, in Hungary alone, the emissaries of Lenin, preceded by a Kerensky in the person of Count Karolyi, were able to set up a brief government based on murder and torture. It was unfortunate that the term "Bolshevism" came to be applied to a movement of old standing, which was not Russian although Russia is the scene of its greatest manifestation up to the present time. The natural result of this misnomer was to suggest the sudden apparition of a new portent and to obscure the pregnant lessons of the past. Confusion of ideas and darkening of counsels thus became inevitable.

The Socialist tide ebbs and flows in Europe, success or failure turning upon national characteristics. Propaganda, directed from Moscow, backed by large funds and far exceeding in intensity and subtlety anything attempted before the War, has now been at work for some years in many countries, and a mass attack in this form has been brought to bear especially upon the British Empire, regarded as the main bulwark of political stability and of Christian civilisation. The effects, moral and material—some of them permanent—are already incalculable.

From 1913 onwards, I carefully watched the signs of the times and earnestly strove to understand their significance. A large proportion of my many writings and speeches was, therefore, devoted to attempts to explain the operations of the revolutionary forces and to give warning of their implications.

In the eight years since the Armistice, I find that I have written more than 1,000 articles and about 300 letters in 24 London and 5 Provincial papers, in 10 foreign journals mainly American, and in 32 magazines and other publications. Of the letters, more than 80 appeared in the *Times*, 88 in the *Morning Post*, and 48 in the *Spectator*. There were also many speeches and interviews. These multitudinous efforts of my old age covered many subjects,

among which Socialism in its economic and subversive aspects was prominent.

In the *Nineteenth Century* of March, 1918,\* I carefully analysed the "Report on Reconstruction" prepared for submission to the Labour Conference at Nottingham in order that it might be discussed by the "Party Conference" held in June. This portentous elaboration of Socialist policy was practically a revised edition of Mr. Sidney Webb's pamphlet *Wanted a Programme* published in 1888, adapted to the growth of the movement which had been powerfully stimulated by the War. Socialism in this country can be traced much further back and shown to be "the local organisation of a European movement."† Being in some measure a secret movement, it had received little attention; but in the Report of 1918, it came out into the open, and I, therefore, strove to point out the grave dangers which threatened the Commonwealth. As I wrote:

"The proposals of to-day were made in 1789-97; but France was then little industrialised, and the 'nationalisation of Production' took the form of State workshops, which reappeared in 1840 and 1848 with effects economically disastrous and widely demoralising. From the Paris Commune, formed after the fall of the Bastille to dominate France, there is an unbroken record of the sanguinary achievements of Socialism and of ruinous failure to fulfil the promises of its high priests. . . . How far the British manual workers have been led to believe in the fallacies of Socialism will soon be apparent . . . dangerous fallacies and alluring promises have been spread broadcast among people who have neither the time nor the knowledge required to analyse them. . . .‡ Democracy will be put to the test in the immediate future and must stand or

\* "The Peril of Socialism."

† *The Menace of Socialism*, W. Lawler Wilson, first published in 1909. St. Stephen's Press.

‡ After an examination of the Socialist policy of "nationalisation," Mr. W. W. Paine justly states: "Of all the wild schemes for the betterment of mankind, the nationalisation of industry is the wildest and most impracticable that has ever entered into the brain of man" (*Times*, January 11, 1927).

fall by what it can accomplish in securing strength and rectitude in government, and in subordinating rhetoric to statesmanship."

March, 1918, was a most critical month in the War, and my effort to make clear the national "Peril" involved in the political and economic aims of "Labour," then publicly avowed, had little effect. The progress of Socialism since has been more rapid than I expected, and the principal political results of the War have been the wholesale capture of Trade Union machinery by the variegated Socialist Party, a marked increase in the Socialist vote, and the continuous manufacture of young Socialists in some Universities and in Public and Elementary schools.

Incidentally, the War, by the strong impulse it gave to Socialism, killed the great Liberal Party,\* which had already lost itself in false dogmas, and having made straight the way for socialised "Labour" by legislation and rhetoric, found itself supplanted by a more virile political organisation. The decision of Mr. Asquith and his followers to put "Labour" in office in 1924 was the swansong of Liberalism, which thus crowned its work and became *functus officio*.

The psychological aftermath of the War is less easily defined. Tendencies previously visible were sharply accelerated, and while we continue to declare that our British characteristics remain unaltered, in spite of ominous evidence to the contrary, any one who has lived to my age must be conscious of radical and disturbing changes, running right through our national life and unfitting our manhood and womanhood for the duties which our predecessors were able to discharge.

The general effects of the War have been summed up by Signor Ferrero in the following words :

"The spirit of violence and domination is raging tempestuously everywhere, threatening the ancient

\* The Liberals in Russia were literally killed off or driven into exile, as always happens in revolutions.

legalities ; the sense of good and evil, of the true and the false, of beauty and ugliness, is being lost amid the confusion of a sort of universal delirium ; no community knows any longer what it wants."

With us the "spirit of violence" at present takes the form of intimidation recently rampant and wearing a cowardly and un-British guise, while the ruthless tyranny of the Trade Unions, exercised upon members and non-members alike, was emphasised last year, when organised "Labour" discarded freedom. For the rest, who can deny that the national sense of "good and evil" has been dulled, that discrimination between the "true and the false" is constantly blurred, and that a cult of "ugliness" in many forms flourishes? Between Praxiteles and Epstein; Leonardo da Vinci and Cubism, a gulf yawns; while Jazz and the Charleston, tracing descent from the crude efforts of African negroes, have robbed our ballrooms of music and of grace.

The astonishing growth of the published word illustrates the aftermath of the War in another aspect. The instructors of the public have multiplied exceedingly, and the result is a huge output, in part trivial, sometimes decadent, and too often tending to confuse opinion. While, in my younger days, a writer on public affairs had to stand on the merits of his work, he may now be forced into notoriety by advertisement. "A striking article by X. will appear on Monday"; "Another thrilling instalment next Sunday." By such means, smart, but often ignorant and shallow, effusions are heralded, and frequent photographs of the authors cater to the artificially stimulated craving for intimate personal details which is now an unwholesome feature in many newspapers. Advertisement—commercial, professional, and personal—which has become the basis of Press finance,\* has been elevated into an art pursued at great expense and with extreme cleverness. It is, of course, necessary within limits; but it brings to the lavish advertiser power over the subsidised

\* We have been informed in evidence that the annual income from advertisements of a popular paper was £2,800,000.

paper, which is not always exercised in the public interest and may militate against honest and independent judgment.\* If the philosophy of advertisement is ever analysed, it will be found that excess in this form of human ingenuity does not indicate a high average of intelligence in a community. The syndication of commercialised newspapers has proceeded apace, and the instruction of the people tends to follow oil in becoming the sport of financial speculators. Many evils thus arise. A great part of the Press is less informative than in Victorian days; † the tyranny of sport is irresistible; the personal aims of individuals usurp the place of national policy, and praise or blame is meted out on other than public grounds. Mr. James M. Beck ‡ has instituted an interesting comparison of the contents of present American newspapers with those of last century, which applies equally to our Press and especially to the section which follows American models.

From all this and more, it results that the democracy is not adequately instructed and is unable to form reasoned opinions on great public questions, although the future of the Nation and Empire depends upon the ballot. At the same time, the flood of subversive literature, in all forms and addressed to all classes as well as to young children, has risen to heights unprecedented. Socialist papers are often clever and seductive; they do not rely on advertisements; but they are never in want of funds, which do not all come from abroad. The result of these and other activities is the visible decay of national unity and of patriotism,§ which a section of our *intelligentsia* now

\* I have had a letter sent back to me by a well-known editor, who agreed with all I had written, but admitted candidly that "advertisements are the apple of my eye," and said that publication of the facts I wished to present might alienate lucrative clients.

† The posters now lavishly displayed must be taken to represent what the public is believed to desire. On January 2 last, one announcement in huge capitals was: "Empire News What Bottomley Will Do." The grotesque incongruity of this conjunction could not have suggested itself to the directors of the *Empire News*.

‡ Ex-Solicitor-General of the United States and a warm friend of this country.

§ The many organisations which are earnestly striving to combat



proclaims to be a form of narrow-mindedness, internationalism being the basis of the Socialist movement. Thus strangely the attribute on which we prided ourselves is being undermined as a result of the War in which it proved to be our salvation. All the tendencies which I have briefly described existed before the War; their rapid development is the most startling feature of the aftermath.

It may well seem that my great volume of writing on many different subjects, even during the past eight years, was excessive. My excuse must be that so many subjects, which I had studied and on which I felt strongly, presented themselves. I can hope only that the views expressed may have helped to exert a passing influence. There are, however, compensations for the time and thought expended and for the inevitable disappointments. It is a delight to find that you have stirred a responsive chord in the minds of readers of whom you know nothing, and this has happened to me in full measure. The answering letters—in this sense—that I have received, often from distant places, would fill a large volume, and they have sometimes led to correspondence with kindred spirits whom I shall never see in the flesh. Here are a few specimens of the encouragement which comes to writers who are in earnest.

The late Mr. H. M. Hyndman, whom I never saw and with most of whose views I profoundly disagreed, moved by a letter of mine, wrote on November 15, 1916: "It is no doubt now clearer to you than it is to me that, unless much more sagacity is displayed in the conduct of public affairs than is anywhere to be descried at present, we shall have a very dangerous economic situation not only during but after the War." And he begged me to write more on this subject.

Following my letter in the *Times*, "Labour and Bolshevist Propaganda" of August 14, 1920, the late Lord Dunraven wrote on the same day:

this evil are generally short of funds and for various reasons do not sufficiently co-operate.

"A very powerful and most useful letter of yours in the *Times* and I fear terribly accurate. I wish the Government would do two things: Tell the people exactly how near starvation we have been. . . . And tell them all they know about Bolshevik activities in the United Kingdom. The people are ignorant, and trust too much to our historic faculty of 'muddling through.' "

Six years later the Government gave some samples of their information, and Ministers began at last to speak plainly about "Bolshevik activities."

In a letter to the *Morning Post*, I had tried to express sympathy with the Japanese in the appalling earthquake disaster which overwhelmed Tokyo. On one day, within four hours, I received responses via Paris and Canada. Mr. Korieksyo Takahashi wrote: "You may tell him that every Japanese must appreciate his sympathy and encouragement in such warmest terms" (Tokyo, October 20, 1923). And Mr. Sasuki, sending to a mutual friend copies of a letter from Lord Curzon to the Lord Mayor of London and of mine, said that they were "the best and most beautifully expressed among the foreign comments with regard to the misfortune befallen upon my country" (Tokyo, October 30, 1923).

I have been brought into contact with many Russian exiles who, having lost their all, are bravely facing adversity. Partly for their sakes, I sent a letter to the *Times* on the tenth anniversary of the battle of the Marne, recalling what the Allies owed to the Imperial Russian Army, and adding: "May I plead for remembrance of the devotion of the Army of Old Russia, which, as Marshal Foch has said, rendered this great victory possible?" (September 6, 1924). From Jugo-Slavia, General Wrangel at once wrote to me:

"In the name of the remnants of the Russian Army, scattered at present about the Balkans, I hasten to express our heartfelt gratitude for this appreciation, particularly valuable at the present time, when the authentic national Russia is forgotten and arbitrarily replaced in the

conception of numerous civilised Western States by the deadliest enemy of both parties—the Third Communist International.”

Of more than thirty articles which I contributed to Magazines after the Armistice, twelve dealt with naval matters to which I unconsciously returned. In the *Nineteenth Century* of June, 1921, I attempted to drive home “A Great Lesson of the Naval War,” which is briefly that the operations of fleets containing battleships are now sharply limited. As I pointed out :

“Surely it must be clear to every one who has attempted to study the situation in the North Sea during the War that no Japanese battle fleet could now be maintained on the Pacific Coast of America in complete readiness to meet a smaller American fleet resting upon its home ports. Conversely, no American fleet could be maintained in the North-Western Pacific capable of dealing with a smaller Japanese fleet as we dealt with the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea. . . . The same conditions would present themselves to a British battle fleet in the N.W. Pacific and China Sea.”

My general thesis was that “the effective transference of sea power to a great distance in order to bring it to bear on a naval belligerent is far more difficult than it was in the past, and in circumstances easily imagined, might be impossible.” I am doubtful if this axiom—as I maintain it to be—is yet accepted, and in the loose expressions of opinion which are not uncommon, I trace fallacies which war would rudely dispel. The base which we are developing at Singapore, and the much stronger base which the Americans have created at Pearl Harbour, Sandwich Islands, are essential for the protection of trade in certain areas, but could not be used for the purposes popularly assigned to both. Neither America nor Britain could by the help of these bases “dominate the Pacific,” as Lord Haldane erroneously said of Singapore.\*

\* House of Lords, July 14, 1924.

It was inevitable that I should be among the earliest "diehards," and my first record is of a small gathering on March 2, 1922, which swelled into a meeting at the House of Commons on April 10. We were regarded as hide-bound Tories consumed with a burning zeal for reaction. It was, therefore, interesting to learn that Lord Grey of Fallodon whole-heartedly shared our views. As he has pointedly written: "After the peace, more especially in the last two years of the Lloyd George Government, its proceedings and conduct of affairs stirred me with indignation and despair such as I have never felt about any other British Government."\* This sentence perfectly describes the sentiments which inspired the "diehards." After the explosion of the Coalition at the Carlton Club on October 19, 1922, Lord Salisbury wrote to me: "No man has worked harder for the downfall of the Coalition than you have done, both in the House of Lords itself and in counsel outside it" (October 21, 1922). This was more than I deserved; but no one—not even Lord Grey—could have been "stirred" to greater "indignation and despair" by "the last two years of the Lloyd George Government."

On March 15, 1911, at a meeting of over 1,200 manufacturers and merchants, held at the Guildhall under the late Lord Avebury, a resolution was passed advocating a distinctive trade mark for goods produced in the Empire. The Executive of the British Empire League, of which I became Chairman after my return from India, warmly espoused this cause, and in 1917-8 we were in correspondence with the Board of Trade. This and a deputation which I introduced to Sir Albert Stanley (now Lord Ashfield) ended in failure. The subject, however, again emerged last year, when the Government passed the Merchandise Marks Bill—a measure, in my view, less likely to benefit Empire trade than the voluntary Mark of Origin for which the League strongly pleaded in vain.

On March 30, 1919, I presided at a luncheon given by the League at which the Prime Ministers of Australia and

\* *Twenty-five Years.*

New Zealand, and four Dominion High Commissioners, were present. We then unanimously passed a resolution that it was desirable to hold a British Empire Exhibition "as an expression of Imperial unity and a means of promoting commerce and industry throughout the Empire." This resolution was sent on the same day to the President of the Board of Trade, with a request that the Government would support the project. More spadework by the League, including the collection of promises of many guarantees, was entailed; but at length the British Empire Exhibition was launched, and in spite of errors which we strove to avoid, a wonderful result was obtained in 1924, to which our President, the Duke of Devonshire, notably contributed.

In these eight years, I accidentally struck upon a subject in which I found new interest. An article by Mr. Morton Luce, in the *Nineteenth Century* (September, 1922), dealing with "Nature in Shakespeare," provided, unconsciously on his part, strong corroboration of the Baconian theory. This I pointed out to the editor, who asked me to put my views into an article which appeared in January, 1923. I had read Sir Sidney Lee's *Life of Shakespeare* when it first appeared in 1898, and had learned from this engaging study of Elizabethan lore that there was not a shred of valid evidence connecting Shakespeare or Shagspere\* of Stratford with the classic Plays, though as propaganda by suggestion the book was most effective. I read the latest edition, which confirmed my early impressions. My article, which was closely reasoned, elicited only sneers and some abuse; but it led to much interesting correspondence, with Americans especially. It then occurred to me that some of the many facts, as to which there can be no dispute, might be brought together in the form of a direct challenge, and in consultation with the late Mr. Crouch Batchelor, I wrote an article in the *English Review*† in which we begged the "Shakespearean

\* The name under which the future actor was married, possibly a corruption of Jacques Pierre, as Shaxsper is another of many variants.

† "The 'Shakespeare' Myth," subsequently republished as a

experts" "to descend from their pedestals, to abandon their pose of disdain and, quitting vague generalities, to take up the challenge now thrown down by supplying—if they can—rational explanations of simple facts." The result was absolute failure, and I discovered that the boycott of indisputable evidence by the general Press was almost complete.

Such totally different personages as Lords Palmerston and Penzance, John Bright, Bismarck, Emerson, Whittier, and Mark Twain, without knowledge of the now huge volume of Baconian research, arrived at the definite conclusion that Plays, embodying all the learning of the Elizabethan era and exhibiting an intimate acquaintance with law and with the life of Courts, could never have been written by an uneducated rustic who became an actor of small parts, and who during his last years, while still in his prime, was engaged in petty trading, in the ruthless collection of small debts, and in trying to deprive the citizens of Stratford of their common lands. That the correspondence of the greatest genius England has produced, which must have been considerable, has entirely disappeared is a staggering fact, as is the appearance for the first time seven years after "Shakespeare's" death of some of the finest Plays and of others extensively edited. That the man who wrote, "Ignorance is the curse of God, knowledge the wing by which we fly to Heaven" (*Henry VI*), allowed his children to be illiterate ought to be unthinkable.

In this intellectually demoralising myth, I trace an analogy with the "muddling through" theory, which has been infinitely harmful to the nation. In effect, Stratfordians must be held to believe that an uneducated person "could surreptitiously absorb all the learning of the Elizabethan age and transmute it into immortal verse,"\* because he was an Englishman to whom the

pamphlet, to which were added reproductions of the amazing frontispiece to Bacon's *De Augmentis* published in 1645 and of the revealing manuscript discovered among the Northumberland papers in 1867.

\* "The 'Shakespeare' Myth."

ordinary processes by which vast knowledge may be acquired were unnecessary. Hofrath Holzer, the eminent German scholar, shortly before his death in 1924, put one aspect of this question in forcible language.

“It is a plain matter of fact that, through a continued, irrational belief in the Shakespeare delusion, the noble history of culture in England is disfigured by a most unsightly blur. The denial of truth always leads to hypocrisy and cant. Any poison of error persistently poured into the open ears of a nation, especially of its boys and girls at school, inevitably infects the whole public mind with false methods of thought producing consequences fatal to efficient intelligent life.”

I shall not live to see the light of truth brought to bear upon the forgery-tainted “Shakespeare delusion,” which will happen directly the conspiracy of silence \*—baffling explanation—is ended.

To most of those who pass the allotted “threescore years and ten,” there comes a time when troubles, once easily thrown off, tend to become chronic, leading to growing disabilities. At seventy-five I was forced to sever my connection with bodies which younger men could better serve. This involved losing touch with many valued colleagues with whom I had long worked, and was the beginning of the detachment from public life and the comparative isolation which are the great trials of old age.

\* Lord Hewart has said that “he was told that the real power of the Press consisted in suppression.” How great that power may be is proved by the persistence of the “Shakespeare” myth.

## CHAPTER XXVI

### QUO VADIMUS ?

WRITING in 1844, Disraeli, whose inside knowledge of European affairs was extensive, caused Sidonia, the great international banker, to instruct Coningsby that "the world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes." Experience leads me to believe that Sidonia was partly right. It may sometimes happen that "personages" to whom the direction of great affairs is popularly ascribed are figure heads; or they may be automatons responding to forces which they are unwilling or unable to resist. The progress or the retrogression of mankind is determined by the involved action and interaction of forces great and small, local and world-wide, political, psychological, and biological. It is of the essence of statesmanship to endeavour to analyse the strength of these forces, and to direct them, so far as possible, into paths leading to the national good, or fearlessly to oppose those that are plainly dangerous.

The currents, visible and concealed, which sway events were never so baffling as to-day. The problems of the Roman Republic and Empire were far simpler than those with which we are confronted. In place of the formula of Carlyle, I have defined genius as "a consummate sense of proportion." \* Genius, in this sense, was never so essential to statesmanship as at the present time, but also—where it can be found—never so difficult to exercise. Always the forces nearest to hand, the forces threatening

\* When I published this definition, in my Preface to the *Life of Sir Andrew Clarke* in 1905, a reviewer denounced it as inapplicable to the case of a Julius Cæsar or a Michael Angelo, although obviously a sense of proportion is the supreme test of a great general or a great artist.



to become unpleasantly active, the forces most stridently advertised, must operate to eliminate statesmanship from the governance of the world. This appears to be an inevitable tendency of our age.

Any one who attempts to peer into the future, and to discern, among the innumerable eddies, cross-currents, and vortices, the course of the main streams which are bearing mankind towards a destiny unknown, must take account of four principal agencies which have already traced indelible marks upon history.

1. Democracy in the form of adult suffrage—the Liberal panacea for all human ills.

2. The Socialist world movement of old standing, now largely, but not solely, working under impulsion from Moscow.

3. "The rising tide of colour" \* now manifesting itself in India, the Far East, and elsewhere.

4. The centralisation of money power.

These four agencies may be studied as separate streams of tendency; but all are acting and interacting upon each other. Democracy, in its present forms, is a potent ally of the world Socialist movement, while the theories which it has evolved and disseminated powerfully reinforce colour antagonism. On the other hand, the Socialist movement, especially since it came under direction from Moscow, seeks and gains advantage by utilising the political facilities which democracies offer, and eagerly promotes racial as well as class war wherever conditions are favourable.

Of democracy we can now plainly see some necessary consequences. The idea of government by "the will of the people" still retains fascination for many minds. But no way of ascertaining the "will of the people," otherwise than by a referendum—a device applicable only to simple issues and then untrustworthy—has yet been discovered. On most important questions "the people" have no "will." For various reasons, popular elections fail to produce truly representative Assemblies, while votes on

\* Lothrop Stoddard.

divisions may not record the real views of Members. These and other limiting conditions escaped the vision of the fervent apostles of democracy. That democracy must tend to curtail freedom, to exaggerate bureaucracy, to make sound finance impossible, and to exalt the demagogue, is being more and more realised. Many Conservatives now admit that democracy is proving a failure. The Socialist does not accept its elementary principles, which he flagrantly violates. In the municipal sphere, it is generally wasteful and may be economically disastrous. Here Socialism steadily advances, and the enfranchisement of persons living at the expense of the public facilitates the endowment of the idler at the cost of the worker. Rates are now a heavy burden on industry, and some municipalities are loaded with debt that will never be repaid.\*

The democracy of the twentieth century is distinguished from the earlier forms by the admission of women on equal terms with men, which has been accomplished in some countries and is threatened in others. We now have over 6,000,000 women voters, who will suffice under our political system to secure the franchise for all their adult sisters, thus giving to the sex a permanent majority of electors. The effects of this revolution are incalculable. Already it is possible to trace certain changes and notably the increase of Socialist voters which I predicted,† basing my forecast on the experience of Australasia. Where women are placed on an equality with men, we can only say with certainty that the virility of a nation must be undermined; but far more is involved. The new status conferred upon women will react upon them, effecting radical changes in our whole social structure which no one can foresee.

It has followed from the conditions I have briefly described that popularly elected assemblies are becoming widely discredited. They tend to become more and more disorderly and unfitted for the calm discussion which

\* The remarkable results obtained by the three Commissioners who replaced the Board of Guardians in West Ham admirably illustrate the advantages of selected administrative capacity as compared with popularly elected profligacy.

† See p. 383.

national problems demand.\* They create instability fatal to national prosperity. Their proceedings no longer interest the public. In these circumstances, it is doubtful whether democracy will survive.

Socialism affects to provide an alternative. Modern civilisation has tended to make inequalities of fortune—always existent—appear more glaring and provocative. They violently conflict with the doctrine of the equality of man, carelessly accepted by the founders of the American Constitution and fundamentally false.† Since my boyhood, there has been an immense advance in the standards of life of the manual workers now provided at the public expense with free benefits of many kinds formerly unknown. Deficient housing accommodation, greatly aggravated by Trade Union policy, the precarious nature of employment in some occupations, and the monotony which machine labour entails, remain to be mitigated. While our employed workers are far better off than formerly and than those in any other European country, the now large number for whom work cannot be found and the increasing number who are unemployable have created new problems. The willing worker, forced to dependence on doles or Poor Law relief, demands our deepest sympathy. There is no remedy except returning industrial prosperity for which peace is the first essential, or emigration to which for several reasons there are limits. The too rapid and coldly material industrialisation of the nineteenth century left ills which we are earnestly seeking to redress, in days when an excess of population creates new difficulties. Hence arises the powerful appeal of Socialism promising universal prosperity without effort on condition of destroying capital. Robespierre, according to Babeuf, “thought that equality would only be a vain word as long as the

\* A recent writer in the *Times*, dealing with the experiences of 1926, stated that the left wing of the Socialist Party “has only distinguished itself by outbreaks of personal attacks in the lowest vein of gutter politics.” More important is his verdict that “not merely the manner but the matter of debates in the Commons has been stereotyped, lethargic, and exasperating.”

† “The iron law of inequality” (Lothrop Stoddard) dominates all classes in all communities.

owners of property were allowed to tyrannise over the great mass, and that in order to destroy their power and to take the mass of citizens out of their dependence, there was no way but to place all property in the hands of the Government.”\* A millennium to be attained by the forcible redistribution of wealth, which the French Revolutionaries held out to the masses, responds to the elemental predatory instincts of mankind inherited in centuries of evolution from the savage. To be rendered prosperous, at the expense of other people, without personal exertion, is a widely attractive prospect. That is the lure of Socialism to-day, and the programme of the French Revolutionaries is in essentials that of the Labour Party.† How a Government is to be constructed to dispose of all national wealth and to carry on all the activities by which we live, and how an economic catastrophe destroying the wealth on which the revenue depends, is to be avoided, are matters which can be left to settle themselves when the workers’ Paradise arrives.‡ All such theories are features of the world revolutionary movement which, having captured Russia, is now strenuously working for the destruction of the British Empire. Here, as elsewhere, Socialism is presented in many aspects in order to multiply its adherents. Intellectuals, sometimes products of the Universities, or hurriedly instructed in “Labour Colleges,” supply it with literary ammunition. Infected school-teachers and a penetrated Civil Service assist its progress. A group of Bishops and clergy, naturally drawn towards schemes which confidently promise alleviation of palpable ills and ignorant of all that lies in the background, give religious sanctions. At the other end of the scale, Communists, whom the Socialist organisations pretend to ostracise and

\* Written in 1795. *World Revolution*, by Mrs. Webster. Constable and Co., 1921.

† According to Mr. Bernard Shaw, “Distributism” would be “rather a better name for Socialism”; but he omits to explain what would be available for distribution or by what means it would be distributed.

‡ Some of the French Revolutionaries, being logical, realised that their promises could not be fulfilled in then existing circumstances, and conceived the idea of reducing the population of France to manageable dimensions by massacre.

who differ from them only in methods, effectively reinforce the "moderates." Apathy and the habit of mind which strains after broadmindedness supply Socialism with benevolent neutrality. Stress is frequently laid upon divisions in the Socialist ranks, which, it is suggested, must render the movement harmless. This convenient assumption is contradicted by the whole history of revolutions, and it may be noted that Socialists of all hues, from Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Saklatvala, unite in championing the Bolsheviks.

The last General Election showed an increase of a million Socialist voters as compared with that of 1923, and the present Conservative majority is much larger than that which the "will of the people," so judged, can justify. All industrial conflicts, by creating poverty, bring converts to Socialism, and are, therefore, promoted by enemies of the Empire without and within. A party which undertakes, by the destruction of the present order, to be effected either by the ballot box or by force as circumstances may prescribe, to remedy all ills and spread prosperity broadcast, is necessarily in a strong position. The ignorant, who will always form the vast majority of electors, may say, "Things are bad and can hardly be worse, let us give the Socialist panacea a trial." For these and other reasons, a rapid growth of Socialism here and elsewhere may be expected. Meanwhile Socialist Legislation, by piling burdens on industries, creates unemployment, and thus furthers the movement.

The war of colour is a perfectly natural result of the impact of Western democratic theories upon civilisations outworn, like those of India and China, or in embryo as among African native races and negroes in West Indian islands. The education which we initiated and for a time controlled in India, was well calculated to produce the ferment now plainly visible.\* The Bishop of Exeter has explained how ill-balanced American history, taught to Chinese students, had the same effect, while incidentally suggesting that "the English are tyrants that oppress

\* See p. 381.

young races struggling to be free.”\* Broadly speaking, what the West has taught the East is that self-government is superior to good government, that Liberty is a matter of votes, and that Liberty and prosperity are usually attained by revolution. This heady wine poured into old bottles could only disintegrate them, and young students in India and China, knowing nothing of the history of their own countries, eagerly swallowed the catch-phrases of democracy. Thus were formed increasing bodies of malcontents resenting all authority, convinced that their slender equipment of Western knowledge qualifies them to rule, but conceiving government and administration in terms of the East. The Westernised *intelligentsia* in India will not form the ruling class if British Government lapses, though it may supply agents to Indian rulers. Left to herself India would revert to her immemorial traditions and customs, and the fighting men would wield the power. Nor will the Cantonese student, brought up on the travesty of American history which the Bishop of Exeter described, find himself transformed into an over-lord in China, where the more virile Northerners might regard him as a Punjabi views a Bengali. Whatever may happen in India, China, or the Philippines, increasing numbers of persons, whose ambitions can never be realised, will continue to manifest more or less bitter hostility to the foreigner, who appears to stand in the way of their advancement.

The victory of the Japanese—a nation apart—over a white race inevitably gave new direction to this hostility. Alike in India and in China, all the conditions which have raised the homogeneous and intensely patriotic Japanese to the position of a Great Power are wanting. “Nationalism,” in India and China, could only take the form of colour unity manifesting itself in antagonism to the Western nations. On this spurious nationalism, the propagandists at Moscow have worked with marked effect—in China especially. Neither Indians nor Chinese have any affinity with Marxism; but the Bolsheviks turn all racial animosities to the fullest account in the interests of world

\* *Times*, December 9, 1926.

revolution, and they are now strenuously seeking to make the Eastern peoples permanently hostile to the Western Powers, and to Great Britain in particular. How far the "Rising tide of Colour" will spread cannot be foreseen ; but it is a modern portent in world affairs.

The fourth agency cannot be ignored, although its operations are largely conjectural. The tendency towards the concentration of money power in relatively few hands, is revealing itself in banking amalgamations and in the creation of huge industrial trusts and combines. America and Germany have led the way in this direction ; but we seem to be following their example. Economic advantage—within limits—can be claimed for these immense undertakings, which, however, may pass beyond the effective control of human brains. Where they are internationally organised, they can play an important part in the economic sphere, and internationalised finance especially may exercise far-reaching influences difficult to detect. Whether, as has frequently been suggested, such influences can be used to manipulate exchanges and currencies cannot be determined with certainty ; but the catastrophic destruction of the old German mark, which conferred enormous advantages on the German State and the great industrialists, should not be forgotten. Other happenings have been ascribed to the same causes, and it may at least be inferred that, by the control of money power, disturbing effects, acting and reacting upon other world forces, may be produced. On the one hand, the suggestion that super-capital is being secretly used against the interests of the masses may be an effective weapon in the hands of the professional revolutionary. On the other hand, the enfranchised masses are largely at the mercy of skilled propaganda, which can be rendered deadly if ample funds are available. Popular elections, in America and elsewhere, may thus be decided, and the foreign or domestic policy of a democratic State may be dictated or at least deflected.

Any one who attempts to survey world conditions to-day must note widespread instability, varying in degree,

but presaging changes of a revolutionary character. The return to comparative tranquillity, which might have been expected eight years after the Armistice, still halts, and even where economic recovery seems to be in progress, the political outlook is charged with uncertainty.

The British Empire has never been so disturbed as now, and never before were there so many and various forces, internal and external, working to bring about its disruption. At home, our economic position has been gravely compromised, by a succession of disastrous strikes, following the huge losses of the War, which have crippled the export trade on which the existence of our over-grown population depends.\* Crushing taxation oppresses all our industries. Public expenditure, which apparently cannot be sharply restricted, grows with the unemployment it creates, completing the vicious circle that surrounds our national finance. Politically, we live under the menace of Socialism, producing a sense of incertitude tending to paralyse our activities. A complex organisation, styling itself "Labour," has arisen, challenging the whole system under which Britain grew great and powerful, committed to nationalisation of the means of producing and distribution in accordance with the programme of Marx and largely under alien inspiration. Good-will among all classes—the first requisite of national prosperity—is being astutely undermined, and the class war is taught even to young children.

The once United Kingdom has been dismembered, and we have an independent State on our Western flank, liable, as in the past, to react to foreign influences and to become a source of danger. In Canada, Australia, and New Zealand revolutionary Socialism is at work in different stages, tending to retard progress in spite of abounding natural advantages. The South African Union has special race problems of its own, and has twice been forced to put down revolutionary movements. Not one of these great Dominions has advanced as rapidly as stable political conditions untainted by political faction would have permitted.

\* The adverse visible trade balance for the year 1926 was £465,406,000.



We have launched India on democratic paths, which can lead her ancient peoples only to disorder,\* and we pathetically note the antics of Swarajists and Responsivists, which are hardly even eddies on the broad stream of tendency. Throughout the Far East, our prestige, which was once a stabilising force, has been allowed to decay, and China, under influences from Moscow, which also deflect our own policy, is the sport of warring factions devastating to the interests of her hapless peoples.

Europe is the scene of political and economic perturbation, varying in intensity with racial characteristics. Democracy has broken down, because it failed to provide governments which could govern, when the aftermath of the Great War made strong and wise administrations essential. Cabinet crises arise with baffling frequency ; general elections at short intervals create general disturbance, and new groups of individuals temporarily seek to undertake tasks in which their predecessors have failed. Such conditions are fatal to good government.

France, with her thrifty, hard-working people and great resources, has been brought to the verge of the abyss by a plethora of wrangling parties producing a Parliament which headed straight for national bankruptcy and Socialist revolution. In despair, a Ministry *ad hoc* was formed under M. Poincaré, which has no certain support in the Chamber of Deputies, but was accepted and equipped with power to carry out reforms by decree † as the last chance of averting financial disaster. The situation is not yet assured, and the violent swing of the franc is affecting different elements of the population in different

\* Speaking before the Viceroy at Delhi, on January 4, the Maharaja of Benares said : " The ever-indulgent British Government, eager to reward India for its war services, made a fatal announcement in 1917, anticipating the actual state of things by at least half a century and attempting to build a twentieth-century constitution with materials of the Middle Ages. . . . A further reduction of the British elements in the Services and the Courts would be a disaster." That reduction is steadily proceeding.

† This power, which expired on December 31, has been largely used, and the judiciary has been reorganised, while many other urgent reforms have been effected. The decrees have to be submitted to Parliament for ratification ; but they might never have been carried out if the claims of democracy had not been abrogated.

ways, while the demoralising gamble of a General Election is drawing near.

Italy, Spain, and Poland, in less degree, have broken loose from democracy which, exploited by Socialism, threatened them with chaos. Italy, on the verge of red ruin, found a saviour in Mussolini—the one outstanding figure in Europe. The Fascist system, which he has inaugurated, is the negation of democracy. His aim, following the example of the best of the Cæsars, has been to establish personal rule of paternal type, based upon patriotism, discipline, and effort which Socialism seeks to destroy. His success in creating a new spirit among the Italian people has been marvellous. Whether Fascism can endure depends wholly upon the permanence of that spirit. Meanwhile, Italy is the only country in Europe which is at present being governed, and governed in the best interests of her people, by a ruler of genius.

The German Republic, hastily erected by a minority after the collapse in November, 1918, and endowed with a Constitution at Weimar, has had a troubled existence. The German people have not easily adapted themselves to political methods foreign to their traditions. The new-fangled Republic has weathered some storms and has dealt effectively alike with Communist risings and with a Nationalist Putsch. But the Constitution works badly and has proved unable to provide a government based on a Parliamentary majority on account of a super-abundance of political parties striving for power. Composite cabinets, existing on sufferance by placating groups liable to break away at any time, are bad instruments for constructing and carrying out national policy. Corrupt bargains, to which the Irish party accustomed us, are inevitable. The minority Government of Herr Marx thus fell in December, 1926, because it suddenly lost the support of both the Nationalists and the Socialists by its treatment of the Reichswehr. These two Parties roughly represent Monarchism and Republicanism, and while poles asunder, each believed that its aims were being prejudiced, and they combined to overthrow the Government. It is

impossible for a foreigner to analyse the currents and cross-currents in Germany ; but, so far as can be seen, there is no present prospect of government by a majority Party, and political instability will continue. Apart from factions, however, the great German industrialists appear to wield powerful influence in the Reich. Trade and industry are admirably organised and progressing.\* Credits from London and New York have been forthcoming, and the influx of private capital last year was remarkable. Germany, with no public debt and with huge factories perfectly equipped, will before long be in the most satisfactory economic position of all the late combatant Powers except the United States. The dream of an economic hegemony of Central Europe may be realised with the help of the immense development of airways now proceeding, and the military power of Germany will again be formidable in not many years. For some purposes the German people can be united, and the new Member of the League of Nations is unlikely to contribute to the harmony of Europe.

All the Scandinavian countries, Sweden and Norway especially, have reacted to Bolshevist inoculation, from which the Nordic race has not proved immune. There are now signs of returning political sanity, and Socialist experiments in these States can be retrieved without incurring the disaster which they must entail in less simple economic conditions.

Austria and Hungary, with areas not permitting economic independence, suffer depression, which the loans promoted by the League of Nations have not wholly relieved. Neither can be regarded as politically stable,† and in both Socialism feeds upon adversity.

Czecho-Slovakia, with good natural resources and large industries now cut off by tariff walls from their old markets,

\* The great firm of Krupp reported for December, 1926, the greatest monthly production of steel since its foundation, due in part to our coal strike.

† The latest elections in Hungary, like ours in 1924, have resulted in a large Conservative majority, which may indicate a strong national resolve arising from bitter experiences ; but the fickleness of mob electorates may again supervene.

experiences many difficulties, which her three separate and inharmonious nationalities may aggravate in the political sphere ; but progress continues, and if stability of government were ensured, there would be fair promise of future prosperity.

The three little peasant Republics, Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia, erected at Versailles, are experimenting with democracy. All are the prey of Bolshevist intrigues, and Lithuania has carried out a military *coup d'état* evicting, in Cromwellian style, a Government and Chamber regarded as too red in complexion and antagonistic to religion. These Republics have no promise of permanence, and would probably gravitate towards a civilised Russia, which Germany and Poland would strongly oppose.

The Balkan States suffered cruelly in the War ; but all except Greece remain monarchical. Bulgaria and Rumania, marching with Soviet Russia, have been victims of Bolshevist activity. Rumania and Jugo-Slavia, widely enlarged at Versailles, are, like Czecho-Slovakia, attempting to administer recalcitrant Hungarian populations—a task which may prove beyond their powers. Jugo-Slavia suffers from acute crises fatal to real progress, and her Croat and Slovene populations are a source of political weakness. Greece, after a succession of distracting revolutions, has little prospect of permanent tranquillity and reconstruction. Albania is again an apple of discord. Stable and efficient governments are not to be looked for in the Balkans.

The pseudo-Turkish Republic is ruled by a dictator not of purely Turkish descent, who has busied himself in uprooting the cherished beliefs and customs of Islam. The amateur Parliament at Angora is at present his tool. Mustapha Kemal has decapitated a great part of the Moslem world in the religious sphere,\* and whether orthodoxy, which cannot have been wholly submerged, will reassert itself none can tell. On the other hand, Ibn Saoud, the

\* The Kalifate at Constantinople was revered by the Indian Moslems, and by representing that Britain was attacking it, a dangerous agitation was raised which Mustapha Kemal's proceedings have rendered ridiculous.

Chieftain of the austere reformed Wahabi Sect of Sunnis, has consolidated his authority over Northern and Central Arabia, and controls the Holy Places except Jerusalem. The world of Islam has thus been profoundly disturbed, and millions of the faithful are leaderless.

Syria is not yet wholly pacified. In Persia, a military dictator, Reza Shah Pahlevis, has overturned the Kajar dynasty and the future depends upon his strength and ability. Experiments in democracy have failed, and personal rule alone can give peace and progress, on condition that it is resolute and enlightened and that intrigues and disaffection in the army can be prevented. Stability in Persia as in the past rests with one man.

While China has reached a state of almost unparalleled confusion, Japan remains the dominant Power in the Far East. The Island Empire has a history curiously resembling our own, and long isolation from Asiatic Asia has conferred distinctive characteristics upon its vigorous people. The Japanese have known how to learn from the West while for a time escaping the disintegrating tendencies to which Western theories have given rise. They still cherish and encourage national patriotism. They have proved potent in war on sea and land, wise in council, and skilful in finance. Of late, however, they have given manifestations of political faction, which adult suffrage is unlikely to diminish. A naturally poor country with a rapidly increasing population is faced with many difficulties ; but if their political stability is assured, the Japanese can count upon a strong position in the affairs of the world.

The Western Hemisphere stands apart though not unaffected by the revolutionary movement. The United States, now coldly critical of Europe, enjoy unprecedented prosperity and are becoming a creditor nation. Their political stability has depended upon a written Constitution, which stood the strain of a great Civil War, and their form of democratic government differs radically from that which has been widely copied from our fluid institutions. As Mr. James M. Beck wrote to me on September 15, 1922 :\*

\* In a letter thanking me for defending him against what he called an

“How long can England continue to be an *unrestrained* democracy? Must you not sooner or later come to constitutional limitations? Certainly without constitutional limitations democracy in America would have perished long ago.” Are “constitutional limitations” now possible? The bane of American democracy has been the intensive organisation of political activities, involving heavy expenditure and tending to create a sense of unreality which keeps large numbers of electors from the polls. A tendency on the part of many highly cultured Americans to regard machine-made politics with detachment is, therefore, widely apparent. This tendency may be corrected by the alarming wave of crime now sweeping over a great part of the United States, which is attributed by many Americans to laxity in the administration of the law aggravated by Prohibition. Subversive movements in many forms are at work, some being indigenous. The “Industrial Workers of the World” have exerted influence here and in our Dominions, while American-Irish organisations have promoted revolution in Ireland. The American authorities, however, have been far more active than our own in unravelling,\* for the information of the public, conspiracies against the Constitution, which, so long as the present abounding prosperity of the manual workers continues, cannot become dangerous.

The Southern and Central Republics of America are nominal democracies, where a wise and honest dictator can accomplish much; but Presidents rise and fall, or are forcibly evicted by conspiring rivals. Natural wealth, foreign capital, largely British,† and private enterprise have secured wonderful progress in some of these Republics and notably in Argentina; but Brazil, the largest and most

“attack” by Lord Cecil in the *Sunday Times* upon his views regarding the League of Nations.

\* Some Congressional Reports are illuminating, and the Lusk Report, in four great volumes, dealing with “Revolutionary Radicalism” in the State of New York, is a monument of careful research unknown in this country.

† Nearly £400,000,000 in Argentina alone.

richly endowed by nature, freely indulges in civil disturbances,\* and her advance is stayed by administrative and racial incompetence. Socialism in some of its Protean shapes is at work in most of these States ; but the directors of revolution are too busily engaged elsewhere to give them special attention. Mexico alone has been semi-Bolshevised under a President irregularly elected, who has evidently borrowed his methods from Lenin. Here Socialism has seemed worth encouraging as a means of creating difficulties for the United States and, as in Britain and in China, of attacking capital. As a centre for fomenting revolutions in Central America, Mexico is well placed, and Panama and Nicaragua have for the United States interests analogous to those of the British Empire in Egypt, the protection of which is liable to create suspicion in South America.

This brief and imperfect survey leads to the impression of widespread instability, in part generated by revolutionary Socialism operating in different stages in different countries—a movement which prospers by exploiting the failure of democracy to govern.

When the resources of Russia were directed with demoniacal cleverness to promote a world revolt against the only system which has raised mankind from barbarism, disruptive forces of old standing were powerfully reinforced. Who, even ten years ago, could have dreamed that organised “Labour” and a numerous *intelligentsia* in this country would have responded to a raging and tearing propaganda emanating from Moscow, and that Russian gold would have been freely employed to corrupt our workers and successfully to promote ruinous strikes ?

Other conditions of the modern world tend towards the subversion of a civilisation dependent on the triumphs of mechanical invention. The life of an advanced nation has come to rest upon complex machinery easily brought to a standstill, as Marx the apostle of organised Labour realised ; but the Class War and the general strike on which this false prophet relied to create revolution can be far more effective now than in his day. The facilities at

\* In the South, guerilla warfare has lasted for four years.

the disposal of the conspirators who contrived the French Revolution were small compared with those which their successors can utilise. Marxism, imposed upon Russia, entailed a far greater loss of life and infinitely more suffering than were inflicted on France, and a country which can feed itself is far less easily brought to ruin than our own. The general strike of last year, if successful, would quickly have spread starvation and bloodshed over these islands, and recovery might have been impossible. For many reasons, a revolutionary upheaval can be more easily arranged and rendered more disastrous than formerly.

From another point of view, civilisation may be imperilled by conditions which it has created. Tireless workers in many different spheres are adding to knowledge at accelerating speed, the increase in the present century being enormous. But, in the case of the most gifted individual, the power of assimilating knowledge is strictly limited, as are the available hours of study. It follows that education cannot make up the ever-growing deficit, that mankind will become—relatively—more and more ignorant, and that the vast majority, whose educational period cannot be greatly extended, must be left far behind in the acquisition of knowledge which may be essential. This is already happening, and specialisation, which has some obvious disadvantages, must further develop. Political power now lies with a mob of men and women, who for the most part have no knowledge whatever of the matters they may have to decide. And in Parliament Bills pass of which only a minority of Members understand the implications, while the strain upon Ministers is so great that they have not time to keep fully abreast of affairs changing almost from day to day, and of scientific research bearing on all the problems of government.

This is not all. Invention continues to produce wonders which profoundly affect the lives of nations. When railways became possible, it was beyond the power of the human brain to foresee the changes they would bring about. Mistakes were made which are now irremediable. To-day we have motor transport introducing new difficulties, also



unforeseen, and it may be that the traffic problem of London will prove insoluble. The population of London itself grew to huge proportions by reason of railways. It is afflicted by evils which might have been averted, and faced by dangers which may increase. Applied Science has enabled eight and a half millions to be regularly supplied with food from the ends of the earth and with water, light, transport, and drainage; but all these essentials are vulnerable. Successful strikes, even the persistence for a few days of fog sufficient to prevent street transport, might create starvation, leading to rioting and bloodshed that could not be arrested. In the great railway strike of 1919, and the brief General Strike of 1926, motors saved the situation; but, in the former case, a heavy fall of snow would have paralysed the efforts of the Government. The complications of governing the population in the London area, apart from these dangers, threaten to pass beyond the wit of man.

The conquest of the air, the cinema, and wireless communication—achievements of the present century—defy human foresight. Here are tremendous new powers which Science enables us to set in motion. We cannot tell whither they will lead. Will our limited intelligence be able to control their operation? The cinema—the most powerful educational instrument yet conceived—overcame us unawares. Here, in India, and in the Far East, it has already done incalculable harm. For purposes of propaganda by suggestion, among the young especially, it is unrivalled. We are now floundering in attempts to render it beneficial or at least innocuous, and we may not succeed. The developments of the air and of wireless stretch beyond our ken and may become unmanageable.

The battleship of Nelson's day was a simple fighting machine. Its successor of last century was intelligible; but I am told that no one, without years of study with the aid of blue prints, could master all the complications which Science has lavishly piled into the new *Nelson* and *Rodney*. The latest battleships may prove to have defeated their objects by passing beyond the mastery of the men who would have to fight them.

In 1914-8, applied Science enabled many millions of men to be put into the field, fed and armed with an array of weapons infinitely more numerous, varied, and powerful than those of last century. Napoleon, who could not have foreseen armies of this magnitude, regarded his Marshals as capable of commanding only limited forces varying with their abilities. Could he himself, with no parallel experience, have effectively directed the huge masses assembled in the Western theatre of War? Critics of the apparent failures, the changing plans, and the incertitude which characterised the long-protracted operations, might well reflect that the supreme direction of this colossal conflict may have been beyond the limits of the human brain.

Mr. H. G. Wells declares that: "I see knowledge increasing and human power increasing. I see ever-increasing possibilities before life, and I see no limit set to it at all." "Knowledge" will increase rapidly, and in the sense that with no effort a 40,000-ton ship can be steered in a gale, "human power" will further increase; but the capacity of the human brain has not increased since the days of ancient Greece and Rome. I believe that, in some spheres, the "limit" of the demands which it can fulfil has been reached—and passed.

Mankind never was in such dire need of government as to-day, and never were the functions expected from governments so ruthlessly exacting. To the failure of government, in part due to limitations of brain power but also to the inherent impossibility of some of the tasks it essays, I attribute in great measure the ominous growth of the revolutionary movement in many countries.

The creed of Liberalism came to be the perfectibility of men and women to be attained by Legislation. Humanity is not perfectible by any means open to mortals, and Legislation, at the present time, can rarely do more than palliate some evils while often creating others. Remorseless economic laws raise barriers to human aspirations which cannot be passed or broken down without sooner or later involving a nation in peril. The disastrous

results of Government interference with industry are already apparent.

In the spiritual sphere, the attack on Christianity is being carried on by methods various and astute. The old faith is irreconcilable with militant Socialism, which nevertheless attracts ill-balanced adherents by spurious appeals to humanitarian sentiment. Lenin and his confederates saw clearly, as did their teacher Marx, that their programme required the destruction of all religion. They therefore laboured to destroy the soul of Russia with appalling results upon public morality. A generation of boys and girls has been brought up in blatant atheism, which, if time permitted, could be made universal. But massacres of Bishops and priests, and the desecration of sanctuaries, have not sufficed to conquer the faith of the peasant masses, which may revive to be the salvation of a free Russia.\*

In this country, great efforts are being made to undermine the religion of children especially, and blasphemous doggerel is taught to them by revolutionaries, largely alien, who follow the precedents of the French Revolution. At the same time many strange cults flourish, all tending to distract and divide opinion, and insidious attempts to disrupt the national Church weaken its authority and assist the general attack on Christianity.

There is another side to this sombre picture. In no other country is social service so freely given to relieve want and suffering, and to minister to infants and young children. Nowhere else can be found so much useful public work carried on by voluntary agency, or more generous contributions from all classes to charitable objects. This is Socialism in the only form which can benefit mankind; but Socialists ignore and affect to despise manifestations of practical Christianity, which they propose to replace by a gigantic bureaucracy controlling the lives of men and women from the cradle to the grave.

\* Last Christmas, for the first time since the capture of Russia by the Marxists, the church bells were allowed to be rung. Was this concession a sign that the Soviet realises that the Cross may yet prevail ?

World conditions, which I have attempted to explain, clearly indicate that our modern civilisation is in danger ; but history cannot help us to forecast the future. The Empires of the past successively rose and fell after building up regional civilisations of their own. The Roman Empire, which more nearly resembled that which the valour and enterprise of our maritime people have created than any other in the long procession, was destroyed by a process of internal decay, and received the final *coup de grâce* from the more virile barbarians. This was the usual fate of the Empires of old. Always some more vigorous race emerged to consolidate its conquests and to build up a new civilisation—doomed in its turn. Evolution in that form cannot now continue. The fall of ancient Rome was followed by centuries of darkness. The recovery was slow because her civilisation was so far-ranging. To-day the civilisation and culture of Europe approximate to a general level and could be destroyed only by the methods of Lenin in Russia, successfully applied in individual countries with the advantages which modern conditions provide. If Great Britain could be brought to the ruin which Socialism must entail, the effect throughout Europe might be rapidly contagious and would extend over the world into regions that Rome never knew. That the main bulwark of law and order and of Christianity should be laid low by any and every means is, therefore, the main object to which all revolutionary forces are now directed. The rest would be easy. The Union Jack is the most formidable enemy of the Red Flag. Here and elsewhere there may be an awakening and a reaction before it is too late ; but I cannot trace clear signs of either.

I have lived to see the zenith of the British peoples when fighting for life as one united nation in the Great War. Since 1918, I have painfully watched developments which threaten disintegration. The triumph of Socialism would bring an end to the Empire to which my life has been dedicated, and I am forced, in old age, to watch events with growing anxiety.

# APPENDIX I

## CO-OPERATIVE IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT

### A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL

THE series of Imperial Conferences which began in 1887 has been valuable in many ways. There have been free exchanges of opinion leading to agreements. Resolutions have been passed which have sometimes taken effect, but have more often failed to materialise. There is no standing machinery working continuously for the development of inter-Imperial Trade as the certain means of securing the full utilisation of our enormous Imperial resources still derelict.

Imperial Trade depends largely on efficient and cheap methods of communication, which include shipping, cables, wireless, and port facilities. If a permanent Imperial Council could be set up to study and assist all such methods of communication, and if it could be provided with a liberal permanent income, the conditions essential to steady Imperial development would be fulfilled. The following are the outlines of a scheme by which these advantages could be secured :

1. An *ad valorem* import duty to be imposed on all imports from foreign countries at all Imperial ports. In 1904, a 1 per cent. duty would have yielded over £4,600,000 per annum. The amount would be less at the present time ; but the duty might be assessed so as to yield the revenue which might be regarded as adequate for the purpose intended.

2. The effect would be a small modicum of Imperial Preference, which would not be felt by consumers in the Empire, but would operate *pro tanto* as an encouragement to inter-Imperial Trade. The Special Tariff would preserve the complete fiscal independence of the Dominions, and as it is raised for revenue purposes only, it would not outrage the principles of Free Trade.

3. The administration of the income so provided to be entrusted to an Imperial Council of fifteen members, which might be composed as follows :

United Kingdom	..	..	..	4 members
Canada	..	..	..	2 „
Australia	..	..	..	2 „
South Africa	..	..	..	2 „
India..	..	..	..	2 „
New Zealand	..	..	..	1 member
Crown Colonies, etc.	..	..	..	2 members
Total				15 members

This proposal is only put forward for the purpose of discussion, and a better constitution for the Council may be suggested.

4. The Council to have its Headquarters and Central Office in London, but to meet at intervals at Montreal, Sydney, Cape Town, and Bombay. The Council would present an annual budget allocating funds from its large income to the purposes named in its Charter.

5. The staff of the Central Office would be continuously occupied in studying the communications of the Empire in the widest possible sense, and in preparing statistics for the use of the Council. Local Offices in the Dominions would probably be set up for the study of local requirements, and would be in communication with the Central Office. This continuous study would be an Imperial advantage of the first class.

Details remain for consideration ; but I claim for this scheme that it would bring the whole Empire into practical and effective co-operation, that it would have the effect of building up inter-Imperial Trade with the necessary result of Imperial development, that it would ensure special study and the bringing together into one office of information now scattered, and that no other scheme exists which would produce these results.

The origin of this idea was a speech by the late Mr. Jan Hofmeyer at the Colonial Conference in 1887. He proposed that a 2 per cent. surtax should be imposed upon all foreign goods, the proceeds to be applied to the Imperial Defences. For some evident reasons, this disposition of the funds is impracticable. It occurred to me later that to apply them to the development of Imperial Communications would avoid all difficulties.

I first made this proposal in a speech at the Town Hall, Melbourne, in 1903, and I developed it in the *Nineteenth Century* for January, 1904. I have never heard any valid objections to the scheme, which appealed strongly to the late Mr. Alfred Lyttelton ; but I have never been able to secure discussion at an Imperial Conference.

## APPENDIX II

### A CONTEMPORARY OPINION OF MY WORK IN INDIA, 1918

(Extracts from the Introduction by Professor A. B. Lattie, M.A., Educational Inspector, Kolhapur State, to a collection of my speeches, published by the Maharaja of Kolhapur, after my return to England.)

“THE open and unbiased mind that first approaches the subject, the untiring and patient search after the whole truth about it, the slow but unquestionable unfolding of the results of inquiry and the almost compulsory assent elicited from the reader to what His Excellency finally settles upon, all this is vividly expressed in his speeches. . . .

“Above all other things, the needs of the masses were His Lordship’s first care ; and even a cursory glance at the first section of the following volume will show that the greatest of His Excellency’s educational achievements was that he fixed the relative positions of primary and higher education, of which the latter had been hitherto allowed to encroach unduly upon the claims of the former. . . .

“This was not, however, the only direction in which His Excellency gave a helping hand to the masses of our countrymen. Sanitation claimed his full attention. Inoculation, the only possible preventive against plague for the poorer among the population, would not have attained half the popularity it did, but for the tactful and unremitting exertions of Lord Sydenham. And that must have saved thousands of valuable lives. The economic interests of the agriculturists—and theirs, as His Lordship has observed, is the greatest of Indian industries—received the full share of his attention. A great engineer himself, he has succeeded in launching great schemes of considerable economic value. The greatest of the irrigation projects in our Presidency—the Nira canal ; the rapid growth of the co-operative movement ; the liberal scale on which the Agricultural Department was encouraged and developed ; the impetus given to industrial undertakings like the Hydro-Electric Scheme of Tata Brothers, these and many other things testify to the splendid work done by Lord Sydenham. . . .

“When Lord Sydenham raised the question : Could the Secondary and the Higher Education of the few be allowed to override the Primary Education of the many ? he touched the most serious omission of the founders of our educational policy to take account of the ‘aptitudes’ of the Indian masses. . . .

“The curriculum of the High Schools and Colleges have both been recast on sounder principles. The teaching profession of the

High Schools has been placed on a satisfactory footing. And the University, abler than ever before to approximate its function as accepted by every advanced educationist in Europe, has been brought into closer touch with the colleges.

"Lord Sydenham has widened the basis of local self-government as none else has done, . . . while his energy and organising power alone could bring into existence Science Institutes such as were never before contemplated in this country. . . .

"The popularity attained by Inoculation during the régime of His Lordship could be valued at its proper worth only by recalling the wild stories that clung to it before his arrival. The removal of many of these prejudices is wholly due to the prudent and tactful advocacy of Lord Sydenham. The candour of his speech and his graceful willingness to co-operate with the Press whose growing power in India he frankly recognised and yet, whose excesses he sternly checked, were also responsible for the marked success he achieved in this as in other fields of activity. The way in which he deals with national aspirations of India, brings out the true character of the man in one entire view. The rigour with which he repressed the growing spirit of sedition, the courage with which he took his steps in the matter and cowed down the insolent spirit of defiance of authority, have been availed of by his critics to give currency to the idea that he was an enemy of popular rights. Nothing, however, could be further from truth.

"A perusal of these speeches alone can give an adequate idea of the high purpose which inspired all his actions, and will dispel the prejudice created against him by those who dislike his strong individuality and stern repression of anarchist forces. . . . He presided over the affairs of this Presidency during a most critical period of its history. He naturally incurred odium from a numerous and extremely vocal class by adopting strong measures for the eradication of sedition. With all this, his name has aroused public enthusiasm such as fell to the lot of only a few. The complaint is often heard that the later Anglo-Indian records do not contain names as great as the Lawrences and Malcolms and Elphinstones. The fault really lay with the fact that the occasions for the manifestation of those higher qualities of statesmanship that characterised the earlier types of the British people in India were not met with in modern times. The period of the past five years and a half was an exception. It gave opportunities for the exercise of the higher powers of wide-looking statesmanship, and Lord Sydenham stood the test to the fullest extent. Inspired by a lofty ideal of duty, he displayed courage and sympathy as each occasion demanded. . . . 'We English are here to show the millions around us what is best in our religion, our culture and our traditions. We have keen critics who watch us, and we are judged much more by our hearts than by our heads. Our influence can be great and beneficial if we ignore the barriers of race and colour and make our fellow-Indian subjects feel that we are their real friends.' No less by his own career than by these eloquent words, did Lord Sydenham prove that he deserves a high place in the long line of Englishmen who have in this way convinced India of their being real friends of this country."



## APPENDIX III

### A FEW *OBITER DICTA* ON THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENTS

1917

*April 1, 1917.*—"It is too soon to be certain that the anarchical elements in Russia will not give trouble to the new Government. . . . The Revolution . . . is a tremendous experiment" (*Sunday Times*).

*July 22, 1917.*—"It is unfortunately clear that the [Russian] Revolution is following the course which all students of history expected" (*Sunday Times*).

*August 12, 1917.*—"A small minority of 'advanced' thinkers in Petrograd, with German assistance, has succeeded in wrecking the hopes of patriots who could speak for the people. . . . After the war, reconstruction and the rebuilding of prosperity on a broad basis will be possible only by the co-operation of all classes in the [British] Commonwealth. . . . Can it be that the horrors of war are to be followed by ruinous civil strife and that the sacrifices and sorrows which the classes have shared are to be in vain?" (*Sunday Times*).

1918

*March 2, 1918.*—"The passing of the Representation of the Peoples Bill must have the effect of bringing a Labour Government into power" (*Manchester*).

*November 26, 1918.*—"We are not yet at peace, though 'the bugles' have sung truce. The Germans, before and throughout the war, have spared no effort to create revolutionary chaos in the countries of the Allies. . . . They can be counted upon to redouble their efforts, in this country especially, as the only chance of wrecking the nation to which mainly they owe their humiliation. . . . If they succeed, all our hopes of reconstruction will be shattered, and we shall be reduced to national bankruptcy, abject poverty, and starvation" (*Evening Standard*).

*December 1, 1918.*—"The manifesto of the Labour Party, if it has any claim to represent the views of British workmen as a whole, would suggest despair as to the future of our country and Empire. It is redolent of the doctrines of Karl Marx. It even reflects the German manner. Some of the signatories have done their best to rob the Allies of the greatest triumph in history, and to render vain the terrible sacrifice of our best manhood" (*Sunday Times*).

## 1919

*February 11, 1919.*—"What is now vital is to spread far and wide the full information available as to what Bolshevism has inflicted on the working classes, to explain clearly their dependence on sea-borne trade for the food on which they subsist and for the raw materials essential to their employment, . . . and to show that only by the full co-operation of all classes and by the free use of capital, can those industries be maintained" (*Morning Post*).

*March 29, 1919.*—"The Germans are basing their hopes upon industrial war in this country, and the Russian Bolshevik leaders know that nothing except the collapse of civilisation throughout Europe will enable them to protract the vilest and most murderous tyranny that the world has known" (*Spectator*).

*July-August, 1919.*—"Incidentally Bolshevism has again proved that Socialistic plans for the regeneration of mankind involve the conscription of labour under cruel penalties as the only means of keeping industries in being" (*Monthly News of the Conservative Women's Reform Association*).

*August 13, 1919.*—"The programme of the Clyde Soviet Committee . . . corresponds closely with that of the subversives in France in 1789. . . . Readers of Mrs. Webster's excellent study of *The French Revolution* will not fail to see the extraordinary resemblance between the situation here to-day and that which preceded the cataclysm in France. The warning is plain, and, if we disregard it, we must be mad. . . . It is the duty of the Government to see that enlightenment is provided, that our good people shall not be led to disaster by alien agency supported by alien funds" (*Times*).

## 1920

*January 31, 1920.*—"I deplore the decision to open trade with organisations under Soviet control. . . . If we make peace with Lenin and Trotsky we shall become apologists for the blackest of crimes and receivers of stolen goods" (*Times*).

*July 17, 1920.*—"It is interesting to note that the Trade Unions employ capital on a large scale to manufacture opinion in their own interests, and that their 'Research Department' is not ashamed to proclaim and glory in the fact" (*Spectator*).

*August 2, 1920.*—"I earnestly hope that your patriotic efforts to bring the truth into the light of day by unmasking the world plot, with a century and a half of evil behind it, may arouse all men and women of good will to a full sense of the peril which in threatening our Empire threatens the civilised world" (*Morning Post*).

*August 14, 1920.*—"No one can fail to note the extraordinary change in the mentality of the manual workers in recent years. If there was any country in the world which might have been expected to obtain their strong sympathies, it is Poland. . . . The attitude of the directors of Labour towards the dictators who have ruined Russia baffles explanation" (*Times*).

*September 14, 1920.*—"Because the most vital industry of the nation depends upon the miners, they were during the war the

objective of the Germans, and they are now being used as the tools of the despots at Moscow" (*Morning Post*).

September 18, 1920.—"The tyrants who have reduced the Russian working classes to slavery, and carried militarism to extremes, never had any intention of setting up a dictatorship of the proletariat. There is no country in which the manual working classes wield less power than in Soviet Russia" (*Spectator*).

## 1921

January 10, 1921.—"The object of the Krassin mission was always obvious. It was directed not to reach a trade agreement, but to establish a base for propaganda" (*Times*).

January 13, 1921.—"The Bolshevik autocracy has been at open war with us in Persia, while in Ireland, India, Egypt, and Afghanistan it has done its utmost, with considerable success, towards wrecking the British Empire, on the maintenance of which the welfare of our working classes depends. . . . The only results of the disastrous negotiations which the Government was induced to undertake have been the encouragement of Bolshevism here, the prolongation of the martyrdom of Russia and the promotion of German aims" (*Financial Times*).

April 19, 1921.—"In a State in which nearly all adults possess a vote, is it necessary to permit a section of the Press to preach revolution as the means of obtaining what a minority has been induced to believe desirable, and diligently to circulate falsehoods calculated to promote civil war?" (*Morning Post*).

June 15, 1921.—"At the present time the British Empire is the main object of attack, and propaganda in the hands of our enemies is their most powerful weapon. Mrs. Webster, in a book which I regard as the most important contribution to history ever made by a woman, has traced back the project of world revolution for 140 years. Probably it goes beyond that; but what is certain is that its spiritual home is in Germany, that in Germany it is really a 'key' industry kept severely for purposes of export. . . . The war on capital, which is the class war proclaimed by Marx and by much earlier world revolutionaries, if successful, would bring ruin on this country, deeper and darker than the ruin which has fallen on Russia, because of the very small food resources which we possess" (Speech in House of Lords).

## 1922

February 23, 1922.—"At the present moment it is clear that the main currents [of propaganda] are divided in three particular directions. In the first place, they are directed to the abolition, or the drastic reduction, of the German reparations; in the second, to the spread of Communism throughout the world, and the recognition of the assassins who have reduced Russia to ruin; and, in the third place, it is quite evident that this propaganda embraces attempts to create ill feeling between ourselves and our late gallant Allies, the French" (Speech in House of Lords).

June 7, 1922.—"It is terribly significant that the religious bodies in this country oppose no united front to the attack on

Christianity which is proceeding everywhere with success, and that some clergy of the Church of England are playing with Bolshevism. Our religious leaders seem to have ceased to lead, and cannot even commit themselves to stern condemnation of what they must know to be wrong, and dangerous because wrong" (*Morning Post*).

1923

*February 28, 1923.*—"The main business of this firm [Arcos, Limited] is obviously propaganda" (Speech in House of Lords).

*March 20, 1923.*—"The total loss of life from the application of the principles of Karl Marx to Russia is now very little short of twenty million people, including those who died from starvation and disease. This is the most horrible crime in all history. In comparison with Lenin and Trotsky, I think we may almost say that Attila and Tamerlane were humanitarian" (Speech in the House of Lords).

*December 16, 1924.*—"That house [Soviet House] harbours a great many people who are not Russians, but who are exceedingly useful for *liaison* and propaganda purposes. . . . I know of no precedent in history for entertaining in this country the agents of a hostile power, and I maintain that the Government of Moscow is, on its own showing, at open war with the British Empire" (Speech in the House of Lords).

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